This Week’s Highlights

• How to make “redlines … achieve their intended result” is the main question in a Foreign Affairs article by Dan Altman and Kathleen E. Powers, professors at Georgia State University and Dartmouth College. “Russia’s core problem is not issuing credible threats but rather making credible assurances,” they write. “If NATO leaders agreed to take Ukrainian membership off the table, they could not be sure that Russia would not use similar threats in the future to make new demands. … U.S. policymakers would be wise to consider this as they craft their own redlines to constrain Russia. Imposing sanctions on Moscow before it attacks Ukraine would be a mistake. Washington should instead create the strongest possible incentive for Putin to stand down by making clear that U.S. sanctions will be maximized if Russia invades and minimized if it does not.”
• “A contest of ideas is underway, both within U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration and outside of it,” Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes for Foreign Policy. He describes the camps as the “liberal internationalists, who … are now yearning for hard punishments to save Ukraine from falling under Russia’s sway,” and “the realists,” who “from the outset … have recognized that Russia has greater interests in Ukraine and more resolve to fight for them than the United States and its allies ever will. Rather than attempt in vain to balance Russia on the battlefield, they want the United States to play a different game: prevent an invasion through diplomacy and compromise, with the aim of reaching a modus vivendi. … If Biden wants to reach the more peaceful future he seeks, he will have to be more determined to go down a realist path.”
• Claims that President Vladimir Putin will look weak and undermine his authority at home if he doesn’t invade Ukraine “overlook key sources of Putin’s domestic appeal,” write Henry Hale and Adam Lenton of George Washington University. Their research shows that Russians see Putin as a guarantor of “stability, security and prosperity” and “a foreign policy moderate.” Moreover, “Putin sells himself to his people in just this way, as a cool head of reason and pragmatism in the face of a West that he depicts as rash, hysterical and full of double standards and zealotry. … When he advocates conflict-avoidance with the United States, his political gains are about the same” as “when he talks about how the West threatens Russia.” If Western actions “make it easier for hardliners to sell Russia’s public on the idea that it is the United States, not Russia, escalating the conflict,” the authors conclude, Russians may become more “supportive of aggressive military action outside its borders.”
• Considering the Ukraine crisis in the context of Russia-China ties, Harvard’s Graham Allison, writing for The National Interest, states his “high-confidence judgment that Putin will not use military force against Ukraine before Feb. 20” … out of his “respect for Xi Jinping and the fact that the Beijing Olympics run” until that date. Paul Saunders, meanwhile, posits that “China has few incentives to welcome war in Europe, as the resulting upheaval could jeopardize its key interests, not least of them economic.” Exploring the nature of Sino-Russian ties for Russia Matters, he writes that “Beijing and Moscow’s increasingly close relationship has emerged from a mutual commitment to non-aggression—and to not threatening one another’s important interests—that allows each government to focus on its strategic aims. Whether the arrangement is sustainable over the long-term … appears remote from current events in Ukraine or elsewhere.”
• “Personalist systems have common characteristics that shape how their leaders operate, and studying them can help observers understand what drives strongman behavior—including Putin’s,” Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky write in Foreign Affairs. “Personalist dictators can afford to be more violent than other kinds of autocrats. That doesn’t mean more violence in Ukraine is preordained. In the past, Putin has been pragmatic and sensitive to war’s costs. But … the future of Ukraine may hinge on a man ensconced in a bubble that both feeds his aggression and shields him from its consequences.” 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Are Iran and Russia Headed for Strategic Partnership?” Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The National Interest, 02.04.22. The author, a Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at Princeton University and a former chief of Iran’s National Security Foreign Relations Committee, writes:

• “There are numerous areas that Iran and Russia can find common ground. … [B]oth combat Sunni extremist groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda; both admonish the United States’ hypocrisy on human rights, terrorism, and unilateralism; both grapple with U.S. sanctions and hope to topple the petrodollar’s dominance in global finance and trade.”
• “On the economic front, geographical proximity and transit connections are likely to strengthen trade and business between the two countries. 
• “Nevertheless, there are also significant divergences between Iran and Russia on important issues. For example, Russia has strategic ties with Israel and seeks to attract Turkey and Saudi Arabia away from the United States. … On issues of energy, Russia and Iran have conflict over exporting gas to Europe. Another example is Islamic divergences. … Iran is a Shia country, while most Russian Muslims are Sunni. … Also, Russia and Israel are strategic partners while Iran considers Israel an enemy.”
• “Further, there are also areas where Russia and the United States find common interests. Reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran is one of those rare occasions. Moreover, neither Russia nor the United States wants another Middle East war. … Moreover, a strategic partnership requires broad public support from both sides but trust issues between the people of Russia and Iran, specifically Iranians, remain an obstacle.”
• “Generally, each side views the other as a bargaining chip in dealing with the West.”

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“When Redlines Fail,” Dan Altman and Kathleen E. Powers, Foreign Affairs, 02.02.22. 

“Putin Has Off-Ramps: Let’s Not Block Them,” Henry Hale and Adam Lenton, PONARS Eurasia, 02.02.22. The authors, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and a PhD candidate in political science at George Washington University, write:

• “With warnings Russia will invade Ukraine growing louder by the day, it is common to hear that President Vladimir Putin has passed the point of no return… [that] anything short of invasion will be seen as weakness and undermine Putin’s authority at home.”
• “Such accounts overlook key sources of Putin’s domestic appeal, which is based much more on pragmatically providing stability, security and prosperity than on aggressiveness. This gives him options for backing off that Western governments should not neglect.”
• “Surveys have long asked Russians what kind of foreign policy they want, and two things are clear. For one, … Russians want to treat the West better than they think it is now treating them. … Putin sells himself to his people in just this way, as a cool head of reason and pragmatism in the face of a West that he depicts as rash, hysterical and full of double standards and zealotry.”
• “This is also how Russians understand Putin. Rather than a hawk, most believe they are getting a foreign policy moderate with Putin. Moreover, it is consistently pro-Western Russians—not anti-Western ones—who support him. Russians who advocate a more aggressive foreign policy tend to back others, such as the Communist Party (which recently called on Putin to recognize the breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine) or the LDPR… These parties … allow Putin tactically to occupy a broad center, where majority opinion lies.”
• “These conclusions emerge from a large-scale study we presented recently… [P]eople become more likely to support Putin when he talks about how the West threatens Russia. But … when he advocates conflict-avoidance with the United States, his political gains are about the same.”

“It Is Not About Ukraine,” Sergei A. Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 02.07.22. The author, honorary chairman at Russia’s advisory Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and an academic supervisor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, writes:

• “Russian troops near the border of Ukraine are not going to move into the country. It is simply senseless. … Troops are there to prevent another assault on Donbas republics. If that happens, Kyiv’s army will be destroyed and what is left of the already failed state will probably collapse.”
• “[Russian] troops and other military-technical means, as Russian generals nicely put it, are there to increase pressure on puppeteers rather than on puppets. … U.S. and NATO are still rejecting fair Russian proposals… The U. S. counter proposals about talks on confidence-building measures and arms control sound pleasant, but they are largely senseless. We had them before.”
• “Confidence could start to be restored only when basic Russian interests are met. … NATO is not an immediate threat. We observed its fighting capabilities in Afghanistan. But we see it as a dangerous virus spreading bellicosity and thriving on it. … [T]he closer it comes to our borders the more dangerous it could become. … The security system in Europe, built largely by the West since 1990s, when a peace treaty was not signed after the end of the previous Cold War, is dangerously unsustainable.”
• “There are a few ways to solve the narrow Ukrainian problem. Return of countries like her to permanent neutrality, legal guarantees by several key NATO countries not to vote ever for further expansion of the bloc. … And, of course, implementation of the Minsk agreements.”
• “But the task is wider: to build a viable system on the ruins of the present. And without resorting to arms, of course. Probably in the wider Greater Eurasian framework. Russia needs a safe and friendly Western flank in the future world competition.”

“For America and Russia, Deadly Perceptions Can Lead to War,” George Beebe, The National Interest, 02.05.22. The author, vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “[B]reaking the dangerous escalatory spiral with Russia is critically important to U.S. national security. Few Americans believe we should defend Ukraine directly with conventional military forces, but many in our government and media advocate unconventional warfare…The belief that we should bloody Putin’s nose is premised on the assumption that he would not strike back.”
• “That is a potentially perilous assumption. Putin has threatened a complete break in relations with the United States in response to severe American sanctions, and he has tacked hard toward China in recent months to show that he has alternatives should push become shove with the West.”
• “The Russians also suffer from flawed assumptions. Putin may be at least partially correct that Washington will only negotiate when faced with the prospect of force. But he is wrong if he believes that Washington would continue to negotiate if that force is applied.”
• “The current escalatory spiral between the United States and Russia would intensify, not diminish, in the aftermath of even a limited Russian invasion of Ukraine. Any exchange of attacks on critical Russian and American infrastructure could have profound consequences.”
• “There is still time for diplomacy to avert such an escalation. But it will only be possible if Washington and Moscow recognize the need to move past mutual threats and find a face-saving compromise on their core concerns: the Russians’ demand that NATO back away from their periphery, and the West’s insistence that Eastern Europe be safe from Russian attack.”

“Russia’s ‘military-technical solution’ for Ukraine,” Greg Austin, IISS, February 2022. The author, a senior fellow for cyber, space and future conflict at IISS, writes:

• “The only clear statement by President Putin of the consequences of a failure by NATO to comply with Russian demands regarding Ukraine is that Moscow will resort to ‘military-technical’ measures.”
• “The same term was also used by the Russian negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, in talks with the United States on 10–11 January: he said that if Russia’s demands regarding Ukraine were not met, it would need to find a ‘military-technical solution.’ What does this term mean in the context of Russian strategic plans and posturing?”
• “My assessment is that by ‘military-technical’ Putin means, apart from weapons deployments outside Ukraine, measures that constitute coerced arms control: the imposition, by force if necessary, of certain restraints or prohibitions on foreign arms deliveries to Ukraine; on stationing of NATO personnel in Ukraine; on military overflight of Ukraine or parts of it; and possibly on NATO operations in close proximity to Ukraine’s borders.”
• “This interpretation does not fully explain the scale and character of the military build-up. Russia may well use its claimed need to undertake such measures simply as an excuse for wider military pressure on Ukraine, including some form of invasion. But under this interpretation of ‘military-technical’ measures (‘coerced arms control’), we could begin to imagine that Russia’s military interventions inside Ukraine may be localized rather than ‘broad front.’”
• “We can interpret the large military build-up by Russia near Ukraine as part of a plan to invade it, and that remains possible. But we could also interpret the build-up in two other ways, which may not be mutually exclusive. … Firstly, it could be to provide adequate forces in place to respond to contingencies that might arise from ‘coerced arms control.’ … Secondly, it may be part of a permanent rebalancing of Russian forces to the country’s western border.”

