This Week’s Highlights:

Political scientist Marc Trachtenberg of UCLA argues that it is clear from the historical record that assurances given to Moscow about NATO non-expansion by the U.S. and German foreign ministers in 1990 covered Eastern Europe in general, not just East Germany. Those promises may not have been legally binding, but “Russian leaders were not (as is sometimes said) simply concocting a false historical narrative for their own political purposes.” They were not, however, deliberately misled either.   

Nuclear dangers can be reduced if we extend key norms even when a treaty- and numbers-centric approach to arms control faces serious obstacles, writes Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center. “The most critical norm is no battlefield use of nuclear weapons,” he writes. “The norm of not testing nuclear weapons reinforces the norm of no use.” Nonproliferation likewise remains “absolutely crucial.” And this approach will be the most promising way to draw Beijing into useful conversations about reducing nuclear danger.  

“The Biden administration should not let missile defense programs move forward on auto-pilot,” argues Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution and the Robert Bosch Academy. If the administration does not agree to constrain missile defenses, this could “mean more than no limits on Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. It could provide an impetus for other countries to increase the size of their strategic nuclear arsenals in order to overwhelm U.S. missile defenses,” he writes. “This is particularly true for China, which deploys a much smaller number of strategic warheads than Russia.”

Four climate experts surveyed by Russia Matters, including Harvard’s John Holdren, mostly agreed that the costs of climate change will far outweigh any benefits Russia stands to gain. Anatol Lieven of Georgetown University in Qatar argues, however, that the pace of climate change will determine whether or not Russia will benefit compared to other nations. Prof. Alexander Kislov of Moscow State University and Carnegie’s Olivia Lazard also noted that, unlike Russia, the U.S. has the economic flexibility necessary to help it better withstand the impacts of climate change.  

“Don’t expect a street revolution or the end of Putinism anytime soon,” writes Jeff Hawn, a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics. Alexei Navalny’s actions, though brave and sufficient to further diminish the popularity of President Vladimir Putin and his party, have almost no chance of immediately deposing the current regime. This is because Navalny, though popular among a substantial number of Russians and able to mobilize large street protests, has little if any support from political and business elites. On the contrary, many of them have been the main targets for Navalny’s crusade against corruption. 

 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“It's time to take domestic nuclear terrorism seriously,” Jayita Sarkar, The Washington Post, 01.27.21. The author, an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, writes:

• “The policy community perceives the threat of nuclear terrorism as almost uniquely emanating from outside of U.S. borders, specifically from Islamist terrorism networks such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and their splinter groups. But in fact, U.S. far-right extremist groups have a history of attempted procurement of nuclear weapons and radiological materials to use against the federal government. Members of neo-Nazi groups such as Atomwaffen Division, which literally means ‘atomic weapons’ in German, and the National Socialist Movement have attempted in the past to access nuclear materials with the intent to cause harm.”
• “The violent white-supremacist ideology that calls for nuclear and radiological attacks against non-white populations has spread outside the United States.”
  • “Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people in July 2011, had called for the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents against ‘cultural Marxists,’ ‘multiculturalists’ and those responsible for the Islamic ‘colonization’ of Europe.”
• “The involvement in the Capitol attack of the Oath Keepers, a far-right anti-government group that recruits former U.S. military and law enforcement personnel, demonstrates the extent of this threat. Screening far-right extremists within government institutions at local, state and federal levels needs to be a priority for the Biden administration.”
• “The threat of nuclear terrorism is such that we must act preemptively, not after a devastating attack. The lessons of the past tell us that action will involve breaking down the artificial border between foreign and domestic policies. National security does not just mean preventing attacks from abroad. The siege of the Capitol came close to being far worse, and there are indications that some rioters intended to harm lawmakers. But just because we escaped the worst does not mean we can rest easy. We must be proactive to prevent far-right domestic terrorism from going nuclear in this country.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments

Great-power rivalry/New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Grave New World. Why Biden’s job will be so much harder than his predecessors’,” Graham Allison, Foreign Policy, 01.15.21. The author, a professor of government at Harvard and a former assistant secretary of defense, writes:

• “[Biden’s] paramount challenge … lies at home. … Unless the country finds ways to reunite its red and blue tribes, restore confidence in its democratic institutions and return to the great American project of providing equal opportunities for all citizens, the nation will lack the foundation from which to play its role in the world.”
• “[Biden’s difficulties are] best illustrated by three numbers: The United States produced nearly half the world’s GDP at the start of the Cold War in 1950, one-quarter at the end of the Cold War in 1991 and only one-seventh today. … [T]he balance of economic power has become as important as the balance of military power.”
• “[T]he conceptual arsenal on which a generation of U.S. foreign-policy makers has relied is no longer fit for service. Their presumptions are still shaped by the conviction that victory in the Cold War meant the universalization of Western liberal democracy.”
• “China poses the most perplexing international challenge to the United States … [with] the resources to grow substantially larger and stronger than the United States.”
• “[W]hile the United States remains the leading military power in the world, … China has built Asia’s most formidable military force. … China has become a serious technological competitor. In artificial intelligence, the technology likely to have the greatest impact on the economy and national security in the coming decade, China is now a ‘full-spectrum peer competitor.’ … However intense the rivalry between the United States and China, technology and nature—in the form of nuclear weapons and climate change—condemn both to coexist, since the alternative is to co-destruct.”
• “Washington … [must] move beyond its traditional strategy of overwhelming problems with resources. Americans will have to learn to be more discriminating in distinguishing between national interests that are truly vital and others that are merely vivid.”

 

“Transatlantic Action Plan: Russia,” Kristi Raik, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2021. This action plan originally appeared in a joint report by the Belfer Center and the German Council on Foreign Relations. The author, director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the International Center for Defense and Security, writes:

• “Russia continues to pose serious challenges to the European and international security order, democratic systems of Western countries and cohesion of major Western organizations.”
• “The U.S. and Europe need to tackle these challenges together and pursue a hard line vis-à-vis Russia in order to put limits to its malicious actions. Europe has to take more responsibility for defending and protecting itself and promoting stability in its neighborhood, but the U.S. contribution to European security … remains indispensable.”
• “The U.S. and European allies need to continue to develop credible defense and deterrence against Russia in the framework of NATO:”
  • “Defend the democratic systems of the U.S. and Europe”;

• “Continue to develop credible defense and deterrence against Russia in the framework of NATO”;
• “Defend the norms-based security order in Europe. Increase costs for violations and pressure on Russia to step back from its destabilizing activities in Ukraine. Provide consistent support to Ukraine”;
• “Work together to strengthen mechanisms of arms control and impose costs on non-compliance”;
• “Revive and strengthen cooperation on climate and energy issues, where it is a shared strategic goal to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy”;
• “Strengthen measures to constrain Russia’s malign economic influence and kleptocracy, including anti-corruption policies and efforts to stop money laundering”;
• “Cooperate more closely on defending human rights, e.g. through the adoption of a European Magnitsky Act”;
• “Engage Russia on international issues where shared interests can be identified, such as stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea”;
• “Work toward a joint engagement in Syria and Libya, to address Russia’s strengthened influence and promote sustainable solutions to the conflicts”;
• “Reach out to Russian society… At the same time, beware of state-sponsored propaganda activities of Russian organizations and individuals.”

