This Week's Highlights

• Regarding the Ukraine crisis, “the best hope for a peaceful resolution of this unhappy mess is for the Ukrainian people and their leaders to realize that having Russia and the West fight over which side ultimately gains Kyiv’s allegiance is going to be a disaster for their country,” Harvard professor Stephen Walt writes in Foreign Policy. “Ukraine should take the initiative and announce it intends to operate as a neutral country that will not join any military alliance. It should formally pledge not to become a member of NATO or join the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.” In similar proposals, CFR’s Thomas Graham and New York Times columnist Ross Douthat both suggest, at the very least, a moratorium on NATO membership for Ukraine. 
• In analyzing why Moscow has decided to ratchet up pressure on Ukraine in recent weeks, the Wall Street Journal’s Gerald F. Seib considers international factors like Washington’s diminishing appetite for military entanglements, Germany’s heightened reliance on Russian energy imports and Russia’s “warming relationship with China.” This relationship is at the heart of Gideon Rachman’s Financial Times column, where he writes that, “even if Putin fails to achieve his goals in Ukraine, the threat to the U.S.-led world order will not disappear. A rising China … will make sure of that.” With Beijing and Moscow “increasingly assertive in their home regions,” President Joe Biden “has been handed the thankless task of shepherding the United States into a new era of global politics,” writes Emma Ashford of the Atlantic Council and Georgetown University. 
• Several analysts parse what might happen if Russia does invade Ukraine. “One report suggests the Biden administration would consider making Ukraine ungovernable by supporting and supplying arms to local resistance groups,” UC San Diego professor of political science David Lake writes in The Washington Post. He compares the policy to recent “forever wars” and warns that it is “likely to leave a shattered country in its wake.” 
• The Financial Times energy editor, David Sheppard, argues that Europe must “reduce its reliance on Russian gas as quickly as possible. … Moscow argues that it is meeting all its long-term contracts to European buyers. But heavily restricting spot sales with little prior warning and draining the storage facilities of Russia’s Gazprom in Europe has left the market desperately tight.” 
• With calm restored in Kazakhstan, the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Alexander Gabuev and Temur Umarov write that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s “years in power are unlikely to be uneventful. The new Kazakh president has yet to establish his authority and to surround himself with trusted elites. Most importantly of all, he cannot rely on the loyalty of the security services.” 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“Defend Chernobyl During an Invasion? Why Bother, Some Ukrainians Ask,” Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 01.21.22. The author, a reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “[W]hile most of the attention around a potential invasion by Russia is focused on troop buildups and daily hostilities in the east, the shortest route from Russia to Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, is from the north. And it passes through the isolated zone around the Chernobyl power plant, where the meltdown of a reactor in 1986 caused the worst nuclear disaster in history.”
• “In one of the incongruities of war, that makes Chernobyl an area that Ukraine thinks it needs to defend, forcing its military to deploy security forces into the eerie and still radioactive forest … The Ukrainian forces in the area, known as the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, would not be sufficient to rebuff an invasion, if one came; they are there mostly to detect warning signs.”
• “The risk of a war further spreading radiation seems minimal. But one object in the zone is particularly vulnerable: a new, $1.7 billion stainless steel arch over the destroyed reactor, paid for mostly by the United States and about 30 other countries. It was completed in 2016 to prevent the spread of highly radioactive dust.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.20.22. The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Strictly speaking, there can only be one guarantee of security in the nuclear age, and that’s the threat of mutually assured destruction ... Nations don’t just enter freely into agreements with each other; they are free to end those agreements too. ... There are no illusions about any of this in the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry, still less in military headquarters. There is no real trust in non-aggression pacts or detargeting (or zero targeting) agreements.”
• “Since the United States is not prepared to go to war with Russia for Ukraine, neither Ukraine nor Georgia will be accepted into NATO as long as Russia is able to prevent it. The threat of Ukraine being in NATO is, therefore, in fact a phantom one for the foreseeable future.”
• “There’s a chance that an agreement could be reached on the issue of not locating U.S. missile stations in Ukraine, as attested to by the willingness of U.S. negotiators to discuss this topic in Geneva. … It will be harder, if not impossible, to agree on ending military and military-technology cooperation between Ukraine and the United States/NATO.”
• “Moscow’s demand for the withdrawal of all military infrastructure deployed to NATO’s Eastern European member states is as impossible as it is largely unnecessary in terms of Russia’s security. ... There is a suspicion that the third key demand—effectively, a return to 1997—was put forward so that it could later be retracted, thereby demonstrating Moscow’s readiness to compromise.”
• “Russian officials have said that if the talks fail, Moscow will take military-technical and even military measures. ... It’s important, however, that these measures be a response to existing and likely future security threats to Russia, rather than a provocation that would elicit new such threats.”

