I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“How to Deter Russian Cyber Attacks,” George Beebe, The National Interest, 07.12.17: The author, who formerly served as chief of Russia analysis at the CIA, writes that in Washington, the consensus around how to punish Russia for its interference in the 2016 election includes a “combination of clear warnings, strengthened sanctions and retaliatory cyber operations.” The message this is meant to send is that Russia will pay a severe price for its interference, “thus deterring future meddling.” However, deterring cyber attacks is a tricky enterprise. As such, the author advises looking to the success of nuclear deterrence theory and policies and apply those principles to cyber security. The first principle is to examine motives, and the objective is convince the adversary that its goal is too costly or difficult to achieve. While tempting to see today’s domestic instability in the U.S. as a goal of the Russian interference, Russian diplomats in fact lament the disarray in America. If Russia’s motives are fear and insecurity rather than aggression, a forceful response by the U.S. could exacerbate those very fears. The second principle is to make punishments and rewards credible. Trust in the execution of punishment and reward is based in communication. The author argues that communication with Moscow at presidential and working levels is necessary to make clear “what we regard as unacceptable and what the consequences for bad behavior will be.” Sound intelligence analysis is also vital. Rewards for good behavior also need to be credible, but the most recent sanctions bill makes lifting sanctions “practically impossible.” The third principle is to “get resilient.” Measures need to be taken to patch vulnerabilities in voting systems and critical infrastructure. “Back-up analog control systems” should also be created to limit the damage of a possible cyber attack. Most importantly, however, the U.S. needs to restore “national confidence that our republic cannot be toppled by propaganda.”

Election interference:

“Collusion, Yes. But in What?,” Andrew C. McCarthy, The Washington Post, 07.13.17: The author, a former federal prosecutor, writes that while the word “collusion” has driven the conversation regarding the Trump administration and its possible ties to the Kremlin, the word itself is problematic. “Collusion can involve any kind of concerted activity, innocent or otherwise. Conspiracy is an agreement to commit a concrete violation of law.” The author argues that evidence of collusion has been established via the emails of Donald Trump, Jr. and Russian real estate magnate and “Putin crony” Aras Agalarov. The evidence reveals that top Trump officials went into a meeting expecting information they could use against Hillary Clinton. The next questions is: “Collusion in what?” The author sees two aspects: one legal, one political. Collusion itself is not a crime; however, for collusion to become conspiracy, there would need to be proof that the Russian government violated U.S. law and that Trump campaign officials knew of these violations “and were complicit in their commission.” The author notes that the U.S. Constitution includes a provision for impeachment as the document’s authors feared a president who could ally secretly with a foreign power against American interests. However, “we have gotten in the habit of tolerating much that ought not be tolerated, from politicians of both parties.” So while it should not be done “in a vaccum,” Trump’s relationship with the Kremlin must still be examined.

“I've Done Political Opposition Research. Donald Trump Jr. Has No Idea What It Is.; Aid From the Russian Government Wouldn't Fly in Any Campaign,” Tracy Sefl, The Washington Post, 07.12.17: The author, a Democratic communications consultant, writes that the reality of opposition research is a far cry from what it is represented as, particularly in Donald Trump, Jr.’s recent comments. “When done well, it's a thoughtful, directed process of compiling known facts and figures about relevant life and career elements of an opponent to bolster an argument.” The author argues that even done poorly, opposition research does not cross the lines Trump Jr. did, as his emails “show he has no idea where they are.” Trained professionals conduct “focused and supervised work” and adhere to ethical standards regarding methods and sources. The author explains that a message like the one Trump, Jr. received would have been met with a call to lawyers or the FBI. “The prospect of responding the way Trump Jr. did is out of the realm of possibility, improbable, absurd.”

"Trump Jr.’s Russia Meeting Sure Sounds Like a Russian Intelligence Operation," Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, The Washington Post, 07.17.17: The author, director of the Intelligence and Defense Project at Harvard’s Belfer Center, writes that it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a private citizen in Russia has access to derogatory information on a U.S. presidential candidate. Offering such information was likely, at minimum, a trial balloon by intelligence services, and at best (from Moscow’s perspective), a chance to pass certain information from a Russian government agent to the Trump campaign. Veselnitskaya may have had her own agenda in requesting a meeting with Trump. But Russian intelligence practice is to co-opt such people by arming them with secret intelligence information and tasking them to pass it on and get a reaction. Did Trump’s people like it? Do they want more? Based on what we now know, this interaction had all the hallmarks of an overture by Russian intelligence to the campaign.