 

“China and Russia: Two Big Threats the U.S. Military Can't Ignore,” J. William Middendorf, The National Interest, 02.01.21. The author, former secretary of the U.S. Navy, writes:

• “On Dec. 22, 2020, six strategic bombers—four Chinese and two Russian—flew a joint patrol mission over the East China and Japan Seas. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the mission was intended to develop and deepen the comprehensive Russia-China partnership, further increase the level of cooperation between the two militaries, expand their ability for joint action and strengthen strategic stability. It was the second joint patrol since July 2019, confirming Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement that ‘the idea of a future Russia-China military alliance’ cannot be ruled out. And this is happening even as the Biden administration considers making deep cuts in the U.S. defense budget.”
• “The best way to prepare for war is to be prepared to win it. We need to stop underfunding the military, especially in such key areas of research as non-conventional war, space, cyberwar and artificial intelligence. War is changing, and we need to change with it. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons.”

 

NATO-Russia relations:

“The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?” Marc Trachtenberg, International Security, Winter 2020/21. The author, a professor of political science at UCLA, writes:

• “Most former officials in the West, and many scholars as well, have denied [Russian government claims that the West promised in 1990 not to expand NATO but later reneged on that promise]… [O]ther scholars, along with a handful of former officials, believe that promises to that effect were, in fact, made… So who is right?”
• “I think it is clear from the historical record that the assurances about NATO non-expansion that both [U.S. Secretary of State James] Baker and [German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich] Genscher gave the Soviets in February 1990 related not just to eastern Germany but to Eastern Europe in general. Genscher was quite explicit in this regard, Baker less so, but the evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that he, too, had the Warsaw Pact area in general in mind. Those assurances amounted to promises—perhaps not legally binding promises but promises nonetheless—and Russian allegations to that effect were by no means baseless. Russian leaders were not (as is sometimes said) simply concocting a false historical narrative for their own political purposes. The Soviets, however, were not deliberately misled at the time… If there was an element of bad faith here, it only came into play months later, when U.S. policy shifted and American leaders began to think about bringing the East Europeans into NATO.”
• “One can, of course, say that … in reneging on those promises what the United States did was disgraceful. Or one could take a more cynical view and argue … that even formal agreements are mere snapshots reflecting the balance of power at a particular point in time… One could argue that the Western powers had a moral obligation to provide for the security of the new democracies … and that this should outweigh the obligation to honor the promises made in February.”

 

Missile defense:

“Should U.S. Missile Defenses Be a Part of Arms Control Negotiations With Russia?” Steven Pifer, The National Interest, 01.26.21. The author, a fellow with The Brookings Institution and the Robert Bosch Academy, writes:

• “Not agreeing to constrain missile defenses could mean more than no limits on Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. It could provide an impetus for other countries [particularly, China] to increase the size of their strategic nuclear arsenals.”
• “[Washington] could find itself in a situation … similar to that with the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s … [when both sides] pursued missile defenses while expanding their ICBM and SLBM forces… This action-reaction dynamic put the countries on a path of spending more and more on strategic offense and defense—with no real gain in security.”
• “An agreement with Russia limiting each side to 100 or so interceptors capable of engaging ICBM and SLBM warheads would allow the U.S. military to maintain some capability to intercept North Korean ICBM warheads. It would also be low enough to assure Russia and China that they do not need an offensive build-up. … One additional reason to consider constraints on missile defenses is that, at present, they do not appear that effective. … [B]uilding the capability to intercept more than a handful of ICBMs carrying warheads and decoys would, with current technology, prove expensive—likely prohibitively so.”
• “If the Biden administration considers that limiting all Russian nuclear warheads is worth accepting some limits on missile defense, it should factor in that giving SM-3 IIAs and THAADs the capability to intercept ICBM and SLBM warheads could make it extremely difficult to find a mutually acceptable deal.”
• “The Biden administration should not let missile defense programs move forward on auto-pilot… [It] may conclude that the [current] missile defense programs … make sense and should not be … constrained by an agreement with Russia. Before reaching that conclusion, however, it should fully consider the potential risks to other parts of its security and arms control agenda.”

 

Arms control:

“Treaties, Numbers and Norms,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 01.31.21. The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “We can succeed at reducing nuclear danger by extending key norms even when a treaty- and numbers-centric approach to arms control faces serious obstacles. … The most critical norm is no battlefield use of nuclear weapons, … now three-quarters-of-a-century old. The norm of not testing nuclear weapons reinforces the norm of no use. … [T]he norm of nonproliferation also remains absolutely crucial.”

• “[A] practical reason to focus on norms is that the geometry of global nuclear competition and domestic divisions in the United States are not conducive to new treaty making. Even so, nuclear excess in U.S. and Russian forces and stockpiles can be further reduced by means of parallel, verifiable actions. The dismantling of excess warheads can certainly continue whether or not Putin resists deeper cuts in deployed forces.”
• “Unlike numbers, norms aren’t about hierarchies… A norms-based approach has utility for every nuclear-armed rivalry. It’s also the most economical way to expend limited U.S. diplomatic capital to reduce nuclear dangers rising on multiple fronts.”
• “In any serious discussion about reducing nuclear danger, India and Pakistan belong at the table along with the United States, China and Russia. I’d include Great Britain and France… I’d exclude Israel and North Korea… One necessary ground rule for multilateral talks on strengthening norms would be a prohibition on raising bilateral disputes.”
• “The heart of the matter is extending and reaffirming norms against the use of nuclear weapons, testing and nonproliferation [sic]. Part and parcel of norm building for every nuclear-armed rival is reaffirmation of the canonical pledge … that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Agreements between Washington and Moscow to prevent dangerous military practices at sea, in the air and for ground forces operating in close proximity are also in need of reaffirmation.” 