“Putin Has the U.S. Right Where He Wants It,” Fiona Hill, The New York Times, 01.24.22. The author, deputy assistant to the president and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council from 2017 to 2019, writes:

• “Putin’s aim is bigger than closing NATO’s ‘open door’ to Ukraine and taking more territory—he wants to evict the United States from Europe.”
• “Ukraine is both Russia’s target and a source of leverage against the United States. … Putin has bogged the Biden administration down in endless tactical games that put the United States on the defensive. … For weeks, American officials have huddled to make sense of the official documents with Russia’s demands and the contradictory commentary, pondered how to deter Mr. Putin in Ukraine and scrambled to talk on his timeline.”
• “Putin is a master of coercive inducement. He manufactures a crisis in such a way that he can win no matter what anyone else does. … Putin can invade Ukraine yet again, or he can leave things where they are and just consolidate the territory Russia effectively controls in Crimea and Donbas. He can stir up trouble in Japan and send hypersonic missiles to Cuba and Venezuela, or not, if things go his way in Europe.”
• “Right now, all signs indicate that Mr. Putin will lock the U.S. into an endless tactical game, take more chunks out of Ukraine and exploit all the frictions and fractures in NATO and the European Union. Getting out of the current crisis requires acting, not reacting. The United States needs to shape the diplomatic response and engage Russia on the West’s terms, not just Moscow’s.”
• “To be sure, Russia does have some legitimate security concerns, and European security arrangements could certainly do with fresh thinking and refurbishment after 30 years. … But a further Russian invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine’s dismemberment and neutralization cannot be an issue for U.S.-Russian negotiation nor a line item in European security. Ultimately, the United States needs to show Mr. Putin that he will face global resistance and Mr. Putin’s aggression will put Russia’s political and economic relationships at risk far beyond Europe.”

“Breaking the Impasse Between Russia and the West Over European Security,” Thomas Graham, Russia Matters, 01.20.22. The author, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration, writes:

• “Last week’s intense talks between Russia and the West over European security seemed to end in failure. … Meanwhile, the march continues toward a new war in Ukraine, which both sides say they want to avert, while elaborating narratives to put the blame for the outbreak of conflict on the other. Is war thus imminent, as many in the West seem to believe? … [T]he exit from the crisis could come in the form of a U.S.-Russian agreement to a moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion.”
• “Serious security negotiations have to be grounded in the realities of power. And the reality is that the United States and Russia alone have the military might to alter the balance of power in Europe.”
• “Substantively, the United States and Russia need to put the full range of issues affecting European security on the table: military activity along the Russian-NATO frontier, NATO expansion and current and frozen conflicts.”
• “The challenge is to square the circle of the West’s insistence on NATO’s open door to former Soviet states and Russia’s demand for a sphere of influence that includes them. The positions appear irreconcilable, but as a colleague and I have proposed, a moratorium on further NATO expansion into the former Soviet space for a period of 20-25 years could bridge the gap. It would formalize what any Western official would say in private—and some have said publicly—that no former Soviet state, including Ukraine, will be ready for membership for years to come.”
• “Critics of compromise will inevitably shout appeasement. But this is hardly the case. … The compromises are intended to ensure that that contest is pursued in a framework that minimizes the risk of a catastrophic military conflict and focuses the two sides on accumulating incremental advantages over time. That kind of responsible rivalry is most assuredly in the West’s interest—and Russia’s.”

“Moscow’s Compellence Strategy,” Rob Lee, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 01.19.22. The author, a fellow in FPRI's Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Misinterpreting Russia’s political goals and its most likely military options can lead to poor policy advice. Many arguments about deterring a Russian invasion assume Russia intends to occupy large parts of Ukrainian territory for long periods of time and suggest further deliveries of Javelin anti-guided missiles or Stinger MANPADS, which could be effective as part of an insurgency. However, if Russia does not plan to occupy population centers, these weapons will have little impact and they wouldn’t be effective at deterring these Russian military options.”
• “If the U.S. attempted to deliver the kind of weapons that could alter the military balance between Russia and Ukraine, such as long-range missiles or missile defense systems, Moscow would almost certainly preempt their delivery with a military escalation. Better deterrence options would not take effect unless Russia conducted a significant escalation, making Moscow the initiator. Such an approach would worsen Russia’s security situation, potentially negating whatever security benefits it hoped to achieve by escalating in Ukraine. These options could include a commitment to deploy long-range missiles or missile defense systems to the Baltic countries in the event of an expanded Russian invasion.”

“How to Retreat From Ukraine,” Ross Douthat, The New York Times, 01.22.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Extricating ourselves from our Ukrainian entanglements will inevitably instill doubts about our more important commitments elsewhere, doubts that will be greater the more Kyiv suffers from our retreat. And handing off more security responsibility to the Europeans has been an unmet goal of every recent U.S. president, with the particular problem that a key European power, Germany, often acts like a de facto ally of the Russians.”
• “Given those difficulties, the Biden administration’s wavering course has been understandable, even if the president’s recent news conference was too honest by several orders of magnitude. The United States cannot do nothing if Russia invades Ukraine; we also would be insane to join the war on Ukraine’s side. So the White House’s quest for the right in-between response, some balance of sanctions and arms shipments, looks groping and uncertain for good reason: There’s simply no perfect answer here, only a least-bad balancing of options.”
• “But my sense is that we are still placing too much weight on the idea that only NATO gets to say who is in NATO, that simply ruling out Ukrainian membership is somehow an impossible concession. This conceit is an anachronism, an artifact of the post-Cold War moment… That’s not how the world works now, and precisely because it’s not how the world works I would be somewhat relieved … to see our leaders acknowledge as much, rather than holding out the idea that someday we might be obliged by treaty to risk a nuclear war over the Donbass.”
• “And if we cannot give up the idea outright, the idea of giving it up for some extensive period—like the 25 years suggested by Thomas Graham and Rajan Menon in a recent Politico op-ed—seems like a very reasonable deal to make.”

