This Week’s Highlights:

• The new U.S. Missile Defense Review contains language that could fuel the concerns of Russia and China, who fear a future in which unconstrained and technologically advanced U.S. missile defenses will eventually be capable of disrupting their strategic retaliatory capability, argue Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda of the Federation of American Scientists.
• Freed from the INF Treaty, Russia could build a conventional strike force using cheap vehicle-based launch systems that would provide a strong deterrent and, if used, inflict major damage on NATO countries, writes Rowan Allport, a senior fellow at the Human Security Center.
• Following a U.S. withdrawal from Syria, Russia will likely try to play Turkey and the Kurds off of each other in its attempts to return the Assad regime to all of Syria, writes Aaron Stein, director of FPRI’s Middle East program.
• Moscow doesn’t really believe the EU can act in the Balkans autonomously from the U.S., and the ideological disagreements between the two turn any region in which Russian and European interests intersect into a source of additional tension, according to Maxim Samorukov, deputy editor of Carnegie.ru.
• Ukraine in 2019 will have to navigate the possible loss of revenues if Russia succeeds in curtailing energy transit across Ukraine, writes Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a senior fellow at FPRI. Poroshenko or a new president will have to do this while seeking to deepen security ties with the West and dealing with how the situation around the Orthodox Church of Ukraine unfolds. Five years after the Euro-Maidan revolution, Ukraine’s westward trajectory continues, but roadblocks still remain, Gvosdev argues.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“The World Still Needs NATO,” Ursula von der Leyen, New York Times, 01.18.19: The author, the German defense minister, writes:

• “[NATO’s] principles are under assault today. Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, the terrorism of the Islamic State spreading from the Middle East to the capitals of Europe, authoritarian regimes developing nuclear weapons — as different as these challenges are, they have one thread in common: They emanate from actors who oppose the international order. They try to undermine or even change the rules that have governed the age of democracy and prosperity since World War II.”
• “The democracies of NATO need to stand together to overcome these challenges. … Accordingly, since 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO has adapted to the situation at hand—as it has done many times in its history.”
• “Our unshakable commitment to Article 5, the NATO treaty’s collective defense provision, ensures that our common security is truly indivisible. We will help our weakest ally just as we have helped our strongest by invoking Article 5—for the first and only time in NATO’s history—after Sept. 11, 2001.”
• “So it is a good thing that the European Union is now undertaking significant steps to enhance its military prowess. … And a stronger NATO will serve the security interests of all members. Most of all, it will send a clear signal to those opposing the rules-based international order: We trans-Atlantic allies are ready and willing to defend our soil, our people and our freedom.”

Missile defense:

“Mixed Messages on Trump’s Missile Defense Review,” Matt Korda and Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 01.17.19: The authors, a research associate and the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, write:

• “President Trump personally released the long-overdue Missile Defense Review (MDR), and despite the document’s assertion that ‘Missile Defenses are Stabilizing,’ the MDR promotes a posture that is anything but.”
• “[D]uring his presentation, Acting Defense Secretary Shanahan falsely asserted that the MDR is consistent with the priorities of the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS). … During Shanahan’s and President Trump’s speeches … they made it clear that the United States will seek to detect and destroy ‘any type of target,’ ‘anywhere, anytime, anyplace,’ either ‘before or after launch.’ Coupled with numerous references to Russia’s and China’s evolving missile arsenals and advancements in hypersonic technology, this kind of rhetoric is wholly inconsistent with the MDR’s description of missile defense being directed solely against ‘rogue states.’”
• “Secondly, the MDR clearly states that the United States ‘will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats.’ This is precisely what concerns Russia and China.”
• “Thirdly, … the MDR commits the Missile Defense Agency to test the SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM-class target in 2020.”
• “Fourthly, the MDR indicates that the United States will look into developing and fielding a variety of new capabilities for detecting and intercepting missiles either immediately before or after launch.”
• “Overall, the Trump Administration’s Missile Defense Review offers up a gamut of expensive, ineffective and destabilizing solutions to problems that missile defense simply cannot solve. … During the upcoming spring hearings, Congress will have an important role to play in determining which capabilities are actually necessary in order to enforce a limited missile defense posture, and which ones are superfluous. And for those superfluous capabilities, there should be very strong pushback.”