 

“Where Next On Nuclear Arms Control?” Steven Pifer, Brown Journal of World Affairs 01.22.21. The author writes:

• “For nearly five decades, nuclear arms control has been an exclusive enterprise between Washington and Moscow. The resulting agreements have provided significant constraints on the U.S.-Soviet (later, U.S.-Russian) nuclear relationship while mandating substantial reductions in their arsenals. However, since the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which reduced U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces to levels not seen since the 1960s, no further progress has been made. Instead, the nuclear arms control regime appears to have broken down, leading some to conclude that the era of negotiated arms limitations has passed.”
• “The U.S. government has decisions to make: Is it prepared to accept a world in which nuclear weapons go unconstrained, or do the reasons that led Washington to pursue limits on nuclear arms for more than 40 years remain valid?”
• “As it considers how it will approach arms control, the Biden administration will have to weigh a number of questions, not just of substance—such as limits on all nuclear weapons and constraints on missile defenses—but also of form—such as whether to reflect limits in a legally binding treaty or in some other format. How the administration answers those questions, and how Moscow responds, will determine whether arms control will provide constraints, transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, or whether the two countries find themselves in a situation not seen since the 1960s: a world where the two nuclear superpowers operate with no limits on their nuclear forces.”

 

“‘This is going to be quite a show’: Biden’s arms control team eyes nuclear policy overhaul,” Bryan Bender, Politico, 01.27.21. The author, a senior national correspondent for Politico, writes:

• “President Joe Biden is assembling a national security team with an unusually ambitious agenda to negotiate new arms control treaties, scale back the nuclear arsenal and review decades of military doctrine.”
• “Yet former Trump officials predict the appointees will be hit by a new reality when they learn more about real-world threats, including China's major nuclear buildup in recent years.”
• “The team advising Biden has big ambitions. One leading player is Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins … [who] has recently argued for declaring a ‘no first-use’ policy when it comes to nuclear weapons, which arms control advocates consider a major step toward reducing nuclear tensions. … [S]everal key players in the new administration have ties with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the research arm of the liberal Council for a Livable World, which aims to ‘reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.’ [They include Alexandra Bell, Leonor Tomero, Mallory Stewart and Colin Kahl.] … Other players … include the NSC's head of strategic planning, Sasha Baker. She's a former national security adviser to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a leading advocate … for reducing the size of the American arsenal.”
• “Many of Biden's arms control advisers believe deeply that the United States' plan to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad—bombers, submarines and land-based missiles—is more comprehensive and expensive than needed… They are also likely to find more allies in a Democratically controlled Congress.”
• “[Former acting undersecretary of state for arms control] Tom Countryman …  acknowledged how hard it will be to make their visions reality[:] … ‘I’m reluctant to predict any specific achievement besides the extension of New START.’"

 

“Is There a Future for Open Skies Without Russia?” Alexander Graef, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.26.21. The author, a researcher at the University of Hamburg’s Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, writes:

• “Without Moscow’s participation, the [Open Skies] treaty loses its rationale. Of course, NATO members could start conducting flights over each other’s territory or shift their flight quotas to non-NATO state parties… In both cases, however, the treaty would be reduced to a symbolic function. The membership of Belarus, meanwhile, is in question. Since Minsk possesses no aircraft dedicated to Open Skies, it is likely to side with Russia, especially since the political future of the embattled President Alexander Lukashenko depends increasingly on Moscow.”
• “[Another] scenario is the return of the United States to the treaty. During his election campaign, Biden criticized the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw, but his legal options are limited. Although a majority in Congress supports treaty membership, the president lacks the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification in the Senate. Biden will also need to address several pressing issues that carry much more weight for the United States than Open Skies… Besides, Russia has repeatedly made clear that it would not accept any special procedures to ease a U.S. return.”
• “For Europe, the end of Open Skies would be another blow to the cooperative regional security order, following the Russian suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007 and the withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. The European arms control architecture that developed at the end of the Cold War is crumbling. Ironically, Europe seems to have become less relevant rather than more so to its survival. In 2021, the strategic rivalry between the United States and Russia continues to overshadow security on the continent. The European attempt to save the Open Skies Treaty has been a litmus test for the popular rhetoric of effective multilateralism and strategic autonomy. The results are not encouraging.”

 

“Saving the Open Skies Treaty,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 01.27.21. The author writes:

• “Here are four steps that state-parties and Washington can take to open a path to preserving the Open Skies Treaty—with the United States and Russia remaining in the agreement:”
  • “First, the Biden administration states that it will conduct a review on rejoining the treaty and announce[s] its decision soon.”
  • “Second, the United States and its NATO allies issue a joint statement saying that, as long as the United States is outside the treaty, the United States will not seek and its allies will not share data collected by NATO member overflights, and that the allies will not veto Russian Open Skies flights over U.S. military installations or activities on their territories.”
  • “Third, the Russian government states that it will pause its process on withdrawal.”
  • “Fourth, legal experts from the United States, Russia and other interested state-parties meet to consider mechanisms by which the United States would rejoin the treaty. Any such mechanism would require that the United States fully carry out its obligations and responsibilities under the treaty, like any other state-party, as well as enjoy its benefits.”
• “At a time when tensions between NATO and Russia are at the highest level since the end of the Cold War, the Open Skies Treaty offers a useful confidence- and security-building measure. It is worth preserving. With political will and some smart lawyers, it could be.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments

Cyber security:

“SolarWinds Hack: Why We Need Defense, Not Retaliation,” William Akoto, The National Interest/The Conversation, 01.31.21. The author, an assistant professor of international politics at Fordham University, writes:

• “[Biden’s] administration faces pressure from members of Congress in both parties and former government officials to respond forcefully to the SolarWinds breach. He is reportedly considering retaliatory cyberattacks against Russia and targeted financial sanctions against the individuals involved.”
• “But the U.S. government may not be able to stop future intrusions into American computer systems. Scholarship describes how difficult it can be to effectively deter cyberattacks or punish those responsible. In fact, as a scholar of cyber conflict, my research strongly indicates that retaliation—in whatever form it might take—will almost certainly invite counter-hacks from Russia, worsening tensions between the countries and potentially escalating into the offline world.”
• “Ignoring cyberattacks, of course, is not a solution either. But I believe the challenge is to determine how to make clear to the perpetrators that large-scale cyber intrusions will not be tolerated—and to do so without escalating the online conflict. I believe there is only one way to prepare—and it’s to accept that hackers will keep trying to attack.”
• “There are some ways to adjust to this new reality, just as there are with other complex and intractable problems. For instance, governments seek to mitigate harm from climate change by limiting greenhouse gas emissions and discouraging new construction in flood zones. The cybersecurity equivalent could be building and programming computer systems that can withstand faults, failures and hacking while still performing essential functions and protecting data security.”
• “The ultimate objective would be not to prevent systems from being breached, but to limit the damage and speed the recovery when they are broken into. My research, and others’, indicates this could be an effective way to address the new reality of state-sponsored hacking while realizing there is no way to truly prevent future attacks.”