“Did Putin’s 2007 Munich Speech Predict the Ukraine Crisis?” Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, 01.24.22. The author, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, writes:

• Putin’s “2007 Munich Security Conference speech should have erased all doubt about whether Russia viewed NATO policy generally and the alliance’s inexorable march eastward in particular as provocative and threatening. Putin was warning his Western counterparts to change course.”
• “In his memoir, 'Duty,' Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in the administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, made some interesting admissions. … Among other missteps, ‘U.S. agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation.’ In an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, Gates asserted that ‘trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching.’ That move, he contended, was a case of ‘recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.’”
• “Unfortunately, Gates was an outlier with his realism. Not only did Washington dismiss Putin’s complaints and warnings at Munich, the Bush administration escalated its provocative policies. The following year, Bush intensified his lobbying campaign to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and asked leaders at the annual summit meeting to approve the first step—a Membership Action Plan for both countries. Fortunately, the German and French governments concluded that such a step was too risky, forcing the adoption of a compromise communique. However, even that compromise document declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become NATO members."
• “Putin’s Munich speech was the first explicit warning of serious trouble if the West did not abandon its increasingly aggressive posture toward Russia; the Kremlin’s latest demands for security guarantees and a NATO military pullback from Russia’s borders may be the last warning. The United States and its allies are backing Russia into a corner, and that is profoundly unwise if the goal is to avoid war with a heavily armed great power.”

“America Needs a Bolder Biden. A Year In, His Foreign Policy Is Too Cautious and Conventional,” Emma Ashford, Foreign Affairs, 01.20.22. The author, a senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, writes:

• “As a former senator and vice president, Biden has more relevant foreign policy experience than any modern president, with the exception of George H. W. Bush. Biden has augmented that experience by hiring a strong team of foreign policy hands—and, perhaps more important, by eschewing policymaking by tweet. … Which is why it is puzzling that the Biden administration has enjoyed so few unqualified successes in its first year.”
• “Its handling of New START … is one such success, with the president signing a five-year extension that will maintain the treaty’s inspections and limits on Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.”
• “Certainly, not all of the United States’ foreign policy woes should be laid at the feet of the Biden administration. … In the context of the country’s domestic political strife, the administration’s desire to connect domestic and foreign policy through ‘a foreign policy for the middle class’ seems reasonable. The same could be said for strategic questions. Today, U.S. military power is in relative decline, and China, Russia, and other states are increasingly assertive in their home regions. In many ways, Biden has been handed the thankless task of shepherding the United States into a new era of global politics.”
• “The Biden team needs to figure out its approach to European strategic autonomy. It has embraced permanent structured cooperation, or PESCO, the European Union defense initiative, and officials have called for Europe to become “more capable militarily.” At the same time, however, the administration’s approach to the Ukraine crisis has been to supplant Germany and France in negotiations with Russia and to pledge more military support to eastern Europe—in essence, asserting the primacy of the U.S. security umbrella.”
• “The Biden team needs to decide what to do about the U.S. nuclear arsenal: Biden should follow through on his campaign pledge to reduce ‘our reliance and excessive expenditure on nuclear weapons.’ Yet that would require applying pressure on the Pentagon, which the administration seems loath to do.”

“Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia. The Role of Ground Forces in Preventing Hostile Measures Below Armed Conflict in Europe,” Stephen Watts, Bryan Rooney, Gene Germanovich, Bruce McClintock, Stephanie Pezard, Clint Reach and Melissa Shostak, RAND, January 2022. The authors of the report write:

• “The same logic of deterrence that has been applied to armed conflict for decades generally also applies to competition below the level of armed conflict, but the effects of U.S. forward posture are more subtle in the competition space. … U.S. military forward posture (including U.S. forces positioned overseas, activities conducted by U.S. military forces, and military agreements) has the potential to deter hostile measures (such as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation). Employed inappropriately, however, it also has the potential to provoke them.”
• “Whether the outcome is escalatory or deterrent depends on the type of posture (forces, activities, and agreements) and three characteristics of its employment: proximity, continuity, and capability. … Of the elements of forward posture, U.S. forces are most consistently associated with deterrence. Forces send a strong signal of U.S. commitment and provide important capabilities. When these forces are first introduced in-theater, however, they can make host countries the targets of Russian hostile measures.”
• “U.S. military activities (such as multilateral military exercises) are less likely to deter Russian hostile measures and more likely to lead to escalation. Escalatory risks are reduced when the United States conducts such activities farther from Russia and takes measures to increase their predictability.”
• “Military agreements also can deter malign activities, especially when the United States enters into an alliance, thus putting its international reputation at stake. Lesser military agreements are weaker deterrents. … Many escalatory consequences are not proximate in space or time. Instead of a clear action-reaction cycle, there are often considerable lags before Russian reactions and thus greater opportunities for misunderstanding.”
• “Typically, forward posture is one contributing factor to competition outcomes, is seldom the primary driver, and most often has effects that are cumulative and long-term.”

“How the West went public to stop a war in Ukraine,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 01.24.22. The author, the FT’s European diplomatic correspondent and former Moscow bureau chief, writes:

• “From the first declassified, grainy spy photos of Russian tanks assembled on the Ukrainian border in November to President Joe Biden’s airing last week of his personal guess that Putin will ‘move in’ and invade, the U.S. and its Western partners have for months fought a remarkably public war of words against the Kremlin’s perceived menace.”
• “A daily bombardment of briefings, intelligence, threats and allegations from the White House, NATO, the EU and European capitals has marked a novel approach to avoiding war. The disclosure of information normally reserved for hidden negotiations is highly unusual in modern-day diplomacy.”
• “While the strategy has shifted the initial calculus for Russia and negated Moscow’s ability to surprise, it has come at the cost of broadcasting to a global audience the West’s divisions on how to handle Russia.”
• “Some analysts have also questioned whether conducting high-stakes dialogue in press conferences and speeches has impeded efforts to find a negotiated solution.” 
• “And shining a light on the crisis may also have another unintended consequence of forcing Putin to take action to avoid appearing to have backed down under U.S. pressure. … ‘But it all depends on how Putin can sell it at home.’”

