Russia Analytical Report, July 1-July 8, 2024

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. With hours left before the NATO summit, debates are raging on in the U.S. on how much more the alliance’s relationship with Ukraine should be strengthened. On one side, more than 60 U.S-based experts and academics have signed an open letter, entitled “The NATO alliance should not invite Ukraine to become a member.” The signatories warn that if a post-war Ukraine were to join the alliance, Putin’s “Russia would have reason to doubt the credibility of NATO’s security guarantee – and would gain an opportunity to test and potentially rupture the alliance.” Daniel Treisman of UCLA is not among the letter’s signatories, but he is also concerned Putin would attempt to test NATO’s resolve if Ukraine is in it. On the other side,  M. E. Sarotte of Johns Hopkins SAIS proposes concrete steps that she believes would allow Ukraine to join NATO, “ideally before January 20, 2025.” Michael McFaul, too, sees Ukraine in NATO, but once the war is over.
  2. In his new article for Russia in Global Affairs, Dmitri Trenin of HSE elaborates further on his repeated calls for Moscow to try and [re]instill fear of a nuclear war in Western capitals.  The article includes such proposed ‘innovations’ as renaming “nuclear deterrence” into “nuclear intimidation”[1] and detailing steps that Russia should take on the escalation ladder in the stand-off with the West. These steps include actions that Russia has already taken, such as the deployment of NSNWs into Belarus and war-gaming these weapons. They also include proposals for such further actions as a nuclear test, strikes on airbases and supply facilities on territory of Western countries as well as NATO personnel in Ukraine. If the West is not intimidated by these measures, then Russia should first warn the U.S. that it would strike American bases abroad and then, ultimately, conduct nuclear strikes against targets on NATO territory, according to Trenin. It is unclear how renaming deterrence into intimidation would impress Western decision-makers.  As for the further Russian steps on the escalation ladder, one wonders whether the author has considered how U.S./NATO would react to each of these proposed steps as well as whether outcomes of multiple rounds of such action/reaction could create outcomes that the author may have not intended.[2]
  3. Iran’s newly-elected reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian supports an easing of relations with the West and has warned against putting too much stock in alliances with Russia and China, according to Lara Jakes of NYT. However, we should not forget that it is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who makes all of the major policy decisions, particularly in foreign affairs and Iran’s nuclear program, this Rome-based journalist reminds us.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“What happens after the Kim-Putin summit?”, Angela Stent and Andrew Yeo interviewed by Hanna Foreman, Brookings, 07.03.24. 

Angela Stent:

  • “This was a successful summit from Putin’s point of view. His last visit to Pyongyang was in 2000 and, since then, North Korea has emerged as a key asset in his war against Ukraine.”
  • “Putin’s Asia trips have reinforced the reality that, since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European and Asian security cannot be decoupled. Putin would not have invaded had he not understood that China would support Russia, even if he failed to apprise Xi Jinping of his exact plans during his visit to Beijing weeks before the war began.”
  • “Putin’s trip to North Korea was intended to showcase what he sees as the new axis of resistance—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.” 

Andrew Yeo: 

  • “The Putin-Kim summit erases any doubt that the two leaders want to preserve their relationship beyond the duration of the Ukraine war. Leaders do not sign treaties formalizing military and diplomatic commitments as Putin and Kim did unless they intend to build a long-lasting relationship.”
  • “Russia’s and China’s permanent memberships to the U.N. Security Council ensure that norm-violating nuclear states like North Korea will remain politically protected on the global stage.”

“Ukraine Rumor Shows How North Korea Boosts Russia-China Axis,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 07.02.24.

  • “There are lies, damn lies and rumors about North Korea. So treat recent reports that Pyongyang will send troops to aid Russia’s assault on Ukraine with more than a grain of salt.”
  • “Yet the summit that spurred those rumors, and the North Korea-Russia military alliance it produced, are part of something very real and very worrying — the tightening of ties between America’s adversaries.”
  • “Those relationships are racing ahead in ways virtually no one would have predicted a few years ago. The US needs to get ready for a world in which they keep advancing, in surprising and disturbing ways.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Hopes for a Diplomatic Opening Rise Under Iran’s New President,” Lara Jakes, NYT, 07.08.24. 

  • “With the election of the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as president, Iran may see a softening of its absolutist foreign policy and even an opportunity for a new diplomatic opening, current and former officials and experts say.”
  • “Most of the Iranian president's powers are confined to domestic issues. It is [Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei, as the country's highest political and religious official, who makes all of the major policy decisions, particularly in foreign affairs and Iran's nuclear program. The other leading power in the Iranian system, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, oversees all of Iran's military matters.”
  • “Iran's foreign policies have grown increasingly hard-line in recent years, diplomats and analysts say, and that trend may well continue under Mr. Pezeshkian. That includes solidifying alliances with other authoritarian states — as Iran has by arming Russia with drones and missiles to attack Ukraine — and portraying itself as a power to be reckoned with, both in the Middle East and the West, despite its domestic upheaval and cratered economy.”
  • “Mr. Pezeshkian has said he is determined to set a policy of international engagement and supports an easing of relations with the West with the aim of ending the sanctions. He says he wants to foster communication with most other governments across the world — except Israel — but he has also warned against putting too much stock in alliances with Russia and China. That’s “because then they could exploit Iran” and further isolate it globally, said Mr. Ali Vaez, the Iran director at the International Crisis Group.”
  • “A key test of Iran's interest in diplomacy with the West will be in whether it responds to efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, an issue that is complicated by the candidacy of former President Donald J. Trump.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“In Ukraine, Killings of Unarmed Russians Divide a U.S.-Led Unit,” Thomas Gibbons-Neff, NYT, 07.06.24.

  • “Hours after a battle in eastern Ukraine in August, a wounded and unarmed Russian soldier crawled through a nearly destroyed trench, seeking help from his captors, a unit of international volunteers led by an American. Caspar Grosse, a German medic in that unit, said he saw the soldier plead for medical attention in a mix of broken English and Russian. It was dusk. A team member looked for bandages. That is when, Mr. Grosse said, a fellow soldier hobbled over and fired his weapon into the Russian soldier’s torso. He slumped, still breathing. Another soldier fired — “just shot him in the head,” Mr. Grosse recalled in an interview.”
    • “The shooting of the unarmed, wounded Russian soldier is one of several killings that have unsettled the Chosen Company, one of the best-known units of international troops fighting on behalf of Ukraine.”
  • “In a second episode, a Chosen member lobbed a grenade at and killed a surrendering Russian soldier who had his hands raised, video footage reviewed by The Times shows. The Ukrainian military released video of the episode to showcase its battlefield prowess, but it edited out the surrender.”
  • “In a third episode, Chosen members boasted in a group chat about killing Russian prisoners of war during a mission in October, text messages show. A soldier who was briefly in command that day alluded to the killings using a slang word for shooting. He said he would take responsibility.”
  • “Killing prisoners of war is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Once soldiers clearly indicate an intention to surrender, they cannot be attacked and must be safely taken into custody. The Ukrainian government has repeatedly pointed at Russian troops killing unarmed and surrendering soldiers as proof of Moscow’s lawlessness.”
  • “A Greek soldier known as Zeus was at the center of all three episodes — tossing the grenade and, Mr. Grosse says, firing at the wounded Russian in the trench and bragging about another kill. He did not respond to messages seeking comments left on his phone and through Facebook. Ryan O’Leary, the de facto commander of Chosen Company and a former U.S. Army National Guardsman from Iowa, said that Zeus did not want to speak.”

