This Week’s Highlights

• The role of Russia’s new, exotic weapons systems are more political than strategic or for security: they are designed to signal Russia’s continuing scientific and military prowess at a time when the country does not otherwise have much on offer, writes Rose Gottemoeller of Stanford University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She notes that if U.S.-Russian arms control remains in place, these kinds of systems would not be deployed in large numbers as they would displace the highly reliable intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Russian force structure.
• If the Soviet Union and the United States managed to avoid a major conflict during the Cold War, then some degree of confidence seems in order today about the far less confrontational relations between China and the United States, writes Zhou Bo, a senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army of China. He notes that the confidence-building measures that exist today between China and the U.S. are rudimentary compared to those between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War, concluding that more of such measures will be necessary in the long run.
• Chinese analysts view the vulnerability of China’s nuclear command, control and communication systems to cyber infiltrations, even those limited to espionage, as a highly escalatory national security threat, write James Johnson and Eleanor Krabill of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Russian analysts, however, tend to view Russia’s nuclear command, control, communications and intelligence network as more isolated, and thus, relatively insulated from cyber attacks.
• The Kremlin has a good reason to play along with Trump and not get involved in the international campaign against the Trump administration’s plan for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, writes Russian analyst Vladimir Frolov. The U.S. plan essentially pushes for international recognition of annexed territories occupied during military operations. In other words, it would set an important precedent for legitimizing Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, which Moscow “reunited with Russia” in 2014, according to Frolov.
• Most Russians are not necessarily angry at Vladimir Putin’s strategy of commencing constitutional change before anyone expected it, writes Carnegie’s Alexander Baunov. However, the Russian public may react differently if the constitutional changes eventually turn out to contradict their expectations. Carnegie’s Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov of the Levada Center write that in the past two years, the Russian public’s appetite for change has increased considerably. A small but growing group of Russians blame Putin for the country’s problems,, they write, and if the thirst for political change continues to gain momentum in Russia, a full-scale demand for political freedoms and alternatives may emerge quite soon.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean for the Rest of Us?” Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 01.29.20: The author, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program, writes:

• “[Russia’s new] exotic systems have more of a political function than a strategic or security one. Their role is to signal Russia’s continuing scientific and military prowess at a time when the country does not otherwise have much on offer. If U.S.-Russian arms control remains in place, such systems definitely will not be deployed in big numbers, because they would displace proven and highly reliable intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Russian force structure.”
• “[W]e must contemplate what it will mean if no nuclear arms control regimes remain in force. For the generation that worked these issues in Russia, the U.S. and Europe, enough of a residual relationship exists that experts can grasp at opportunities for cooperation when they present themselves. Some mechanisms such as scientist-to-scientist dialogues are likely to remain.”
• “We should be concerned, however, that they may revert to the talk shops of the Cold War, with few opportunities to work together on practical projects. Meanwhile, pragmatic and persistent tools, such as the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers … may find their missions sharply curtailed as they cease to serve any treaty purpose. The U.S., Russia and Europe may thus be heading to a time when their means of communications in a nuclear crisis is no better than they had during the Cold War.”

“The Bomb—Why Nuclear Cataclysm Is Still Waiting to Happen: The risk of atomic Armageddon still looms over the world, warns Fred Kaplan,” Rodric Braithwaite, Financial Times, 01.29.20: The author, Britain's ambassador to Moscow during the collapse of the USSR, writes:

• “[In his new book, ‘The Bomb,’] Fred Kaplan dates the return of nuclear anxiety to the day in August 2017 when Donald Trump threatened North Korea with ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen.’ Up until then, people had assumed that nuclear confrontation had ended with the Cold War.”
• “Russian and U.S. leaders no longer abused and threatened one another. Their forces were no longer on hair-trigger alert. The Americans decided they didn't need all their warheads and cut them substantially; the Russians followed suit—slowly. Successive presidents … combined in efforts to bring the whole thing under lasting control.”
• “It was largely an illusion. The mechanisms of confrontation were not dismantled. The Russians were in disarray in the 1990s, but they pulled their chaotic political, military, and industrial machinery together, updated their old weapons and began developing new ones. The Americans matched them.
• “[T]he world is more complex than it was in the good old days of the cold war. The Chinese are just over the horizon. The Indians and the Pakistanis, the Israelis and the Iranians—and indeed the North Koreans—could each deliver an unpleasant surprise … Just keeping our fingers crossed is not much comfort. But that, plus whatever shrewdness we can muster, may be the best we can do.”

“The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking,” Andrew Facini, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 01.28.20: The author, publishing manager at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes:

• “The Trump administration first announced its plans for a new low-yield nuclear warhead in its February 2018 Nuclear Posture Review … [It] presented the lower-strength warhead as necessary for the ‘preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression.’”
• “In other words, the United States was seeking a new, intermediate option for an imagined scenario in which Russia, after starting a conventional war in Europe, might be tempted to use smaller nuclear weapons first in order to win the conflict. In such a scenario … the threat of U.S. retaliation with full-strength bombs would not be believable and would not be enough to deter Russia from pursuing such a course in the first place. The way to deter a limited nuclear strike by Russia was for the United States to have a readily available option for retaliating with a limited, proportional strike of its own.”
• “Proponents of the low-yield warhead overlook or dismiss a few key concerns that make the W76-2 an unrealistic military option. First, the imagined target for such a weapon is yet unclear. … Second, launching low-yield missiles would create a so-called ‘discrimination problem.’ … Third, launching a ballistic missile from a submarine risks revealing that submarine’s location instantly, making it an extremely high value target for a rapid enemy response. … Finally, critics worry that military planners will be tempted to use the low-yield warhead not for deterrence, but for a first strike.”
• “What’s needed most today is not a just technological rebuke of the low-yield nuclear warhead, but a fresh line of thinking about nuclear weapons broadly, and an entirely new set of proscriptive rules for the Pentagon to build around for the coming decades. For that, the field needs new voices, ideas and perspectives.”

“A Dangerous Game: Russia and America Keep Flying Their Planes Near Each Other's Borders: Nuclear chicken anyone?” David Axe, The National Interest, 01.27.20: The author, defense editor of The National Interest, writes:

• “During the Cold War, Moscow and Washington also tested each other's nerves and resolve by flying close by. The problem is that what happens if there's an accident and someone starts shooting?”
• “The next time a Russian bomber appears near the U.S. coast, remember that American bombers are just as likely to appear off the Russian coast. Mutual displays of aerial might by nuclear-capable warplanes is a routine, if chilling, fact of life for the United States and Russia.”

“China and America Can Compete and Coexist,” Zhou Bo, New York Times, 02.03.20: The author, a senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army of China, writes:

• “With the temperature seeming to rise on both sides, how can a conflict, or something like a new cold war, between China and the United States be avoided? Precisely by looking at the actual Cold War.”
• “In the early years … American and Soviet aircrafts didn’t hesitate to fire at one another. … And yet outright conflict was averted, thanks to a few modest agreements and well-established hotlines … Even bitter enemies can build trust, and with imperfect tools, when they measure the stakes of a full-on clash. … In 1972, Washington and Moscow signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas … Within two years of its entry into force … the number of incidents per year had dropped from 100 to 40.”
• “If the Soviet Union and the United States managed to avoid a major conflict during the Cold War, then some degree of confidence seems in order today about the far less confrontational relations between China and the United States.”
• “The confidence-building measures that exist today between China and the United States are rudimentary compared to those between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. In a way, this may be a comforting fact: a suggestion that relations haven’t become so hostile as to require many such measures. Yet more of them will be necessary in the long run.”
• “For Chinese people, who traditionally believe in yin and yang, the notion that rivals can cooperate isn’t a contradiction in terms. It seems to be a problem for America, however.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“What Provokes Putin’s Russia? Deterring Without Unintended Escalation,” Stephanie Pezard and Ashley L. Rhoades, RAND Corporation, January 2020: The authors, a senior political scientist and a defense analyst at RAND, write:

• “In the context of [NATO]–Russia relations, deterring without provoking requires an understanding of what Russia considers to be ‘redlines,’ defined as those triggers that Russian leadership claims cannot be crossed without provoking a major or hostile response on their part.”
• “Russia’s claimed redlines: The following redlines have been publicly mentioned by Russian leadership—including in official documents such as the Military Doctrine—as being unacceptable to Russia, and have prompted explicit threats of hostile responses … NATO enlargement, disruption of the strategic balance, direct threat to eliminate or overthrow the Russian regime, and loss of influence in the near abroad.”
• “To mitigate the risk of escalation, there are several measures that the United States and NATO could implement. First and foremost, the United States and NATO should pursue confidence-building measures. In addition to not crossing Russian redlines where feasible, the United States should explicitly articulate its own redlines and the consequences for crossing these lines. Deterrence by denial represents another way the United States can deter Russia while limiting risks of escalation.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments

Nuclear arms control:

“Don't Let New START Die,” Steven Pifer, The National Interest, 02.03.20: The author, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “Unfortunately, the administration’s attitude toward the INF Treaty and New START give little reason to think anything positive will happen on the arms control agenda under Mr. Trump’s watch. Change will require the Democratic candidate wins in November.”
• “If the Democrats were to win, New START extension would demand urgent attention from the incoming president. He or she would take the oath of office on Jan. 20, 2021—just 15 days before the treaty’s expiration date. The new president should immediately agree to Mr. Putin’s offer on extending the treaty.”
• “If extension were decided, U.S. and Russian officials could use the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission to take a more serious look at Russian concerns about conversion of U.S. strategic systems and the new kinds of strategic arms under development in Russia, such as the Poseidon nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered torpedo.”
• “New START extension would provide a solid foundation for discussions with Russian officials on the full range of issues affecting the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship: strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear arms, precision-guided long-range conventional strike systems, missile defense, third-country nuclear forces, cyber and space issues, as well as how to maintain strategic stability in a rapidly changing world.”
• “Extending New START, strategic discussions with Russia and China, and the possible negotiation of an agreement to ban land-based, intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads comprise a more modest agenda for nuclear arms control than many would like.”

“Noninterference With National Technical Means: The Status Quo Will Not Survive,’” Michael P. Gleason and Luc H. Riesbeck, The Aerospace Corporation, January 2020: The authors, a national security senior project engineer at The Aerospace Corporation and a graduate student at George Washington University, write:

• “The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) currently in force between the United States and Russia is set to expire on Feb. 5, 2021. When that happens, formal prohibitions on interference with national technical means (NTM) of verification expire along with limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear arms.”
• “This will mark a significant change in the strategic context within which U.S. national security space forces operate. U.S. space forces’ resources will be taxed, and the stability of the space domain will face new risks. The United States needs a comprehensive strategy to address these challenges.”
• “This paper introduces a thought experiment to identify the key factors that should be considered when such a strategy is formulated. It does this by contemplating four alternative futures.”
• “Importantly, all scenarios represent clear opportunities for U.S. policymakers to proactively shape the new strategic context with a variety of disruptive policy changes. With the growing threats to the stability of the space domain presented by China and Russia and the increasingly contested nature of the space domain, the national security space community should consider how the demise of New START may exacerbate these challenges.”