“The US Navy’s New Missile Defense Is a Bad Idea,” David Axe, The National Interest, 01.17.19: The author, defense editor of The National Interest, writes:

• “The U.S. Navy will try for the first time to shoot down an intercontinental ballistic missile in the middle phase of the ICBM's flight … But it's not clear the Navy's SM-3 missile is up to the task.”
• “Even if it works, the SM-3 could prove provocative, warned Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda … [T]hey are worried that the SM-3 test could encourage Russia and China to develop new strategic weapons to defeat the interceptor, potentially spurring a dangerous nuclear arms race.”
• “Russia apparently isn't waiting to see if the SM-3 actually can hit an ICBM. In 2018 Russian President Vladimir Putin rushed development of the Kremlin's new hypersonic Avangard nuclear missile, a Mach-20 glider that travels lower than an ICBM does, potentially foiling missiles such as the SM-3 that only work at high altitudes.”

Nuclear arms control:

“Russia’s Conventional Weapons Are Deadlier Than Its Nukes. Withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty would take the United States one step forward and many steps back on international security,” Rowan Allport, Foreign Policy, 01.17.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Human Security Center, writes:

• “At present, Moscow’s non-nuclear strategic strike capability is powerful but not overwhelming. Various initiatives by NATO members … are likely to further reduce Russian capabilities. But with the end of the INF Treaty, Russia will be free to openly mass-produce conventional variants of the 9M729 or successor systems.”
• “Launched from territory in the west of the country, such missiles could potentially reach almost any point in Europe. … Moscow could use relatively cheap vehicle-based launch systems instead of expensive ships and aircraft to build a conventional strike force. This would both deliver a considerable deterrent effect and—if utilized—inflict major damage on NATO countries.”
• “Moscow’s existing nuclear systems are more than adequate for its needs. Instead, enhanced conventional capabilities would offer the greatest potential reward—and the biggest threat to the West. For this reason, the United States should think carefully before terminating the INF Treaty and falling into a potential Kremlin trap.”

“The Role of Verification in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Dispute,” Darya Dolzikova, RUSI, 01.15.19: The author, a counter-proliferation finance research analyst in the proliferation and nuclear policy program at RUSI, writes:

• “What remains to be seen is what conclusions future disarmament negotiators and policymakers will draw from the INF Treaty’s fate. … Ensuring that clear provisions are defined for conducting regular and challenge on-site inspections for the entire duration of a disarmament or non-proliferation treaty is a critical component of the treaty’s sustainability. This may necessitate the conclusion of time-limited treaties in the future.”
• “At the same time, where no political will exists to comply with treaty obligations or to resolve compliance issues as they arise, no amount of inspections will help. The precarious future of New START … may end up being an unfortunate example of this.”
• “Treaties … must first and foremost be built on a foundation of trust; a strong verification regime is a backstop for times when that trust may come to be in short supply. Hoping that disputes over compliance can be negotiated away when tensions are already running high and fingers are being pointed is wishful thinking.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“The Scramble for Northeast Syria. What Will Happen Once the United States Pulls Out,” Aaron Stein, Foreign Affairs, 01.22.19: The author, director of the Middle East program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes:

• “[S]everal of those players [in Syria] are poised to shape the situation on the ground in their favor—and to the detriment of the United States. The most influential protagonists … are Turkey and Russia. Both countries would like to take over the territory in northeast Syria that has so far been under the control of the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).”
• “For Ankara and Moscow, the stakes are high: … Russia seeks to exploit Kurdish weakness and the threat of Turkish military intervention to empower its ally in Damascus, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. If the United States withdraws, Washington will be forced to watch this race from the sidelines.”
• “For Russia, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal serves to broaden the playing field. So far, Moscow has avoided revealing any concrete plans. But judging from its statements on the matter and from its past behavior in the region, Russia will likely attempt to play Turkey and the Kurds off of each other in pursuit of its overriding aim: the return of the Assad regime to all of Syria … Such manipulations will require Moscow to balance its interest in deepening ties with Turkey against its interest in propping up its ally in Damascus.”

