Russia Analytical Report, Jan. 13-21, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. FT commentator Martin Sandbu has proclaimed that, due to ballooning corporate debt, "Russia’s war economy is a house of cards” following a Jan. 11 Substack post by Craig Kennedy, in which he dissects what he claims to be Russian authorities’ off-budget defense financing scheme. This former Morgan Stanley banker argued in his recent post that to help fund their mounting war costs, Russian authorities have designed a scheme, “which provides for preferential loans to war-related businesses.” That scheme explains an “unprecedented $415 billion surge in overall corporate borrowing” since Russia’s full-scale reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These claims were quickly contested, however. In his dissection of Kennedy’s claims, Sergey Aleksashenko, a former head of Russia’s Central Bank, estimated that “the entire debt of the corporate sector increased” only by $280 billion since the invasion. Adam Tooze of Columbia University also expressed doubts about claims by Kennedy and Sandbu. “Faced with the prospects of negotiations, it may suit Western pundits to conjure up the specter of financial collapse in Russia. But, if we actually want to get a realistic assessment of Russia’s long-run power potential, images like a ‘House of Cards’ are an indulgence,” Tooze argued on his Substack. Writing in the Bell, Russian experts Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko also disputed what they described as “claims of an imminent catastrophe” by Kennedy and Sandbu. “In our view, all things being equal, it’s unlikely that the economy will implode soon,” they wrote. “If Western capitals cannot bank on the imminent collapse of the Russian economy, they must face the reality that Russia will pose an immense challenge for the next year or more,” according to Prokopenko’s separate commentary in FA. The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook anticipates Russia’s rate of economic growth will be lower in 2025–2026 than that of China, India, the U.S., advanced economies as a whole and developing economies as a whole. However, Russia’s GDP is still expected to grow in that period, even though the growth will slow from 3.8% in 2024 to 1.4% in 2025 and 1.2% in 2026, according to the IMF.
  2. The wide-ranging treaty signed by Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian was presented as a “breakthrough, but the pact does not constitute a military alliance,” according to Nikita Smagin of the Russian International Affairs Council. Rather, the Jan. 17 pact “simply formalizes the close ties between Iran and Russia that have developed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” Smagin writes for CEIP. Even though last year saw Vladimir Putin twice refer to Iran as Russia's ally at one and the same event in October 2024, and Masoud Pezeshkian did the same in July 2024, the text of the treaty contains no reference to Russia and Iran being allied. Nor does it have a clause for mutual military aid of the kind that can be found in the 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
  3. Last week saw Senate committees hold confirmation hearings for at least seven of Donald Trump’s nominees who, if approved in their secretarial-level posts, would play key roles in shaping U.S. policies toward Russia.1 Of the seven nominees, only two explicitly referred to Russia or Ukraine in their opening statements.2 John Ratcliffe, the nominee for CIA director, in his opening statement warned that the Russian-Ukrainian war is “increasing the risk of the United States being pulled into conflict with a nuclear power.” In his turn Marco Rubio—whom the Senate confirmed this week—used his opening statement at his hearing last week to accuse dictators in Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang of sowing “chaos and instability and align[ing] with and fund[ing] radical terror groups.” That of the seven nominees for secretarial-level posts, in which they’d play roles in shaping America’s Russia policy, five did not refer to Russia in their opening statements indicates that some in Trump’s new administration don’t think Russia matters to the U.S. (“matters” meaning impacting U.S. national security and the security of its allies in profound ways).

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"What North Korea gains by sending troops to fight for Russia," The Economist, 01.15.25. 

  • Since North Korea began aiding Russia’s war effort around mid-2023, there have been “unprecedented levels of traffic” observed in satellite imagery of customs areas between the two, says Victor Cha of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
  • North Korea is also seeking ... designs for intercontinental ballistic missiles and re-entry vehicles, as well as submarine and satellite technology, are thought to be on the wishlist.
  • Russia may be keener to use North Korean troops as cannon fodder than to involve them in sophisticated operations.
  • "They will come back with valuable experience, but possibly also dangerous ideas," says Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul.
  • "There’s a blood debt now," says Jenny Town of the Stimson Centre.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Iran and its nuclear program:

"New Russia-Iran Treaty Reveals the Limits of Their Partnership," Nikita Smagin, Carnegie Politika, 01.21.25. 