“NATO Expansion and the Great Unraveling of Arms Control,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 02.03.20: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “The apogee of nuclear arms control occurred in a ten-year period between 1986 and 1996. … After this golden decade, we’ve been heading downhill.”
• “There were many reasons for decline that were unrelated to arms control, like the end of the Cold War. Of more direct consequence, I’ll mention only three: the decision to expand NATO, aerial bombardment to stop Serbian aggression after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the insistent pursuit by Republicans on Capitol Hill, codified in public law, of a national missile defense.”
• “In my view, it was essential to stop Slobodan Milošević’s war crimes. … I don’t think that the Balkan Wars ensured the downturn of U.S.-Russian relations. For this we must look to NATO expansion and the death of the ABM Treaty. … NATO expansion ensured that an era of confrontation followed an abbreviated era of partnership, just the reverse of what advocates propounded. But not right away because Putin was still operating from a position of weakness.”
• “Not to have expanded NATO would have required great restraint against a prostrate foe after winning the Cold War. These conditions didn’t exist at the outset of the Clinton administration. And even had Clinton chosen not to expand NATO, George W. Bush and his team of triumphalists and romantics were dead set on doing so. We’re dealing with the consequences now.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments

Cyber security:

“AI, Cyberspace and Nuclear Weapons,” James Johnson and Eleanor Krabill, War on the Rocks, 01.31.20: The authors, a postdoctoral research fellow and a Master of Arts in Nonproliferation and Terrorism candidate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, write:

• “How might the linkages between AI and cyberspace impact the security of nuclear systems? A new generation of AI-augmented offensive cyber capabilities will likely exacerbate the military escalation risks associated with emerging technology, especially inadvertent and accidental escalation. Examples include the increasing vulnerability of nuclear command … systems to cyber attacks. Further, the challenges posed by remote sensing technology, autonomous vehicles, conventional precision munitions and hypersonic weapons to hitherto concealed and hardened nuclear assets. Taken together, this trend might further erode the survivability of states’ nuclear forces.”
• “Open-source research suggests that Chinese analysts view the vulnerability of China’s NC3 to cyber infiltrations—even if an attacker’s objective was limited to cyber espionage—as a highly escalatory national security threat. By contrast, Russian analysts tend to view Russia’s nuclear command, control, communications and intelligence … network as more isolated, and thus, relatively insulated from cyber attacks.”
• “AI systems could have both positive and negative implications for cyber and nuclear security. On balance, however, several factors make this development particularly troublesome. These include the increasing attacks vectors which threaten states’ NC3 systems, a new generation of destabilizing, AI-empowered cyber offensive capabilities …, the blurring of AI-cyber offense-defense, uncertainties and strategic ambiguity about AI-augmented cyber capabilities and … a competitive and contested geo-strategic environment.”
• “Now is the time … for positive intervention to mitigate (or at least manage) the potential destabilizing and escalatory risks posed by AI and help steer it toward bolstering strategic stability as the technology matures.”

Elections interference:

• No significant developments

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia: Adapting to Sanctions Leaves Economy in Robust Health,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 01.29.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “Moscow’s resilience has called into question the power of the extraterritorial restrictions imposed by the U.S. and EU, and their worth as a foreign policy tool. Russia’s $1.7 trillion economy looks to be in better shape today than it has done for some time.”
• “Growth is slower but more stable, a $124 billion sovereign fund has been created, exporters have found new markets and importers have found domestic alternatives. … All three levels of Russia’s government ran a budget surplus in 2018 and 2019, and its total public debt is about 15 percent of GDP. The EU average is 80 percent.”
• “Since the end of 2015, Russia’s international currency reserves have risen almost 50 percent to $542 billion at the end of November, the highest level since 2011 and close to a record peak achieved in 2008. … The farming sector is booming … and Russia earned a record $24 billion in agriculture exports last year, more than twice what it made from arms exports. … And, thanks to a relatively steady increase in oil prices since 2014 and the successful implementation of the wealth fund, Russia had $124 billion saved up at the start of December—about 7 percent of GDP.”
• “Yet economic growth is still way below the Kremlin’s hopes. Independent studies suggest real GDP growth was just 1.2 percent last year and will be around 1.6 percent this year and 1.8 percent in 2021.”
• “Measures curtailing investment and technology transfer to the Russian energy industry in certain areas such as shale, offshore or Arctic drilling have had a medium-term impact not yet seen, given the long gestation period for energy projects.”