“Macron’s Flawed Vision for Europe,” Francis J. Gavin and Alina Polyakova, Foreign Affairs, 01.19.22. The authors, director of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and the president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis, write:

• “Macron is right that Europe needs to reevaluate its priorities and act on them. The European Union cannot continue to drift and depend entirely on a distant and distracted superpower for its security while standing on the sidelines. At a time when the U.S. position in the world is uncertain, a vigorous European effort to contribute to a strategy for the West would be most welcome.”
• “Any new strategy, however, should be built on several principles. … For one thing, Macron should make a greater effort to generate consensus on the most pressing security challenges. The threat presented by Russia provides an early but crucial test in a way that goes beyond immediate military decisions. For example, Europe depends on Russia for energy. Whether the continent is willing to explore serious efforts to end this dependence will reveal the outer limits of what individual nation-states are willing to sacrifice in exchange for reducing President Vladimir Putin’s leverage.”
• “A new European strategy also cannot emerge solely from Paris. It will be Germany, with its economic power and historical legacy, whose actions will matter far more than France’s. … Nor can the continent go it alone; it must involve non-European partners.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Russia and China’s plans for a new world order,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 01.23.22. The author, the FT’s chief foreign affairs columnist, writes:

• “[A]s the Ukraine crisis reaches boiling point, Western efforts to isolate and punish Russia are likely to be undermined by the support of China… [which has] supported Russia’s demand that Ukraine must never join NATO.”
• “Putin and Xi have … made it clear they believe that America’s ultimate goal is to overthrow the Russian and Chinese governments and that local pro-democracy forces are America’s Trojan horse.” Russia and China “share a determination to create a new world order that will better accommodate [their] interests … as defined by their current leaders … [who] believe that the current arrangements give America too much power.”
• “America’s defeat in Afghanistan, symbolized by the chaotic withdrawal from Kabul in the summer of 2021, has given the Russians hope that the U.S.-led world order is crumbling. … Influential Chinese academics are thinking along similar lines.”
• “Beijing and Moscow argue that the current world order is characterized by an American attempt to impose Western ideas about democracy and human rights on other countries, if necessary through military intervention. The new world order that Russia and China are demanding would instead be based on distinct [cultural traditions and] spheres of influence. … The crisis over Ukraine is a struggle over the future world order because it turns on precisely these issues.”
• “There are also some important differences between the approaches of Moscow and Beijing. Russia is currently more willing to take military risks than China. But its ultimate goals may be more limited. … [W]hile Russia aspires to be one of the world’s great powers, China seems to be contemplating displacing the U.S. as the world’s pre-eminent power. … The difference in the scale of the ambitions … reflects the difference in their economic potential. … [This] makes Xi ultimately more ambitious than Putin, [but] in the short term it also makes him more cautious.”
• “But will gradualism work? Or do Russia and China need some kind of dramatic moment to create the new world order that they seek? History suggests that new governing systems for the world generally emerge after some kind of seismic political event, such as a major war. … [E]ven if Putin fails to achieve his goals in Ukraine, the threat to the U.S.-led world order will not disappear. A rising China, led by an ambitious President Xi, will make sure of that.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“Russia’s Escalation Management and a Baltic Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone,” Lukas Milevski, Orbis, Winter 2022. The author, an assistant professor at Leiden University, writes:

• “[T]here has been renewed discussion in some quarters of a Cold War-era idea: a Baltic nuclear- weapon free zone (NWFZ).  The basic suggestion is that if the two sides could agree on removing nuclear weapons, then a natural cap would constrain any hypothetical future escalation in the region. … The Russians may or may not agree, and their considerations regarding such a zone would never be limited to narrow thought processes about limiting nuclear weapons.”
• “Russia … has developed a quite sophisticated [deterrence and escalation management] theory … This theory relies on Russia’s own long-range precision missiles together with its NSNWs, both of which share similar tasks but neither of which can replace the other within this highly developed theory, causing the Russian military at the very least probably to react negatively to a proposed Baltic NWFZ.  Rather than reinforcing stability, such a proposal may ironically decrease stability.”
• “This is not to argue that a Baltic NWFZ is inherently destabilizing. Based on Russia’s theory of escalation management and their suspicions of the United States and NATO both globally and in the Baltic region, there is a solid chance that a NWFZ would increase rather than decrease instability. Russians tend to think in terms of effects and outcomes. The effects of a conventional disarming strike versus a diplomatic NWFZ would be broadly comparable, albeit through different means of achievement … The political leadership could decide to override military concerns to some degree if it judges diplomatic and geopolitical benefits to be greater than loss of capacity to implement a theory of escalation management in which it may lack confidence or belief.
• “Regarding perspectives about—and prospects for—a hypothetical Baltic NWFZ, arms controllers cannot be careless in their assumptions.  They must consider the full range of plausible Russian perspectives which may emerge in reaction to their proposals, including those based on Russia’s propounded theories of escalation management and the political considerations, which may constrain them.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“Russia’s ransomware arrests send an ominous message,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 01.21.22. The authors write:

• “[Russia’s] Federal Security Service (FSB) last week arrested 14 alleged members of the REvil hacking collective at … Washington’s request. This is good news. The bad part is the timing.”
• “[W]hile the Kremlin has been happy to police Jehovah’s Witnesses, dissidents and businesses executives… officials are less eager to prevent criminals from wreaking havoc abroad by hacking servers and demanding money to restore them. These groups tend to operate with impunity in Russia, as long as they pick the right victims.”
• “With the REvil arrests, Mr. Putin has proved Mr. Biden’s point. He does have the power to curb the incursions… The rub is, he also has the power to do nothing.”
• “Russia sends this signal at the same time it is amassing troops, armor and aircraft along its border with Ukraine, and at the same time the United States is vowing to retaliate in the event of an invasion. The message is simple: Like seeing cybercriminals behind bars? Then don’t make us angry.”
• “The White House shouldn’t be cowed. Russia’s ‘ransomware diplomacy,’ as one expert put it, should encourage the United States to consider cyber an essential component of its arsenal as well.”
• “Defense is as important as offense; the administration is seeking to remedy decades of negligence, most recently in a memorandum directing national security agencies to secure themselves. CISA is trying to help the private sector stay safe, too.”
• “So far, so slow — Wednesday’s memo, for instance, came six months later than a 60-day deadline imposed in May’s sweeping cybersecurity executive order. The Government Accountability Office reports also found agencies have been haphazard in implementing recommendations and requirements. A robust cybersecurity strategy is no longer a matter of preparing for the future; now, it’s a critical part of contending with the present.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Moscow has the EU over a barrel on energy,” David Sheppard, Financial Times, 01.20.22. The author, energy editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “The EU relies on Russia for around 40 percent of its gas in normal years. A steep decline in exports from the country in recent months has served—most likely by Kremlin-approved design—as a reminder of Europe’s huge strategic weakness when it comes to energy.”
• “Analysts at Citi warned this week that with a complete loss of Russian supplies Europe would face widespread industrial disruption and ‘rationing [of] electricity, potentially including rolling blackouts.’ At best, with coordinated government action and significantly higher prices, Europe could replace two-thirds of Russian gas with seaborne LNG cargoes, Citi estimates.”
• “Moscow argues that it is meeting all its long-term contracts to European buyers. But heavily restricting spot sales with little prior warning and draining the storage facilities of Russia’s Gazprom in Europe has left the market desperately tight. Putin has repeatedly tied higher supplies to the approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would bypass Ukraine to carry gas direct to Germany.”
• “Even if the current crises blow over, Gazprom has made clear it does not see Europe as its future, with plans to send the continent headlong into competition with China for its wares ... Cold winters 10 years from now could land households in Europe in a bidding war with state-backed Chinese utilities for the gas they need.”
• “Today’s intertwined crises in gas prices and Ukraine should finally force action from Europe to reduce its reliance on Russian gas as quickly as possible.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Putin already has at least one client regime in Central Europe,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 01.19.22. The author, a Russian opposition politician, writes:

• “While the world’s attention is understandably focused on the Kremlin’s growing threats against Ukraine, a less-noticed political scandal brewing in the Balkans has served as a reminder that Vladimir Putin already has at least one client regime in Central Europe. Last week, Serbia’s independent media revealed that the country’s security agencies are effectively running errands for Russia’s Federal Security Service—and assisting the Kremlin in going after its political opponents.”
• “At their recent meeting in Moscow, Serbian Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin and Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, reportedly agreed to establish a ‘working group for combating color revolutions’ (a term denoting pro-democracy uprisings in authoritarian states), including by stepping up joint monitoring of civil society organizations, opposition activists, and independent media. The problem for both security chiefs—and for their political masters—is that when enough people in society are willing to stand up to authoritarianism, all the wiretaps, working groups, and monitoring efforts become powerless. Recent history has shown this clearly. Just ask the Serbs.”

“Russia’s Enduring Role in the World; In Review, John P. LeDonne, ‘Forging a Unitary State: Russia’s Management of the Eurasian Space 1650-1850,’” Jakub Grygiel, Orbis, Winter 2022. The author, a professor of politics at The Catholic University of America and a senior advisor at The Marathon Initiative, writes:

• “What makes Russia such an enduring geopolitical actor? One answer may be provided by a recent work by John LeDonne, a historian of Russia … [H]is latest tome, ‘Forging a Unitary State,’ is history at its best.”
• “The argument is that from theseventeenth century on Russian leaders sought to establish a unitary state at its core, a ‘Fortress Russia,’ from which to project power and influence. This core was never fixed, and its boundaries moved in and out … Where the unitary state was unfeasible, Russia pursued an empire. … The distinction between these two analytical concepts—unitary state and empire—and the strategies associated with them is important because it explains the pattern of Russian history.”  
• “Two lessons … seem relevant.  First, Russia, unlike most of the Western powers, has never fixed its borders as lines beyond which it will not attempt to establish a unitary state. … Other European powers and the United States are no longer in the business of extending direct control beyond their borders. As states, whether unitary or national, they are stable. While this is a positive historical development, it also seems to create a certain amnesia or inability to understand that other polities in the world, such as Russia, have never abandoned their ambition to push their unitary state beyond the existing lines.”
• “The second related lesson is that there are few reasons to expect a lasting stability around Russia. Russia and its neighboring countries have fundamentally different interests, policy vectors and civilizational foundations. As a result, they are locked in enduring conflicts that will not be transcended through the expansion of globalization or global institutions.”
• “The competition between Russia and the West could end, hypothetically, only if either Russia abandons its centralizing nature—the historic effort to expand its unitary state—or its neighbors cease to aspire to be parts of the wider Western world.  Neither is likely.  The borderlands will remain a zone of competition, conflict, and, yes, war.”