  • The wide-ranging treaty signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on January 17 was presented as a breakthrough in relations between the two countries. However, the pact does not constitute a military alliance and requires no direct obligations from either party. Instead, it simply formalizes the close ties between Iran and Russia that have developed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

For more commentary on this subject, see:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"The U.S. Case for Ukraine’s Reconstruction," Richard R. Verma, FP, 01.17.25. 

  • Ukraine’s future membership in the EU and integration into global markets will yield massive dividends in terms of future U.S. economic security and private sector activity. Ukraine will be an essential partner as the United States and Europe emancipate themselves from reliance on energy, manufactured goods, and critical raw materials from adversaries such as China and Russia.
  • The World Bank estimates that Ukraine’s reconstruction will cost nearly $500 billion over 10 years, the largest such undertaking since post-World War II reconstruction. But unlike postwar Europe, where the United States spearheaded the reconstruction of 16 nations with the Marshall Plan, Ukraine’s recovery involves a broad coalition of contributors—many countries plus the international private sector—focused on rebuilding only one country.
  • The Biden administration has been clear: Our support for Ukraine’s economic recovery isn’t charity, but an investment in U.S. economic and national security interests. It is about realigning Ukraine’s economic future—including supply chains, trade routes, business practices, and the immense innovative talent of the Ukrainian people—toward the EU, the United States, and global markets. Ukraine’s success will have a tangible impact on the United States’ bottom line.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Russia's Military After Ukraine: Potential Pathways for the Postwar Reconstitution of the Russian Armed Forces," Michelle Grisé, Mark Cozad, Anna M. Dowd, et al., RAND, 01.16.25. 

  • The way in which the Ukraine war ends will inform the lessons that Russia learns from the conflict and, by extension, the decisions that Russia makes about the reconstitution of its armed forces.
  • Russia's relationships with its key partners—including, notably, China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea—will play an especially influential role in shaping the reconstitution process.
  • Russia's decision to restructure the country's economy for wartime has created dependencies within the defense industrial base that will be difficult to reverse.
  • Although U.S. allies are closely tracking Russia's reconstitution efforts, their focus is on the speed of reconstitution rather than the nature of the reconstituted Russian military.
  • A partially reconstituted Russian military will still pose a significant threat to U.S. and Western interests in the European theater.

"Armada Sunset: Soviet and Russian tanks suitable for restoration and repair will run out in 2025," Re: Russia, 01.16.25. 

  • Having analyzed satellite images of Russian tank bases, a group of OSINT investigators has determined that since the start of the war, the Russian military and defense industry have effectively used up about half of their stock of old Soviet and Russian tanks. Based on high-resolution satellite images taken in late 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024, the total number of tanks in storage bases at the end of 2021 was 7,342, 6,870 at the end of 2022, 4,666 at the end of 2023 and 3,517 at the end of 2024. Thus, in the first year following the invasion of Ukraine, approximately 530 tanks were withdrawn from storage; in 2023, about 2,200 tanks were removed; and in 2024, the number dropped to 1,150 tanks. In total, approximately 3,825 tanks have been withdrawn (it should be noted, however, that these calculations only account for open central storage bases – tanks may also be stored at mobilization and repair bases, tank repair factories, warehouses, and under shelters, as one investigator, Covert Cabal, has pointed out).
  • At first glance, it seems paradoxical that the rate of tank withdrawals from storage sharply declined in 2024, even as the Russian military conducted its most active offensive operations. However, the paradox has a simple explanation: initially, more modern tanks in good condition, requiring minimal or minor repairs, were removed from storage. As these were depleted, increasingly older and less reliable tanks had to be used, and the withdrawal rate became more constrained by repair and renovation.
  • According to researchers, roughly 280 tanks currently in Russian storage can be reactivated relatively easily. The remaining 3,250 tanks either require significant repairs or can only be used for 'cannibalization,' meaning dismantling for spare parts. This situation will severely limit the supply of older tanks for frontline needs in the coming year. 