“Why Biden Should Give Diplomacy With Russia a Chance” Dimitri K. Simes, The National Interest, 02.04.22. The author, president of The Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “The West’s preoccupation with the threat of an imminent, out-of-the-blue Russian invasion of Ukraine is misplaced. It is based on a fundamental misreading of Russia’s mindset, priorities and mode of operations. The suggestion that Moscow will proceed with a massive, unprovoked attack—with Russian tank columns driving straight into Ukraine’s Javelin-strengthened defenses—and that it will happen soon, perhaps this month, is questionable at best.”
• “Rather than undertake an all-out invasion of Ukraine without any specific reason, Russia is more likely to remain patient—and wait for what could be portrayed as a Ukrainian provocation. Meanwhile, it is preparing to respond to the West’s ‘sanctions from hell’ as if they were the functional equivalent of war—meaning that instead of its familiar, toothless countersanctions, Moscow would employ a broad spectrum of measures targeted against Western economies, infrastructure and individuals perceived as involved in hostile activities against Russia.”
• “So how could a military conflict in Ukraine actually start? In the many conversations I had in Moscow in December with Russian officials—some considered close to President Vladimir Putin—I did not hear a single one mention the possibility of a major Russian invasion simply because Moscow’s demands on NATO enlargement and NATO forces in Eastern Europe were not met.”
• “The Biden administration must provide leadership in addressing Russian demands, including Moscow’s call for a formal treaty that precludes Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership. So far, Washington’s response to this demand has been unequivocal: ‘it cannot be done.’ But Washington never really explains why.”
• “It would be perfectly appropriate … to at least acknowledge the truth: that neither Ukraine nor Georgia are ready for NATO membership by any objective criteria, and that it will take years before they can realistically expect to join the alliance.”

“The Costs of War With Russia,” Mathew Burrows, The National Interest, 02.04.22. The author, who serves as the Atlantic Council’s director of foresight and co-director of the New American Engagement Initiative (NAEI), having retired from a 28-year career at the CIA, writes:

• “Although it is hard to imagine, resolving the Ukraine issue could be the beginning of a major improvement in relations between Russia and the West. It could help President Joe Biden undo the damage to his image stemming from the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, bolstering his sagging popularity. Equally, an agreement from which Russia could also claim some gains might help to convince Putin that he can deal with West and make him less inclined to deepen relations with China. … A peaceful resolution of the ongoing crisis would also discredit the false analogy of appeasement that is frequently used to argue against any attempt to negotiate with Moscow or Beijing.”
• “[C]rafting a peaceful settlement is easier said than done. But the Biden administration should not waver from this goal So far, the administration has been largely reactive by saying no and hoping the Russians give up after being intimidated by the threat of sanctions. Instead, pushing Ukraine to engage with members of the Normandy Format and reinvigorating the Minsk peace progress is a move that would be welcomed by European allies.”
• “Regarding NATO expansion, a number of agreements could be reached to create a buffer zone between Russia and NATO. It is doubtful that would [be] enough to satisfy Russian expectations but the trust that could be generated may help both sides reach an understanding on NATO.”
• “While ‘muddling through’ may seem less risky for the administration in the short run, a failure to reach an accord with Russia will lead to some form of Russian military intervention as well as cyberattacks, an energy cutoff and the use of insurgent proxies… [E]ven in the case of more limited Russian operations, Biden would find himself under congressional and other pressure to become more actively involved by supplying arms [to Ukraine].”

“Five Takeaways on Ukraine Crisis, After Putin Breaks Silence,” Marc Santora and Shashank Bengali, The New York Times, 02.02.22. The authors, editors for the news outlet, write:

• “Here are some takeaways: President Putin breaks his silence. … [W]hen he finally broke his silence on Tuesday, Mr. Putin did not repeat his threatening language, saying that ‘dialogue will be continued.’ But he made it clear that the chasm between what Russia wants and what the United States and NATO will discuss remains vast.”
• “The U.S. tones down warnings, but will also send more troops to the region. … amid the burst of diplomatic meetings … the Biden administration appears to have softened its tone. … But … [o]n Wednesday, the Pentagon spokesman, John F. Kirby, said 3,000 additional troops would be sent to Poland and Romania.”
• “European leaders are pursuing one-on-one contact with Mr. Putin. While the United States has presented itself as the leader of a unified Western response to Russia, European nations have made their own direct outreach to the Kremlin in an effort to cool temperatures. These overtures, as much as anything America does, could help determine whether the crisis is resolved peacefully.”
• “Russia is not alone. Mr. Putin spoke about Ukraine on Tuesday while standing side-by-side with the leader of Hungary, a European Union member state and NATO ally. It was a pointed bit of diplomatic stagecraft aimed at demonstrating divisions in the West, as well as the fact that Mr. Putin is not isolated.”
• “Ukraine watches and waits. … Watching Mr. Zelenskiy on Tuesday was a case study in the contradictions and concern gripping Ukraine in the face of threats by its giant neighbor. He opened a new session of Parliament by calling for unity in the country … and praising the enormous show of diplomatic and military support from Ukraine’s allies. He avoided any direct mention of Russia’s massing of troops."

“Biden’s resolute campaign of deterrence against Russia in Ukraine,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 02.01.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “As this crisis moves toward a decisive point, it’s useful to review how we got here. This wasn’t an accidental confrontation. Russian President Vladimir Putin set it in motion, advertising his ambition to redraw the security map in Europe—without knowing where his bold campaign would end. He must have hoped for a feckless, divided response from the West. So far, that hasn’t happened. The NATO alliance, massaged almost daily by President Biden and his team, has mostly held firm.”
• “Putin is determined to stop what he has called the ‘anti-Russian project.’ He made a huge gamble that the West would back down in Ukraine. The big surprise for Putin is that he has met an unwavering adversary in Biden—a garrulous, genial career politician who, in this confrontation, has been surprisingly resolute.”

“Ukraine conflict: An escalation within limits,” Margarete Klein, SWP, 01.31.22. The author, a researcher with SWP, writes:

• “[I]t is worth taking a look at the Kremlin’s previous pattern of using the Russian military as a foreign policy tool. From this, conclusions can be drawn regarding the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculations. First, the military show of force represents a firmly established instrument of Russian coercive diplomacy. … Second, Putin always kept Russia’s previous military interventions limited … Third, there has been only one case of military intervention leading to the annexation of territory: the conquest of Crimea. … Based on this, three scenarios can be identified as more likely among the options being discussed in the media.”
• “First, it is in line with previous logic to view the deployment on the border with Ukraine as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy to influence the U.S. and NATO to make substantial concessions. … If the talks fail, there is a risk of escalation. … Russia’s leadership risks running into a trap of its own making and loosing the possibility of a face-saving solution.”
• “Second, Moscow could further underpin its coercive diplomacy by permanently deploying Russian troops in Belarus. … Since the stationing of Russian troops requested by Belarusian ruler Alexander Lukashenko would not constitute a hostile incursion, Moscow would not be subject to political and economic sanctions, but it would have to expect increased military reassurance measures from NATO for the eastern member states.”
• “A third scenario is the open invasion by Russian troops into the separatist-controlled part of the Donbass. The number of Russian soldiers massed on the border gives credibility to this scenario. The military costs for Moscow would be low … Russia would face sanctions from Western countries, but these would be limited compared to a full-scale invasion. … According to the logic so far, Russia is not expected to annex the Donbass, but recognize its independence.”

“The limits of western sanctions on Russia,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 02.02.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Unwilling to risk a military clash with a nuclear-armed Russia, the west is relying in large part on the threat of punitive sanctions to deter Moscow from invading Ukraine. … [T]hese are unlikely to be enough, in themselves, to persuade President Vladimir Putin to desist—and the west must brace for pain from both its own measures and Russian retaliation.”
• “Russia has … sanction-proofed itself rather well since the west took measures over its 2014 aggression against Ukraine. The Kremlin pressed oligarchs to bring money home in 2015, and banned senior officials from holding overseas assets. Moscow has amassed gold and foreign exchange reserves topping $620 billion; only one-sixth are now in dollars. Surplus oil and gas revenues have been hoarded in a $190 billion National Wealth Fund. Government debt is just 20 percent of GDP.”
• “Moscow also has non-military ways to hit back, and has strengthened the leverage it exerts through Europe’s reliance on Russia for 40 percent of its natural gas. … Russia has helped to push European gas storage down to less than 40 percent of capacity, the lowest ever at this time of year. Liquefied natural gas from suppliers such as Qatar would be insufficient to make up for even partial supply restrictions by Russia.”
• “Yet while the Kremlin may feel confident of withstanding a short-term shock, western measures would cause yet more damage to Russia’s economy over the longer run. Coming on top of the cost of both sanctions and sanction-proofing since 2014, which has led to stagnant growth and living standards, the political blowback for Russia’s president could, over time, be severe.”
• “Today’s crisis may yet be defused. But western leaders can no longer be in any doubt over the nature of the Kremlin they are dealing with.”

“America is in Europe to stay—thanks to Putin,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 02.03.22. The author, the U.S. national editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “So much for America’s shift from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. By demanding concessions that have shocked a divided and rudderless Europe, Russian president Vladimir Putin has united the west behind U.S. leadership. … Russia has brought about what it fears—a West that is displaying something approaching resolve. As a result, U.S. President Joe Biden now finds himself on the front lines of two potential cold wars, one in eastern Europe, the other in the South China Sea.”
• “Putin has overplayed his hand. In contrast to last summer, U.S. officials have been assiduous in consulting and listening to their European counterparts. Biden now faces two urgent challenges. The first is whether he can offer a way for Putin to climb down without losing face. The alternative is a conflict in Ukraine that could put the Balkans atrocities of the 1990s in the shade.”
• “If, as the consensus in Washington holds, China poses the overwhelming strategic challenge to the U.S., Biden must eventually find a way to loosen Russia from China’s embrace. Existential rhetoric about a global battle between autocracy and democracy will only drive Moscow closer to Beijing. It will also unsettle many of Biden’s newly reassured European allies.”
• “The crisis in Europe offers Biden a clarifying exit from the rhetorical trap he has set for himself. The principle at stake is Ukraine’s sovereignty. … [R]ecent history ought to have taught the U.S. the risks of proclaiming its mission of universal freedom. Almost everyone, on the other hand, can agree on the sanctity of borders. By threatening Ukraine’s sovereignty, Putin has done something Biden could not on his own—unite the west. It gives Biden an advantage that should not be squandered.” 