Cyber security:

“Cyberweapons: A Growing Threat to Strategic Stability in the Twenty-First Century,” Vassily Kashin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.21.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, writes:  

• “Current changes in the military sphere—in particular, the integration of artificial intelligence into weapons systems and military technology, as well as the prospects for the emergence of autonomous weapons systems—have made cyberspace a far more important arena of military operations.”
• “The United States views China as its main opponent in cyberspace, though not its only one: Russia is considered another serious adversary. However, unlike Russia, China has a proven track record of carrying out extremely large-scale and successful intelligence operations in cyberspace. … China’s strength lies in major state investments in artificial intelligence development programs, as well as huge data sets that can be used to develop machine-learning technology.”
• “The three leading nuclear powers—the United States, Russia and China—are paying considerable attention to developing unmanned and autonomous weapons systems. Such autonomous platforms offer opportunities for creating fundamentally new means of delivering nuclear weapons. … In turn, these autonomous weapons systems may become prime targets for the opponent’s cyberweapons.”
• “The threat of deploying cyberweapons will increase with the introduction of artificial intelligence into strategic nuclear forces’ control systems, as the consequence of having less time to make a decision to launch a strike, due to the greater vulnerability of strategic nuclear forces and the emergence of new offensive systems such as hypersonic weapons.”

“Are China, Russia Winning the AI Arms Race?” Peter Apps, Reuters, 01.15.19: The author, a global affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “So far, Western states have stuck to the belief that decisions of life and death in conflict should always be made by humans … Other nations—particularly Russia and China—are flirting with a different path.”
• “Russia--which last year announced it was doubling AI investment—said this month it would publish a new AI national strategy ‘roadmap’ by mid-2019. Russian officials say they see AI as a key to dominating cyberspace and information operations, with suspected Russian online ‘troll farms’ thought to already be using automated social media feeds to push disinformation. Beijing is seen as even further ahead.”
• “Experts say achieving mastery in AI comes down to having sufficient computer power, enough data to learn from and the human talent to make those systems work. As the world’s most powerful autocratic states, Russia and China have that capability and intent.”
• “In January last year, the Pentagon reported Russia was building and looking to operate its own large nuclear-powered unmanned submarines, likely capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Both Moscow and Beijing are also prioritizing unmanned robot tanks … Such systems could dramatically complicate battlefield targeting decisions for Western commanders in any conflict, making it unclear whether individual vehicles or vessels contained human beings. Mistakes could start or dramatically escalate wars.”

“Behind Russia's Cyberwarfare Lies a Serious Case Of Cyber-Phobia; Regime Change Has Gone Digital,” Lincoln Pigman, The Washington Post, 01.17.19: The author, a master's student at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, writes:

• “Russia perceives three major threats emanating from cyberspace: Regime change has gone digital. … The Internet is the playground of criminals and terrorists. … The Internet fosters moral decadence.”
• “Years of talk of bringing cyberspace under state control—and various attempts to do so—point to a deep and long-standing anxiety in Moscow over the power of the Internet to change regimes—even in Russia. As the United States confronts its own cyber insecurity, it's not alone; Moscow is just as cyber-phobic.”

