This Week’s Highlights:

• Having abstained from strategic nuclear arms negotiations since 2010’s New START talks, Russia and the United States are now in the longest break from such negotiations since the Cuban Missile Crisis, writes Jon Wolfsthal.
• The Trump administration might honestly believe that enough is being done to curb Russia’s economic prospects, which some Obama-era officials may agree with, according to David Szakonyi.
• Moscow and Beijing don’t have a shared vision for an authoritarian world order, argues Michael Kofman. Their present relationship, writes Dmitri Trenin, is best described as an entente.
• The U.S. sacrifices political leverage by sending antitank missiles to Ukraine, argues Andrew S. Bowen. Even if the Javelins are used, it may not be possible to deploy them quickly enough to turn the tide of conflict, which is being fought mostly with artillery anyway.
• Whatever changes 2018 and 2024 bring to Russia’s leadership, the broader political system will become increasingly depersonalized in the years ahead, according to Tatyana Stanovaya.
• A new national movement in Russia’s republic of Tatarstan would be led by the republic’s mullahs, not its nationalist intelligentsia, writes Kamil Galeev.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“Making Sense of the US National Defense Strategy,” Kevin Ryan, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.05.18: The author, an associate fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, writes that the new National Defense Strategy Summary makes clear that the U.S.-Russian “relationship will not become friendlier for the immediate future.” The document names not terrorism, but interstate strategic competition as the main U.S. national security concern, and “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities.” Ryan writes: “To fully understand American defense strategy thinking in 2018, one must read not only the National Defense Strategy Summary, but also at a minimum the unclassified version of the National Security Strategy … , the National Military Strategy Summary (when it is published), and the Nuclear Posture Review.” The 2018 National Defense Strategy “sees China and Russia as global powers with global impacts, and they have become America’s main adversaries.” The 2018 documents show a shift to balancing forces in “four regions: ‘the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere.’” Additionally, “American military forces will be sized to win a war with a major power while deterring or fighting lesser adversaries in other theaters. … America will rely on its nuclear deterrent and security relationships to accomplish its goals. … Ballistic missile defenses are not being sized to defeat the Russian nuclear deterrent. … [The U.S. Defense Department] must team with an expanding number of agencies … . a key objective of U.S. nuclear policy is to dissuade Russia … that a first use of nuclear weapons … would de-escalate the conflict on terms favorable to Russia. … Congress … has made clear that it will not support any new arms control agreements until the situation in Ukraine … is resolved, and alleged Russian violation of the INF Treaty is reversed.” While the 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary names similar “threats and missions [as earlier strategies] … the priorities have changed dramatically.” The 2018 NDS “policy supports the view of the National Security Strategy and is bolstered by the positions of other key U.S. strategy documents. … There is, however, always opportunity for reversing direction.”