For recent reporting, as well as for more commentary relevant to this section, see:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukrainian attacks on supply lines slowed Russians in Kharkiv, intercepts show,” Siobhán O’Grady, Kostiantyn Khudov and Serhiy Morgunov, WP, 07.08.24.

  • “Ukrainian attacks on Russian supply lines have left Russian units scrambling for food, water and ammunition, blunting Moscow's renewed invasion into Ukraine's northeast Kharkiv region, according to Ukrainian field commanders who shared radio and phone intercepts and results of their interrogations of Russian prisoners of war.”
  • “The intercepts and extensive interviews with 10 Ukrainian commanders and troops operating across the front line in Kharkiv — including several who monitor Russian communications and who question POWs immediately after they are captured — paint a picture of increasingly desperate Russian ground troops who are losing personnel and momentum after reinvading across the border in May.”
  • “Russia's military, which far outnumbers Ukraine's, remains at a strong advantage in the region, supported by hundreds of enormous glide bombs smashing weekly into Ukrainian positions across the front line. But Ukrainian troops have largely prevented major Russian territorial gains. According to British intelligence analysts, Russia in May suffered its highest number of daily casualties since the invasion began in February 2022, with at least 1,200 Russian troops killed or wounded each day.”
  • “The steep losses and degraded condition of Russian units on the front show how Moscow's invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a grinding war of attrition with major territorial shifts unlikely between now and November when the Kremlin sees a chance with a Trump victory in the U.S. presidential.” 

For more commentary that is relevant to this section see: 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“At the NATO summit, Biden needs to deliver for Ukraine,” Josh Rogin, WP, 07.05.24. 

  • “We need to secure our cities,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, told a small group of reporters in Washington this week. “For us, this is the most important thing. And we are looking for some serious and strong decisions from the Washington Summit.”
  • “NATO leaders will reportedly announce a new NATO office in Kyiv, which will be touted as a “bridge” to membership in the alliance. They are also expected to announce a joint commitment of about $40 billion in financial assistance for Ukraine for 2025.”
  • “Ukraine wanted more, including a formal step toward membership, similar to the milestone it recently reached with the EU. But after Zelenskyy's complaints almost derailed last year's NATO summit in Lithuania, Ukrainian officials won’t publicly air their frustrations. Instead, Ukrainian leaders are pushing for more concrete items that could make a difference on the battlefield. Ukraine desperately needs more air-defense systems, Yermak said. There are promises from allies to send Ukraine more Patriot missile systems, but no clear idea of how many will be delivered or when.”
  • “Ukrainian leaders are also asking the Biden administration to further reduce restrictions on the use of U.S. weapons on military targets inside Russia.”
  • “With Trump's possible return looming, the best way to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security is to give Ukraine more capability to actually defeat Russia. That means speeding up delivery of air-defense systems, fighter planes, longer-range rockets, and helping Ukraine develop its own defense production to reduce its dependence on the West.”
  • “Biden should also use the NATO summit to explain to the American people why Ukraine's success matters for U.S. national security interests.”

For more commentary that is relevant to this section, see “Background Press Call Previewing the NATO Summit,” official website of the U.S. president, 07.05.24.

  • No significant developments.

“Russia, Ukraine, America, and the end of imagination,” Melanie W. Sisson, Brookings, 07.03.24. 

  • “How the war ends will affect, but not determine, the depth and duration of stability in Europe thereafter. The search for an improbable perfect—a victory that returns all Ukrainian territory and ensures Russia will not attack it ever again — therefore should not be allowed to be the enemy of an achievable good. And an achievable, good outcome is one in which the war ends with a sovereign Ukrainian state led by an autonomous Ukrainian government.”
  • “A strategy designed to make this outcome more likely than a forever war or a Russian victory does not require Ukraine to retake territory and is not dependent upon additional transfers of American money or material. Neither does it entail dictating to Kyiv whether or when to negotiate, what the terms of a settlement should be, or how it should fight until that time; the only limitations on Ukraine’s use of any weapons the U.S. chooses to provide should be those imposed by international humanitarian law. Such a strategy, however, does need to continue the Biden administration’s policy of declining to support Ukrainian accession to NATO and of precluding the possibility of direct U.S. combat involvement—so long as NATO’s borders remain secure and nuclear weapons remain undetonated. It will commit the U.S. to engage with postwar Ukraine in ways that advance Kyiv’s defense capabilities and expand its economic potential. It will include ongoing work to limit Russia’s role in the global economy, and it will convey to Russia the requirements for any relaxation of sanctions.”
  • “Putin’s worldview is anachronistic, and his leadership of Russia is tragic, but just as he is not Peter the Great, neither is he Adolf Hitler. Narratives that elevate these comparisons and strategies that are built to address imagined events in a possible future can be rousing. But what is needed is a strategy that is built to address real events in the actual present, because that is the kind of strategy that has the best chance of being effective.”

“Answers to Russian media questions. In conclusion of his working visit to Astana, Vladimir Putin answered questions from representatives of Russian media.” official website of the Russian president, 07.04.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

  • “You know, we take seriously enough the things that Mr. Trump is saying as a presidential candidate about his readiness and wish to stop the war in Ukraine. Naturally, I do not know his possible proposals as to how he is going to do it – and this is, of course, the key question. However, I have no doubt that he is saying it sincerely, and we support it.”
  • “We have always been in favor of negotiations, as you know. We never rejected them. The problem is that I consider it improbable that the conflict can be settled through mediators alone, above all because a mediator will not be authorized to sign any final documents, and moreover, even bring them for signing. The competencies of these mediators are not the only crucial issue, but their authority, too. Who can vest the authority to any mediator to put this conflict to an end? I find this improbable. However, we welcome mediation, for example, like that of Mr. Erdogan during our negotiation process in Istanbul.”
  • “The first thing I would like to point out is that, indeed, the U.S. has destroyed the fundamental documents that underpinned international stability and security. We did not withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was a cornerstone, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or the CTBT.”
  • “However, the issue of creating a legal framework for international security and strategic stability is still on our to-do list. Should these be new agreements or should we return to the old ones? This is up to the experts to decide.”
  • “We need to wait for the new [U.S.] administration to be formed, to understand their preferences, views, and plans, and whether they are willing to discuss this matter. To reiterate, they are letting us know from time to time that they are willing to resume this dialogue with us. However, shortly after, they vanish and then come up with abstract topics that are not directly related to matters of strategic stability. To reiterate, let us wait until the new administration is formed and see what its plans and preferences are. Once again, we are ready for that.”