Ukraine:

“Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 01.19.22. The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “The situation in Ukraine is bad and getting worse. … Negotiations do not appear to be succeeding, and the United States and its NATO allies are beginning to contemplate how they will make Russia pay should it press forward with an invasion. A real war is now a distinct possibility, which would have far-reaching consequences for everyone involved, especially Ukraine’s citizens.”
• “The great tragedy is this entire affair was avoidable. Had the United States and its European allies not succumbed to hubris, wishful thinking, and liberal idealism and relied instead on realism’s core insights, the present crisis would not have occurred. … The world is paying a high price for relying on a flawed theory of world politics.”
• “To get around this problem, the two sides would have to transform this negotiation from one that looks like blackmail to one that looks more like mutual backscratching. … The Biden administration appears to be attempting something along these lines by proposing mutually beneficial agreements on missile deployments and other secondary issues and trying to take the question of future NATO enlargement off the table. … I don’t think this approach is going to fly. Why not? Because in the end, Ukraine’s geopolitical alignment is a vital interest for the Kremlin and Russia will insist on getting something tangible.”
• “The best hope for a peaceful resolution of this unhappy mess is for the Ukrainian people and their leaders to realize that having Russia and the West fight over which side ultimately gains Kyiv’s allegiance is going to be a disaster for their country. Ukraine should take the initiative and announce it intends to operate as a neutral country that will not join any military alliance. It should formally pledge not to become a member of NATO or join the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.”
• “Anti-Russian sentiment is now running high in most of Ukraine, however, which makes it less likely this possible exit ramp can be taken.”

“If Russia invades Ukraine, what happens next?” David Lake, The Washington Post, 01.22.22. The author, a distinguished professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, who is completing a book on U.S. indirect rule, writes:

• “In the event of a Russian incursion into Ukraine, what happens next? One report suggests the Biden administration would consider making Ukraine ungovernable by supporting and supplying arms to local resistance groups. … But it’s a policy with significant cost, and … likely to leave a shattered country in its wake.”
• “My research on indirect rule suggests Russia is unlikely to formally incorporate Ukraine … into some new version of the Soviet empire. … Moscow is more likely to try to subvert the current government … and rule indirectly through a pro-Russian Ukrainian proxy.”
• “To the extent that … Putin seeks to block NATO’s expansion further to the east, this approach ensures pro-Russian leaders in the target countries would rebuff any Western invitations.”
• “Great powers most often exert influence by tipping the political scales within a target country toward factions sympathetic to their own policy preferences,” which then enact policies to benefit themselves and their great-power benefactor.
• “If Russia plans to invade Ukraine to install a friendly government, then the United States is in a difficult position. Increased Western sanctions appear unlikely to dissuade Moscow. … With direct military action … in Ukraine apparently off the table, the Biden administration appears to have conceded that it won’t defend the territory.”
• “Alternatively, my research suggests the United States might continue to support its own client regime in Ukraine against one backed by Russia. But a ‘bidding war’ … would become costly, with Russia “likely to outbid” the U.S.
• “If the United States supports domestic resistance in Ukraine, Moscow might eventually decide that maintaining a friendly government in Ukraine is not worth the cost in blood and treasure.” The U.S. hope would be to “raise the costs to Moscow sufficiently that it abandons its proxy and goes home, much as happened in the Soviet Union’s failed attempt in Afghanistan or in Washington’s ‘endless wars.’”
• “The downside of this strategy, of course, is its very prospects for success. … [The U.S.] might find itself cleaning up the pieces of a broken Ukraine—much along the lines of what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. That would leave Washington … little choice but to live with a new pro-Russian Ukraine.”

“Here’s one way a war might start,” Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 01.21.22. The author, a reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “The large buildup of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border is as clear a sign as any that Moscow is considering using military force to achieve its aims if diplomacy fails. But how exactly hostilities might begin has been something of a guessing game, military analysts say. One possibility came into sharper focus this week when the second-largest political party in Russia’s parliament, the Communist Party, proposed that Russia recognize two self-declared separatist states in eastern Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics.”
• “If Russia recognized the states, that could create an immediate rationale for Russian military intervention. … First, the speaker of Russia’s lower house of parliament said it was a ‘serious and responsible’ [proposal] that ought to be considered. But soon afterward, the Kremlin signaled disapproval for such a move.”
• “[I]f Russia recognized them [Donetsk and Luhansk], they might invite Russia to base troops in their territory to assist in advancing to their claimed borders. This could cloak a Russian invasion as assistance for new allies.”
• “Western diplomats say that Moscow has been striving to settle the eastern Ukraine war in exchange for political concessions from Kyiv, including a rejection of future NATO membership and a role for Russian-aligned political parties and politicians in the national government.”
• “Analysts say that helps explain why Russia has long been reluctant to recognize the states; doing so would take away the leverage it has over Kyiv to accomplish these goals that the more ambiguous conflict has provided.”