“The Use of Twitter Bots in Russian Political Communication,” Joshua Tucker, Denis Stukal, Sergey Sanovich and Richard Bonneau, PONARS Eurasia, January 2019: The authors, researchers at NYU’s Social Media and Political Participation lab, write:

• “In order to better understand the … efforts [of regimes] to shape the online conversation—in Russia, we study the political use of Russian language Twitter bots using a large collection of tweets about Russian politics from 2014–2018.”
• “We find that despite public discussion that has largely focused on the actions of pro-Kremlin bots, the other three categories [pro-opposition, pro-Kyiv or neutral] are also quite active. … [W]e find that pro-Kremlin bots are slightly younger than either pro-opposition or pro-Kyiv bots, and that they were more active than the other types of bots during the period of high Russian involvement in the Ukrainian crisis in 2014.”
• “We also characterize the activity of these bots, finding that all of the political bots are much more likely to retweet content produced by other accounts than the neutral bots. However, neutral bots are more likely to produce tweets that have identical content to those produced by other bots. Finally, we use network analysis to illustrate that the sources of retweets from Russian political bots are mass media and active Twitter users whose political leanings correspond to bots’ political orientation. This provides additional evidence in support of the claim that bots are mostly used as amplifiers for political messages.”

Elections interference:

“How About Some Russia Facts? If Trump hates media innuendo, he can release the FBI documents,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 01.14.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Another Trump-Russia ‘scoop,’ another bout of feverish media speculation. That's the essence of the New York Times story that the FBI opened a criminal inquiry into President Trump after he fired FBI Director James Comey in 2017.”
• “The story told us nothing new about the Trump-Russia relationship, though it did confirm that senior officials in the FBI were in need of adult supervision. Think about the implications of this one for a minute: Senior FBI officials decided to investigate Mr. Trump because the President had fired their boss, which any President has the constitutional authority to do.”
• “What the American people deserve, after all of the innuendo and accusations, are the facts of what these investigations have found. The endless investigations are one more reason for Mr. Trump to declassify the Justice and FBI documents related to 2016 and put them on the public record.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Russia Sanctions Must Be Removable to Be Effective,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 01.16.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “The U.S. can use the measures [sanctions] to stake out its implacable positions on issues such as Russian aggression in Ukraine, but Putin can use them to argue that the U.S. is Russia’s enemy forever and that its sanctions won’t be lifted whatever Russia does.”
• “[The] Treasury’s deal contains a more nuanced plan for changing Russia’s behavior. It’s trying to make working with Putin toxic for wealthy Russians as a way to undermine the regime. The signal is probably based on flawed logic: Not working with Putin is not an option for a wealthy Russian with any assets in the home country.”
• “Treasury’s stance signals that the sanctions are about specific targets and can be lifted by following specific rules. That undermines the eternal enmity argument somewhat, and it signals that the West’s approach to Russia is rules-based rather than motivated by an irrational hatred. Whether wealthy Russians find that signal believable and, ultimately, somehow align with the West depends on how clearly the rules of the game are defined and whether they’re followed unflinchingly by Western nations themselves.”

“The Russia Sanctions Test in the US Senate,” Stephen Sestanovich, Council on Foreign Relations, 01.17.19: The author, the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “Bipartisan votes against the administration's handling of Rusal showed real unhappiness with the president's overall Russia policy. But they reflect a sharp drop-off from the near-unanimous hostility that followed Trump's first meetings with Putin in 2017.”
• “To push successfully for new approaches on other issues—from sanctions to arms control to election meddling—Congress will have to speak with one voice, both to the administration and to Moscow. Because it is unlikely to do so, congressional critics will remain frustrated by Trump's approach to Russia, but they will struggle to develop effective alternatives.”

“Sorry, but Trump Is Not 'Tough on Russia',” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 01.17.19: The author, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, writes:

• “To defend himself from accusations of collusion or collaboration with Russian government officials … President Trump recently repeated a familiar claim: ‘I have been FAR tougher on Russia than Obama, Bush or Clinton. Maybe tougher than any other President.’”
• “The Trump administration has a tough policy on Russia, one that I mostly support. But Trump himself does not. For the past two years, he has consistently made it clear that he does not support his own administration's policy toward Russia.”
• “I cannot remember a policy … in which there was such a wide gap between a presidential administration and the president himself. … The important question, therefore, is … why our current president has gone to such great lengths to distance himself from his own government's Russia policy.”