Vladimir Putin’s “Press statement following talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban,” official website of the Russian president, 07.05.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “As we see the state of affairs, including in the light of what we heard today from Mr. Prime Minister, Kyiv is still not ready to abandon the idea of waging “war until final victory.” In my opinion, the Kyiv regime does not allow the very idea of cessation of hostilities because, in this case, the pretext for extending martial law disappears. And if martial law has to be canceled, it means that the elections, which were not held on time, will have to be held. But the chances of winning them are close to zero for the Ukrainian rulers who have lost their ranking and legitimacy.”
  • “Meanwhile, we outlined our peace initiative quite recently at my meeting with the senior officials of the MFA of the Russian Federation. We believe that its implementation would make it possible to end hostilities and begin negotiations. Moreover, this should not just be a truce or a temporary ceasefire, nor should it be a pause that the Kyiv regime could use to recover its losses, regroup and rearm. Russia advocates for a full and final end to the conflict. The conditions for that, as I have already said, are set out in my speech at the MFA. We are talking about the complete withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. There are other conditions as well. But this is a subject for fairly detailed consideration in the course of possible joint work.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The NATO alliance should not invite Ukraine to become a member,” James Acton et al., an open letter published in the Guardian and Politico, 07.08.24. 

  • “If Ukraine were to join NATO after the current war, the U.S. and its allies would be understood to be making a commitment to fight Russian forces over Ukraine, should Russia invade again… As the administration recognizes, the security and prosperity of the U.S. are not implicated in the current war to the degree that would warrant direct U.S. military intervention. Indeed, both the U.S. president and former president Trump have warned that the conflict could escalate into “World War III.” For the same reason that the U.S. should not go to war against Russia over Ukraine today, it should not make a commitment to go to war against Russia over Ukraine in the future.”
  • “Some claim that the act of bringing Ukraine into NATO would deter Russia from ever invading Ukraine again. That is wishful thinking… If Ukraine were to join NATO, Russia would have reason to doubt the credibility of NATO’s security guarantee – and would gain an opportunity to test and potentially rupture the alliance. The result could be a direct NATO-Russia war or the unraveling of NATO itself.”
  • “Dangling NATO membership for Ukraine does a disservice to Ukrainians who are bravely fighting for their independence. The closer NATO comes to promising that Ukraine will join the alliance once the war ends, the greater the incentive for Russia to keep fighting the war and killing Ukrainians so as to forestall Ukraine’s integration into NATO.”
  • “The challenges Russia poses can be managed without bringing Ukraine into NATO.”
  • “The purpose of NATO is not to signal esteem for other countries; it is to defend NATO territory and strengthen the security of NATO members. Admitting Ukraine would reduce the security of the U.S. and NATO allies, at considerable risk to all.”

“America Is in Denial About NATO’s Future,” Daniel Treisman, FP, 07.05.24.

  • “Biden’s stance [on Ukraine in NATO] raises some difficult questions. If he is unwilling to risk provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin into a nuclear confrontation, then why are we promising to commit to do just that if necessary to defend Ukraine in the future? After Ukraine enters NATO, that is what Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will require, as Biden clearly recognizes. If defeating Russia in Ukraine is a U.S. vital interest, then why are we holding back now? And if it is not, then why should we pledge to risk everything on Ukraine’s behalf later?”
  • “The key question is whether other alliance members—not just their foreign-policy elites but general publics as well—are ready, in Biden’s words, to “fight the third world war” over Ukraine. If they are not, then inducting Kyiv after the current war ends may actually make both it and the West less secure. It will provoke Putin to prod and probe in the hope of inflaming Western divisions.”
  • “What Ukraine needs is a detailed, fully funded, broadly backed Western plan, insulated against future political turbulence, to create the kind of defense infrastructure on its eastern border that could repel—and therefore deter—a future Russian invasion. To avoid Russian blackmail, if not actual missiles, the country will need a large network of top-of-the-line air defenses. It will need intelligence-sharing arrangements with Western governments and an in-country military-industrial base that can rapidly resupply weapons. And, of course, it will need economic aid to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and capital stock. This is a very tall order. But an invitation to NATO will not in itself provide these things—and it cannot substitute for them.”
  • “To deter attacks on other NATO members, the alliance must rapidly reinforce its eastern borders.” 

“This NATO Summit Is a Big Win for Biden,” Michael McFaul, FP, 07.05.24. 

  • “In 2022, Biden led the alliance in responding quickly and comprehensively to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It seems far-fetched now, but it’s useful to remember how many politicians, analysts, and journalists expected Russian forces to be in downtown Kyiv within days. The world also feared that Putin would succeed in deposing or killing Zelenskyy, install a puppet regime, and thereby gain control of all of Ukraine. That none of this happened, that Ukraine was able to liberate about half of the territory initially occupied by Russian forces, and that it has held the line against relentless Russian assaults—all while a direct conflict between NATO and Russia has been avoided—is a remarkable achievement.”
  • “As the war has dragged on, the share of military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine from European NATO allies has increased dramatically. Under Biden’s watch, trans-Atlantic burden-sharing has become real, not just a talking point: Today, Europe outspends Washington in terms of total support for Ukraine. In fact, Europe is sending much more aid directly to Ukraine, whereas U.S. military spending stays in the U.S. to build new weapons for the U.S. military, which then transfers its older, often decommissioned weapons to Ukraine.”
    • “None of these achievements were inevitable.”
  • “The final step—a formal invitation [to Ukraine] to membership—should be taken immediately after the war is over.”
  • “Today, U.S. security, prosperity, and values continue to be advanced by a strong NATO—an incomparable U.S. foreign-policy asset that should never be taken for granted. That is cause for celebration—and for the hope that Americans will continue to appreciate leaders who value and nurture allies.”

 

“The Coming Russian Escalation With the West,” George Beebe, Time, 07.02.24. 