“Europe Thinks Putin Is Planning Something Even Worse Than War,” Ivan Krastev, The New York Times, 02.03.22. The author, a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna and an expert on international politics, writes:

• “For the United States and President Biden … a Russian invasion led by President Vladimir Putin is a ‘distinct possibility.’ For Europe, not so much. A senior German diplomat summed up the divergence. ‘The U.S. thinks Putin will do a full-blown war,’ he said. ‘Europeans think he’s bluffing.’”
• “Europeans and Ukrainians are skeptical of a major Russian invasion in Ukraine not because they have a more benign view of Mr. Putin than their American counterparts. On the contrary, it’s because they see him as more malicious. War, they reason, is not the Kremlin’s game. Instead, it’s an extensive suite of tactics designed to destabilize the West. For Europe, the threat of war could turn out to be more destructive than war itself.”
• “America and Europe aren’t divided on what Mr. Putin wants. … The Kremlin wants a symbolic break from the 1990s, burying the post-Cold War order. That would take the form of a new European security architecture that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and rejects the universality of Western values. Rather than the restoration of the Soviet Union, the goal is the recovery of what Mr. Putin regards as historic Russia.”
• “But while Americans tend to believe that Mr. Putin needs a hot war in Ukraine to realize his grand ambitions, Europeans and presumably Ukrainians believe that a hybrid strategy — involving military presence on the border, weaponization of energy flows and cyberattacks — will serve him better. That’s based on some sound reasoning. A Russian incursion into Ukraine could, in a perverse way, save the current European order. NATO would have no choice but to respond assertively, bringing in stiff sanctions and acting in decisive unity. … Holding back, by contrast, could have the opposite effect.”

“Will Germany Hobble Western Sanctions Against Russia?,” Emma Ashford and Rachel Rizzo, Foreign Policy, 02.03.22. The authors, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, write:

• “Last week, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz urged caution when it comes to potential sanctions on Russia. … His statements drew outcry in Washington. Indeed, much of the press coverage portrayed Scholz’s statement as an indicator that Germany was simply not willing to get tough on Russia, presenting the country as a potential spoiler of Western unity.”
• “The core issue, however, is less one of German intransigence but rather that there are limited options on the table for sanctions in the event of a Russian invasion. … Policymakers face a Hobson’s choice: Exempt energy transactions from potential sanctions, and they are unlikely to be effective; or include energy transactions, and bear what could be extreme costs on Western economies.”
• “Europe’s fraught relationship with Russian gas is widely known, though often oversimplified to a kind of morality play, where Russia cynically manipulates European gas markets to create shortages and drive political concessions. There have certainly been cases where Russia has been able to use gas shut-offs as a point of leverage, albeit mostly with the goal of achieving higher gas prices rather than furthering its political aims.”
• “This leaves arms exports, technology restrictions, and targeting Russia’s ability to refinance its sovereign debt as the most viable options in the event of Russian escalation, as these can be most easily compartmentalized from energy concerns. Germany—and other European states—should not fear a Russian gas shut-off if such tactics are used. Indeed, Russia has always been paranoid about being seen as a reliable supplier in Western Europe and thus has a long-term incentive to maintain its European gas markets.”
• “Policymakers are thus left with a variety of unsatisfying options. The least bad of these may be for Washington to move closer to Germany’s more moderate position, looking for non-sanctions-related solutions to the crisis.”

“Renewed tensions with Russia inject new lease of life into NATO,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 02.04.22. The author, European diplomatic correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “French president Emmanuel Macron once observed that Europe was living through the ‘brain death’ of NATO while former U.S. president Donald Trump branded it ‘obsolete.’ But after Russia spent the winter assembling its forces on the border with Ukraine and warning of a military response to what it said were the alliance’s eastern European ambitions, NATO has been brought back to life.”
• “[T]he Ukraine crisis has reinvigorated support for the alliance’s original concept: as a defensive collective to deter a possible attack from Moscow. … The organization’s role became less defined after the end of the cold war and, as it sought new meaning, its involvement in the 1990s Yugoslav wars drew criticism from within its own ranks.”
• “In recent years, Washington’s pivot to Asia under Trump and his successor Joe Biden have prompted calls, most forcefully by Macron, for the EU to take on a larger role in Europe’s defense to achieve an autonomy that was less reliant on the U.S.-led alliance. Yet Vladimir Putin’s decision to deploy more than 106,000 troops on the Ukraine border, alongside demands including a ban on Ukraine and Georgia becoming NATO members, has made clear the value of unity and the organization’s unique ability to collectively respond to Moscow with both political clout and troops, officials say.”
• “Even before the Russian build-up, 2022 had long been viewed as a pivotal year for NATO. The alliance will outline its priorities for the next decade in a ‘strategic concept’ document this summer. It is also seeking a new leader to replace Stoltenberg, who steps down in September …The new strategy is expected to include significant mentions of China, climate change and cyber security … But the events of the past few months have reminded allies that their original foe still remains a present threat.”

“With Putin, Biden Should Channel His Inner Realist,” Stephen Wertheim, Foreign Policy, 02.03.22. The author, a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “On the surface, Americans have sounded remarkably unified during the monthslong showdown that Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated with the West. …Look closer, however, and a contest of ideas is underway, both within U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration and outside of it. Familiar camps are taking unusual positions and pulling Biden in opposing directions.”
• “On one side are liberal internationalists, who often emphasize soft power and multilateral diplomacy but are now yearning for hard punishments to save Ukraine from falling under Russia’s sway. … On the other side of the U.S. debate are the realists, who are known for prescribing just that: power to balance power. In this case though, it’s the realists who think no balance is possible in Ukraine—given Russia’s advantages. They favor diplomatic compromise between Washington and Moscow without even the threat of force.”
• “Although the administration is currently rushing weapons shipments to Kyiv, Biden has not pretended to look for a true counterweight to Russian power in Ukraine. Instead, he has adopted a pragmatic, largely realist view of the crisis. From the outset, realists have recognized that Russia has greater interests in Ukraine and more resolve to fight for them than the United States and its allies ever will. Rather than attempt in vain to balance Russia on the battlefield, they want the United States to play a different game: Prevent an invasion through diplomacy and compromise, with the aim of reaching a modus vivendi.”
• “The future remains open, Biden might then say; even the United States’ adversaries may make choices based on how it acts toward them. But if Biden wants to reach the more peaceful future he seeks, he will have to be more determined to go down a realist path through serious diplomacy now.”

“Realism About Foreign-Policy Realism,” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Project Syndicate, 02.04.22. The author, a professor at Harvard University, writes:

• “When realists describe the world as if moral choices do not exist, they are merely disguising their own choice. Survival may come first, but it is hardly the only value worth upholding. Most of international politics today is not about survival at all. The smart realist might not urge NATO to extend membership to Ukraine, but nor would he support abandoning that country altogether.”
• “In a world of sovereign states, realism in crafting foreign policy is unavoidable. But too many realists stop there, rather than acknowledging that cosmopolitanism and liberalism often have something important to contribute. Realism is thus a necessary but insufficient basis for foreign policy.”
• “The question is one of degree. Since there is never perfect security, an administration must decide how much security will be assured before it incorporates other values such as freedom, identity, or rights into its foreign policy. Foreign-policy choices often pit values against practical or commercial interests, such as when the US decides to sell arms to authoritarian allies, or to condemn China for its human-rights record. When realists treat such trade-offs as similar to Churchill’s decision to attack the French fleet, they are simply ducking the hard moral questions.”
• “But President Joe Biden cannot ignore the issue. His diplomatic challenge today is to find a way to avoid war without abandoning Ukraine or the values that sustain America’s soft power and network of alliances.”

“Biden Must Be Blunt With Ukraine,” Daniel R. DePetris, The National Interest, 02.06.22. The author, a fellow at Defense Priorities, writes:

• “The Biden administration has delivered an unequivocal message to Russian president Vladimir Putin: if you order another invasion of Ukraine, expect a whirlwind of financial and diplomatic consequences.”
• “It’s unclear, however, whether the United States has been equally blunt to the Ukrainian government.  … [I]nstead of the usual talking points, the United States would be better served giving its Ukrainian counterparts a dose of brutal honesty: a war is the worst possible option for your country. The United States has no obligation to come to your defense. Therefore, you, the Ukrainian government, need to do everything in your power to find a diplomatic off-ramp that averts a conflict.”
• “The only option for Ukraine is sitting down with Russia and coming to an ugly, but necessary, compromise on its geopolitical orientation. Officials in the United States and European capitals will reflexively flinch at such a statement … But Ukraine can’t ignore its own geography or swim against the current of its unique geopolitical circumstances. Nor can Ukrainian officials delude themselves into thinking the United States, NATO or some coalition of the willing will save them in the final hour.”
• “This last part is critical, for if the United States and NATO continue to act as if Ukraine is on the road to possible membership in the alliance, the Ukrainian government has less reason to engage in the kind of negotiation it desperately needs if war in Europe is to be avoided.”
• “Ukraine is in a weak position; the United States and its NATO allies don’t want to engage in a hot war with a nuclear-armed Russia on its behalf; and Russia, despite its belligerence, has proven it will undergo a significant amount of economic pain and international opprobrium if it means preventing Kyiv from becoming a full-fledged participant in Western security institutions.”

“How to Break the Cycle of Conflict With Russia; Seeking Consensus Isn’t Appeasement—It’s Pragmatism,” Samuel Charap, Foreign Affairs, 02.07.22. 

“The exit from the Ukraine crisis that’s hiding in plain sight,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The New York Times, 02.01.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Is there any way out of this exceedingly dangerous crisis? Perhaps the only hope is the Minsk II agreement, forged in February 2015 between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by Germany and France, and endorsed by the European Union and the United Nations.”
• “Minsk II is a compromise. As such, it requires hard choices on all sides. Ideally, the agreement would be accompanied by a treaty between Russia and the United States and Europe guaranteeing neutrality for Ukraine, similar to the enforced neutrality of Austria since the Cold War’s early years. The Ukrainians would have to give up aspirations to join NATO, and accept an autonomous Donbas region. Russia would have to agree to Ukrainian independence and give up any effort to make the country part of any Russian-dominated alliance. As Quincy Institute senior fellow Anatol Lieven notes, this would be a major concession: Putin has seen Ukrainian membership in the Eurasian Economic Union as essential to countering the European Union.”
• “What is the alternative? For all the screeching of the hawks, there is none in sight.” 