“Searching for Strategy in Washington’s Competition with Russia,” Michael Kofman, War on the Rocks, 01.30.18: The author, a senior research scientist at CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, writes: “The National Defense Strategy’s urgency is valid and its desire to focus on inter-state conflict meritorious. … But it betrays a poor understanding of the nature of the problem and the adversaries with whom we are competing. … There is no effort made to lay out Russian strategy as the Pentagon understands it, and what it is the two countries are actually competing over … . the text lacks a concept of how the United States will attack Russia’s strategy, gain leverage and … deter or compel Russia over those things that America finds of vital interest. … The first problem is that Russia is not adhering to the previously agreed rules governing European security, a region where the United States is highly exposed … . Following that problem … Russia is undeterred from political, cyber and information attacks on the U.S. homeland and its allies. … Third, managing competition with Russia by pouring gasoline on it will make it harder for the United States to … to manage a much stronger challenge looming from China. … the document … conceives of deterrence as the capacity to win. … would Russia let the United States ‘win’ a general conventional war without using nuclear weapons first? Nyet! … China may pose a genuine challenge to U.S. global leadership, but Russia seeks great power exemptions and traditional privileges … . However, there is no evidence of a special shared vision for an authoritarian world order between Moscow and Beijing. … Russia is a highly vulnerable country, always suspecting the United States wants to further fragment what’s left of its sphere of influence and develop capabilities to nullify its nuclear deterrent. … Russia’s military is always fearful of a first strike. This is fertile ground to plow … . Perhaps it is best we stay emergent and lean, keeping our strategy iterative, and adjusting as the future unfolds. This strategy is a good step forward from the strategic miasma in which we were, but it is unlikely to take us where we can, or necessarily should go.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“US Approach to Russia in New Nuclear Posture Review Risks Boosting Chances of Conflict,” Jon Wolfsthal, Russia Matters, 02.02.18: The author, former special assistant to the president of the United States for national security affairs, writes: “The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review … states that the world has seen ‘the return of Great Power competition’ and again puts Russia at the core of U.S. nuclear strategy. … Not mentioned … is the need for direct, sustained high-level engagement between Moscow and Washington to reduce the risks of conflict and of nuclear tensions. If we are back to a clearly adversarial relationship à la the Cold War … then why not go back to the tools that worked then? Russia and the United States have not been involved in any strategic nuclear arms control negotiations since the New START talks ended in 2010—the longest such break in strategic discussions since the Cuban Missile Crisis. … the NPR was released three days before the central limits of that agreement enter into force—limits that both states will meet, demonstrating that both still value managing the nuclear competition between them. Failure to pursue further engagement … could prove fruitless and leave America with few options aside from nuclear arms racing, but assuming this to be the case without meaningful efforts to avoid such an outcome is fraught with consequences. … Our allies in Europe don’t want an arms race … . It is not too late for Congress to convince the Trump administration to broaden its view, but such efforts may come too late to prevent further damage to strategic stability between the two Cold War veterans.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Putin Wants Syria Talks to Last Forever. It's the only way for Russia to build a long-term military presence in the Middle East,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 02.01.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes argues that Russia “isn't interested in any kind of resolution to the conflict [in Syria] even as it plays along with the peace process. … Putin would be unlikely to keep the bases [in Syria] under a plan like the one proposed by the U.S., the U.K., France, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, whose representatives met with the U.N.-recognized Syrian rebels in Vienna last week. The idea of that plan is to devolve much of Assad's authority to the parliament and to regions. … Whatever Russian officials, including Putin, say about a political solution, what they really want is for Syrian constitution talks to go on for 49 years, and then for another 25. … A de facto partition and a semi-frozen conflict … is the only viable option for Russia, the best one for Iran since it retains influence on Assad, an acceptable second-best scenario for Turkey and an unnecessary nuisance for the U.S. But since Russia isn't likely to believe any Western guarantees that it can retain its bases indefinitely under any alternative arrangement, none of the alternatives are feasible.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Why Did the Trump Administration Pass the Buck on Sanctioning Russia?” David Szakonyi, Russia Matters, 02.01.18: The author, an assistant professor of political science at George Washington University, writes that “we simply don’t know the true reasoning behind the [Trump] administration’s decision. But a look back at how the original debate over the CAATSA legislation unfolded, as well as official U.S. statements on the approach to Russia, offer a few hints … . Trump officials came out repeatedly against CAATSA not only for conflicting with their desired approach toward Russia (read: kid gloves), but also for the perceived overreach of the legislative branch into matters traditionally reserved for the executive. … By ignoring the strict mandate to impose new sanctions, the Trump administration is basically goading Congress to call its bluff. CAATSA is one of the few bipartisan achievements of the current session … . The Trump administration is gambling that that level of across-the-aisle harmony was simply a flash in the pan. … Even this non-action on CAATSA has demonstrated the U.S.’s ability to disrupt Russian economic activity. In many respects, the oligarch list was largely designed to be a psychological tool, and some of that damage has already been inflicted. … The Trump government may honestly believe that enough is being done to curb Russia’s economic prospects, something some Obama-era officials might agree with. … But Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said on Jan. 30 that there was a ‘classified version’ of the report and new sanctions were forthcoming. And if Congress gets its act together and decides to act independently, the ultimate measures may be even stronger than what the Trump administration could have minimally imposed this week.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia as a Disruptor of the Post-Cold War Order: To What Effect?” Dmitri Trenin, Raisina Files, 01.30.18: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “After the end of the Cold War … the Russian Federation tried to fit into the emerging Western system on special conditions of some ill-defined co-equality with the U.S., which would have effectively meant Russia’s participation in real decision-making. … When it became clear … that Washington instead expected Russia to accept the reality of U.S. global dominance and its own much-diminished status, Russian-American relations began to sour.” The ascension to power in Kiev of “a coalition of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Western oligarchs constituted an intolerable threat to Russia’s national security interests. As with Georgia in 2008, the looming threat to Moscow was a possible NATO enlargement all the way to the Russian border … . Russia’s 2015 military intervention in Syria was a war of choice. … Russia’s security would probably have suffered as a result of an Islamic State takeover of Damascus and the total collapse of the Syrian state, [but] Russia would not have been disproportionately affected … . Russia is now redefining itself as a global actor, although a very different one from the Soviet Union. It has no universal ideology to promote, but a set of fairly traditional values to defend … . Russia’s and China’s views of the global order are close. … Moscow and Beijing coordinate their policies on a range of world-order issues, from nuclear proliferation to cyber security, but they have not yet formed an alliance. Their current relationship can be best described as an entente: a combination of mutual reassurance (Russia and China will never work against each other), flexibility (they do not always have to be on the same page) and policy coordination.”