  • “For Washington’s hawkish chorus, the benefits of providing increasingly greater lethality to Ukraine outweigh the dangers of provoking a direct Russian attack on the West. They insist that the U.S. not allow fears of an unlikely Armageddon to block much-needed aid for Ukraine’s defense, particularly now that battlefield momentum has swung toward Russia.”
  • “There are several problems with this reasoning.”
    • “The first is that it treats Russia’s redlines—limits that if crossed, will provoke retaliation against the U.S. or NATO—as fixed rather than moveable.  It is true that Putin has proved quite reluctant to strike directly at the West in response to its military aid for Ukraine. But what Putin can live with today may become a casus belli tomorrow. The world will only know where his red lines are actually drawn once they have been crossed and the U.S. finds itself having to respond to Russian retaliation.”
    • “The second problem is that by focusing narrowly on how Moscow might react to each individual bit of American assistance to Ukraine, this approach underestimates the cumulative impact on Putin and the Kremlin’s calculations. Russian experts have become convinced that the U.S. has lost its fear of nuclear war, a fear they regard as having been central to stability for most of the Cold War, when it dissuaded both superpowers from taking actions that might threaten the other’s core interests.”
  • “A key question now being debated within Russia’s foreign policy elite is how to restore America’s fear of nuclear escalation while avoiding a direct military clash that might spin out of control. Some Moscow hardliners advocate using tactical nuclear weapons against wartime targets to shock the West into sobriety. More moderate experts have floated the idea of a nuclear bomb demonstration test.”
    • “Underlying these internal Russian debates is a widespread consensus that unless the Kremlin draws a hard line soon, the U.S. and its NATO allies will only add more capable weapons to Ukraine’s arsenal that eventually threatens Moscow’s ability to detect and respond to strikes on its nuclear forces.”
  • “Last week, following a Ukrainian strike on the Crimean port of Sevastopol that resulted in American-supplied cluster munitions killing at least five Russian beachgoers and wounding more than 100, Russian officials insisted that such an attack was only possible with U.S. satellite guidance aiding Ukraine. The Kremlin spokesperson announced that “the involvement of the U.S., the direct involvement, as a result of which Russian civilians are killed, cannot be without consequences.”
  • “Are the Russians bluffing, or are they approaching a point where they fear the consequences of not drawing a hard line outweighs the dangers of precipitating a direct military confrontation? To argue that we cannot know, and therefore should proceed with deploying American military contractors or French trainers in Ukraine until the Russians’ actions match their bellicose words, is to ignore the very real problems we would face in managing a bilateral crisis.” 

“Why NATOizing Military Assistance to Ukraine Won’t Solve the Alliance’s Ukraine Dilemma,” Sara Bjerg Moller, FPRI, 07.02.24.

  • “Despite promises to support Ukraine for as long as necessary, many NATO Allies are starting to reach a tipping point in their military assistance to Ukraine. That reality, and the specter of Donald Trump’s reelection this November, has led some within the Alliance to call for the NATOization of the war in Ukraine.”
  • “Absent consensus on extending Ukraine an invitation for NATO membership, NATO Allies have spent the last few months finalizing plans for alternative ways to show support for Ukraine at the upcoming Washington Summit.”
  • “Intended to be a ‘bridge’ to NATO membership, the new measures—which will see NATO taking a larger role in coordination of allied training and security assistance—are unlikely to resolve the underlying dilemma the Alliance has faced since 2014: determining how far NATO should go in supporting Ukraine absent a formal collective defense security guarantee by the Alliance. Moreover, by fundamentally altering NATO’s role in the conflict, the new measures could actually increase ambiguity surrounding the Allies’ commitment to the defense of Ukraine, prompting Putin to potentially test the Alliance’s resolve.”
  • “Those advocating for swift action on membership favor the logic of fait accomplis and acting in one fell swoop, while those urging caution embrace a strategy premised on small incrementals, what Thomas Schelling called ‘salami slicing.’ Neither strategy is devoid of risk. A strategy premised on small incremental steps could prove as dangerous as a fait accomplis completed in one fell swoop. As one recently put it, “The risk in salami slicing is that, if you push too far, you may lose a finger.” For now, only one thing seems certain, regardless of what position NATO leaders adopt toward Ukraine at the Washington July Summit: The certitude of each camp is unlikely to change.”

“Russia is trying to put a price tag on NATO’s involvement in Ukraine,” Alexander Gabuev, FT, 07.07.24. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “In year three of its war against Ukraine, perceived by the Kremlin as just one thread in its broader confrontation with the West, inflicting pain on Kyiv’s supporters is increasingly a priority for Putin. The Kremlin wants to put a price tag on NATO’s growing involvement in the war on Ukraine’s behalf — as both deterrence and revenge.”
  • “Since the start of the war, the West’s primary concern has been the possible use of nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin is again beating the tired drum of nuclear escalation. … With the outlook now more favorable for Russia, it’s unlikely that Putin will reach for the most potent instrument at his disposal — one better kept as the ultimate insurance against defeat.”
  • “But Putin is not short of other tools.”
    • “Right now, Moscow’s primary instrument for escalation is the use of missiles and drones against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.”
    • “Then there is Russia’s campaign of sabotage in Europe.”
    • “Finally, Russia is ready to share its sensitive military technologies with the West’s adversaries.”
  • “NATO’s response must go beyond efforts to deliver more air defense to Ukraine, which will be constrained by output bottlenecks and the alliance’s own needs. Plans should be laid to help Ukraine through the winter and prepare for a possible wave of refugees. In addition to re-establishing military deterrence, the West should beef up its capabilities in counter-intelligence, counterterrorism and combating organized crime. It is the nexus of these three worlds that Russia is tempted to weaponize. Finally, NATO should take back control of escalation management during this war.”

“How Trump can make NATO great again,” Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 07.08.24. 

  • “Enshrine the new spending levels in the North Atlantic Treaty.”
  • “Launch a second Trump defense buildup.”
  • “Shift U.S. troops from Germany to Poland and the Baltic states.”
  • “Force Putin to sue for peace by arming Ukraine. ... [Trump can give] Kyiv all the weapons Biden has withheld or slow-rolled, and lifting restrictions on their use on Russian territory, so Ukraine can regain the offensive. This would create leverage to force Putin to the negotiating table. But Trump would also need to make sure any peace deal he helps strike is irreversible. ... The only way to stop Putin from attacking again is to make a resumption of war impossible. And the only way to do that is to bring Ukraine into NATO with defensible borders.”
  • “Finally, globalize NATO to include our Pacific allies.”

“Will Europe’s Front-Line States Have Enough Soldiers to Fight?” Jakub Grygiel, FP, 07.02.24. 

  • “What the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made clear is that technology cannot take the place of soldiers in a major land war.”
  • “But no matter what they tell pollsters, many citizens of Russia’s potential targets may choose to leave when the prospect of war becomes real.”
    • “In recent years, many Central Europeans have also acquired second residences abroad. Poles, for instance, have been buying real estate in Spain in record numbers. If their rising prosperity and desire to diversify their savings is one reason, then unease about the future since the return of Russian aggression is likely another. In Spain, after all, they would be safe from errant missiles and artillery duels.”
    • “The second reason why Europe’s front-line states may have a recruitment problem if Russia attacks is that much of Western Europe would be more than happy to accept large numbers of young people from their eastern neighbors, even if the migration was induced by war.”
  • “As war-waging Russia advances westward, European countries on the front line need to plan how to retain their own people.”
  • “One of the tasks for Europe’s front-line countries is, therefore, to sustain a vibrant patriotism.”