“Is Biden’s Strategy With Putin Working, or Goading Moscow to War?” David E. Sanger, The New York Times, 02.02.22. The author, a White House and national security correspondent, writes:

• “At key moments since the Ukraine crisis flared into the headlines two months ago, President Biden and his aides have worked to expose Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s plans, declassifying intelligence about his next steps and calling him out as an ‘aggressor.’ The administration has revealed information that could only have been obtained by penetrating, at least to some degree, Russia’s military and intelligence systems. … Each one of those revelations was part of a strategy to get ahead of the Russians in an area where Moscow has long excelled: information warfare.
• “But the disclosures also raised the issue of whether, in trying to disrupt Moscow’s actions by revealing them in advance, the administration is deterring Russian action or spurring it on. The administration’s goal is to cut the Russians off at each turn by exposing their plans and forcing them to think of alternative strategies. But that approach could provoke Mr. Putin at a moment when American intelligence officials believe he has not yet decided whether to invade.”
• “‘Regardless of how this plays out, it will be a great case study in the pre-emptive use of intelligence,’ said Paul R. Kolbe, the former chief of the CIA’s Central Eurasia Division, who worked in Russia as Mr. Putin rose and now directs the Intelligence Project at Harvard.”
• “Some Russia experts inside and outside the government say that while Mr. Putin is seeking respect for Russia as a great power and real attention to his security needs—complaints that the West has largely ignored—lengthy negotiations over new arms control treaties or reciprocal limits on troop movements and exercises are unlikely to satisfy him. He will want concrete concessions now, in this view, before he can pull back from the border. … The Olympics end around Feb. 20, and the administration’s Russia hands say that will be the time to assess whether they have had any impact.”

“A Little Mud Won’t Stop Putin,” Amy Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 01.31.22. The author, a national security and intelligence reporter at Foreign Policy, writes:

• “TV pundits, journalists and even U.S. President Joe Biden have zeroed in on the idea that the Russian military needs to wait to launch an attack until at least mid-February, when the ground around Ukraine’s borders will be frozen hard, enabling Russia’s ground forces to roll in without getting bogged down in mud. ‘He’s going to have to wait a little bit until the ground is frozen so he can cross,’ Biden said at a press conference earlier this month.”
• “It’s an alluring concept, one that appears to offer some lodestar in a time of deep uncertainty. While frozen ground would certainly make life easier for Russia’s military, experts believe that the Russian mechanized forces, which have undergone multiple rounds of upgrades and investments in recent years, have the capabilities to invade at any time of year.”
• “While deep winter and late summer offer the most optimal operating environments for Russian forces, they train for all conditions. ‘The Russian military trains in all types of weather—their training cycles extend all year round, so they do have some familiarity with shifting ground conditions,’ said Dara Massicot, a senior policy researcher with the Rand Corp. who specializes in Russian defense.”

“False-Flag Invasions Are a Russian Specialty,” Calder Walton, Foreign Policy, 02.04.22. The author, the assistant director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Applied History Project and director of research of its Intelligence Project, writes:

• “The recent claims by Western governments about Russian false-flag operations and its intention to install a pliant leader in Ukraine, are entirely unsurprising when seen from a historical perspective. Such moves were deliberate strategies on the part of the Kremlin during the Cold War, which Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin—an old cold warrior and former KGB officer—knows only too well. Understanding this history informs what we are seeing unfolding right now.”
• “Putin’s recent actions suggest he is creating a modern Brezhnev Doctrine, giving him the right to intervene to impose fellow autocrats in Russia’s near abroad. He has intervened in Kazakhstan and has a pliant leader in Belarus. Ukraine would be the logical next step.”
• “At the same time, Putin’s Russia is not simply the Soviet Union Part II. His regime is above all a kleptocratic mafia state, which fuses revanchist old traditions with new authoritarian Russian-nationalist ones. The more that can be done to expose its ugly reality, the better it will be for Russians, Ukrainians and the world.”

“How Would The American Public Respond To A Russian Invasion Of Ukraine?” Jordan Tama and Dina Smeltz, War On The Rocks, 02.03.22. The authors, an associate professor at the School of International Service at American University and a senior fellow of public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, write:

• “In July 2021, a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that 50 percent of Americans favored the use of U.S. troops if Russia were to invade the rest of Ukraine, whereas 48 percent of Americans opposed deploying troops in this situation.”
• “These levels of support are up considerably from previous years, as only 30 percent of Americans favored using U.S. troops if Russia invaded the rest of Ukraine following its annexation of Crimea in 2014.”
• “Other surveys have found that sizable portions of the American public favor strong steps in response to a Russian attack on Ukraine, though many Americans are unsure about how the United States should respond. An Economist-YouGov poll in December found that 64 percent of Democrats and 54 percent of Republicans place greater importance on the United States taking a strong stand so that Russia does not take over Ukraine by force than on maintaining good relations with Russia, whereas just 22 percent of Republicans and 14 percent of Democrats instead prioritize the latter goal.”
• “A YouGov-Charles Koch Institute survey in December found weaker support for defending Ukraine, finding that just 27 percent of Americans favored going to war with Russia in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine, whereas 48 percent of Americans opposed doing so.”
• “Overall, the available data indicate that the public is more supportive of a strong response to Russian aggression than inward-looking caricatures of the American people would suggest. This should enable Biden to rally much of the public behind him if he responds forcefully to a Russian invasion, which in turn may strengthen his ability to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine in the first place. Public support for a tough U.S. response does not necessarily translate into public backing for very costly forms of military intervention.”

“The West Has Responded to Russia’s Ultimatum. Is It Enough? Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.01.22. The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor in chief of Carnegie.ru, writes:

• “The Kremlin is often crystal clear about its intentions, and highly evasive on the means to be used. Its aim of stopping NATO expansion, above all into Ukraine, is genuine. How that aim will be achieved depends on how circumstances develop. Putin, for his part, will make that decision not as a politician, but as someone preoccupied with his legacy and place in history. After all, NATO’s expansion and advance toward Russia’s borders has been described as the main threat to Russia and the most dire consequence of the failed foreign policy of Putin’s predecessors.”
• “Yet the most sensitive stage of that expansion—into the Baltic countries—happened on Putin’s watch. It was also during Putin’s tenure that NATO pledged that Georgia and Ukraine would one day become members. For this reason, the president will do everything he possibly can to avoid becoming the Russian ruler who presided over that moment, too. Just like with that other dilemma Putin faces—whether to stay on or step down when his current term ends in 2024—a decision has not yet been made. As usual, there will be several different plans of action on his desk. What is certain is that he will pursue policies that leave both possibilities—of staying in power and of using military force—open to him.”
• “One question remains unanswered, however, and that is why countries that were Russia’s allies in World War II and during the Cold War, not to mention a whole host of nations that were once part of Russian territory, have all ended up as potential enemies. In one respect, the Western responses are entirely in keeping with the spirit of Russia’s approach to Ukraine: we have created the crisis, and we will help to resolve it.”

“Russian State Media Aren’t Preparing for War,” Alexey Kovalev, Foreign Policy, 02.02.22. The author, an investigative editor at Meduza, writes:

• “One of the most memorable pieces of fake news during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine was the ‘crucified boy of Slavyansk,’ a canard designed by Russian state-controlled media to whip Russians into a nationalist frenzy by the sheer enormity of the alleged crime. … Today, there is nothing in the Russian media even remotely like the ‘crucified boy’ canard, just the usual barrage of familiar anti-Western tropes and propaganda. Nothing is certain, of course, but this suggests that the Kremlin isn’t preparing Russians for a 2014-like scenario.”
• “In the state media’s echoing of Putin’s view that Ukraine has no business being an independent state, nothing has changed—except in the very important sense that the rhetoric is notably more subdued this time, echoing what the Russian Foreign Ministry considers its peace overtures to the West.”
• “It turns out that all these years of harsh anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda turned out to be an utter flop: According to the latest Levada poll, Russians’ attitudes toward the United States may not be at an all-time high, but a solid 45 percent of respondents still viewed the country positively—compared with only 12 percent in 2015. There is no seething hatred toward Ukraine either: While 42 percent of Russians polled by Levada harbored a negative view of their neighbor, 45 percent saw Ukraine positively—a stark difference with 24 percent positive and 63 percent negative in 2015.
• “A new Russian-Ukrainian war … thus looks unsustainable from the perspective of public opinion. … At his meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Moscow this week, Putin loudly complained about the West ignoring Russia’s security concerns—but still offered to talk it out some more.”

“The international cult of Vladimir Putin,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 01.31.22. The author, chief foreign affairs commentator for the news outlet, writes:

• “One great danger of the current Ukraine crisis is that if Putin emerges looking victorious, his style of leadership will gain even more prestige and imitators across the world. Land grabs, military threats, lies and assassinations will look like the techniques of a winner.”
• “The current confrontation between Russia and the west is about more than Ukraine’s independence, important though that is. The outcome of the crisis may also determine the tone of world politics. If Putin faces down the western democracies, his thuggish strongman style of leadership will look like the wave of the future.”

“Putin, Put’n and Peace in Ukraine: How we can emerge from crisis without war,” Anatol Lieven, The Nation, 01.31.22. The author, a senior fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “A mythological monster is haunting the fevered imagination of the West. Its name, as pronounced by the U.S. media and political establishment, is ‘Put’n.’”
• “This fantastic creature is related to President Vladimir Putin of Russia—but only distantly. The real Putin is certainly ruthless, cynical and cold-blooded, but also highly cautious and level-headed—too much so, in the view of more ambitious and hotheaded members of the Russian elite. He has never once taken an international action that actually risked war with the West or local Russian defeat. This should give confidence that we can emerge from the present crisis without disaster.”
• “When it comes to occupying more territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, perhaps even the actual Putin would feel in these circumstances that he missed a chance in 2014, and should not miss that chance again. Any such move would be followed by a new Russian offer to negotiate an agreement on Ukrainian neutrality and federalism; but, in the meantime, thousands of people would have died.”