“How Events in the U.S., Germany and China Embolden Putin,” Gerald F. Seib, Wall Street Journal, 01.24.22. The author, the newspaper’s executive Washington editor, writes:

• “[I]n trying to figure out why Mr. Putin is laying the groundwork for a move on Ukraine, and doing so now, a few crucial factors emerge from the fog. He wants to move now because he sees Ukraine slipping from his grasp. And the reasons he may think he’s free to act actually lie in three other countries: the U.S., Germany and China. If this combination of forces is, in fact, helping drive Mr. Putin, they also demonstrate why dissuading him is proving difficult. He may feel both a sense of urgency, and a fleeting moment of opportunity.”
• “The motivation starts within Ukraine itself. It is moving toward the West… ‘[Ukraine’s] security relationship [with the West] is getting stronger by the day. From his [Putin’s] point of view there is some urgency to act in Ukraine before developments there become irreversible,’” according to “Robert Gates, former defense secretary and head of central intelligence and a longtime Russia analyst.”
• “[W]hy should Mr. Putin think he could get away with attacking the sovereignty of a neighbor? Start with how he likely sees the U.S. … [Its] power … to act decisively is diminished by internal squabbling… Meantime, three straight American presidents … have demonstrated, through word and deed, that Americans are tired of engagements abroad, particularly military engagements.” 
• "At the same time, Germany is giving Mr. Putin reason to doubt that the West can really unite in response to a Russian invasion. Germany’s decision to close all of its nuclear reactors by the end of 2022 has made it more dependent than ever on Russian energy imports… When tiny Estonia … wanted to send weapons to Ukraine in a show of solidarity, Germany refused to issue permits for the export of German-made weapons.”
• “Meantime, Mr. Putin’s warming relationship with China gives him reason to think Beijing will be there to help him overcome whatever Western economic sanctions are put in place after an incursion into Ukraine.”

“In Ukraine Talks, Who Is Playing for Time?” Michael R. Gordon, James Marson and Vivian Salama, Wall Street Journal, 01.22.22. The authors, reporters for the Journal, write:

• “With talks between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine continuing into next week, who gains more leverage as the diplomatic clock ticks?”
• “Publicly, Ukrainians and U.S. officials have been describing the looming danger in different terms. Ukrainian officials have expressed concern that the Russian buildup is intended to sap Ukraine’s economy and unnerve its people. Ukraine has privately expressed concern to Western allies, including the U.S., over public rhetoric suggesting a Russian attack is imminent, officials from the two countries say. … U.S. and other Western officials have expressed more alarm that a major attack could be at hand.”
• “‘From the standpoint of military considerations, it would make better sense to launch an operation in February,’ said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at CNA Corp. But Mr. Kofman added that Russia has the capability of keeping a sizable military presence near Ukraine for some time, providing Mr. Putin with considerable latitude over how and when to use his military.”
• “Another factor in the timing of a Russian invasion may be geopolitics—and the Winter Olympics in Beijing. Rob Lee, a former Marine infantry officer and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Philadelphia-based think tank, has noted that … ‘Moscow likely wants to avoid drawing attention away from Beijing again [as it did with its incursion into Georgia in 2008].’”
• “From the other side, the U.S. is seeking to delay any attack by promoting diplomacy and more talks. The White House has floated a potential summit between the two presidents.”
• “All those factors hold different significance if Mr. Putin isn’t planning a military assault and instead aims to put Ukraine in a press and then negotiate at the point of a gun. Demands could be accompanied with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, analysts say.”

“The Day After Russia Attacks,” Alexander Vindman and Dominic Cruz Bustillos, Foreign Affairs, 01.21.22. The authors, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and research associate at the Lawfare Institute, respectively, write:

• “Russian officials have made clear that they are not interested in proposals focused solely on strategic stability or on military exercises, or even on a moratorium on NATO membership for Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks nothing short of the complete dismantling of Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture and a rollback of fundamental international agreements governing states’ rights to self-determination—an outcome the United States and its partners and allies will never accept.”
• “Presuming that diplomacy fails, there are three scenarios that could play out. Which one comes to pass will depend in large part on how Putin decides he can best achieve his ultimate goals.”
• “The first scenario would involve a coercive diplomatic resolution to the present crisis. Russia could move to formally recognize or annex the occupied Donbas region of eastern Ukraine … [or] goad Ukraine into a miscalculation similar to the one made in 2008 by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. … On their own, however, such moves would not represent gains for Russia; they would merely further calcify the status quo.”
• “A second scenario would involve a limited Russian offensive, with limited airpower, to seize additional territory in eastern Ukraine and in the Donbas, perhaps as an extension of recognition or full annexation. … Such a move would deprive Ukraine of vital economic ports along its southern coast, render Ukraine landlocked, and resolve Russia’s long-standing logistical problems with providing supplies, including water, to Crimea.”
• “[T]he third and most likely outcome is a full-scale Russian offensive employing land, air and sea power on all axes of attack. … A long-term occupation would be unlikely in this scenario.”
• “Regardless of whether Russia opts for a more limited incursion or a broader attack, the consequences it faces from the United States and its allies and partners must be unprecedented.”