 

“SolarWinds Cyber Attack Reveals Risks of Accidental Nuclear War,” Rachel Traczyk, The National Interest, 01.29.21. The author, who works with Beyond the Bomb to help recruit and train the next generation of anti-nuclear advocates, writes:

• “Experts are now claiming that the recently discovered cyberattack on the software manufacturing company SolarWinds has potentially become one of the greatest surveillance attacks against the United States in history.”
• “One of the many victims of this attack is Los Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico, a government facility famous for the production of nuclear weapons, and a terrifying example of the type of target that could result in an accidental nuclear war.”
• “It’s hard to tell how often and how long hackers were openly browsing governmental agencies and websites. It’s even harder to tell how much information they were able to access and what will be done with that information. In the case of Los Alamos Laboratories, Russian hackers had open access to a governmental entity that is actively producing nuclear weapons. Luckily, there wasn’t a threat of the hack directly leading to a launch. However, … [t]here is always a possibility of a fake ‘under attack’ alert that could lead to a dangerous escalation. … Top personnel would have to make a momentary decision to either retaliate and launch a nuclear weapon or take the time to consider that the threat might be false. This decision would be most likely made before a nuclear weapon is even detonated on their territory.”
• “[E]ven if nuclear command and control operations remain secure from cyberattacks … this lack of checks and balances creates other cyber vulnerabilities.”
• “Nuclear weapons are not just an issue of the 1950s… The security measures that govern them are outdated and risky. Improving our cybersecurity is key, but safer policies are what is truly crucial. The new Biden administration and incoming Congress could pass a No First Use Policy… That would mitigate the threat of a false first strike that hacks make eerily possible.”

Elections interference:

“You Can’t Blame Russia for Trump,” Natalia Antonova, Foreign Policy, 01.26.21. The author, a writer, journalist and “online safety expert” based in Washington D.C., writes:

• “Realistically, the Russian government is always going to want to take advantage of turmoil on American soil. The country has a long history of exploiting violent U.S. racism. Putin made use of Trump and is bound to keep taking advantage of the divisions Trump has encouraged. The Capitol assault was grist for Russian propagandists’ mill, even if they didn’t actually incite it. The Biden presidency is a fresh start but isn’t going to make this kind of Russian hostility simply go away. That’s why a sensible wariness about Russian efforts can’t hurt.”
• “At the same time, the United States can’t heal from the Trump years while heaping blame on Russia every time something goes wrong, and certainly not if Americans keep comparing our internal woes to Russia’s own history of instability.”
• “Instead, it’s more helpful to think of elite convergence—Trump started resembling a post-Soviet dictator because corrupt, wealthy nihilists tend to have similar values and outlooks on life. They value power for the sake of it, and see the nation state as simply a vast collection of financial resources for them and their families to plunder.”
• “By electing Biden, the United States committed itself, at least in the short term, to a different path. It’s an option that other countries haven’t been lucky enough to enjoy. But the almost-peaceful transition of power turned out to be far more fragile a tradition than Americans thought. Seeking foreign scapegoats instead of tackling domestic enemies won’t fix that problem.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Biden’s First Call with Putin Shows He’s a Dealmaker,” Jacob Heilbrunn, The National Interest, 01.26.21. The author, who is the magazine’s editor, writes:

• “It was no accident that Russian President Vladimir Putin dragged his heels about acknowledging Joe Biden’s victory… During the campaign, Biden repeatedly voiced his disdain for what he depicted as Trump’s truckling to the Kremlin and declared that he would pursue a tougher policy. His first phone call with Putin …, however, suggests that he will be more successful in dealing with Russia than his predecessor. Indeed, Biden is likely to follow a more nuanced course than his campaign rhetoric might have indicated.”
• “If Biden wants to be a transformative president in both domestic and foreign policy, he will seize the opportunity to thaw … relations with Moscow. It would not be surprising if he pushes for a summit meeting with Putin in Europe this year. The upsides are clear. Dealing with Russia would allow him to focus on the competition with China, attenuate the threat to NATO and reach a real resolution on Ukraine. Anyway, Biden, who has a heavy lift at home in reviving a battered economy, is hardly eager to stumble into a fresh foreign policy crisis with Russia.”
• “A single phone call will hardly suffice to ease relations between two powers that have been locked in confrontation. Biden did not roll over during the call, reaffirming his ‘firm support for Ukraine’s sovereignty,’ raising the matter of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment and condemning the SolarWinds hack on the federal government. Perhaps he may come to conclude that a more radical change is necessary.”
• “For now, Biden has it right in refusing to call for a ‘reset’ in relations. Instead of spouting slogans about reviving ties between Russia and America, he is better advised to seek incremental change. Unlike Trump, who was hobbled from the outset by suspicion about his tenebrous ties to Russia, Biden has a lot of maneuvering room. He should use it.”

 

“Expert Survey: How Will Climate Change Impact US-Russian Relations?” Russia Matters, 01.28.21.

• Russia Matters has asked four leading climate experts to speak about the impacts of climate change on Russia and the U.S., and on the global balance of power, and about ways that the Biden administration’s policies toward Russia may be shaped by this shared threat.
  • While most agreed that the costs of climate change will far outweigh any benefits Russia stands to gain, Anatol Lieven of Georgetown University in Qatar argues that the pace of climate change will determine whether or not Russia will benefit compared to other nations.
  • Prof. Alexander Kislov of Moscow State University and Carnegie’s Olivia Lazard also noted that, unlike Russia, the U.S. has the economic flexibility necessary to help it better withstand the impacts of climate change.
  • The experts largely agreed that combating climate change is an essential interest of both the U.S. and Russia.
  • However, while Harvard’s John Holdren notes Russia’s strong support for the Paris Agreement on climate change—to which both Russia and the U.S. are signatories—Lazard argues that Russia is one of its biggest spoilers.