China:

“The Autocrat’s Achilles' Heel. How Putin and Xi Undermine Their Own Rule,” Alina Polyakova and Torrey Taussig, Foreign Affairs, 02.02.18: The authors, fellows at the Brookings Institution, write: “Russia and China—two great powers with autocrats at their helms—are actively testing the durability of the international order as the West seemingly retreats.” However, Putin and Xi “are staking their countries’ futures, and international trajectories, on one thing: themselves. … As both leaders seek more ‘wins’ to justify their personal control at home, they may increasingly pursue riskier and bolder foreign policies. … Putin will need to prove to an anxious and wavering elite that he is still the people’s chosen leader. … Putin is reportedly seeking to achieve a 70/70 goal: to win the [March 2018 presidential] election with a 70 percent turnout and with 70 percent of the vote. … Putin will have to reenergize his support base by shoring up nationalist-populist sentiments—so far, foreign incursions have been the only winning formula … elite competition in China is contained within the institutionalized one-party system. Yet Xi’s rapid consolidation of control is testing the bounds of China’s collective leadership model. … Putin and Xi’s consolidation of control will leave them personally responsible for their governments’ successes and missteps. … repression is a costly way to ensure long-term compliance from a citizenry. Putin and Xi might find it easier to enhance legitimacy by depicting their regimes as ‘defenders of the people’ against malevolent outsiders … . Putin and Xi may look like the world’s most powerful strongmen, but the age-old axiom still applies: authoritarian regimes are stable, until they are not.”

“With Everyone Focused on Russia, China Is Quietly Expanding Its Influence Across Europe,” Rick Noack, The Washington Post, 02.05.18: The author, a foreign affairs reporter for the news outlet, writes: “Two new studies suggest that Europe's embrace of China, even as it warns against Russian meddling, might benefit from a certain degree of wariness. When it comes to Beijing … European leaders appear too willing to overlook China's authoritarian ambitions.” A new study from two Berlin-based think tanks argues: “Political elites in the EU and its close neighbors have started to embrace Chinese rhetoric and interests, including where they contradict national or European interests.” Additionally, “a report by the European Council on Foreign Relations with similar conclusions was released last December. … five researchers examined a number of covert and more public means the Chinese Communist Party is believed to be using to influence European politics, such as infrastructure investments in eastern and southern Europe … . ‘Very few outsiders see Putin's Russia as a successful model for sustained growth and development, and Russia invests less in building stocks of influence,’ the researchers explain. ‘By comparison, the CCP leadership's buildup of influence across Europe is reinforced by China's emerging status as a successful socioeconomic model. … It is China that is set to be the bigger long-term challenge to Europe's values and interests.’”

Ukraine:

“The US Will Send Antitank Weaponry to Ukraine. Here are 4 big questions,” Andrew S. Bowen, The Washington Post, 02.02.18: The author, a PhD candidate in political science at Boston College, writes: “The U.S. decision in late 2017 to provide the Ukrainian government advanced Javelin antitank missiles … opens up a few big questions: 1) What's the backstory on the lethal weaponry decision? … Even without the Javelins, Ukraine was able to seize back much of the territory it had lost … . Minsk II … laid out a cease-fire plan. But …  there has been little progress toward a permanent peace settlement. 2) How do the Javelins change the picture? … Even if they were to be deployed … it's questionable they could be deployed fast enough or in great enough numbers to change the tide of the conflict. Not to mention that the current conflict is largely fought with artillery. 3) What does the U.S. lose by sending this weaponry to Ukraine? … Sending Ukraine advanced weaponry today gains little military advantage, and sacrifices political leverage … . 4) How is Russia likely to respond?  Russia retains escalation dominance in not only Ukraine but also the region. … Moscow can deploy more troops faster than the West. … However, the most likely scenario, should Russia choose to escalate, may not necessarily play out in Ukraine. Russia is adept at using unconventional actors—such as organized crime networks—in unexpected places. … Sending U.S. Javelins to Ukraine currently brings little military benefit, while heightening the risk of escalation with Russia. … the risk of escalation is not confined to Ukraine, giving Russia the advantage of choosing exactly where and how it responds.”