Military aid to Ukraine

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

"Countering Russia’s 'Shadow Fleet'," Henri van Soest, NI, 01.16.25. 

  • Sanctioning vessels is part of the solution to the shadow fleet threat, but its effectiveness is limited. Sanctions require accurate identification of shadow fleet vessels, and the fleet’s complexity hinders comprehensive mapping. For instance, the UK recently sanctioned twenty vessels, a small fraction of the over 1,000-strong fleet. The Eagle S, implicated in the Finland-Estonia incident, was not on the EU’s list of seventy-nine sanctioned ships.
  • Enhanced naval protection also forms part of the response, but it is resource-intensive and cannot guarantee complete security. Monitoring suspicious vessels is crucial for removing Russia’s plausible deniability. Yet proactively guarding all subsea infrastructure is impractical. Coast guard and naval resources are already stretched, and diverting them from other essential tasks could benefit adversaries like Russia. Additionally, cable sabotage can occur within minutes, leaving little time to react in vast maritime spaces.
  • A more promising approach involves targeting the vessel and its crew. Damaging subsea infrastructure requires active decisions by the crew, and investigations can determine whether negligence or intent was involved. Proactively detaining suspicious vessels and crews, combined with clear deterrence measures, may discourage sabotage. Recent incidents demonstrate this strategy: Finnish special forces boarded the Eagle S, steered it to Finnish waters, and detained its crew. A few days later, Finland refused to give the ship permission to operate after a technical inspection found major safety issues. The Swedish Navy recovered the Eagle S’s anchor using the submarine rescue ship HMS Belos.
  • While a robust approach to seizing and detaining ships could deter further sabotage, it carries risks. Shadow fleet operations exist in legal grey zones, making arrests and seizures legally complex. Western nations must uphold maritime law to maintain international credibility, and questionable actions could undermine this principle. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

"In Rare Criticism, Trump Says Putin Is ‘Destroying Russia,’" Anton Troianovski, NYT, 01.21.25. 

  • President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia heralded President Trump’s second inauguration with glowing praise, saying Mr. Trump showed “courage” in his campaign and won a “convincing victory” in the election. But hours later on Monday, in the Oval Office, Mr. Trump didn’t return the favor. The American president made some of the most critical comments he’s ever made about Mr. Putin, declaring that the Russian leader is “destroying Russia” by waging war in Ukraine. “He can’t be thrilled, he’s not doing so well,” Mr. Trump told reporters Monday evening, referring to Mr. Putin’s war. “Russia is bigger, they have more soldiers to lose, but that’s no way to run a country.”
  • The whiplash underscored why celebrations of Mr. Trump’s return to the White House have been muted in Russia in recent months: Russian officials know that Mr. Trump is unpredictable.
  • Still, the situation remains fluid, and Mr. Trump said Monday that he may speak to Mr. Putin “very soon.” On Tuesday, Mr. Putin’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, told reporters that Russia was “taking into account” Mr. Trump’s Oval Office comments but was still waiting for his aides to reach out about potential talks. “We are ready and open for dialogue with the new U.S. administration on the Ukraine conflict,” Mr. Ushakov said. “If the relevant signals come in from Washington, then we’ll pick them up and will be ready to hold negotiations.”
  • Mr. Putin is hedging his bets by firming up his existing alliances.
    • Last Friday, Mr. Putin welcomed Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, to the Kremlin as the two signed a treaty pledging to increase their cooperation on military and economic matters.
    • And on Tuesday, Mr. Putin held a video call with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, greeting him as his “dear friend.”

"Putin’s Plan for Peace Is No Peace at All," Lloyd J. Austin III and Antony J. Blinken, NYT, 01.14.25. 