 

“Even from prison, Navalny is the most potent political threat Putin has ever faced,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 01.26.21. The author, a foreign-affairs columnist, writes:

• “Alexei Navalny combines two qualities that Russians admire: a mordant sarcasm toward the country's leaders and great personal bravery. Together, they make him the most potent political threat that President Vladimir Putin has ever faced.”
• “Navalny's latest riposte is a wickedly funny video posted Jan. 19 on YouTube, documenting the corruption that surrounds what he calls ‘Putin's Palace,’ a billion-dollar project on the Black Sea that includes mansions, vineyards, a private casino, even an underground hockey rink. The video alleges a network of payoffs for Putin's friends and family, as well as for two girlfriends and their relatives. The mocking video had been seen by more than 90 million people as of [Jan. 26].”
• “Leonid Volkov, the manager of Navalny's 2018 presidential campaign and his chief of staff, spoke with me … in a telephone interview from Lithuania. He said the goal of Navalny's movement is to make Russia ‘a normal European country with rule of law and independent courts and free media.’ Navalny should be released, and Putin, who extended his term as president through a special constitutional amendment, should ‘talk about transition of power,’ Volkov demanded.”
• “Navalny's battle with Putin presents an early test for President Biden and his foreign policy team. The new administration immediately called for Navalny's release. But Volkov argued that the United States should do more, working with European countries to identify and freeze assets held outside Russia for Putin's benefit. Biden's press secretary, Jen Psaki, said Biden discussed Navalny and other issues with Putin in a phone call [Jan. 26] … but she didn't provide details.”
• “Navalny now sits in prison. But his words at the end of the video echo across Russia: ‘The future is in our hands. Do not be silent. Don't agree to obey the feasting villains.’"

 

“To Silence Navalny, Putin Will Try to Enlist the West. Washington Should Beware Falling Into the Kremlin’s Trap,” Jeremy Stern, Foreign Affairs, 01.27.21. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, writes:

• “The Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny will soon appear in court for a hearing that will determine his fate. In the run-up to this pivotal decision, Western capitals have tried to show support for Navalny and for his anticorruption, pro-democracy cause. But they should beware a trap that the Kremlin is likely to set. Like Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev before him, Russian President Vladimir Putin will try to coax the United States and European governments into helping him neutralize his most problematic critic.”
• “Insecure regimes are often the most ruthless, and if Navalny is made a surrogate for the return of American democracy promotion, the Kremlin is not likely to exhibit restraint. For the Biden administration, stabilizing relations with Moscow while supporting Navalny’s cause might seem like a strategy that sacrifices neither the United States’ security interests nor its core values. But such an option may not exist. When Americans decline to accept painful tradeoffs between their interests and values, they commonly end up sacrificing both.”

 

“West needs a strategy to oppose the jailing of Alexei Navalny,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 01.26.21. The authors write:

• “The detention of Mr. Navalny was a blunder that has intensified the Kremlin’s dilemma. If a court next month converts a three-and-a-half-year suspended sentence against the activist on bogus corruption charges into a custodial term, for violating parole terms, he will become even more of a martyr-figure. Yet releasing him would look like a cave-in, leaving Mr. Navalny a victor. The former path appears more likely. The Kremlin would then attempt to contain what may become weekly protests, as neighboring Belarus has done, in the hope they peter out.”
• “Much will depend on western countries holding Russia to account for Mr. Navalny’s imprisonment, and for how it treats his supporters.”
• “EU foreign ministers said on Monday [Jan. 25] the bloc would refrain from imposing sanctions on more Russian individuals if the Kremlin released Mr. Navalny. That imposes at least some pressure, while allowing time to craft a joint response with Washington. Mr. Biden’s first priority must, of course, be to bolster U.S. democracy after the assault on the Capitol. But it would be a disservice to the grit of Mr. Navalny and his supporters if he neglected, meanwhile, the cause of freedom of political choice elsewhere.”

 

“What another poisoning can tell us,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 01.29.21. The authors write:

• “For mysterious reasons, the FBI has refused to reveal what it knows about attacks on another Russian opposition activist, Vladimir Kara-Murza. Mr. Kara-Murza, a permanent U.S. resident and Post contributing columnist who divides his time between Moscow and Northern Virginia, has twice suffered apparent poisoning attacks while in Russia, in 2015 and 2017. In both cases, he experienced multiple organ failures and only barely survived. Following the second episode, Mr. Kara-Murza's wife hand-carried a sample of his blood to Washington. She was met at Dulles International Airport by FBI agents, who took the sample for testing at the agency's labs.”
• “FBI reports say that the ‘sum total of the symptoms and health effects Kara-Murza experienced could not have been brought about without a toxin being introduced to his system’ and that the bureau is ‘investigating this matter as a case of intentional poisoning.’"
• “It's possible that the FBI was unable to determine the poison used against Mr. Kara-Murza; a 2018 report says its lab had been ‘unable to definitively link a toxin to the victim's illness.’ But the agency has a record of reluctance to acknowledge what it knows about Russia's possession of banned chemical weapons and their use. In light of the string of attacks on Kremlin opponents and the imperative of holding the Putin regime accountable, that's not acceptable. Incoming Attorney General Merrick Garland should order the FBI to disclose what it knows about Mr. Kara-Murza.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Fall in Wages Costs Putin Key Support for Policies,” Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 01.31.21. The author, a reporter with The Times’ Moscow bureau, writes:

• “Opinion polls have for a few years been tracking a pivot in the national mood, away from what was called the ‘Crimea consensus’ of wide support for President Vladimir V. Putin for annexing the Ukrainian peninsula. Now, people are focused on their disappointment over slumping wages and pensions.”
• “In Russia, the competition between the rally-around-the-flag effect of Mr. Putin's assertive foreign policy and anger over the sagging economy is often referred to as the battle between the television and the refrigerator: Do Russians pay attention to the patriotic news on TV or notice their empty fridges?”
• “‘Rallying around the flag is no longer an antidote against protest,’ Ekaterina Schulmann, an associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at … Chatham House, said. … Russians shown economic statistics about declining wages or the ruble's exchange rate to the dollar were more likely to express support for a cautious foreign policy than Russians not shown the economic data first.”
• “Financial stagnation brought on by sanctions, a decrease in foreign investment amid tensions with the West and low oil prices have forced the Kremlin to impose unpopular policies, including raising the retirement age to shore up government pension funds. Russians' average take-home wages adjusted for inflation have been declining since the Ukraine crisis. … It is taking a toll on support for the Putin government. A range of opposition groups have taken to the streets, from Communists to right-wing nationalists.”
• “It is no coincidence that protests have seeped out of the wealthy cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg to Russia's far-flung provinces, which are feeling the economic pain more acutely. Protests have been reported in more than 100 cities and towns. … Such remote cities and towns were once seen as hotbeds of support for Mr. Putin.”