“Kennan Cable No. 30: Democracy in Ukraine: Are We There Yet?” Matthew Rojansky and Mykhailo Minakov, Kennan Institute, 01.30.18: The authors, the director of the Kennan Institute and a professor at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, write: “While Ukraine is a clearly established polity with internationally recognized sovereignty, it is nonetheless hampered in its democratic and free market development by endemic corruption, retrograde political cycles and aggression by its powerful neighbor Russia. … Attempts by Ukrainian elites to reverse some reforms in 2016–17 have thus far been successfully countered … . On the other hand … [Due to] Russian interventions, the military and security establishment play a far greater role in Ukrainian government … . These new factors increase the political weight of the president as military commander-in-chief, and introduce risks of even more radical authoritarian tendencies … . Economic prosperity has been subordinated to security concerns … . Voters continue to reject most state institutions as untrustworthy and corrupt. The result is that politics are highly fluid, institutions are weak and clans dominate political competition … . Ukrainian democracy has come a long way from its earliest post-1991 manifestations … [but it] is also hostage to the ongoing war with Russia and the country’s continuing socio-economic crisis. The future depends on whether the war can be brought to a peaceful end, national reconciliation can be launched and ordinary Ukrainians can begin to benefit from the many reforms now underway.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Fear and Loathing in Russia’s Catalonia: Moscow’s Fight Against Federalism,” Kamil Galeev, War on the Rocks, 01.31.18: The author, a graduate student in China Studies at Yenching Academy, Peking University, writes: “In September 2017, Russia’s central government started to enforce … abolishing local language courses in the ethnic republics. … While most local governments did not put up much of a fight, Tatarstan’s leaders pushed back hard against the new policy. This Muslim-majority republic is the closest Russian analog to Catalonia, a region with a strong local identity, tradition of resistance to central authorities and, most importantly, wealth—Tatarstan is a net donor to Russia’s budget. … The Kremlin is strong enough to impose its will over the republics … . However, to do so Putin has to rely on force and threats. In the future, Moscow may only increase its attacks on the ethnic republics and may even attempt to abolish them completely. … Whatever Moscow chooses to do with Tatarstan’s autonomy, it is fair to assume that any diminishing of central power in Russia (similar to perestroika) will immediately boost the national movement in the republic. This time, however, the movement might be led not by the nationalist intelligentsia, as in the 1990s, but by Tatarstan’s mullahs.”

“Rotating the Elite: The Kremlin’s New Personnel Policy,” Tatyana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.29.18: The author, director of the analytical department of the Center of Political Technologies in Moscow, writes: “Putin’s influential appointees are being replaced by technical figures with far less political gravitas. Continued involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine forced the regime to reduce the costs of domestic governance in order to save time and resources. … a vertical model of decision-making—one more comfortable for the president—has emerged. … Putin’s inner circle now increasingly consists of yes-men technocrats rather than elite partners. … Putin will have to make a decision about his future shortly after his reelection … stay in power after 2024 by repealing the constitutionally established presidential term limit, leave the presidency but retain de facto leadership by installing a figurehead president or transfer power to a true successor. Regardless … significant and swift personnel changes and institutional reforms will be required. … the broader political system will become increasingly depersonalized in the years ahead … . For the first time in decades, the system, rather than the president, will be the source of stability in Russia. And this means that, at least in the short term, Russian policy will likely become even less predictable.”

“Western Leaders Shouldn't Recognize Russia's Sham Election; It's Time to Break a Bad Habit,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 01.31.18: The author, a Russian opposition politician, writes: “For years, the attitude of Western democracies toward Russian elections has followed a strikingly duplicitous model: After observers from OSCE countries concluded that the elections had not been free or fair, the leaders of those same countries … called Vladimir Putin to congratulate him, in effect, on a successful theft. … the defining aspect of Russia's 2018 election—the elimination of genuine competition—is already well-known. The OSCE's preliminary mission report notes that Alexei Navalny, Putin's strongest surviving opponent, has been barred from the ballot on the grounds of a conviction that was found by the European Court of Human Rights to be ‘arbitrary and unfair.’ … The only acceptable form of legitimacy for an OSCE member-state government in the 21st century should be one based on free and fair elections. To affirm this is the least that can be expected from countries that pride themselves on democratic governance and the rule of law.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.