“Putin Targets Germany, NATO’s Weakest Link; Biden should encourage Berlin to come off the sidelines and stop giving Moscow a pass, Peter Rough, Wall Street Journal, 02.06.22. The author, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, writes:

• “As the world wonders if Vladimir Putin will invade Ukraine, the battle for the West is already under way. Without firing a shot, Mr. Putin has attacked the trans-Atlantic alliance at its weakest link: Germany. When Chancellor Olaf Scholz visits the White House on Monday, it will be the most important meeting between a U.S. president and a German leader since before the Iraq war.”
• “Instead of merely embracing Mr. Scholz, Mr. Biden must also lean on him. This is essential if Germany is to rebuild its relationships with Eastern Europe. Germany sees itself as an economic power, and it must commit to answering Russian aggression with sweeping sanctions coordinated through the European Union. To make the case, Mr. Biden can point to similar efforts underway in Congress. While Germany may balk at rebuilding its army and supplying Ukraine with weapons, it can finance the development of allied militaries and support the permanent basing of coalition troops in NATO frontline states.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Opportunity for Diplomacy: No Russian Attack Before February 20,” Graham Allison, The National Interest, 02.04.22. The author, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, writes:

• “Last Wednesday, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman stated publicly that “we certainly see every indication that [Vladimir] Putin is going to use military force sometime, perhaps between now and the middle of February.” While I have great respect for the deputy secretary (whom I’m proud to count as a friend), I disagree. She, of course, is reading highly classified intelligence that I don’t have access to. Nonetheless, watching all the evidence I can see, I’ll state my high-confidence judgment that Putin will not use military force against Ukraine before Feb. 20.”
• “To sharpen the point, in a conversation last week with a colleague serving in the current administration, I offered him a four-to-one bet against Putin invading Ukraine before Feb. 20. That means I bet $4 of my money against $1 of his that Russia will not invade before Feb. 20. A willingness to give four-to-one odds reflects a high degree of confidence in one’s forecast: 80 percent.”
• “My confidence about the next two weeks providing a window of opportunity for diplomacy is based on my assessment of Putin’s respect for Xi Jinping and the fact that the Beijing Olympics run from today until the closing ceremony on Feb. 20.”
• “The year before he died in 2017, one of America’s leading twentieth-century strategic thinkers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, tried to sound an alarm. In analyzing threats to American security, ‘the most dangerous scenario,’ he warned, would be ‘a grand coalition of China and Russia… united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.’ This coalition ‘would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.’ Brzezinski’s specter of an ‘alliance of the aggrieved’ is now materializing on the geopolitical map.”

“Non-Aggressors With Benefits: Russia-China Alignment Won’t Be Game-Changed by Ukraine or Much Else,” Paul Saunders, Russia Matters, 02.03.22. The author, president of the Energy Innovation Reform Project and a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “In Russia’s standoff with the West over European security, Chinese diplomatic rhetoric has been ‘firmly in Russia’s corner,’ as The Washington Post put it recently. … [H]owever, China has few incentives to welcome war in Europe, as the resulting upheaval could jeopardize its key interests, not least of them economic.”
• “Beijing and Moscow’s increasingly close relationship has emerged from a mutual commitment to non-aggression—and to not threatening one another’s important interests—that allows each government to focus on its strategic aims. Whether the arrangement is sustainable over the long-term, which some have doubted, appears remote from current events in Ukraine or elsewhere.”
• “Washington can develop strategies to manage the Russia-China relationship and should be able to affect each government’s calculus in supporting the other to some extent. But, for now, the Russia-China alignment is here to stay.”

“Crossroads of Competition: China, Russia, and the United States in the Middle East,” Becca Wasser, Howard J. Shatz, John J. Drennan, Andrew Scobell, Brian G. Carlson, and Yvonne K. Crane, RAND, 2022. The authors of the report write:

• “Although Russia presents short-term challenges, China poses a greater threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East in the long term … China is economically and demographically larger, globally engaged, and has been strengthening its armed forces across all domains of warfare.
• “Chinese documents routinely accuse the United States of maintaining a ‘Cold War mindset.’ Chinese officials view modern strategic competition as similar to the Cold War in that it is global in scope and not geographically contained to the Indo-Pacific region. … Russian objectives often place Moscow in opposition to the goals of the United States and its allies. Russia views itself as occupying a place of privilege and significant influence in its immediate post-Soviet neighborhood and seeks recognition as a great power.”
• “China and Russia have approached the region differently, but both have sought to remain on good terms with all Middle Eastern states, regardless of intra-regional disputes … Both countries are diplomatically active in the region, as reflected by their senior leaders visiting the majority of countries there, often multiple times.”
• “Russia has been far more active than China in the military domain, even prior to its military intervention in Syria in 2015. … China has pursued economic engagement while remaining cautious about deepening its involvement in regional diplomatic and security affairs.”

“America Is Stronger Than It Looks. Moves by China and Russia have bolstered the U.S. Indo-Pacific alliances and NATO,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 01.31.22 The author, the Ravenel B. Curry III Distinguished Fellow in Strategy and Statesmanship at Hudson Institute, writes:

• “The factors making for the long-term success of Anglo-American order building are still present today. An open society and competitive business climate promote the technological progress and economic growth that underwrite our foreign policy. As a global sea power interested in preventing large land powers from dominating either Europe or Asia, Americans are the natural allies of smaller states seeking to protect themselves against the ambitions of aspiring hegemons like China and Russia. Overbearing Chinese policies in the Indo-Pacific have strengthened U.S. alliances there, and Russia’s threats to Ukraine are reinvigorating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and reminding Europeans why Washington, warts and all, is a good ally.”
• “Unfortunately, the American educational system in recent decades has treated the study of the foundations of American success with suspicion and disdain. Americans seeking to prepare themselves for the struggles of our era would do well to renew their acquaintance with the history of the world system we are called again to defend.”

Missile defense:

“China and Russia’s hypersonic weaponry threatens US early warning system,” William Schneider, Financial Times, 02.06.22. The author,

• “The evolving importance of space has been obscured by the seamless way in which space capabilities have become integral to both everyday public life and national security. But operations there are decisive for nuclear deterrence. Both China and Russia have well developed advanced offensive capabilities in space.”
• “The U.S. is developing a space-based system that uses advanced infrared sensors which may be able to detect maneuvering hypersonic warheads. However, current missile defense systems do not permit them to engage with rapidly maneuvering warheads. China and Russia have also developed counter systems that jeopardize U.S. space monitoring and communications capabilities at low, medium and high altitudes.”
• “By maneuvering their satellites for offensive space operations adjacent to US satellites, China and Russia could conduct a wide variety of offensive operations. These include disrupting, spoofing or destroying sensors, on-board computation, data links or satellite electric power systems, and inserting malicious code using cyber techniques.”
• “All of this is augmented by their ability to employ both cyber and kinetic capabilities to attack critical American infrastructure.”
• “China and Russia’s maneuvering hypersonic missile capabilities enable these adversarial powers to have an integrated capacity to defeat the U.S. early warning system. Under these circumstances, the U.S. would be blind to an incoming foreign missile attack, and its ability to respond significantly constrained.”

Nuclear arms control:

“How the demise of an arms control treaty foreshadowed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine,” Amy J. Nelson and Adam Twardowski, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 02.01.22. The authors, a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy program and a senior research assistant in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program's Center for Security, Strategy and Technology, write:

• “So, what does the conventional arms control version of the current crisis with Ukraine reveal? The pressing need for a new security architecture? A glitch in the arc of progress of the liberal order? Is this story one of an arms control treaty’s protracted failure? Or its useless endurance?”
• “We believe this is the story of the slow and arduous dismantlement of an entire arms control system, nested within the broader security architecture, to serve the national objectives of one treaty partner to the exclusion of all others, and that arms control agreements, no matter how robust, require the political will of all involved to remain relevant. In the early 2000s, the Russian Federation increasingly viewed the CFE Treaty as a speed bump preventing it from enacting national priorities—it no longer wanted such constraints to interfere with its strategic objectives.”
• “While it is impossible to know if the arms control system’s endurance would have prevented Russia’s aggression (again: highly unlikely), and the resentment toward NATO that provoked it (the flimsy rationale), the only outcome we could certainly expect from the erosion of this conventional arms control system is the dismantlement of the broader security architecture we are experiencing today. It is the inevitable endpoint on the trend line. The endgame of Putin’s actions remains to be seen. However, what is certain is that the dismantlement of the European security architecture will be a dismal consequence. In this context, calls for a new conventional arms control treaty to highlight the urgent need for renewal and stability in the region appear, unfortunately, as nonstarters: The world has never been further from an arms control solution or CFE renewal than at this moment in time.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“Even amid the saber-rattling, Russia’s spies reach out to the U.S.,” Andrei Soldatov, The New York Times, 02.01.22. The author, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in D.C., writes:

• “Last month, the FSB arrested 14 members of the REvil hacking group, whose ransomware attacks are allegedly responsible for millions of dollars’ worth of damage. The agency said it was responding to a request from the U.S. government. … One week later, … the FSB went after another high-profile Russian hacker—Andrei Novak, the leader of the Infraud Organization.”
• “What we’re seeing is less an effort to sow goodwill in the West than an attempt by the FSB to affirm its rising status as the major bureaucratic force behind Russian foreign policy—to the detriment of the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
• “This decline in the ministry’s international reputation merely confirms a long-standing trend. Western diplomats have long suspected that the ministry lacks the genuine authority to make policy on Ukraine. When Putin issued his ultimatums on NATO in December, observers noticed that the Russian diplomats dispatched for talks didn’t seem to have much of an idea about their own government’s next steps.”
• “The FSB’s power is growing apace. … The FSB has skillfully used its role as the lead Russian agency on counterterrorism to expand its influence in the U.S. capital. And these recent arrests—however calculated they might have been—will only reinforce the FSB’s image as the agency that delivers.”
• “The FSB has also played a leading role in Russia’s efforts to shape events in Ukraine. And it was also the FSB that tried to poison Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny … … Nonetheless, with the relationship between Russia and the United States unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, the FSB has deftly positioned itself as a valuable interlocutor on the issues that really matter between the two countries. And that poses a challenge to all democracies.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Don’t Blame Putin for Europe’s Energy Crisis,” Jason Bordoff, Foreign Policy, 02.01.22. The author, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the co-founding dean of the Columbia Climate School, writes:

• “The jagged energy transition that lies ahead is going to increase, not decrease, the need for tools to smooth jarring volatility in energy markets. Even if Russian gas continues to flow uninterrupted to Europe, Europe is in for a rocky road ahead. Ironically, Europe’s energy woes today reflect the success of its own reforms to liberalize European gas markets and shift to reliance on market prices. That success, however, was incomplete, as European regulators failed to simultaneously put in place the necessary measures to deal with the market’s extreme—and inevitable—swings. To avoid even more economic and geopolitical chaos than this winter’s, European leaders must urgently complement their successful gas reform with the necessary tools to buffer price volatility in the years ahead.”
• “European governments should ensure that gas storage can be counted on to provide supply security and system flexibility, including by strengthening storage requirements. This can take the form of minimum storage obligations for private firms or strategic gas reserves where appropriate … The need for regulators to impose obligations on private firms to fill their inventories to minimum levels was reinforced this winter, as Gazprom, which owns a sizeable share of Europe’s gas storage capacity, chose not to refill its facilities ahead of the heating season.”
• “Although it takes time to deliver benefits, European governments should double down on efforts to curb demand through efficiency in home heating systems and through regulations and mechanisms such as variable pricing or technologies to shift demand from peak to off-peak times of day.”
• “European countries should avoid retiring other sources of energy generation until new sources are able to pick up the slack. Europe should also ensure adequate investments in zero-carbon electricity generation that can produce energy at any time such as nuclear energy, hydropower and biogas.”