“The Unpalatable Truth About Trump’s Embrace of the Russian Bear,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 01.17.19: The author, a commentator for the news outlet, writes:

• “Nothing … would compare to the U.S. abandoning NATO. It would realize Mr. Putin’s ultimate dream by destroying the Western alliance. The fact that Mr. Trump keeps raising the prospect is radical enough. That Mr. Trump met Mr. Putin without aides for two hours in Helsinki last year rang an alarm bell. That he then personally ordered the U.S. interpreter to surrender her notes sounds a shriller alarm altogether.”
• “On the one hand, Mr. Trump claims Mr. Mueller is pursuing a ‘witch hunt’ that is backed by the ‘deep state’ and broadcast by the ‘fake news’ media. In which case, Mr. Trump is the victim of a vast leftwing conspiracy.”
• “On the other hand, they [the FBI and other branches of government] may be faithfully carrying out their jobs, which means investigating whether America’s commander-in-chief is working for a foreign adversary.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Can Russia and the EU Overcome Their Differences in the Balkans?” Maxim Samorukov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.16.19: The author, deputy editor of Carnegie.ru, writes:

• “What the EU claims is Russia ‘behaving destructively’ in the [Balkan] region is actually Russia simply trying to prevent developments that will negatively impact its interests. … In the Balkans … European integration would have consequences that are very specific and clearly unfavorable for Moscow.”
• “It would become more difficult for Russian companies to operate in the region in line with EU standards. The EU’s overall foreign trade policy would force Balkan countries to give up their free trade agreements with Russia. Russians would need visas to travel to the Western Balkans. … [And it] would increase the number of states that have imposed sanctions on Russia.”
• “Moscow doesn’t really believe that the EU is capable of acting in the Balkans autonomously from Russia’s main geopolitical opponent—the United States—and the profound ideological disagreements between the two sides turn any region in which Russian and European interests intersect in any way into a source of additional tension in their relations.”

“Russia's Future Is Rapped in an Enigma,” Konstantin Dobrynin, Wall Street Journal, 01.14.19: The author, a former senator in Russia's Federation Council, a vice president of the Russian Bar Association and a senior partner at a law firm, writes:

• “Russia's leaders must outgrow power politics and recognize that force can't secure their position either at home or abroad. They should begin to de-escalate the conflict with Ukraine through simple measures like an exchange of all prisoners of war … Moscow must also commit not to interfere with the Ukrainian presidential election in March.”
• “More broadly, Russia must demilitarize its consciousness, recognizing that the logic of war is defective and archaic and that modern problems are more often solved through battles of ideas. History proves that reforms in my country are possible against all odds.”
• “Given the political will, 2019 could be an extraordinary year for the Russian Federation—and it's remarkable that regional elections, intelligence scandals, court verdicts, the Orthodox Church and music may together inspire the transformation. If rap lyrics are what it takes to sustain this awakening, let's write them together.”

“Consequences of a Precipitous US Withdrawal From Afghanistan,” James Dobbins, Jason H. Campbell, Sean Mann and Laurel E. Miller, RAND, January 2019: The authors, security experts at RAND, write:

• “On Dec. 19, 2018, President Donald Trump directed then–Secretary of Defense James Mattis to reduce by half the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan. The President gave this instruction at the same time that he ordered a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria. … [I]t is prudent to consider the likely effects of an early and complete or near-complete departure [from Afghanistan] unrelated to a negotiated peace settlement.”
• “We judge that the following consequences are likely: Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces also leave. U.S. and other international civilian presence are sharply reduced. External economic and security assistance diminish. … The government in Kabul begins to lose influence and legitimacy. Power moves from the center to the periphery. Responsibility for security increasingly devolves to regional militias and local warlords.”
• “Since 2001, Russia and Iran have generally supported the Kabul government but, in recent years, have provided limited aid to the Taliban as a hedge. Russia and Iran … also have a history of support for Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara warlords. These relationships will likely be reinforced.”