“Russians’ Growing Appetite for Change,” Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.30.20: The authors, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and a sociologist at the Levada Center, write:

• “In the past two years, the Russian public’s appetite for change has increased considerably. A small but growing group of Russians blame President Vladimir Putin for the country’s problems, and his capacity to deliver change is now being questioned. Yet the demands for change are taking very different forms, not only in open protests but also through latent discontent, and the public has not identified a specific alternative leader as a potential agent of change.”
• “The Carnegie-Levada 2019 poll results suggest that five social groups, with very different profiles, are most in favor of comprehensive change: People between ages 40 and 54 (63 percent said they wanted decisive change). These are people who will soon enter pre-retirement. They are unhappy with pension reform and the labor market. People with higher education (62 percent). People with low incomes, such as those who can barely afford to buy groceries (66 percent). Residents of midsize cities (60 percent). Sentiment among Moscow residents was less pro-reform at 54 percent. Critics of the current ruling regime (80 percent). This group disapproves of Putin’s job performance and does not want him to stay in office after 2024.”
• “If the thirst for political change continues to gain momentum in Russia, a full-scale demand for political freedoms and alternatives may emerge quite soon.”

“Why Aren’t Russians Protesting Putin’s Reforms?” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.30.20: The author, editor of Carnegie.ru, writes:

•  “This strategy of commencing change before anyone expected it and at a rapid pace while introducing new names and rafts of reforms have left most Russians dumbfounded and intrigued, but not necessarily angry.”
• “People may react differently only if the constitutional changes turn out to contradict their expectations. Right now, the general consensus is that Putin will step down from the presidency, even if it is effectively to move upward.”

“Vladimir Putin Follows a Long Russian Tradition of Enlightened Autocrats,” Ani Kokobobo, The Washington Post, 02.03.20: The author, associate professor and chair of the Slavic Department at the University of Kansas, writes:

• “On Jan. 15, Putin proposed reorganizing the government to give more power to the Russian Duma—the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia. Once these reforms are clarified, Putin says it's necessary to have a ‘vote of the citizens on the whole packet’ of constitutional changes. It's tempting to view Putin's actions as a mere contemporary authoritarian maneuver, designed to extend power beyond his presidential term, which ends in 2024.”
• “But looking into Russia's past gives important clues about the proposed political changes. In particular, Russia's tsarist period has many precedents of liberal reform from above. This is what historians traditionally identified as forms of ‘enlightened despotism’—rulers who retain absolute power, but use it to the advantage of their subjects.”
• “After having been in power in one way or another for over 20 years, Putin may be seeking his exit strategy, and legacy shopping in the process. And enlightened despotism, born out of Russia's tsarist past, is one legacy he could be striving for.”
• “Implicit in Putin's actions is the notion that he alone knows best—like the tsars of old—and will always be the one making the final decisions. The symbolism of the Russian government tendering its resignation in response to the president's wish for constitutional change merely underscores how much of Russia's political system lies in one man's hands.”

“Will Vladimir Putin Become Russia's Prime Minister After 2024?” Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield, The Washington Post, 01.29.20: The authors, professors at the University of Oxford, write:

• “Of the proposals Putin announced, the most significant change would transfer the appointment of the prime minister to the parliament. This change opens up the possibility that Putin could stay on as prime minister, with the backing of a substantial legislative majority. This proposal provides an elegant solution to the problem Putin faces, but it is not without risks.”
• “First, the Russian public expects its national government to take direct responsibility for economic and social policies—and also to take the heat for any public criticism of policy failures. … Second, Russian citizens aren't so happy about their leaders manipulating constitutional rules and norms for personal gain.”
• “Putin may not want to become prime minister in 2024, because it would put him much more directly in the political firing line.”
• “He could lead a new constitutional organ, the State Council, with power to exert influence behind the scenes. This would maintain Putin's influence over strategic decisions without responsibility for day-to-day governmental action. Or perhaps he will head the ruling party, which could potentially play a more significant role in the formation of the government.”