“Russia Will Be Back. Here’s How to Hack-Proof the Next Election,” Tom Donilon, The Washington Post, 07.14.17: The author, national security adviser to former President Barack Obama, writes that Russia’s interference in the 2016 election is “a public and high-confidence conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community.” The operation is consistent with Russian and Soviet intelligence operations known as “active measures.” And due to a fairly small price paid for its actions, Russia is likely to stage a repeat performance. The author urges five steps for meeting this threat. First, U.S. President Donald Trump must acknowledge Russia’s interference and make clear that further attacks will not be tolerated. Second, “the Department of Homeland Security and the Election Assistance Commission should lead a process to develop election baseline cybersecurity guidelines and help states implement these best practices.” Third, the U.S. needs a better system of communication between federal and state officials. Fourth, a national policy discussion regarding the responsibilities and roles of social media needs to begin. Finally, the U.S. should work with “international forums to establish the principle that an attack on election systems violates the principles of noninterference and sovereignty and would justify a robust response.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Why Europeans Oppose the Russia Sanctions Bill,” Wolfgang Ischinger, Wall Street Journal, 07.16.17: The author, a former German ambassador to the U.S., writes that the U.S. has every right to punish Russia for its election interference, as it is trying to do with the new sanctions bill recently passed by the Senate and which is now awaiting a vote in the House of Representatives. However, in its current form, the bill would harm U.S. relations with Europe and hurt European energy security, both of which would benefit Russia. Previous sanctions had been assessed and enacted together in order to not exploit each other’s markets. Now, the “trans-Atlantic approach” is in jeopardy as the Senate seeks to act unilaterally and “against the explicit will of the European Commission and key U.S. allies.” Other language in the bill appears to “advance U.S. commercial interests at Europe’s expense.” A target of the bill is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and while there are sound arguments for Europe to diversify its gas supply, there are provisions in place to keep Russia from using energy as a weapon against Europe. Additionally, the bill jeopardizes European energy projects well under way and “hinder operations and safety” for existing pipelines. The author urges that the bill be revised “in line with realities and recommit to a joint trans-Atlantic approach.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“A Russia Sanctions Trap,” Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 07.10.17: The authors write that the recent bill passed by the U.S. Senate to increase sanctions on Russia contains a provision that could damage American interests. This provision would bar U.S. energy firms from participating “in any project anywhere with sanctioned Russian firms.” This could actually help Russia and China by keeping the U.S. out of the world’s largest deepwater drilling projects, or even letting Russia exploit the provision by bidding on projects simply to keep the U.S. out of them. The damage could cost $100 billion in missed exploration projects over 10 years. U.S. President Donald Trump would like to “unleash U.S. oil and gas production.” That move that could actually undercut Russia’s oil revenue, so crippling U.S. energy production in a bill aimed at sanction Russia makes little sense.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Reverence for Putin on the Right Buys Trump Cover,” Jeremy W. Peters, New York Times, 07.14.17: The author writes that while fondness for Russian President Vladimir Putin fell outside the Republican party’s mainstream only a few years ago, today it is “a widely held sentiment inside the conservative movement.” This view of U.S.-Russia relations sees Putin not as an “archvillian,” but rather as the kind of leader conservatives want, one who represents “respect for traditional Christian values, a swelling nationalist pride and an aggressive posture toward foreign adversaries.” Additionally, the “Paul Bunyan-esque” image of Putin in the conservative media is not unlike the image Trump has attempted to create for himself. Despite increasing evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election and Russia’s history as an enemy in the Republican Party’s foreign policy, the idea of Russia as the true defender of Christian values persists.

“Making the Best of a No-Win Encounter: Putin and Trump Meet,” Alexander Baunov, Carneige Moscow Center, 07.13.17: The author, a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, discusses the much anticipated, much delayed first meeting of Presidents Putin and Trump that occurred at the G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany. Putin wanted and received a spontaneous meeting that ran over schedule, “a diplomatic success or Russia.” For Trump, the meeting was a little more challenging due to domestic politics. The two leaders agreed on a ceasefire in Syria, appointed a new U.S. special envoy for Ukraine, agreed to appoint new ambassadors more quickly and broached the idea of “creating a joint ‘impenetrable’ cybersecurity unit.” The idea was met with criticism by Trump critics, but “in Moscow this proposal looked very different.” The author argues that Russia and the U.S. cannot strike a major deal because the two do not have anything of equal value to trade. Russia wants many things from the U.S. but has little to offer in return. Another problem is that while putting less pressure on Russia tends to help matters of cooperation, it is also seen as the U.S. being soft on Russia and giving it what it wants. A way out of this trap would be to “stop automatically seeing any Russian proposal as destructive,” a move that the current “Cold War-style confrontation” could actually help foster.