“Weaning Europe Off Russian Gas Will Take Time,” Rochelle Toplensky, Wall Street Journal, 02.07.22. The author, a London-based columnist for the newspaper focusing on energy, writes:

• “Europe and Russia have been gas-bound frenemies for decades. In Washington today, recently installed German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will be under serious pressure to rethink the relationship. While a quick breakup isn’t likely, change is coming.”
• “Previous Ukraine crises pushed Europe to link up its internal energy market and invest in renewable power. The current one is likely to give another boost to clean energy and improve the region’s connections with the rest of the world.”
• “About 40% of Europe’s gas imports come from Russia, while 70% of state-run supplier Gazprom’s gas pipeline sales are to Western Europe. … In Germany and beyond, particularly in former Eastern bloc nations, many are growing more wary of this interdependence.”
• “Europe has made some progress. Gazprom was forced into more flexible contracts that allow buyers to share their gas. Connections were built and upgraded to allow two-way gas flows. Investment was also fast-tracked to build renewable power generation and electricity links as well as new LNG terminals and pipelines.”
• “The gas crunch, coinciding with fresh tensions between Russia and Ukraine, has moved energy security back up the agenda. The EU has proposed new rules to improve gas storage and enable joint buying of strategic stocks. … Europe’s green deal, which looks likely to include gas as a transition fuel away from more heavily polluting alternatives, also is getting a boost from this crisis. There are moves to cut permitting time for renewable developments, promote power-purchase agreements more widely and fast-track energy efficiency measures such as building renovations. Gazprom also has diversified its customer base with LNG terminals and a pipeline to China and Turkey, with plans in the works for more.”
• “Europe and Russia are working to reduce their co-dependency, which could benefit gas exporters in the U.S. and elsewhere.”

Climate change:

“Could Russia and Australia Become Allies on Climate Change?” Stanislav Kuvaldin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.02.22. The author, a journalist and historian, writes:

• “Australia’s climate change policy has a lot in common with Russia’s. Is this enough for two countries, neither of whose climate plans are particularly ambitious, to become allies in international climate negotiations?”
• “In reality, there’s no unity among Western nations. The Australian government, for example, says openly that it’s not prepared to take drastic measures to reduce the carbon footprint of its economy. The main reason for this is that raw materials, in particular coal, form a major part of Australia’s exports, leaving the country little room for maneuver.”
• “In this respect, Australia closely resembles Russia, where officials are also hoping for a smooth energy transition that retains as much fossil fuel use as possible. The similarity of their approaches could make Australia an important partner for Russia in international negotiations: after all, climate change has a history of creating some strange alliances. But coming together will not be easy. Russia faces serious climate-related problems, and the solutions to them will be more demanding than any of the solutions Australia needs to embrace.”
• “[W]ill the similarities be enough for the two countries to become allies at international climate change negotiations? The answer is likely “no.” For a start, there are important differences. Despite its reputation as a gas station, Russia still has a greater wealth of technological skills and knowledge at its disposal than Australia.”
• “Finally, Russia’s geopolitical ambitions are radically different to those of Australia, and it will likely face far more significant consequences if it takes no action on climate change. For the moment, global warming is not an issue in the standoff between the great powers, and this leaves Russia a choice.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Bully in the Bubble,” Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, Foreign Affairs, 02.04.22.  

“What Would a War With Ukraine Mean for Ordinary Russians?” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.31.22. The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Our research has shown that Russians do not consider such limited military operations to be ‘real wars.’ These events bear no relation to everyday life. Soldiers may lose their lives, but that is seen as part of the occupational risk. The army has gradually overtaken the presidency as the most trusted Russian institution, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has long been the most popular minister, second only to President Vladimir Putin.”
• “Growing belief in the likelihood of war reflects a worsening of the general mood in Russia, which was far gloomier at the end of 2021 than a year earlier. … For example, 63 percent of respondents expected an economic crisis at the end of 2021, compared with 49 percent a year ago; 37 percent anticipated a conflict with a neighboring country (compared with 23 percent a year ago), and 25 percent expected a war with NATO or the United States (up from just 14 percent the previous year).”
• “However, this is unlikely to lead to more support for the authorities … Rising support for the president and a readiness to go and fight would be a long way off.”
• “Combined with the ongoing fallout from the pandemic, it seems clear that any war would destroy the still-relevant Putinist model of the state as stable and successful. Instead of mobilizing public opinion ahead of the 2024 presidential election, it would have the opposite effect. And it’s extremely unlikely that a ‘NATO consensus’ would replace the ‘Crimean consensus’ of 2014.”
• “If such a war should break out, it will be difficult to convince the West that it should not equate the political regime in Russia with ordinary Russians.” 

“How War Would Change Russia,” Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.03.22. The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Some believe a war would lead to internal upheaval in Russia. … While that certainly looks logical, there is actually more evidence to suggest events would develop very differently. Rather than losing control, the authorities would actually be able to strengthen their grip. And, unlike the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it would not be accompanied by public euphoria, but by coercion and repression.”
• “There are several compelling reasons to believe this latter scenario is far more likely. First and foremost is the growing influence of a conservative, anti-liberal, and anti-Western elite in decisionmaking. … A military escalation would heighten the sense of a national emergency, in which laws can be disregarded … Inevitably, war would lead to increased isolation … There will be no one prepared to seriously oppose such a course.”
• “Faced with financial difficulties, the government would inevitably increase the tax burden on business. … There is a feeling among the Russian leadership that the country has enough money to see itself through.”
• “Control over elections will increase, and voting at all levels will become, once and for all, nothing more than plebiscite campaigns with preapproval from the Kremlin required for all candidates. This will push Russian society into a deep political depression. … A new spiral of international escalation would accelerate and entrench the repressive trends that have been in ascendancy in Russian public life in recent years.”
• “As for society, there would likely be some sort of forced patriotic mobilization. Instead of a natural coming together, as in 2014, it would be characterized by coercion and displays of sham loyalty. The divergence between a fake system marching in lockstep and a mood of doom and gloom would quickly become a yawning chasm—with all the risks that entails.”

“Huge impact of ‘fortress economics’ in Russia and China,” David Lubin, Chatham House, 02.02.22. The author, an associate fellow in the Global Economy and Finance Program at Chatham House, writes:

• “The logic of fortress economics also argues in favor of building up a big stock of foreign exchange reserves to support a country’s ability to spend if, and when, sanctions bite—and Russia has followed this pattern assiduously. Its current account surplus averages 3.5 percent of GDP in the past ten years, which helped finance a build-up of foreign exchange reserves worth $460 billion, or around 30 percent of GDP – huge by international standards.”
• “A crucial tool in building this financial fortress is a highly conservative bias in fiscal and monetary policy. Macroeconomic policy must be kept tight to restrain domestic spending, and indeed the average growth rate of Russian public spending over the past decade has been less than one per cent in real terms, way below the 3.5 percent average in other emerging economies.”
• “In addition, as Russia needs to think of ways of surviving a post-fossil fuel future, saving now is sensible, particularly as the government’s budget deficit stripped of oil revenues is scarily large – almost eight percent GDP on average during the past five years.”
• “But Russia is not alone in seeking to insulate itself in this financial fortress – it is increasingly tempting to describe China in the same way. Ever since 2018 when China’s current account fell uncomfortably into deficit, the country’s policymakers have seemed ever more interested in ensuring that never happens again.”
• “Fortress economics does have one major consequence, which is that economic growth ends up lower than it might otherwise be, and the defensive approach to aggregate spending which is needed to build the fortress makes this outcome inescapable. Russia’s per capita GDP growth in the decade running up to the pandemic was considerably lower than its emerging markets peers.”

“Will a New Generation of Russians Modernize Their Country?” Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.04.22. The authors, the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and director of the Levada Center, write:

• “The regime needs to think about the future, and that means finding supporters among young people. Meanwhile, the young generation does not have a particularly favorable impression of the regime. One of the recurring topics raised by our [young] respondents was the ineffectiveness of the feedback channel for young people to communicate with government representatives and officials.”
• “The aging members of the Russian elite are also finding it harder and harder to find common ground with young people because of a generational conflict. This conflict manifests itself not only in the regime’s repressive policy toward young people, but also in the approval for this policy from a considerable share of the older generation. Young people and their parents don’t understand each other well when it comes to political issues, the general situation in the country and views of the outside world.”
• “To turn young people into supporters, the government will need to conduct a more active youth policy within the current political cycle, before the 2024 presidential elections. For now, this policy is limited to attempts to indoctrinate the young with conservative ideology, to cultivate a new generation of conformists and careerists. The main priority of the regime is to do whatever it can to keep young people away not only from political activism but also from any civic activism that it is not sanctioned by the government.”
• “The emergence of a new generation of Russians will not automatically bring positive changes to the state and society. Young people don’t feel free enough and they don’t view the future as anything concrete, despite their abstract desire for ‘self-improvement.’ However, we should emphasize that young people are not all alike, and for now, the quality of Russia’s human capital is very high.”