  • Ukraine's success to date is a huge strategic achievement, but its troops still face profound challenges on the battlefield. Russian forces have recently clawed back some of the territory that Ukraine liberated earlier in the war, and Mr. Putin's bombardment of Ukraine's power plants and other critical infrastructure is taking a harrowing toll. The Ukrainian people have shown magnificent defiance, but they have paid a steep price for their freedom.
  • Russia is suffering huge losses—an average of 1,500 casualties a day—to seize small slivers of territory. Russia has suffered more than 700,000 dead and injured since Mr. Putin began his war. Now he increasingly faces a painful dilemma: either endure high casualties for minimal gains, perhaps order a mobilization that triggers domestic instability, or negotiate seriously with Ukraine to end his war.
  • Even with some 40 percent of Russia's budget going to the military, the Kremlin can't produce enough materiel to replenish its capabilities. Mr. Putin has burned through nearly two-thirds of rainy-day funds that Russia built up over decades, robbing the country's future to pursue its imperial past. Roughly a million Russians, many of them young and talented, have fled the country.
  • All of this has given leverage to Ukraine -- and to the next U.S. administration. This leverage should be used to end Mr. Putin's war and usher in a durable peace that ensures Ukrainians can deter further Russian aggression, defend their territory and thrive as a sovereign democracy. That is what peace through strength would look like. But because Mr. Putin retains his imperial ambitions, giving up our leverage now by cutting aid and forcing a premature cease-fire would simply allow Mr. Putin to rest, refit and eventually reattack. This would be peace through surrender, which would be no peace at all.

"It's Trump's Messy, Dangerous World Now," Leon E. Panetta, NYT, 01.21.25. 

  • The world that awaits Mr. Trump is far different from and more threatening than what he had to confront in his first four years. Autocrats that once operated in their own spheres of influence have now joined together in an axis of mutual support and aggression: Vladimir Putin of Russia is not just a temperamental bully but also a tyrant who invaded the sovereign democracy of Ukraine and continues to threaten democracies in the West; Xi Jinping of China has made clear that he is prepared for a potential Taiwan invasion and wants to compete with the United States as a leading military power; Kim Jong-un of North Korea is not just threatening democracy in South Korea but has also sent drones and thousands of troops to Russia to fight Ukrainians; Iran, weakened by Israel, continues to enrich uranium and is ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon; and ISIS has once again raised its ugly head by inspiring a lone-wolf attack in New Orleans.
  • This is, however, a time when ''peace through strength'' could actually work....On Ukraine, it is becoming clear that Ukraine and Mr. Putin must find a way to a negotiated settlement to the war. Mr. Trump must make clear that the United States will continue to work with NATO to support Ukraine and that Mr. Putin will not be allowed to succeed. If that message is clear to Mr. Putin and if Ukraine can gain traction against Russia, President Volodymyr Zelensky will have the leverage to negotiate a settlement that provides for Ukraine's sovereignty and security, allows Russia to remain in Crimea and other limited areas and achieves an end to the war. That would be peace through strength

"Ending War Is Hard to Do," Gideon Rose, FA, 01.21.25. 

  • A deal that allows Russia to get sanctions lifted and keep control of most of the Donbas and Crimea while letting the rest of Ukraine go should be acceptable to Moscow—unless what Moscow always really wanted out of the war was complete submission. During the negotiations over a settlement, it might demand not just outright control over the fifth of Ukrainian territory it has conquered but indirect control over the rest, as well. If it does that, the United States and Europe will have to choose between accepting those terms—essentially, defeat—or continuing to support Ukraine in holding out against Russian attacks. The most significant obstacle to a deal, in other words, may be the extent of Putin’s demands on postwar Kyiv. And if Russia is unyielding and the Trump administration unwilling to accept humiliation, the White House could find itself sticking with the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy for much longer than it expects. In fact, this is probably the likeliest outcome this year, and not the worst—for it would be better than a bad deal on Moscow’s terms.
  • In Ukraine and Gaza, the wars’ endgames may be approaching. Plausible settlements are available that could acceptably serve the belligerents’ core interests—at least better than continued fighting would. What remains to be seen is whether the politicians in charge want to grasp the nettles in peace or choose instead to continue gambling for resurrection on the battlefield.