“Biden Needs to Go for NATO’s Sake Too,” Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 07.03.24. 

  • “Even if Biden still ekes out a second term, the outlook isn’t much better. In the shape he’s in, which is unlikely to improve, he’ll struggle to lead the alliance as U.S. presidents are expected to do. Even before last week’s debate, European officials had worries about Biden’s focus and stamina at other summits, and how he’d hold up in a second term.”
  • “If Biden were to bow out at this late stage in favor of a younger nominee, the uncertainty would temporarily increase. None of the Democrats in the headlines — from Vice President Kamala Harris to the governors of California, Michigan or Illinois — has burnished a national security profile. Putin or other dictators might still be tempted to test the new situation. Then again, being new in the Oval Office — Harry Truman in 1945 springs to mind — needn’t stand in the way of strong leadership.”

“The Point of NATO Is Peace, Not Endless War,” Viktor Orban, Newsweek, 07.08.24. 

  • “NATO is approaching a watershed moment. It is worth remembering that the most successful military alliance in world history started as a peace project, and its future success depends on its ability to maintain peace. But today, instead of peace, the agenda is the pursuit of war; instead of defense it is offense.”
  • “When it comes to the future of NATO, we are not in full agreement with the majority of member countries. Today ever more voices within NATO are making the case for the necessity—or even inevitability—of military confrontation with the world's other geopolitical power centers.”
  • “Today the self-fulfilling nature of this confrontation prophecy is becoming increasingly apparent, with the news that preparations have begun for a possible NATO operation in Ukraine—and even high-level reports that troops from NATO member countries are already near the Ukrainian front.”
  • “The Hungarian historical experience is that when a military alliance changes from focusing on defense to focusing on offense, from avoiding conflict to seeking conflict, it buys itself a ticket to defeat.”

“Why America’s Adversaries Are Wrong About the Biden-Trump Debate,” Sergey Radchenko, NYT, 07.03.24.

  • “America is at a low moment. Anyone can see that, without the help of Chinese or Russian propaganda. And there may be darker days still ahead, with no promise of a quick resolution or even a smooth election this fall.”
  • “But history has shown that resilience is built into the American system — through its institutional constraints, accountability and genuine, meaningful debate about the country’s direction. Amid all this turmoil, an American comeback still feels possible, even plausible. America in decline is America on the road to renewal.”

“Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine,” Denys Yurchenko, FPRI, July 2024.

  • “Strategic culture theory continues to be popular among academic researchers after emerging in Russia following the Soviet Union’s methods in international relations. On the other hand, NATO was created in 1949 to deal with the Soviet Union’s possible aggression and defend allies if necessary. In this case, Western countries should remember why this organization was created many years ago. The positive aspect is that Russia is weaker than the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The states that help Ukraine have a GDP twenty-five times larger than Russia and its allies. The Western world should fully reject the strategy of cooperation with Russia and focus on the strategy of containment. A similar circumstance was in 1947 when Kennan wrote his long telegram explaining Russian behavior.”
  • “The possible defeat of Russia will not resemble the defeat of Nazi Germany: The Allies’ troops will not cross Russian borders. This means that even if Russia is defeated, it will remain dangerous. Russian strategic culture will not change and future Russian leaders will utilize the defeat as a justification for possible confrontation. If Russia chooses the role of an outcast in international relations, the West should be ready to deter it and adopt a new strategic concept for undermining Russia’s capabilities. The U.S. and other Western powers should always be ready and not be as naïve as they were for a long time after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”

For more analysis that is relevant to this section, see 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Is Ineffective and Irrelevant,” Temur Umarov, CEIP, 07.05.24.

  • “As usual, the most recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, which was hosted by Kazakhstan this week, attracted a lot of international attention.”
  • “However, the SCO’s successes since it was enlarged in 2001 from the Shanghai Five have been few and far between, essentially limited to attracting new members and avoiding high-profile scandals.”
  • “At the SCO’s annual summits, leaders make a plethora of announcements that are dutifully relayed by news agencies but rarely become reality.”
  • “If there’s one SCO organ that should operate effectively, it’s the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. But it does little more than help member states organize military exercises.”
  • “When Russia began pushing for the expansion of the SCO, China was disengaged enough to be unconcerned about its effectiveness being diluted. India and Pakistan joined the SCO in 2017, and Iran in 2022. Belarus became the tenth member of the group at the most recent summit in Kazakhstan. It goes without saying that with such a diverse membership, it’s difficult to get anything off the ground.”
  • “Today, the bloated SCO has become little more than a talking club for leaders of friendly countries. The SCO could even get bigger in coming years. Indeed, why not join if membership does not entail taking on any responsibilities? However much the SCO would like to convince others that it is capable of changing facts on the ground, the reality is very different.”
  • “The degradation of the SCO is yet another example of how Russia’s lack of a systematic approach to foreign policy undermines Russian influence, even in places where Moscow had a nearly monopolistic presence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fearing competition with China, Russia blocked initiatives that could have turned the SCO into an effective regional organization. Instead, Moscow chose to find itself in a situation where Chinese influence in Central Asia still became a reality, while Russia was left with a mere shell of an institution capable of only hosting meetings and generating self-indulgent headlines.”

For more analysis that is relevant to this section, see 

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Nuclear arms/space:

“Trump Advisers Call for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing if He Is Elected,” William J. Broad, NYT, 07.06.24.

  • “In the latest issue of FA magazine, Robert C. O'Brien, a former national security adviser to Mr. Trump, urges him to conduct nuclear tests if he wins a new term. Washington, he wrote, “must test new nuclear weapons for reliability and safety in the real world for the first time since 1992.” Doing so, he added, would help the U.S. “maintain technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles.”
  • “But the Biden administration and other Democrats warn that a U.S. test could lead to a chain reaction of testing by other countries. Over time, they add, resumption could result in a nuclear arms race that destabilizes the global balance of terror and heightens the risk of war.”
    • “It's a terrible idea,” said Ernest J. Moniz, who oversaw the U.S. nuclear arsenal as the secretary of energy in the Obama administration. “New testing would make us less secure. You can’t divorce it from the global repercussions.”
    • “Siegfried S. Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons lab in New Mexico, where J. Robert Oppenheimer led the creation of the atomic bomb, called new testing a risky trade-off between domestic gains and global losses. “We stand to lose more” than America’s nuclear rivals would, he said.”
  • “It's unclear if Mr. Trump would act on the testing proposals. In a statement, Chris LaCivita and Susie Wiles, Mr. Trump’s co-campaign managers, did not directly address the candidate’s position on nuclear testing. They said that Mr. O’Brien, as well as other outside groups and individuals, were “misguided, speaking prematurely, and may well be entirely wrong” about a second Trump administration’s plans.”
  • “Despite the conflicting claims and uncertain election outcomes, nuclear experts say that China and Russia are readying their test sites for new detonations, perhaps in case the U.S. restarts its program, or alternatively to race ahead on their own. Dr. Moniz, the former secretary of energy, said he fears that Washington will go first if Mr. Trump wins a second term.”