Defense and aerospace:

“The dynamics of Russia’s defense policy,” Pavel Luzin, Riddle, 02.02.22. The author, a political scientist with a focus on the Russian armed forces, writes:

• “The Russian authorities are now forced to return to an issue … abandoned in the very early 2010s[:] … an attempt at introducing a major reform of military education modelling it on the systems existing in NATO countries. This triggered resistance within military institutions, academies and universities, as well as among the political leadership. The point was that such a reform would sooner or later lead to a mismatch between the quality of the officer corps and the civilian bureaucracy, to the advantage of the former, and this posed a threat to the sustainability of the country’s established political order.”
• “[T]he Kremlin is currently experimenting, trying to strike a balance between proactive and unconventionally thinking officers and well-trained soldiers, sergeants and warrant officers, on the one hand, and ensuring their full loyalty to the country’s political leadership on the other.”
• “[M]oney, together with the military mortgage program, remains the most accessible instrument for the Russian authorities in these efforts. If we consider that expenditures only on servicemen’s salaries today … amount to 500-600 billion rubles a year, then this figure alone can be expected to increase by at least 100-150 billion rubles a year in the coming years. … [A]n additional 60 billion rubles per year has been allocated only for increasing the number of contract soldiers in 2021-2023.”
• “Some conclusions on the transfer of troops to Kazakhstan and Belarus: … Russia continues to hone the mobility of its armed forces within the [Eurasian] continent but is approaching the upper ceiling of its capabilities. … [I]f Moscow seeks to strengthen its role in international relations away from its borders, then the NAP‑2033 [national armaments program] will put more emphasis on increasing capabilities for maritime expeditions.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“It may seem like a distant conflict, but fresh Russian aggression will strengthen China and weaken New Delhi,” Sadanand Dhume, Wall Street Journal, 02.04.22. The author, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “At first glance, the case for New Delhi not taking sides in a standoff between Washington and Moscow is straightforward. … India shares no border with Russia or Ukraine. How they settle their problems is of no obvious concern to New Delhi, and many Indians support trying to walk a tightrope between Russian and U.S. interests. … While India’s security ties with the West have strengthened over the past two decades, Moscow is still India’s largest arms supplier by far.”
• “Many Indian foreign-policy elites also view what’s officially called the country’s “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia as a totem of Indian strategic autonomy. … India shares Russia’s goal of a multipolar world. It is a member of the Russian- and Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and of BRICS, a loose grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.”
• “But Russian aggression against Ukraine will have broad geopolitical consequences that affect Indian national security. As the Brookings Institution’s Tanvi Madan points out in a recent op-ed, fresh Russian military action in Ukraine would undermine a key Indian strategic goal by virtually guaranteeing that Russia becomes even more dependent on China for political support, market access and technology.”
• “At the same time, Russian belligerence would force the U.S. to shift resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific to Europe. Democrats don’t seem particularly eager to expand the American military budget, so a beefed-up presence in Eastern Europe means a thinner one elsewhere.”
• “India has a lot to lose if Russia ignites a new cold war in Europe. New Delhi can’t control Mr. Putin, but it could do more to make it clear to Moscow that it disapproves of Russian military adventurism. Of what use is a “special and privileged” partnership if you can’t speak the truth?”

“Can Macron be trusted when it comes to Russia?” Sylvie Kauffmann, Financial Times, 02.03.22. The author, editorial director and columnist at Le Monde, writes:

• “Keen observers of shifts in the rhetoric used by world leaders may have noticed over the past year that ‘strategic autonomy’ has been replaced by ‘European sovereignty’ in Emmanuel Macron’s discourse. The French president has also stopped promoting a ‘new architecture of trust and security’ for Europe and now prefers talking about the ‘European security order.’ These semantic changes reflect an evolution in the way Macron addresses the issue of European unity and the Russian question.”
• “Can Macron be trusted on Russia at a time when European unity is so crucial? This is a legitimate question, given traditional suspicions of French complacency towards Russia and a no less traditional irritation caused by the Gallic taste for an independent foreign policy.”
• “Macron has over the past few days spoken four times with Putin, making him the European leader to have had the most contact with the Russian president since Angela Merkel’s departure as German chancellor. … Does he merely seek a path to de-escalation for Europe, or will he try to pursue his old dream of a reset of French relations with Moscow?”
• “Two factors have since made the Elysée more realistic [since 2019]. First, the main result of Macron’s Kremlin charm offensive was to antagonize some of his European partners. Second, Russian assertiveness has grown spectacularly—including at the expense of French interests, as shown with the recent deployment of Russian mercenaries in Mali.”
• “Paris’s determination not to give in to Moscow’s pressure was visible early in this crisis. French diplomats like to recall that they were the first, on Nov. 12 last year, to use the phrase ‘serious consequences’ if Russia invaded Ukraine. In another sign of the priority given to western unity, French outrage at the AUKUS pact … has been dialed right down.”

“Analysis: EU faces a complex task as it tries to agree Russia sanctions,” Reuters, 02.02.22. The news agency’s analysts write:

• “The European Union says it is ready to impose ‘massive’ economic sanctions on Russia if it invades Ukraine, but officials and diplomats say the threat depends on complex negotiations involving 27 member states that are far from complete.”
• “‘Energy dependency makes a deal more difficult for the EU than for the United States. Getting political agreement is harder,’ said a senior EU diplomat. … ‘We have a deep relationship with Russia so there will be economic pain, and for some more than others.’"
• “Talks are being held in secret between EU capitals and the bloc's executive body, the European Commission, not as a group in Brussels. ‘Conversations are under way with member states. We don't want to do this in public. Moscow is good at exploiting divisions,’ said a second EU diplomat.”
• “EU economies are more exposed than the United States. Their exports to Russia declined by a fifth in the two years following Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 that led to Western sanctions being imposed on Moscow, according to EU data.”
• “Russia is the EU's fifth-largest trading partner overall, and Russia supplied 44% of the gas the EU imported in 2020. But [Russian] gas makes up from 75% to 100% of the value of gas imports in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, according to EU data. Germany and Italy are among the biggest exporters to Russia, with sales in sectors from manufactured goods to mining.”

“Turkey is friends with Ukraine. But Erdogan won’t cross Russia’s red lines,” Asli Aydintasbas, The Washington Post, 02.02.22. The author, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “For decades, Turkey has supported the independence of countries in the post-Soviet space. But with Ukraine it has gone even farther, building up a strong and mutually beneficial defense relationship. Turkey sells armed drones in return for Ukrainian know-how that could help Turkey’s ambitious defense projects (particularly regarding jet engines). Turkish drones have already been used in Donbas against pro-Russian targets, angering Moscow and making Turkey popular among Ukrainians. If things get worse, Kyiv is hoping its fleet of Turkish armed drones will make a dent in the Russian armor.”
• “Erdogan’s trip to Ukraine this week, as the leader of an important NATO country, will be a major boost to Ukrainian morale. No doubt Turks are genuinely alarmed by Russia’s desire to remodel NATO’s security architecture. After all, it was fear of Stalin’s Soviet Union that prompted Turkey to join NATO in 1952. When the Cold War was over, Turkey championed NATO expansion in Eastern Europe.”
• “But over the past few years, Ankara has edged so close to Russia that it can’t dismiss Moscow’s pressure when it comes to Ukraine. Turkey can support Ukraine to an extent that is permissible to Russia — but without crossing Moscow’s red lines.This should be a lesson to Turkey and others in Europe: You can deal with Russia and trade with Russia, but if you become dependent on Russia, your options in the great power game will be limited. Erdogan will do all he can to support Ukraine diplomatically and step up Turkey’s NATO engagement. But if war becomes inevitable, Turkey will be careful not to cross Putin’s red lines.”

“Russia's Growing Presence in Africa: A Geostrategic Assessment,” Adam R. Grissom, Samuel Charap, Joe Cheravitch, Russell Hanson, Dara Massicot, Christopher A. Mouton and Jordan R. Reimer, RAND, 2022. The authors of the report write:

• “Russia's presence in Africa is very limited. Because Moscow strategically withdrew from the region from 1990 to 2015, recent growth in Russian activity started from a very low baseline and remains modest compared with that of the United States and China.”
• “There is little evidence that the Kremlin has a grand plan for Africa. Because the continent remains peripheral to Russian grand strategy, Moscow's approach in Africa is essentially opportunistic. The key players in Russian policymaking on Africa seek opportunities to (1) advance Kremlin-endorsed policy objectives, (2) reap low-risk status gains and (3) capitalize on opportunities for extraordinary profits in Africa's rentier economies.”
• “Russia's future activity pattern could be predicted by identifying where conditions are most likely to create opportunities attractive to these Russian power brokers: preexisting government and commercial relationships, lucrative opportunities in extractive industries, local elites seeking external sponsorship and opportunities to burnish Russia's great power credentials.”
• “Moscow will continue to find such opportunities across a wide swath of the continent, but conditions will be especially ripe in North Africa, particularly in Libya, Algeria and Egypt. This is where powerful geopolitical and commercial opportunities overlap with the most-robust preexisting bilateral and commercial relationships.”
• “Conditions in Central and West Africa also might be conducive to greater Russian involvement. For the most part, Russian activity in these locations will be problematic for AFAFRICA primarily because of the potential for operational entanglement, in which the operations of U.S. and Russian forces overlap in time and space.”

Ukraine:

“Russia Can Win in Ukraine Without Firing a Shot,” Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, 01.28.22. The author, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “It seems most everyone is staring at satellite photos of Russia’s border with Ukraine. But they’d do well to study insurance tables as well. Business in Ukraine is becoming more and more difficult to insure. Indeed, underwriters are staying away from the country. And without insurance, there’s no business. Even without sending a single soldier across the border, Russia could make Ukraine’s economy tank.”
• “Companies wanting to bring goods to and from Ukraine’s ports could struggle to find an insurer—and without insurance, business is far too dangerous. Political risk insurers—which insure losses caused by political events—have already made that decision. When Laura Burns, a senior vice president at the insurance broker WTW, and her team recently canvassed the 60 insurers that have in recent years been willing to insure business operations in Ukraine, they found that only three are now willing to take the risk.”
• “In the past few years, insurance rates for Ukraine—except the Donbass, which insurers unsurprisingly stay away from—have skyrocketed. As late as 2016, a company with, say, $10 million of exposure would pay an annual insurance premium of $55,000. Today, the premium is $250,000.”