 

“Navalny’s Bravery Is Unlikely to Shift Putin’s Entrenched Power,” Jeff Hawn, Foreign Policy, 01.25.21. The author, a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s department of international history, writes:

• “Don’t expect a street revolution or the end of Putinism anytime soon. Navalny’s actions … currently have almost no chance of immediately deposing the current regime. … Navalny … has little if any support from political and business elites on a local, regional or national level.”
• “If Navalny wants to seize control of the country through a revolution of the street, he needs allies within the circles of the elite. … Consider the two most recent examples from Russia’s neighbors: Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution. In both cases … the protesters were abetted by the internal weakness of the regimes they were confronting.”
• “Russia and the Putin regime are an entirely different animal. … In Putin’s Russia, those oligarchs who acknowledged Putin’s supremacy were able to remain within the structure of power and profit. … This state-sanctioned self-enrichment and abuse of power happens on all levels of government, abetting the very corruption that Navalny claims he is fighting against.”
• “Putin has presided over a corrupt and brutal regime, but that has also allowed him to fully consolidate control over the Russian organs of state. … While Russia might be undergoing a constitutional transition to prepare for the time when Putin will relinquish power, it is a transition that will ensure that those already in Putin’s circle will continue to maintain their positions.”
• “Navalny’s protests … will undermine an already unpopular regime heading into parliamentary elections in September and continue to mobilize a new generation of young Russians. … Yet this will take years, and there is no imminent color revolution at hand. … The current regime is too resilient … Unless substantial figures within the current regime begin to defect to Navalny’s cause, the chance of street protest alone provoking a change of government is dubious.”

 

“Putin Has Learned From Belarus in Handling the Navalny Protests,” Alexander Gabuev, Foreign Policy, 01.26.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The Russian security services have clearly learned the lesson of neighboring Belarus—that excessive violence only causes more trouble—and they are trying to manage a delicate balance as they handle the new wave of Navalny-inspired protests. This explains the somewhat restrained behavior by the police last week—though to be sure, they were restrained only relative to the typically brutal standards of Russian law enforcement under Putin.”
• “What also gets overlooked is the sophistication that the Kremlin has shown in recent years in addressing dissent across the country. During the last decade, Russia has become a country of protests, with many national and local issues bringing people to the streets. … Most of the time, the Kremlin has chosen to ignore the protesters and wait until their enthusiasm evaporated. … For Putin, the protests also serve the useful purpose of demonizing the opposition as radicals seeking a bloody revolution.”
• “It seems that the Kremlin is betting that the right combination of brutality, legal pressure and patience will pay bigger dividends than broadly cracking down. So far, the system has demonstrated enormous resilience. … The elites are mostly united behind the regime, law enforcement and interior troops remain loyal, and the bulk of the population is too disinterested or scared to present a serious challenge to Putin’s rule.”
• “Absent any major unpredictable developments, the Kremlin seems content to keep Navalny behind bars. Navalny has proven time and again that he can win battles in the digital domain and chip away at the legitimacy of the Putin regime. … But the hard men in the Kremlin have repeatedly shown that they are no slouches when it comes to battling existential threats. So far, at least, they don’t appear to see Navalny’s supporters on the streets within that category.”

 

“Might Versus Right: Putin’s Bunker and the Protests Outside,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.01.21. The author, a senior fellow and chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “In Russia, it has often been said in recent months that Putin has shut himself away in a bunker. It’s a similar story with Lukashenko: He has shut himself off from civil society and surrounded himself with men from the security services. Putin’s brutal actions and his willingness to resort to police batons have polarized society and radicalized those who are dissatisfied with his rule.”
• “In a sense, the battle now is for the apathetic majority. A key pillar of Putin’s regime has always been—and continues to be—the indifference of the masses, which automatically support the government. But on January 31, at least one such person left his home to go to work and was detained by police. When he was released, he told reporters that he would seriously reconsider his views on power in Russia. It’s unlikely he is alone. Sometimes, brutal police power loses out to moral authority.”

 

“Alexei Navalny protests show the power of digital ‘samizdat’,” John Thornhill, Financial Times, 01.28.21. The author, the innovation editor at the Financial Times, writes:

• “In a video conference with students this week, President Vladimir Putin made the startling claim that the jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny was conspiring with foreign intelligence agencies to ‘brainwash’ the Russian population.  Mr. Putin said he had not had time to watch Mr. Navalny’s sensational YouTube video—now viewed 99 million times—alleging that the Russian president owned a palace overlooking the Black Sea. But he denied that he or his family had any ownership interest in the estate, ingeniously filmed by Mr. Navalny’s team operating a flying drone from an inflatable boat.”
• “This compelling mini-saga, mixing high-stakes politics and low farce, highlights how much the world has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how the technology of protest has been transformed.”
• “The ability of a political activist to release a video, shape the national debate and ignite mass protests in 125 cities across Russia while sitting in a cell in Moscow’s Matrosskaya Tishina prison reveals how the control of information has been turned upside down.”
• “While he may exercise extraordinary sway over the younger, online generation, Mr. Navalny will struggle to shift older, offline Russians who still wield brute power. As shown in neighboring Belarus, a political strongman can defy mass protests for months—so long as his inner circle does not split.”

 

“Putin's new war on the opposition suggests he sees it as a real threat,” Samuel A. Greene, Graeme B. Robertson, The Washington Post, 01.27.21. Greene, a professor of Russian politics and director of the Russia Institute at King's College, London, and Robertson, a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, write:

• “The problem for Putin is that sharp-edged autocracy is not a good way to run a country: The harsher the crackdown, the more difficult it is to revert to a softer form of authoritarianism. And for all of the repression he has meted out, Putin has always allowed the opposition a degree of breathing room. But now he may have fallen fully into what some political scientists call a ‘repression trap.’”
• “The Kremlin has broken its own taboo on engaging directly with Navalny. While Putin still won't say his name, he made a public show … of denying that he owned the palace the opposition leader had publicized. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did the same at greater length, and parliamentarians met in the Duma to deliver a denunciation. All this had the unintended effect of giving Navalny more airtime than he has received before.”
• “Navalny serves the interests of foreign governments, Putin says, and he compared Saturday's protesters to terrorists. All of this suggests that he worries that Navalny's support—which ranges between 5 and 20 percent, depending on who is asking the question and how—is only likely to grow, especially given that the national economic malaise is stretching into an eighth year. It's therefore essential, in the government's eyes, to confront the challenge head-on now.”
• “But taking on Navalny and his supporters so directly has a cost: From now until his last day in office, every compromise by Putin will be viewed as a sign of weakness, inviting more resistance, and the street clashes are likely to get more violent. The resulting volatility will further undermine the economy and deepen poverty, sapping Putin's support. Even under those circumstances, Putin can maintain his grip on Russia—but it will be a very different Russia.”