“Russia: Vladimir Putin’s Pivot to Africa,” Henry Foy, Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and David Pilling, Financial Times, 01.22.19: The authors, journalists for the news outlet, write:

• “Amid deteriorating relations with Western countries, a diplomatic campaign to win new friends and partners in Africa is at the forefront of a sweeping foreign policy pivot by Moscow.”
• “From Algeria to Uganda, Russia is building influence in Africa, lending support to embattled strongmen, taking on natural resource projects in conflict-racked states and positioning itself as a new powerbroker without the baggage of former colonial powers.”
• “In 2017, Russia’s trade with Africa rose 26 percent … Russia sold twice as much weaponry to African countries in 2017 as it did in 2012 … Between 2013 and 2017, Russia supplied 39 percent of Africa’s imported arms.”
• “‘Zimbabwe is under the yoke of sanctions imposed by western countries,’ Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa told Mr. Putin in the Kremlin. ‘However, through these days of isolation, you, Russia, have remained with us as a reliable partner.’”

China:

• No significant commentary.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Wants to Be a Part of the West. But it's strategy is yielding mixed results,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 01.16.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, writes:

• “Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has staked his country’s future and his own chances at re-election … on three gambles. … [T]he scorecard is showing mixed results.”

• “Poroshenko relied on assurances from the United States and some of its central European allies … that Russian pipeline projects to Europe bypassing Ukraine would be permanently stopped. … However … the EU budget commissioner, concedes that the [Nord Stream II] project may be too far along to be canceled. Meanwhile, Ankara is determined to replace Ukraine as a key energy hub for Russian deliveries to Europe.”
• “It [Ukraine] is receiving more shipments of U.S. weaponry … as well as expanded efforts by U.S. forces to train Ukrainian military personnel. … Yet, if the ‘probe’ into the Kerch Strait … was meant to showcase Ukraine’s ability to show its flag and maintain its maritime claims, the end result was less than satisfactory.”
• “Finally, there is the question of the Orthodox Church. Poroshenko succeeded … in getting the Patriarch of Constantinople to recognize as canonical the two independent Ukrainian jurisdictions … The test that he now faces … is whether or not those Orthodox parishes, clergy and believers who remain part of the Moscow Patriarchate will choose to … affiliate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.”
• “Five years after the Euro-Maidan revolution, Ukraine’s westward trajectory continues, but roadblocks still remain.”

“It’s Time to Stand Up to Russia’s Aggression in Ukraine. Putin's latest ploy in the Kerch Strait must be countered fast,” Stephen J. Hadley, Foreign Policy, 01.18.19: The author, a former national security advisor, writes:

• “Russia has seized unilateral control of the Kerch Strait, and the West has done nothing. This may tempt Putin … to seize even more Ukrainian territory, attempt to subvert the Ukrainian presidential election or both.”
• “But prudent steps taken now could help deter further aggression … Such measures should cover a wide spectrum of diplomatic, economic and preventive military steps.”
• “No … negotiations are likely until after the March Ukrainian presidential election. At that point, negotiations should pick up on suggestions made by both Putin and Poroshenko that an international peacekeeping force be deployed to the Donbass.”
• “This resolution … would still leave Crimea unresolved. But it would be a first step toward getting Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe back into a more manageable framework: cooperating with Russia where they can and standing up for their principles where they and Russia disagree, but managing those disagreements so that they do not lead to confrontation or conflict. A return to such a framework would benefit the interests of everyone, including Russia itself.”