“Strategic deterrence: new contours,” Dmitri Trenin, Russia in Global Affairs, July 2024.^ Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The armed conflict in Ukraine, which, in fact, is a proxy war between Russia and the collective West led by the U.S. - forces us to… take a fresh look at the issues of military, spatial and coalitional containment of the main adversary [enemy]. The acute conflict with the West will probably continue for a long time - in different forms and in different theaters. ... Nuclear deterrence has not prevented geopolitical aggression and indirect military conflict affecting the vital interests of Russia. Other forms of strategic deterrence are required.”
  • “We have to admit that [Moscow’s model of] strategic deterrence in its post-Soviet configuration failed to prevent a threat that the Russian President has repeatedly characterized as existential. ... [efforts to prevent] the outbreak of war in Ukraine failed. The urgent task in the third year of the military confrontation is to stop further involvement of NATO countries. If this is not done, the inertia of escalation, consistently carried out by the West, will lead to a direct clash between the armed forces of Russia and NATO, which would be fraught with all-out nuclear war.”
  • “It is necessary to break the escalatory strategy of the West and thwart its attempts to prevent Russia from achieving the goals of the Northern Military District. ... First of all, it is necessary to strengthen nuclear deterrence, which would be more correct to describe as nuclear intimidation of the adversary. [Russia’s 2020] “Fundamentals of Nuclear Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” allows for the use of nuclear weapons in cases where the existence of a state is threatened. For the situation in which Russia finds itself, this bar is too high. It needs to be lowered.”
  • “Active nuclear intimidation entails the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons during an ongoing conflict, not necessarily on the battlefield and not on the territory of Ukraine.”
  • “It is important to convince the ruling elite of the U.S. and the West as a whole that, having provoked a conflict with Russia, they can no longer remain in a comfortable, fully protected state.”
  • “The Western model of creeping escalation in the Ukrainian conflict should be contrasted with a well-thought-out escalation strategy based on a certain sequence of actions (“escalation ladder”).”
    • “The deployment of Russian nuclear forces on the territory of Belarus in 2023 was the first practical step to raise the stakes in the conflict on the Russian side.”
    • “The exercises of non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in 2024 became another preventive action.”
    • “The logical conclusion of these exercises could be the testing of non-strategic nuclear weapons at the test site on Novaya Zemlya.”
    • “The next step could be... non-nuclear strikes on locations at airfields of NATO countries, where F-16, which will be given to Kyiv, are based, as well as on military contingents of NATO countries in Ukraine; on UAVs in the no-fly zone over the Black Sea. The same list of steps includes cyber attacks on elements of critical infrastructure in Europe and North America, and non-nuclear strikes on key supply points for the Armed Forces of Ukraine... located on the territory of the alliance states. Separately, a warning would be issued about the readiness and determination of the Russian Federation to strike at US strategic targets - starting with American military bases abroad.”
    • “An absolute last resort (God forbid, of course) is crossing the nuclear threshold - launching nuclear strikes against targets on NATO territory.”  
  • “It is fundamentally important that... the Russian leadership remains in contact at every stage with the leadership of the U.S. to convey to Washington signals of the seriousness of intentions and, at the same time, readiness to end the conflict on terms favorable to Russia.”
    • “In the field of strategic communications, it is necessary to ensure maximum consistency in actions and statements. The chaotic and multidirectional nature of public statements creates the impression of internal disorganization and is more likely to provoke than to restrain. It is important to develop and apply a clear system of strategic signals.”
  • “Creation of a system of strategic deterrence in all directions is urgently needed. The goal of geopolitical deterrence is to prevent a hostile presence along the entire perimeter of Russian borders.”
  • “As the experience of the Ukrainian crisis shows, in the first half of the 21st century, geopolitical containment of the enemy, and, if necessary, pushing him back beyond the borders of the near abroad, is of vital importance for Russia. Strategic threats in the geopolitical field are more relevant than threats of a massive nuclear attack or large-scale military aggression. From the Arctic to Transcaucasia and from Central Asia to the Far East, Russia will have to build a belt of security and cooperation that would allow it to develop freely and successfully and actively interact with its neighbors. … Tashkent is now more important for us in the future than Paris, and Astana is more important than Berlin.”
    • “The most immediate goal is to prevent the enemy from opening a “second front,” be it in the Arctic, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Transcaucasia or the Far East.”
  • “Russia could initiate consultations, dialogue, and in the future – negotiations to develop, under the auspices of the SCO, a continental agreement on strengthening strategic stability (in a broad sense) in Eurasia – for now without the “European Peninsula.”

“It’s time to end the game of spillikins,” Sergei Oznobishchev and Vasily Klimov, Russia in Global Affairs, 07.01.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

  • “In the ancient Russian game of spillikins, participants took turns pulling miniature toy objects out of a slide until the slide fell apart, which meant the last player was defeated. This game is reminiscent of the situation in the arms control system.”
  • “For the first time in half a century, continuity of arms control has broken off. Its entire structure, which took decades to build, has been shaken.”
  • “The history of the Cold War and its enormous costs objectively do not allow us to consider an unlimited arms build-up as a reliable tool for ensuring national and international security. To achieve such goals, there is no other way than to use the arms limitation mechanism, which has been tried and tested for decades.”
  • “The approaches of previous decades [towards arms control] have indeed exhausted themselves to some extent, because they worked in a different international political environment. However, it would be wrong to completely discard the experience of the past. The main thing it can teach us is that in the midst of even the most acute military-political crisis, there is always the opportunity to make contact to prevent the most unfavorable scenario.”  

“What would happen if Russia detonated a nuclear bomb in space?” William Neff, Frank Hulley-Jones, and Joel Achenbach, WP, 07.06.24. 

  • “White House officials have confirmed that they believe [Russia’s satellite] Cosmos 2553 is designed to test components of an “anti-satellite capability,” which could cripple orbital technology, potentially by a nuclear detonation in space. We have some idea what this would look like.”
    • “A nuclear explosion in space [low-Orbit] would cause indiscriminate damage, with the blast potentially knocking out many capabilities — from internet services to early-warning military systems that track missile launches — of both the U.S. and its adversaries.”
    • “Hundreds of satellites might lose the ability to correct their positioning, sending them careening into one another. That could create fields of debris moving at more than 10,000 miles per hour, slamming into thousands of other satellites and creating a theoretical cascade effect known as Kessler Syndrome.”