“Explaining Bad Governance in Russia: Institutions and Incentives,” Vladimir Gelman and Margarita Zavadskaya, PONARS Eurasia, January 2020: The authors, a distinguished professor at the Aleksanteri Institute at the University of Helsinki and a research fellow at the European University at St. Petersburg, write:

• “As the recent experience of Ukraine suggests, even the democratization of Russia’s political regime as such could not guarantee the diminishment of bad governance within the country. Nonetheless, without major political changes, there is no way to improve the quality of governance.”
• “Without these changes, Russia most likely will be doomed to muddling through numerous pathologies of bad governance while preserving certain ‘pockets of efficiency’ in strategically-important priority sectors and policy fields, selectively picking up good apples fallen from the bad trees of ineffectiveness and un-rule of law. The question is to what extent these pathologies of bad governance could turn into chronic diseases, not curable under any treatment, and whether or not the ‘vicious circle’ of bad governance in Russia may be broken in the foreseeable future.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Goodbye, Palestine! Why Trump’s ‘Peace Deal’ Is Good for Moscow,” Vladimir Frolov, The Moscow Times/Republic, 01.31.20: The author, a Russian political analyst, writes:

• “The Trump administration’s plan for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the so-called ‘Deal of the Century’—unilaterally imposes humiliating terms for peace on the Palestinians that Tel Aviv’s right-wing forces have long wanted.”
• “Moscow, meanwhile, stands to benefit from the Trump plan—not because it advances peace in the Middle East, but because it provides a precedent for major powers dictating terms to weaker ones.”
• “The Kremlin has a good reason to play along with Trump and not get involved in the international campaign against the U.S.-sponsored settlement mechanism. The U.S. plan essentially pushes for international recognition of annexed territories occupied during military operations. In other words, it would set an important precedent for legitimizing Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, which Moscow ‘reunited with Russia’ in 2014. That would give Putin a perfect quid pro quo with Trump and Macron at the upcoming meeting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.”

“Why Brexit Won’t Affect EU-Russia Relations,” Oksana Antonenko, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.03.20: The author, a member of the EU-Russia Expert Network on Foreign Policy, writes:

• “Brexit is unlikely to significantly affect Russia’s relations with Europe, which have been witnessing a tentative revival in recent months. This is driven by some progress in the Normandy talks on resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine, changes in the EU leadership and renewed EU-Russia dialogue on key foreign policy issues … The growing fallout from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry is also pushing Europe and Russia closer together.”
• “Nor will Brexit weaken the EU from within, as some in Russia have predicted, or trigger more exits by other member states. If anything, it may accelerate the process of closer political integration being championed by France and Germany.”
• “Brexit does not provide an obvious path toward improving U.K.-Russian relations. Many Brits continue to believe that Russia interfered in the Brexit referendum campaign by financing and promoting the Leave campaign. These perceptions will not go away any time soon.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Russia Would Bet on America in a US-China Naval War,” Michael Peck, The National Interest, 01.29.20: The author, a contributing writer for The National Interest, writes:

• “If U.S. and Chinese aircraft carriers were to clash, the U.S. Navy would win. And who makes that prediction? A Russian military expert. Konstantin Sivkov, a member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, argues that superior U.S. reconnaissance capabilities would trump China’s advantages in hypersonic missiles.”
• “‘The key role that determines the course and outcome of hostilities at sea in modern conditions is played not so much by the power and quantity of strike weapons, but by the capabilities of the reconnaissance system on an ocean theater of operations,’ Sivkov writes … ‘Surpassing the enemy in this respect, the U.S. Navy is able to significantly level the superiority of the Chinese in hypersonic anti-ship missiles.’”