“Vladimir Putin’s Remarks at the Jan. 20 meeting with permanent members of the Russian Security Council,” Kremlin.ru, 01.20.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • We observe that the newly elected President of the United States and his team have expressed a desire to re-establish direct contact with Russia, which the outgoing Administration had severed, through no fault of our own. Furthermore, we note his remarks on the necessity of doing everything possible to avert a third world war. Naturally, we welcome this stance and extend our congratulations to the President-elect of the United States of America on his inauguration.
  • I wish to emphasize that we have never declined dialogue and have always been prepared to sustain amicable and cooperative relations with any American administration, as I have reiterated on numerous occasions. We operate under the premise that the dialogue will be established on an equal and mutually respectful foundation, acknowledging the significant roles our nations play on several vital global issues, including the enhancement of strategic stability and security.
  • We are also open to dialogue with the new US Administration concerning the Ukrainian conflict. The primary focus here should be addressing the root causes of the crisis, which we have discussed extensively. Concerning the resolution of the situation itself, I would like to reiterate that its objective should not be a temporary ceasefire or a pause to regroup forces and rearm for the eventual continuation of the conflict, but rather a lasting peace founded on respect for the legitimate interests of all individuals and peoples residing in this region. Nonetheless, we will steadfastly advocate for the interests of Russia and the Russian people. This, in essence, is the purpose and meaning of the special military operation.

“Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks at the Jan. 20 meeting with permanent members of the Russian Security Council,” Kremlin.ru, 01.20.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Unofficially, members of his [Trump’s] team and he, himself, have repeatedly spoken out about the Middle East and the Ukraine crisis, which Trump considers a priority area of his foreign policy activity with an eye to resolving it, making it clear that they understand the Russian position in some of its aspects: for example, regarding the unacceptability of Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. However, let me repeat that all of these are preliminary statements, more like “test runs,” made on the eve of the new President’s official inauguration and the approval of members of his administration.
  • This is why a lot depends on the United States, first of all, because the Europeans and US Asian allies, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand are completely guided by the position of the White House, and in this sense, they are waiting to see what its final position will be.
  • We are open to contacts. We have repeatedly confirmed this in response to relevant questions, with the understanding that we will have serious proposals from those of our colleagues who once suspended, or even broke off, relations with the Russian Federation.

"Nikolai Patrushev: 'It is possible that Ukraine will cease to exist this year,'" Andrei Baranov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 01.14.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

Since his departure from the post of secretary of Putin's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev’s remit in his role as the assistant to Putin was supposed to be maritime issues. However, as my summary of his Jan. 14, 2025, interview with KP demonstrates, Patrushev continues to freely comment on a wide range of issues that are beyond that supposed remit, such as reaffirming Russia’s conditions for ending the war, assessing Trump’s priorities and whether Ukraine is one of them, as well as issuing threats that Moldova and Ukraine may cease to exist.

  • For the Biden administration, Ukraine was an absolute priority. It is clear that the relationship between Trump and Biden is antagonistic. Therefore, Ukraine will not be among Trump's priorities. He is more concerned about China.
  • Our main priority is the protection and well-being of our citizens and compatriots around the world. If we talk about the international aspect, then discrimination against the Russian population in a number of countries, and of course, in the Baltics and Moldova, must be stopped.
  • I do not rule out that the aggressive anti-Russian policy of Chisinau will lead to Moldova either becoming part of another state or ceasing to exist altogether. In this situation, we can look at the example of Ukraine, where neo-Nazism and Russophobia led the country to collapse, long before the special military operation.
  • [When asked to comment on discussions in Trump's team on annexation of Ukrainian territories by Russia:] This is not even discussed. The territories that were once governed from Kyiv became part of Russia based on the expression of the will of citizens in accordance with international law, the laws of the Russian Federation and the legislation of these regions.