“Reimagining the Meaning of ‘the West,’” Ivan Krastev, New York Times, 07.12.17: The author, a political scientist, writes that the meaning of “the West” has changed from “the so-called free world” during the Cold War to something more like a cultural, not political, notion today. The speech delivered by U.S. President Donald Trump in Warsaw leads the author to imagine two memos addressed to the president, one by Stephen Bannon and the other by H.R. McMaster. Both urge Trump to deliver a big speech in Europe, but the two request “sharply different speeches.” In the imagined scenario, where Bannon urges Trump to paint the picture of a Christian world under siege by radical Islam, McMaster advocates for the preservation of NATO and holding fast to post-Cold War alliances. The author argues that Trump in Warsaw gave both of these speeches “combined as one.” Another noteworthy aspect of Trump’s speech is its pessimism and the image of a West preoccupied not with the hope of victory, but rather the fear of defeat.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

“Keeping Moscow Focused on China,” Alexander Gabuev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.17.17: The author, senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Russia has already reaped “all the low-hanging fruit” from its close relationship with China. The two grew closer after the onset of the Ukraine crisis, and the relationship has been marked by large contracts and “generous Chinese investment,” among other things. Russia’s elite remains skeptical about the pivot to East, as only a choice few have benefited from the move. However, the large scale projects are drying up. At the state level, there is “some administrative chaos.” Lacking large projects, “Russian business cooperation with China will be increasingly dependent on technical management and governance.” Russia will need to reduce the number of governmental panels and their redundancies. Russian businesses also need better organization for representing their interests in China, like the EU’s European Chamber of Commerce in China, and existing business groups could be more effective. A free trade zone is also vital to creating “a sizeable presence in the Chinese market.”

Ukraine:

“The Window for Reform Is Closing in Ukraine,” Melinda Haring, The Washington Post, 07.11.17: The author, editor of the UkraineAlert blog at the Atlantic Council, writes that while Ukraine has accomplished some genuine achievements in the last three years, there is still much to be done, and the next round of reforms “is likely to be especially tough.” The author argues that reforms have stalled and the window for their implementation is closing. Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau facing serious push back and may find its power soon curtailed, while the government is harassing anti-corruption activists. The current acting health minister and finance minister have made progress in the right direction, but with the campaign season set to begin soon, the future is uncertain. The International Monetary Fund has a lengthy to-do list for Ukraine before they will disburse their next round of assistance, and Ukraine’s most talented are leaving the country in large numbers. Yulia Tymoshenko is the favored national candidate, and her populist policies could have a regressive effect on the country. Kiev needs to push through “the next round of urgently needed reforms, and the IMF should hold them to it.”

“Kiev’s Leadership Is on Its Way to Reinvent Ukraine’s Patronalistic Regime,” Andreas Umland, openDemocracy, 07.11.17: The author, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kiev, writes that the West needs to be careful about who it supports in Ukraine as the country’s “clan networks” begin to reassert power. This spring, two prominent Ukrainian politicians were arrested on corruption charges, but were then released. “Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective” by Henry Hale helps to explain the strange contradictions of today’s Ukrainian politics.

“How Russian Rule Has Changed Crimea: Moscow’s Massive Social Engineering Project on the Peninsula,” Ilan Berman, Foreign Affairs, 07.13.17:  The author, senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council, details the findings of a new report by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future titled “Crimea: Three Years of Occupation.” The report finds that under Moscow’s administration, Crimea has been subject to a host of new laws “governing everything from military conscription to alcohol consumption.” The region has also seen human rights abuses and the persecution of its native Tatar population. While 10% of Crimea’s population has left, an influx of Russians paid by the government for settling in the region has moved in. Agriculture and banking have both deteriorated. The size of the state, however, has increased. Russia’s naval fleet in the Black Sea has been reinforced, and the number of naval personnel in Sevastopol has grown. While Russia has framed its annexation of Crimea in historic terms, the economic realities of the acquisition are ones Moscow “can ill afford.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

•   No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.