“A majority of Ukrainians support joining NATO. Does this matter?” Olga Onuch and Javier Pérez Sandoval, The Washington Post (Monkey Cage), 02.04.22. The authors, a senior lecturer at the University of Manchester and a lecturer in politics at Pembroke College, Oxford University, write:

• “Our team has followed Ukrainian public opinion in a series of 11 surveys over eight years… Our survey, conducted in February 2021—before the Russian military buildup—reveals that a majority of Ukrainians now support joining NATO. For the first time, a plurality in each region agree on this point. This recent rise in support is most pronounced in the eastern and southern oblasts—closest to the ongoing conflict.”
• “For years, surveys found a minority (20% to 30%) of Ukrainians approved of Ukraine joining NATO. In our own survey from May 2014, conducted in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea, just 30% of Ukrainians were in favor of NATO membership… Even after the July 2014 escalation to all-out war in parts of eastern Ukraine, this number rose to just 37%… Our research finds that preferences shifted dramatically after 2019.”
• “Surveys by Ukrainian pollster KIIS from December suggest that support for NATO membership might now be as high as 59%. Of course, it’s possible this reflects a temporary shift in attitudes following months of escalation in Russian action and rhetoric. But our surveys from February 2021 show that 56% of respondents agreed that Ukraine should join NATO—and these surveys were taken before Russia began massing additional troops on the border.”
• “Further, we found support for NATO membership has been growing across all regions of Ukraine… [B]etween 2019 and 2021, support for NATO membership increased by 20% in central Ukraine. In regions with close historical ties to Russia, this support doubled … rising from 15% to 31% in the south, and from 19% to 40% in the east.”
• “In 2021… First, Ukrainians who voted for [President Volodymyr] Zelensky’s party in 2019 were 19% more likely than others to have switched their view of NATO by 2021.”

“Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is a lone voice of reason in stand-off with Russia,” Mary Dejevsky, The Independent, 02.02.22. The author, a columnist on foreign affairs for the newspaper and its former correspondent in Moscow, writes:

• “One reason [Ukraine’s voice is still not being heard] would appear to be that it is not saying what the U.S., the U.K. and the more hawkish Europeans want to hear. Rather than amplifying the alarm about an imminent Russian invasion, Kiev has been saying ‘calm down.’ Not only that, but the central message from Ukrainian officials, up to and including the president, has been that what it sees as the overheated rhetoric coming from some Western capitals risks making the situation considerably worse.”
• “And it is hard to disagree. Were Russian troops to cross into Ukraine in large numbers, it is Ukraine that would find itself in all-out war … and Ukrainian land that would be devastated. … NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg drew a clear distinction between NATO members … that were protected by the Article 5 guarantee of mutual defense and Ukraine, which … would not benefit from that guarantee, even if Russia invaded.”
• “It is the disparity between the alarm being sounded in the most hawkish Western capitals, including London, and the calm that prevails across Ukraine that has been one of the most striking aspects of this potential conflict so far.”
• “In all the hue and cry about an existential threat to Ukraine from Russia, [President Volodymyr] Zelensky is almost the only national leader who has kept a cool head.”
• “Last Friday [Jan. 28], … [Zelensky was] bold enough to challenge U.S. assessments of the situation. … Asked to justify his questioning of U.S. forecasts of an invasion, he noted how wrong U.S. intelligence had been about Taliban victory in Afghanistan and claimed that the U.S. had said—for its own political purposes—that Russian forces were leaving the border area last April, when Ukrainian information on the ground said they were still there.”

“The Reason Putin Would Risk War,” Anne Applebaum, The Atlantic, 02.03.22. The author—a staff writer at The Atlantic, a fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University and author of several books about Russia and Eastern Europe—writes:

• “[O]f all the questions that repeatedly arise about a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, the one that gets the least satisfactory answers is this one: Why?”
• “To explain why requires some history… Putin and the people around him have been … profoundly shaped … by their path to power. … For KGB operatives [like Putin], this [the chaotic end of the Cold War] was not a time of rejoicing, but rather a lesson about the nature of street movements and the power of rhetoric: democratic rhetoric, anti-authoritarian rhetoric, anti-totalitarian rhetoric. Putin … concluded from that period that spontaneity is dangerous. Protest is dangerous. Talk of democracy and political change is dangerous. To keep them from spreading, Russia’s rulers must maintain careful control over the life of the nation.”
• “But although Putin missed the euphoria of the ’80s, he certainly took full part in the orgy of greed that gripped Russia in the ’90s. Having weathered the trauma of the Berlin Wall, Putin returned to the Soviet Union and joined his former colleagues in a massive looting of the Soviet state. … Eventually Putin wound up as the top billionaire among all the other billionaires—or at least the one who controls the secret police.”
• “This position makes Putin simultaneously very strong and very weak, a paradox that many Americans and Europeans find hard to understand. … Despite all of that power and all of that money … Putin must know, at some level, that he is an illegitimate leader. … He knows, in other words, that one day, prodemocracy activists of the kind he saw in Dresden might come for him too.”

“Putin, Ukraine and the madman theory of diplomacy,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 02.07.22. The author, the newspaper’s chief foreign affairs commentator, writes:

• “Will there be a war in Ukraine? The one man who might know for sure is Vladimir Putin. … But how will Putin decide? That depends on which version of the Russian leader you believe in: Putin the Rational or Vlad the Mad. Most western policymakers believe in Putin the Rational. … He takes risks, but he is not crazy. But there are other analysts who fear the Russian leader is turning into Vlad the Mad.”
• “A final twist is that Putin the Rational may be pretending to be Vlad the Mad. It was Richard Nixon who outlined the ‘madman theory,’ when the U.S. president told aides that it could be helpful if America’s enemies thought he was crazy enough to use nuclear weapons. Putin is said to be planning high-profile nuclear weapons exercises in the coming weeks—which would be a move straight from the ‘madman’ playbook. But the line between acting like a madman and being a madman is disconcertingly thin.”

“Russia Couldn’t Occupy Ukraine if It Wanted to,” Alexander Clarkson, Foreign Policy, 02.03.22. The author, a lecturer in German and European Studies at King's College London, writes:

• “A vast move to seize and hold large cities, including Kyiv, Kharkiv or Odessa, would require enough troops to destroy the Ukrainian army, crush a potential insurgency and back up any permanent security force that can be recruited from local collaborators or hired from outside Ukraine. Kyiv alone has a population of 3 million. … The level of manpower that previous occupations at this scale required provide a hint of the challenges Russia would face when occupying all or a large part of Ukraine.”
• “In Syria, the Russian military could rely on Wagner mercenaries or Iranian-backed militias to do the dying for it. In Ukraine it would be professional Russian soldiers and even conscripts that would have to shoulder the burden until a local proxy force can emerge.”
• “Worryingly, there are a range of other possible pathways the Russian generals could consider. Purely in military terms, a campaign to destroy the Ukrainian military as well as the foundations of its arms industry would remove a security challenge from along Russian borders as the Ukrainian government would then face years of work to rebuild defense capacity even with NATO support.”
• “Another approach short of full occupation of all or most of Ukraine could also be a drawn-out effort to destabilize the Ukrainian state, culminating in military attacks to force Zelensky to accept Moscow’s interpretation of the Minsk Protocol signed between both states in 2015 through Franco-German mediation.”
• “Though assessing the worst of worst-case scenarios is crucial for military planning, on the political level focusing too much on their supposed inevitability can engender a sense of fatalism rather than the mobilization and coordination needed to prevent them from unfolding. Perhaps such greater awareness of Western strengths can over time even open up the space for Russia after Putin to join … in a shared European home.”

“With Low-Tech, Trench Warfare, Ukraine’s Army Isn’t NATO Caliber,” Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 02.01.22. 

The author, a reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “In the icy trenches of eastern Ukraine, where government troops are fighting Russian-backed separatists, one of the critical issues in the standoff between Russia and the West—should Ukraine be allowed to join NATO?—seems hardly pressing or even relevant: Little about the day-to-day activities of Ukrainian soldiers suggests the kind of sophisticated, contemporary military that distinguishes NATO members. ‘You dig a hole, then you sleep in that damned hole,’ said Pvt. Yuri Todorchuk, who is 53, summing up service in the Ukrainian army in the east.”
• “Hard-pressed for soldiers, the military now admits enlisted men up to age 57 on three-year contracts. It has been reforming and re-arming but remains almost wholly focused on the manpower-intensive trench fighting in the east, a decidedly old-fashioned form of war.”
• “The conflict is fought mostly with rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and artillery systems dating to the 1970s or earlier. The United States has sold Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine since 2018, but they are intended mainly to repel a broad Russian attack, not for use on the front. Turkey provides another of the country’s newer weapons, the Bayraktar TB2 armed drone, but the Ukrainian military has acknowledged using it only once in combat, last October.”
• “Still, military analysts say the force is in far better shape than in 2014 … The United States has provided $2.7 billion in military assistance in the years since. In recent weeks, it authorized Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to send American-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Ukraine, and Britain has provided guided anti-tank missiles.”
• “And the Ukrainian army is battle hardened. About 400,000 Ukrainian soldiers, including about 13,000 women, have gone through rotations along the eastern front, providing a pool of veteran fighters who might be called up in the event of war.”

“Europe’s Next Refugee Crisis; The EU isn’t ready for millions of Ukrainians if Russia invades," Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 02.06.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “A major Russian escalation could push millions into the EU within months. Ukrainians would more readily integrate economically and culturally than the 2015 migrants, but Central Europe would struggle by itself to cope with a dramatic increase in arrivals. Brussels should be coordinating an EU-wide plan.”
• “The best way to prevent another refugee crisis in Europe is to deter Mr. Putin from invading Ukraine. But he may pursue his dream of resurrecting some form of Greater Russia whatever the cost, and the Continent will have to get ready for second-order consequences now.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“How A Russian-Led Alliance Keeps A Lid On Central Asia,” Polina Beliakova, War on the Rocks, 02.04.22. The author, a Ph.D. candidate and a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, writes:

• “The case of Kazakhstan suggests that it is time to re-evaluate the previous limitations associated with the CSTO’s role as a regional security actor. First, deploying Russian airborne troops in Kazakhstan as part of the CSTO peacekeeping force demonstrated the new level of Moscow’s commitment to the alliance. This gesture becomes even more salient given that the Kremlin is currently engaged in political-military tensions with the West over Ukraine and European security architecture.”
• “In addition, despite the lack of evidence that the Kazakh crisis was indeed externally coordinated, the CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan shows a new flexibility in the alliance’s readiness to intervene militarily. The deployment on such short notice by all member states (even in symbolic numbers) points to the Kremlin’s ability to overcome the internal divisions within the CSTO if necessary. These developments increase Russia’s influence among the CSTO states and up its game in Central Asia, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.”
• “In addition, the potential of CSTO interventions to deter coups and defections could increase the dependence of member states with volatile control over their security forces (e.g., Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) on the Kremlin. Overall, overcoming previous limitations and capitalizing on new opportunities to use the CSTO for regional security could advance Russian-led integration of the former Soviet space, provide Moscow with an additional mechanism to shape the political reality in the region, and contribute to Russia’s growing role in international security.”