“Space Technology Advances: Catalysts for Conflict or Pathways for Human Progress?”, Abnesh Raina, Belfer Center, June 2024.

  • “The disparities in technological and financial capabilities among nations will exacerbate global dependencies and foster geopolitical tensions. The existing international space law frameworks, such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, struggle to address the contemporary realities of space activities.”
  • “To maintain orderly and responsible space activities there is an urgent need for updated legal frameworks to accommodate new activities such as space tourism, mining, and private space stations. Additionally, fostering international cooperation to establish frameworks that ensure the peaceful, fair, and sustainable use of outer space resources is crucial.”
  • “In sum, ensuring that space remains a domain for peaceful exploration and mutual benefit rather than a new frontier for conflict will significantly depend on the global community's ability to navigate the complex interplay of technological advancements, regulatory frameworks, economic opportunities, and geopolitical challenges.”
  • “The economic potential of space, forecasted to evolve into a multi-trillion-dollar industry, funded by investments from both government and private sectors is driving innovations in space tourism, lunar and asteroid mining, and other space-related industries poised to create new markets and job opportunities.”
  • “The advent of technologies such as hyperspectral imaging, advanced satellite systems, and artificial intelligence is reshaping capabilities in surveillance and reconnaissance of celestial bodies, potentially creating conflicts over valuable extraterrestrial assets and national security concerns.”

For more analysis that is relevant to this section, see 

“Europe is Quietly Debating a Nuclear Future Without the U.S.,” Laura Kayali et al, Politico/Welt am Zontag, 07.04.24.

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“A.I. Begins Ushering In an Age of Killer Robots,” Adam Satariano, Paul Mozur, NYT, 07.02.24. 

  • “What the companies are creating is technology that makes human judgment about targeting and firing increasingly tangential. The widespread availability of off-the-shelf devices, easy-to-design software, powerful automation algorithms and specialized artificial intelligence microchips has pushed a deadly innovation race into uncharted territory, fueling a potential new era of killer robots.”
  • “For Ukraine, the technologies could provide an edge against Russia, which is also developing autonomous killer gadgets — or simply help it keep pace. The systems raise the stakes in an international debate about the ethical and legal ramifications of A.I. on the battlefield. Human rights groups and U.N. officials want to limit the use of autonomous weapons for fear that they may trigger a new global arms race that could spiral out of control.”
  • “In Ukraine, such concerns are secondary to fighting off an invader. “We need maximum automation,” said Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s minister of digital transformation, who has led the country’s efforts to use tech start-ups to expand advanced fighting capabilities. “These technologies are fundamental to our victory.”
  • “Officials have spent more than a decade debating rules about the use of autonomous weapons, but few expect any international deal to set new regulations, especially as the U.S., China, Israel, Russia and others race to develop even more advanced weapons. In one U.S. program announced in August, known as the Replicator initiative, the Pentagon said it planned to mass-produce thousands of autonomous drones.”
  • “The geopolitics makes it impossible,” said Alexander Kmentt, Austria’s top negotiator on autonomous weapons at the U.N. “These weapons will be used, and they’ll be used in the military arsenal of pretty much everybody.” Nobody expects countries to accept an outright ban of such weapons, he said, “but they should be regulated in a way that we don’t end up with an absolutely nightmare scenario.”
  • “For many in Ukraine, the debate is academic. They are outgunned and outmanned. “We need to win first,” Mr. Fedorov, the minister of digital transformation, said. “To do that, we will do everything we can to introduce automation to its maximum to save the lives of our soldiers.”

For more in-depth reporting on issues relevant for this section see:

Energy exports from CIS:

“A Naval Blockade of Russian Oil Exports Risks a Military Showdown,” Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 07.05.24. 

  • “The price cap mechanism was built on a belief that the West has a monopoly on the services needed to move oil from Russian ports to Asian refineries: that Russia would not be able to manage without Western-owned tankers, insurance underwritten by Western-led P&I clubs, or bank transactions in Western currencies passing through Western banks. That belief turned out to be incorrect. Russia managed to organize a parallel system to handle its oil trade by amassing a shadow fleet and finding alternative insurance providers. This is a deeply unsatisfying state of affairs for Western policymakers, from both a reputational and practical point of view.”
    • “First, it undermines the authority of the Western coalition and the effectiveness of future sanctions, since they are dependent on the willingness of potential sanctions violators and violation abettors to take risks, having weighed up the likely losses and rewards.”
    • “Second, the failure of the price cap keeps Russian coffers full and the war machine running. Accordingly, Western governments are looking for more radical solutions and fixes.”
  • “The challenge European policymakers are facing now... is how to make a blockade—an act often used during hostilities—look like a justified peacetime measure within the framework of conventions written to avoid hostilities. In other words, how to conduct an act of war while technically not conducting an act of war.”
  • “The West still has the means to enforce the price cap more strictly and more broadly by going after profit-seekers who are willing to help move Russian oil for a fee and turn a blind eye to phony price cap compliance attestation. The West could also threaten secondary sanctions against Chinese and Indian buyers—if it has the will to expend political capital on the issue. But attempts to stop the physical flow of Russian oil through international straits would amount to a blockade, and will be seen as such.”

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Trump 2.0: what can we expect from US foreign policy after the elections?” Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 07.05.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

“Ukraine is a large investment of American resources, attention, energy and symbolic capital, which the U.S. will not allow to immediately “fold” without exchanging it for something valuable. Can the U.S. offer Russia anything in this trade? I seriously doubt it. Unfortunately, Trump's first term has shown that there is no great platform for deep and meaningful negotiations that would produce lasting results. I am particularly convinced of this because there is no guarantee that any agreement with a possible future Trump administration will survive its term in office. We’ve seen this in some other major foreign policy situations in the past.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Russian media sending truth back home,” Simon Kuper, FT, 07.04.24. 

  • “Days after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s last independent TV station ended its last broadcast by playing Swan Lake. This was the ballet that Soviet state TV liked to use as a stalling tactic at historic turning points, such as the attempted coup of 1991. By this point, TV Rain’s journalists were fleeing abroad. Margarita Liutova, who had packed a suitcase in hours, watched that final broadcast crying in a park in Yerevan, Armenia. Free Russian media seemed doomed.”
  • “Instead, TV Rain (known in Russia as Dozhd), The Moscow Times and other independent journalists have gathered in Amsterdam, from where they are sending truth back to Russia. Can they make a difference? And will they ever return home?”
  • “The exiles understand they might stay here forever, dying forgotten abroad like their post-1917 forebears. Liutova, who now works for Meduza, wards off anguish. “I felt some despair the day Alexei Navalny was killed. Then I thought about what he conveyed to us. If you are healthy and free, you cannot despair.”
  • “The dream is to return. Samantha Berkhead, Russophile American editor of The Moscow Times, longs to live in a post-Putin Russia: “It’s kind of like having a toxic ex. You think, ‘Oh, if I go back, maybe it won’t be the same this time.’”