Ukraine:

“Russia’s Ukraine Policy: Change to Stay the Same,” Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 02.03.20: The author, a senior policy fellow at ECFR, writes:

• “Long-time political operator, ideologue and manager of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov, has allegedly quit his post as special adviser in the presidential administration, following disputes over the handling of the Kremlin’s Ukraine portfolio.”
• “Although official denials have emerged from the Kremlin, signs are that Surkov will depart soon. He has extracted himself from the preparations for April’s Normandy summit on Ukraine, and from the management of Ukraine matters more generally. A further clue lies in the Kremlin’s decision to move former vice-premier Dmitry Kozak to the Kremlin. Surkov’s likely successor is experienced in the field of foreign policy, including leading negotiations with Moldova on Transnistria.”
• “In the past, Kozak has criticized Surkov’s policy on Donbass, attacking the financial burden inflicted by the conflict—from both Western sanctions and having to finance mini-dictatorships in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). Kozak has advocated for Moscow to seek a compromise with Kyiv and bring the conflict to an end. The fact that Kozak was born in Kropyvnytskyi oblast, central Ukraine, has not escaped the notice of the Ukrainian government either. Is there reason to be optimistic?”
• “In comparison with Surkov, Kozak is a politer negotiating counterpart. However, in substance, he is little different … Russia’s rhetoric concentrates on preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, its actions are all geared towards trying to isolate Ukraine in matters far beyond military affairs.”
• “Exchanging Surkov for Kozak is window-dressing. The Kremlin’s interests and policies vis-à-vis Ukraine have not changed.”

“Pompeo Visited Ukraine. Good. What Next?” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 02.03.20: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “Kyiv was so eager to host Pompeo that Ukrainian officials overlooked the secretary’s faux pas a week before his arrival. In an interview with National Public Radio’s Mary Louise Kelly, Pompeo took umbrage when she raised Ukraine and questioned the secretary’s failure to speak up for U.S. officials called to testify in Trump’s impeachment hearings. An angry Pompeo asked: ‘Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?’”
• “The secretary had no major new announcements, but his public remarks following his meeting with Zelenskiy struck the right notes from the Ukrainian perspective … In addition to meetings with Ukrainian officials, Pompeo laid a wreath in honor of Ukrainian soldiers who have died fighting Russian and Russian proxy forces the past six years in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass. He later visited wounded soldiers.”
• “The only discordant note: The secretary ducked a question as to when Zelenskiy could visit Washington. Zelenskiy, who received an invitation from Trump last May, but no specific date, made clear his readiness to travel.”
• “The U.S. government and Pompeo should follow up on his visit with steps to bolster the relationship and Ukraine’s confidence. First, the president should quickly nominate an ambassador to Ukraine … Second, the secretary should task Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun … to devote some of his time to Russia and Ukraine. … Third, the secretary should ask Trump to give Zelenskiy a specific date to come to Washington.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Mike Pompeo Says US Ready to Meet All Belarus’s Oil Needs,” James Shotter, Financial Times, 02.01.20: The author, Frankfurt correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “Mike Pompeo said that the U.S. was ready to provide all of Belarus’s oil needs, as he became the first American secretary of state to visit the former Soviet state in more than a quarter of a century. … ‘We’re the biggest energy producer in the world, and all you have to do is call us,’ he said at a press conference with Belarus’s foreign minister.”
• “Pompeo’s visit comes amid heightened tension between Belarus and its traditional ally, Russia, which has been pushing its reluctant neighbor to accept deeper integration, and temporarily cut oil supplies last month.”
• “The U.S. and Belarus said in September that they would exchange ambassadors for the first time in 12 years, and Mr. Pompeo said on [Feb. 1] that he hoped this would happen soon. ‘We would welcome the more active role of the United States here in Belarus . . . We are quite interested in American business coming here to Belarus and working quite actively,’ Mr. Makei [Belarus’s foreign minister] said.”