 

“By trying to silence protesters, Vladimir Putin is falling into a repression trap,” Timothy Frye, The Washington Post, 01.26.21. The author, the Marshall D. Shulman Professor of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy at Columbia University and co-director of ICSID at the Higher School of Economics, writes:

• “Repression has its downside: It helps keep incumbents in power but may prevent them from addressing the deep-seated problems that drive protests and opposition in the first place. The more they rely on coercion, the more they neglect the problems generating protest—such as declining living standards, corruption and a lack of accountability—and spark further opposition, creating a ‘repression trap’ for the regime.”
• “To avoid the repression trap, the Kremlin would have to use sufficient force to silence the opposition. That's going to be hard. Navalny persuaded 200,000 Russians to take part in an unsanctioned protest with a high expectation of police violence in the middle of a Russian winter during a pandemic. That suggests a depth of commitment among Navalny's supporters that will be hard to extinguish. Even should protests fade, the Kremlin's heavy-handed response is hardly likely to boost its popular support on its own.”
• “Alternatively, the Kremlin could find other sources of popular support. An easy foreign policy victory might do the trick, but low-risk, high-reward operations such as the annexation of Crimea are hard to find. Another option would be to reduce corruption, increase accountability and level the economic playing field — measures that will do little to endear Putin to the security forces and economic elites that are central to his rule. Given these options, cycles of protest and repression may become a common feature of Russian politics.”

 

“Navalny’s Return Has Thrown Putin Off Balance,” Vladislav Davidzon, Foreign Policy, 01.29.21. The author, the chief editor of The Odessa Review, writes:

• “The Kremlin is now trapped in the usual authoritarian dilemma of whether to risk a ratcheting up of the cycle of political polarization through the escalation of systemic violence or to risk increased protests and a revealed preference cascade by signaling weakness. Navalny’s return to Moscow has upended all previous calculations, on all sides.”

 

“A New Wave of Research on Civilizational Politics,” Henry Hale and Marlene Laruelle, Nationalities Papers, Jan. 19, 2021. Hale and Laruelle, professors at George Washington University and co-directors of PONARS Eurasia, write:

• “While in most cases … indirect civilizational identity is likely to correspond with people’s direct (personal) civilizational identity, this need not be the case: for example, a community of Muslims in Russia may identify themselves (at least in part) with a perceived Islamic civilization at the same time that they (a) identify Russia as part of European or a distinct Eurasian civilization and (b) identify themselves with Russia.”
• “The concept of civilization has been used by different political actors as an aspirational project to describe the country they wish Russia to become. The Putin regime has associated civilization mostly with Europe as a way to claim Russia’s legitimate right to be part of European civilization and therefore to have a say in the continent’s affairs, or has asserted Russia’s status as a unique state-civilization that would be immune to Western standards and a bearer of its own value scale.”
• “Even before the Russian state adopted a civilizational language, other nonstate actors … had been using the term to associate Russia with a racially white civilization, which they …. thought should look for support from brotherly nations in Europe and in the U.S. While anti-Americanism has been a trademark of Russia’s political language for years … a rise of a civilizational reference to a white, Christian world to which Russia would belong has allowed … a constituency … to identify positively with the West.”
• “Russian elites who see their country as part of ‘European civilization’ are more likely than are others to expect their dominant regime party … to leave power earlier. … [and] are more likely to believe that their country’s politics will follow norms of behavior commonly associated with this civilization, in this case meaning that Russian politics will demonstrate more democratic behavior in the future.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The Pandemic Has Failed to Unite Russia and Europe,” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.27.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor in chief of Carnegie.ru, writes:

• “The fight against the pandemic is developing along different lines in Russia and Europe.”
  • “After some initial wavering, and seeing the failure of its former leader—the United States—to deal with the situation, Europe chose a milder version of China’s tough response. Sweden, which went its own way at the beginning, was quickly shamed and put in its place.”
  • “Russia, like the rest of the world, also tried at first to copy (again in a milder form) the Chinese approach, but soon rejected that model. Now, with many European countries in their third full lockdown—in some cases stricter than the first—and imposing curfews and domestic travel restrictions, Russia is seeking a middle way, without the slightest hint of the kind of official COVID dissidence shown by Trump or Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.”
• “A government’s political orientation doesn’t necessarily translate into it being included within the bubble of European isolation, and no country illustrates this more starkly than Ukraine. Despite having made its choice firmly in favor of Europe, Ukraine has been left outside the European bubble, yet can no longer be part of the Russian bubble.”
• “Even as the EU appears to weaken, we are seeing growing demands among Europeans for more Europe-wide cooperation. This is a direct consequence of the period of European isolation. This crisis-era isolation did not include Russia, and will form Europe’s future notions of its own borders and resilience.”

 

“Will This Contender for German Chancellor Be a Friend to Russia,” Dmitri Kartsev, Carnegie Moscow Center/The Moscow Times, 01.28.21. The author, a foreign-affairs columnist at Meduza, writes:

• “Germany’s ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has chosen a new leader: Armin Laschet, the prime minister of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. This fall, he will most probably head the joint CDU/Christian Social Union list in Germany’s parliamentary election. With the Christian Democrats’ approval ratings currently very high, they are unlikely to lose the election, meaning Laschet will most likely replace Angela Merkel as German chancellor.”
• “The German media have dubbed Laschet a Merkel loyalist who will extend her era. Concerns have been expressed, however, about Laschet’s foreign policy views. Back in 2014, Die Welt newspaper included Laschet on the list of Putin-Versteher: Putin-friendly politicians.”
• “The question is whether Laschet will retain his sympathies toward Russia as chancellor, and there is no guarantee that he will. His personal preferences, if they even exist, will have to contend with a number of other factors shaping German foreign policy. And unlike the U.S. or Russian presidents, the German chancellor exerts far less foreign policy influence.”
• “Much will depend on the choice of coalition partner, since the head of the second coalition party generally becomes foreign minister. That place may well be occupied by the Greens after the fall elections, and they take a very tough stance on Russia.”
• “There are no indications that Laschet would want to preside over a change in old policies, which combine sanctions that he has said should not be lifted, and specific agreements in certain areas despite the sanctions regime.”