For more analysis that is relevant to this section, see 

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“France and Britain are changing places,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 07.08.24.

  • “Britain and France are sitting on opposite ends of a political seesaw. Three days after the UK elected a pragmatic, centrist government with a huge majority, France went to the opposite extreme. Sunday’s legislative elections have produced a deadlocked parliament, with both the far right and the far left gaining ground.”
  • “The international challenges faced by Britain, France and Europe as a whole are only likely to intensify in severity over the coming year. The Ukraine war is currently deadlocked and nervousness about a potential Russian breakthrough is mounting. A second Trump presidency would pose clear risks to the NATO alliance and the international trading system. That, in turn, would imperil Europe’s future prosperity and security.”
  • “In theory, an obvious response to these common threats would be for France and Britain to work much more closely together — and to push for greater European cooperation to reduce the continent’s vulnerability to a more dangerous world. In reality, the recent shifts in the politics of both France and Britain will make that kind of cooperation much harder. If French foreign policy begins to reflect the priorities of the political extremes, that would create an obvious clash with the views of the new Starmer government in Britain. Both the extreme left and the extreme right in France are much more sympathetic to Putin’s Russia than either Macron or Starmer.”

“Why is Narendra Modi coming to Moscow?”, Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 07.05.24. 

  • “Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is due to fly into Moscow on Monday to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in three years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, India has become one of Moscow’s most important trading partners, with only China buying more Russian oil.”
  • “The key issues between Russia and India are economic.”
    • “According to India’s Trade Ministry, trade between India and Russia reached a record $65.7 billion in the 2023-2024 financial year. Of that, Indian exports (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electrical and mechanical equipment, iron and steel) to Russia totaled $4.26 billion, while imports from Russia were $61.44 billion (mostly oil, oil products and fertilizers).”
    • “India purchased almost no Russian oil before the war. Now, it is the second biggest buyer after China (in some months, it is biggest). In April, Indian exports of Russian oil reached a nine-month high of 1.96 million barrels a day, rising to 2.1 million barrels a day in May and 2.13 million in June. Almost 41% of India’s oil imports now come from Russia. The G7 price cap on Russian oil exports has had little impact on this trade. The Indian Express cited sources in May who claimed the Western restrictions “in the best case had only an insignificant and short-lived influence” on India’s oil imports.”
  • “Modi and Putin are… likely to discuss military questions. ... India remains dependent on Russian-made weapons… the war is causing delays to Russian deliveries.”
  • “Why the world should care: By starting his third term with a trip to Moscow, the pragmatic Modi is offering New Delhi an alternative to Beijing. India is anxious about the possibility of Russia becoming an obedient vassal of China—both in terms of what that would mean for Indo-Russian relations and the major blow that would deliver to its efforts to contain China.”

“From unpredictability to risk management: Modi’s visit to Moscow,” Ivan Shchedrov, ORFO, 07.06.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

“The high dynamism in bilateral [Russian-Indian] trade requires an appropriate strategic basis that will make the India-Russia relationship more manageable. The increased predictability is a long-felt need for payment-related issues, logistics, technology, and investment spheres. In the political domain, both countries need to confirm mutual trust amidst growing apprehensions about Russia-China and India-U.S. convergences. In these conditions, the states need to establish a roadmap to bring greater manageability to bilateral ties. In doing so, the leaders will express the intention to shift from a paradigm of “ad-hoc response to external challenges” to creating a more sustainable framework for interaction.”

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Strains to Maintain Neutrality Through U.S. Political Dogfight,” Steven Erlanger and Marc Santora, NYT, 07.08.24. 

  • “Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is asked in nearly every interview what a second Trump administration would mean for Ukraine. While Mr. Zelenskyy chooses his words carefully, sometimes the emotional weight of the assumption behind the question — that Mr. Trump could end American military assistance, allowing Russia to succeed in destroying the Ukrainian state — spills into view.”
  • “Quite frankly, we are in a rather vulnerable situation right now,” Oleksandr Merezhko, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament's foreign affairs committee, said in an interview. “If Trump becomes president, it should not be a shock for us,” he said, motioning to a stack of books about Mr. Trump’s presidency that he has been reading for insights. But reaching out to people close to Trump, he said, “needs to be done in a delicate way, not to antagonize Democrats.” “We are very careful not to get involved in internal political struggle in the U.S.,” he said. “We don't want to spoil the relations with anyone.”

Russia’s other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Why Washington Must Push Forward the Fragile Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Plan,” Garo Paylan, CEIP, 07.03.24.

  • “The Caucasus has also historically fallen squarely into Russia’s sphere of influence. Now it seems to benefit from Russia’s distraction in Ukraine. Recently, the two historic rivals quietly began bilateral talks to put an end to the fighting. After multiple failed attempts at peacemaking, a bittersweet truce seems to be within reach.”
  • “Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Yerevan has steadily been lurching toward the West, stoking Moscow’s ire. It has ratified the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute and frozen its ties with the Russia-backed Collective Security Treaty Organization. Armenia’s democratically elected government, led by Nikol Pashinyan, is anathema to Russia’s preferred model of governance.”
  • “In both the 2020 and 2023 wars, Russian peacekeepers in the region stood by as Azerbaijan’s tanks and drones decimated the Armenian military. The Kremlin would almost certainly welcome another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that could lead to the overthrow of the government in Yerevan.”
  • “Türkiye’s mercurial president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is close to Aliyev, and he has repeatedly said he is willing to normalize relations with Armenia and open the Turkish-Armenian border, which has been sealed for nearly a century. Erdoğan understands that peace would offer economic and political benefits for his country at the expense of Russian influence.”
  • “To bring an end to the cycles of retribution and great power overreach that have long plagued the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Armenia need to forge economic interdependence and a durable peace, creating a regional architecture that stretches toward Türkiye and Europe. This would not only strengthen the resilience of Armenian democracy against the pull of Russian-backed autocracy but would also reintegrate this long-neglected region into the global economy.”
  • “Washington should warn Aliyev against any further military action and emphasize that he will build an important legacy and economic benefits for his country if he signs the deal now.”

 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by NATO released under the legally recognized terms of "Fair Use" to members of the press, academia, non-profits and the general public.

 

[1] Trenin uses Russian term “устрашение” which can also be translated as horrification. We chose to translate as intimidation because the author contrasts it with deterrence.

[2] *Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

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