“Moscow seeks agents of influence in Ukraine,” Max Seddon and Roman Olearchyk, Financial Times, 01.23.22. The authors, reporters for the FT, write:

• “The last time Ukrainians heard of Yevhen Murayev was when the pro-Russian former lawmaker unfurled a banner in central Kyiv last autumn with the inscription “This is our land!” Following a public outcry, it was taken down a few hours later—an indication of his dwindling political fortunes. Murayev seemed destined to remain in obscurity until Saturday [Jan. 22], when the UK claimed he was in line to lead a pliant Ukrainian government as part of a Russian regime-change plot.”
• “But the UK allegations, for which London provided no evidence and which Russia has dismissed, struck many in Ukraine as far-fetched.”
• “In 2018, Russia placed [Murayev] under sanctions—a move he blamed on a falling out with Viktor Medvedchuk, a Putin confidant and the Kremlin’s longstanding main political ally in Ukraine. … In recent months, Murayev, who owns a large Ukrainian TV station, began to mount plans for a comeback after Kyiv placed Medvedchuk under house arrest and shut three other channels close to him last year.”
• “The alleged plan to install Murayev was the second Western warning of an impending Russian coup in Ukraine in a week. The U.S. earlier said Russian intelligence had similar plans in concert with a different group of Ukrainian politicians close to Medvedchuk—only one of whom was also named by the UK. ‘A lot of the people who are named as members of this future government aren’t even on speaking terms with each other,’ [Vadim] Novinsky [an oligarch and MP for a pro-Russian party] said. ‘It’s a random group of names.’”

“London’s Ukraine Coup Claims Strain Both Belief and Consensus,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 01.24.22. The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:

• “[I]t is worth noting that the American and British allegations, while similar in nature, are strikingly different in detail. Only one individual appears on both lists: Vladimir Sivkovich, the former Deputy Head of the Ukrainian National Security & Defence Council, currently in exile in Russia.” 
• “Considering the breadth and depth of U.K. and U.S. intelligence sharing and policy coordination, it seems strange that they manage to come up with similar sounding plots but different casts.”
• “The FCDO claims that former Ukrainian MP Yevhen Murayev ‘is being considered as a potential candidate’ as puppet leader… He is not exactly a household name in Ukraine: a poll in December by the Razumkov Centre saw him ranked seventh among potential candidates for the presidency with 6.3% support. More to the point, he is actually under Russian sanctions and reportedly opposed to Viktor Medvedchuk, generally considered Vladimir Putin’s closest ally in Ukraine.”
• “Finally, amidst all this talk of coups … the allegations are usually of ‘links’ and ‘contacts’ with Russian intelligence officers and assets. The Russians—like everyone else—plan for all kinds of contingencies. … [T]hey operate on multiple axes such that they can react to changes. Part of that must mean cultivating contacts … with all kinds of people who might be of value in Ukraine.”
• “Moscow also has a particular approach which tends to put competition and multiplicity over coordination. The Kremlin has encouraged a carnivorously competitive intelligence environment… Furthermore, it continues to encourage all kinds of other ‘geopolitical entrepreneurs’ to play.”
• “In that context, there will be all kinds of contacts and conversations, wild ideas being generated and cockeyed plans being pitched to the Kremlin. The real difficulty is in trying to distinguish which of these, if any, has some kind of official sanction.”
• “[T]he less solidly based and plausible such alarums [as the coup allegations] may be, the less good they actually do to efforts to maintain a coalition able … to defend Ukraine and push back against Russian pressure.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Kazakhstan After the Crisis: What Next?” Alexander Gabuev and Temur Umarov, Carnegie Mocow Center, 01.24.22. The authors, experts on China and Central Asia at the center, write:

• “The rest of President Tokayev’s years in power are unlikely to be uneventful. The new Kazakh president has yet to establish his authority and to surround himself with trusted elites. Most importantly of all, he cannot rely on the loyalty of the security services.”
• “Some people have concluded, from looking at how much stronger Tokayev has been left by the crisis, that he himself must have been behind the unrest. Yet that doesn’t seem likely.”
• “Indeed, it’s far more likely that representatives of the Nazarbayev clan were involved in the riots in Almaty… Their involvement would explain both the inaction of the security services (many senior security officials in southern Kazakhstan were appointed under the Nazarbayevs’ patronage, or have forged informal ties with the country’s most powerful family) and the involvement in the rioting of gangland figures.”
• “In the end, however, Tokayev managed to turn events in his favor, and used the unrest to take over his predecessor’s last remaining position of influence as head of the Security Council. … In quashing the unrest, Tokayev has also changed tack from the course he embarked upon in 2019 of gradual liberalization.”

“Precedent Kazakhstan,” Margarete Klein and Andrea Schmitz, SWP, 01.19.22. The authors, researchers at SWP, write:

• “This decision [by Tokayev to invite CSTO troops] has far-reaching consequences for Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia. Moscow is now likely to see its role as Kazakhstan’s ally and guarantor of its security strengthened. This increase in importance comes at a critical time. Tensions between Russia and the West have already made it difficult to maintain the foreign policy balance that the government has always advocated, and the balance is now likely to shift further.”
• “Beyond the bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan, the CSTO’s military intervention represents an opportunity for Moscow to present itself as the most important security actor in Central Asia.”
• “The deployment of the Russian-led CSTO military alliance continues the trend toward the militarization of Russian foreign policy.”
• “The fact that the first deployment of the CSTO is now taking place in connection with the protests in Kazakhstan shows that there is only one common threat perception within the alliance that is shared by the leaderships of all member states: the concern about a threat to authoritarian stability, which is always portrayed as being fomented from the outside. The security concept underlying the military alliance is thus one that equates national security with regime security. The mission in Kazakhstan could thus serve as a model for further CSTO interventions.”