 

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Biden's Opening Salvo on Beijing,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 01.25.21. The author, a Hudson Institute fellow, Bard professor and Journal columnist, writes:

• “Initiating his China policy with the most aggressive concatenation of moves against a foreign power that any peacetime U.S. administration has ever launched so early on, President Biden has thrown down a gauntlet that Beijing is unlikely to ignore.”
  • “Besides issuing a formal invitation to Taiwan's top Washington representative to attend the inauguration … the incoming team has pledged to continue arms sales to Taiwan and indicated that it wants to delay high-level U.S.-China talks until it consults with close allies—a stand that China will interpret as a rebuff.”
  • “Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken announced that he concurs with his predecessor Mike Pompeo's finding that China is engaged in a genocide against its mostly Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang province. Taken with the previously planned dispatch of a naval strike group to the South China Sea, it all amounts to a stern message to Beijing.”
• “The crisis in China policy is the most dramatic problem facing the new administration, but relations with Russia also look tangled. The quick U.S. response to support the rights of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and his supporters is noble from a human-rights standpoint, but it will strengthen the hand of those in the Kremlin (and in Beijing) who argue that Washington's ultimate goal in their countries remains regime change. … [That] will certainly stimulate efforts in both China and Russia to weaken U.S. power, meddle in American politics and disrupt Washington's alliances.”
• “All this may well be inevitable, and the U.S. cannot abandon either its strategic interests or its core values. But weaving those sometimes conflicting elements into a coherent foreign policy is never an easy task.”

Ukraine:

“The Biden Presidency and Ukraine, Steven Pifer, Stanford International Policy Review/Brookings, 01.28.21. The author, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, writes:

• “In a December 2020 New York Times interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Joe Biden’s election as U.S. president. Zelensky observed that Biden ‘knows Ukraine better than the previous president’ and ‘will really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation of our territory.’”
• “While Zelensky’s comments may prove overly optimistic, there is little reason to doubt that the Biden presidency will be good for Ukraine. The incoming president knows the country, and he understands both the value of a stable and successful Ukraine for U.S. interests in Europe and the challenges posed to Ukraine and the West by Russia. That might—might, not will, but might—help break the logjam on the stalemated Donbas conflict, which Zelensky of course would welcome. Perhaps less welcome to the Ukrainian president may be Biden’s readiness to play hardball to press Kyiv to take needed but politically difficult reform and anti-corruption steps. Ukraine’s success as a liberal democracy depends not just on ending its conflict with Russia but also on combating corruption and advancing still necessary economic reforms.”
• “Without the Kremlin’s cooperation, Kyiv on its own cannot resolve the conflict in Donbas, and Crimea poses an even harder question. However, meeting the second of the challenges facing Ukraine—implementation of reforms and anti-corruption measures needed to build a fair, robust and growing economy—lies largely within Kyiv’s purview.”
• “The Biden presidency is good news for Ukraine and those who wish to see it develop into a modern European state. It will mean more high-level but hard-nosed U.S. support. That could lead to greater progress on reform within the country. And, with some imaginative diplomacy and luck, it might even help break the logjam with Russia over resolving the fate of Donbas.”

Belarus

“Biden and Belarus: A strategy for the new administration,” Anders Åslund, Melinda Haring, John E. Herbst, Alexander Vershbow, Atlantic Council, 01.27.21. The authors, including a deputy secretary general of NATO, write:

• “[Biden] has a historic opportunity to bring Europe together and reverse the tide of dictatorship by building an international coalition to support democracy in Belarus. … [But doing so] is not simple given internal resistance and Moscow’s determination to prevent another ‘color revolution.’”
• “Lukashenka is likely finished, unable to restore any authority or legitimacy. But he is seeking to hang on despite Moscow’s efforts to arrange a pliable replacement who would preserve Minsk’s pro-Russian orientation. … Russia remains the key geopolitical player in Belarus, often plays the long game, and may be willing to countenance military options that the United States cannot.”
• “Biden … is ideally situated to promote clear support for the people of Belarus that does not directly challenge Moscow’s security interests. … Biden should[:] … meet with Tsikhanouskaya within his first 100 days as president…; designate a senior official to coordinate sanctions with the EU, the UK and Canada…; sign an executive order on Belarus that would sanction hundreds of Belarusian officials who violate human rights.”
  • “[Washington] should refer to Lukashenka as the former president…;  sanction companies that handle Lukashenka’s private finances…; threaten Russian companies and businessmen with sanctions in case they take over Belarusian companies or support Lukashenka’s regime financially or politically…; [and] sanction Russian … journalists participating in propaganda campaigns against the Belarus protest movement.”
  • “Congress should give specific guidance to the State Department that it spend no less than $200 million annually on civil society and media support for Belarus.”
  • “The United States … should send humanitarian assistance to the opposition.”
  • “The secretary of state should facilitate and encourage the unconditional release of and amnesty for all political prisoners … and insist on an inclusive national dialogue.”
  • “The United States should use its power in international organizations … to ensure their active participation in solving the Belarus crisis.”
• The authors likewise suggest measures “to manage the Russian reaction to developments in Belarus with a view to preventing a Kremlin crackdown.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Revolution Again in Kyrgyzstan: Forward to the Past?” Andrea Schmitz, SWP, January 2021. The author, a senior associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP, writes:

• “The idea of a strong president ensuring order and justice is apparently attractive to the nationalists and conservatives who make up the bulk of [Sadyr] Japarov’s supporters. They skew heavily rural, where large parts of the population struggle to make ends meet. The populist promise of ‘honest politics’ resonates there, as do Japarov’s simplistic claims and explanations.”
• “Criticisms of Japarov’s democratic deficits do no harm to his popularity. The open and latent violence that propelled him to power does not in the eyes of his supporters speak against him, nor did his aggressive election campaign or the fact that he diverted state resources to fund it. Even the suspicion that prominent criminals funded Japarov’s campaign and that his popularity was boosted by professional social media manipulation appears not to concern his adherents.”
• “Hard times are ahead for critics of Japarov’s authoritarian populism. This applies to all the civil society organizations, intellectuals, journalists and, not least, the many women who have been campaigning for years for human rights and a democratic order. These groups have experienced intimidation and threats of violence since the events of October 2020, and it must be feared that the pressure will increase. This applies above all in the event of Japarov failing to fulfil the expectations of his supporters. In order to stifle protests he might—like Bakiyev before him—be tempted to deflect criticism using increasingly repressive means.”
• “Germany and the EU should do everything in their power to prevent that happening, firstly pressing for a fundamental revision of the draft constitution, which is currently being reviewed by the Venice Commission. Beyond that, support for critical media should be foregrounded and prioritized in political dialogue.”