"Can Trump Stop the Conflict in Ukraine?" Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 01.20.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

  • On the part of the USA, several prerequisites are possible for starting contacts with Moscow.
  • First – expectations of a crisis on the Ukrainian front, Kyiv’s further territorial losses and the possible military successes of Russia.
  • The second one is limited resources. Support for Kyiv requires tens of billions of dollars.
  • The third is the political ambitions of Trump, who can try to end the costly conflict on terms acceptable to the United States, signing up for a diplomatic victory or its appearance.
  • The fourth is the fear of an excessive escalation of the conflict and a direct military clash with Russia, the inevitable weakening of the USA in rivalry with China.
  • Fifth – strengthening, thanks to Moscow's support, the enemies of the United States, including North Korea and Iran.
  • The sixth is the limitation of levers of pressure on Russia, including economic sanctions: restrictive measures caused significant damage, but did not affect Moscow's determination to achieve its foreign policy goals in the European direction.
  • On the part of Russia, the preconditions for negotiations are less obvious. Despite the high defense costs and the strained economy, Moscow retains the ability to conduct military operations without excessive mobilization. The Russian army, albeit slowly, is increasing its pressure on the enemy. Possible escalation steps, in particular by striking Russian territory with Western missiles, are countered by even more large-scale strikes, including new systems. Moscow's stated openness to negotiations does not necessarily mean readiness to make concessions.
  • The distance between the proposed positions of the USA and Russia will most likely turn out to be high, which initially makes the possibility of their rapprochement doubtful. There are other factors.

"Russians Rally Around Putin’s Foreign Policy," Dina Smeltz and Lama El Baz, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 01.25.25. The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Levada Center. 

  • Six in 10 (62%) Russians believe it is best for Russia’s future if it takes an active part in world affairs, while a quarter (26%) believes it is best if Russia stays out of them.
  • Russians are more likely to say military power (48%) has greater significance in determining Russia’s overall strength and influence in the world than economic power (39%).
  • Maintaining Russia’s military superiority (85%) and strengthening cooperation with BRICS countries (83%) are seen by Russians as the most effective approaches to achieve Russia’s foreign policy goals.
  • More than half of Russians (54%) say their country is now more competitive in the global economy than it was 10 years ago, but nearly two in 10 say it is either less competitive (19%) or equally as competitive (18%).
  • Majorities of Russians believe their country should strengthen its relations with Belarus (79%), China (76%), India (67%), North Korea (64%), and, to a lesser extent, Syria (59%), and Iran (56%).

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"A New NATO Deal for America," Hans Binnendijk and Alexander Vershbow, FP, 01.17.25. 

  • More than 60 senior trans-Atlantic defense leaders—including the authors of this article—have outlined a new NATO deal for the United States. The proposed Atlantic Charter 2025 ..., offers a detailed prescription for how European nations might meet the incoming administration’s likely expectations on defense. ... The proposed charter addresses three converging challenges.
    • The first is the belligerent behavior that Russia displays not only in Ukraine but increasingly toward members of the alliance.
    • The second is the growing challenge from China, most evident in its military expansion, aggressive behavior toward its neighbors, and “no limits” partnership with Russia.
    • The third challenge is the United States’ growing global defense responsibilities and justified desire to redistribute defense burdens more evenly.
      • The European allies … must by 2030 collectively provide at least half of all the capabilities designated for NATO’s defense in Europe. ... the proposed charter suggests the creation of two European shield corps forward-deployed in Poland and Romania, backed up by four reserve European war-fighting corps. ... The four new reserve corps would be used to quickly transform the current Allied Reaction Force into an Allied Heavy Mobile Force, a high-end first-responder force capable of a conventional deep strike. This force would be available to immediately reinforce the two shield corps to drive back any invasion force.
  • NATO’s nuclear deterrence also needs to be strengthened in response to the Kremlin’s continued nuclear threats and increased Russian deployment of shorter-range nuclear forces, including in Belarus. The charter recommends ways to accomplish this, including broader nuclear-sharing arrangements and greater nuclear cooperation between Britain and France. Given Russian behavior, the NATO-Russia Founding Act should be set aside for now, and its prohibitions should not inhibit these and other deterrence enhancements.

"Will Davos Preview a New World Disorder?" Steven Erlanger, NYT, 01.19.25. 