“25 Years After Ukraine Denuclearized, Russian Aggression Continues to Rise,” Strobe Talbott and Maggie Tennis, Brookings Institution, 01.18.19: The authors, a distinguished fellow in residence and a research assistant at Brookings, write:

• “The Budapest Memorandum was aimed at keeping Ukraine safe from Russia’s hegemonic ambitions. Instead, today’s Ukraine is reeling from a simmering conflict in its eastern regions, an ever-growing population of almost 2 million internally-displaced persons … and more recently, Russian brinkmanship and the breach of maritime law in the Sea of Azov.”
• “Russia has little incentive to change course. The international community … has not done nearly enough to make Russia’s actions in Ukraine costly for Moscow. … To reinforce a commitment to nonproliferation, Washington must do more for Ukraine.”
• “That means maintaining tight sanctions and escalating pressure on our European partners to expand sanctions on Russia. … It also means supporting an international peacekeeping force in Donbass, and increasing NATO warships in the Black Sea.”
• “Sanctions could target Russia for its malign activities in the Sea of Azov by prohibiting Russian-flag commercial vessels and vessels with cargos loaded at Russian ports on the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea from docking in European or U.S. ports. The United States also should increase demands that Russia release wrongfully detained Ukrainian sailors … and provide additional security assistance as Ukraine strives to rebuild its sea forces.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Why the International Community Should Be More Accommodating to De Facto States,” Eiki Berg and Kristel Vits, PONARS Eurasia, January 2019: The authors, a professor and a junior research fellow at the University of Tartu, Estonia, write:

• “De facto states are notorious for their pariah status … producing the perception that they are states-in-the-making perpetually striving for sheer survival. Their reliance on a patron is considered proof that they would not be viable states and thus are incapable of having independent agency.”
• “A focus on agency allows us to ask how far and in what ways these unrecognized entities have been able to act in the international system.”
• “We demonstrate that, despite their limited capacity, de facto states do display some agency, and that their foreign policy choices are sometimes not remarkably different from recognized small states or micro-states. Even imperfect agency may bring relief for local policymakers who are supposed to alleviate anarchy and chaos in their daily practices. The international community … should thus be more accommodating to de facto states; if their agency is continuously denied, they will be both increasingly reliant on their patron and separated from the international community.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Pragmatic Paternalism: The Russian Public and the Private Sector,” Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, Carneige Moscow Center, 01.18.19: The authors, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and a sociologist at the Levada Center, write:

• “Almost three decades after the end of the socialist system in their country, Russians still harbor confused feelings about the private sector.”
• “They believe that private businesses are more efficient than state-owned ones, yet they also regret that the government does not intervene more in the economy. They believe it is impossible to both stay honest and get rich, and they distrust big business, but they approve of small and medium-sized businesses. They choose paid employment for themselves, but would like their children to have their own businesses and to be independent and successful.”
• “The larger the state, the stronger its gravitational pull and the more people and the more products of their activity fall into its gravitational field. These people … are ready to adapt to the rules of the game: to work for the state and with the state. However, our study shows that conformism has its limits, beyond which a different future may begin. It turns out that Russians have a dream for their children and their grandchildren of a different environment that is favorable for entrepreneurship and private initiatives.”

“Modernizing the Masses: Russia’s People vs Putin,” Konstantin Gaaze, Carnegie Moscow Center, 01.15.19: The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Putin’s press conference made it clear that for the president, the question of whether ordinary people want to participate in modernization is secondary to the fact that the government wants to carry it out, and that there are enough people around who are ‘full of optimism and ready to work.’ The subject of optimism and the future epitomizes the problem of the gap between the modernization agenda and public sentiment.”
• “Russians are starting to view as a problem the divergence between their worldview and the picture being painted by the government and the president in particular. The fishy statistics, the pipelines that ‘exist, kind of,’ the apartment buildings that are officially complete but aren’t fit for moving into by residents who financed their construction; all of these beg the question: is the president’s worldview realistic?”
• “The synthesis of sovereignty as the president’s absolute power and the thesis of Western Russophobia as the foundation for the doctrine of Russia’s global survival guarantees that for the next few decades—so long as Putin has any say in the matter—the Russian regime will not change fundamentally.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.