  • One of the dominant topics in Davos is likely to be Ukraine. Mr. Trump says he wants to end the war in a day, which virtually no one takes literally, not even his special adviser for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg. Mr. Trump or no, Ukraine is slowly losing the war, and negotiations are coming to try to end the bloodshed, probably this spring.
  • But on what basis is the key question. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia is facing high inflation and interest rates but has put his country on a wartime economy in what he presents as an existential conflict with the West. Despite very high casualties, he is so far able to replenish his losses with major financial incentives: 70 percent of his forces are contract soldiers and only 7 percent are draftees, said Zaki Laïdi, a French analyst who advised the European Union's former foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell Fontelles.
  • ''We still hear that Ukraine is fighting our war, but let's tell the truth,'' said Charles A. Kupchan, a former Obama administration official and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. ''The United States has a policy without a strategy,'' insisting that the West will support Ukraine as long as it takes and that Ukraine alone can decide when and how to negotiate, as if Washington had no interests of its own, he said. ''That's dangerous and it's turning Ukraine into a failed state,'' he said. Some see Russia and its desire to continue the war collapsing under economic and business pressure, Mr. Kupchan said. ''But I see the opposite: Russia is OK and Ukraine is running out of gas, without enough manpower or air defense, and it's not like it's all sitting in Western warehouses -- we don't have it.''

"Europe Needs to Compete for the Top Spot in Priorities, Alliances and Technological Development – Speech by the President [Volodymyr Zelenskyy] at the World Economic Forum," Office of the President of Ukraine, 01.21.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • Right now, all eyes are on Washington. But who’s actually watching Europe at the moment? That’s the key question for Europe.
  • I remember last year’s Asia Security Summit in Singapore – the Shangri-La Dialogue. There, representatives of the U.S. delegation openly said – their top security priority is the Indo-Pacific region, the second is the Middle East and the Gulf, and only the third is Europe. And that was under the previous Administration. Will President Trump even notice Europe? Does he see NATO as necessary? And will he respect EU institutions?
  • Europe can’t afford to be second or third in line for its allies. If that happens, the world will start moving forward without Europe, and that’s a world that won’t be comfortable or beneficial for all Europeans. Europe needs to compete for the top spot in priorities, alliances, and technological development.
  • We’re at yet another turning point, which some see as a problem for Europe, but others call a chance. Europe must establish itself as a strong global player. As an indispensable player.
  • Let’s not forget – there’s no ocean separating European countries from Russia. And European leaders should remember this – battles involving North Korean soldiers are now happening in places geographically closer to Davos than to Pyongyang.
  • Right now, it’s not clear whether Europe will even have a seat at the table when the war against our country ends. We see how much influence China has on Russia. We’re deeply grateful to Europe for all the support it’s given our country during this war. But will President Trump listen to Europe, or will he negotiate with Russia and China without Europe?

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Vladimir Putin held talks, via videoconference, with President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping,” official web site of the Russian president, 01.21.25. Clues from Chinese and Russian Views. 

Xi Jinping: 

  • President Putin, my dear friend, I am very happy to see you in the online format ahead of the Chinese New Year. On New Year’s Eve, it is an opportune moment to review results and to chart plans for the future. In 2024, you and I met three times—in Beijing, Astana and Kazan—and we reached a number of important agreements.
  • We marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Russia in an impressive setting. Chinese-Russian relations, based on eternal neighborliness and friendship, comprehensive strategic collaboration, mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual benefits, are acquiring new vitality.
  • Our countries are collaborating actively within the framework of the UN, the SCO, BRICS and other international platforms. 

Vladimir Putin: 

  • President Xi Jinping, my dear friend, I am sincerely pleased to greet you and to have the opportunity to speak with you at the beginning of the year, continuing our good tradition of reviewing the work done over the past period and outlining new plans for the development of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation.
  • I agree with you that cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is based on common national interests in many spheres and shared views on what relations between major powers should be like. We are developing our ties on the basis of friendship, mutual trust and support, equality and mutual benefit. These ties are self-sufficient, as they do not depend on any domestic political factors or the current global situation. Their all-round strengthening fully meets the goals of the comprehensive development of Russia and China and the improvement of our peoples’ well-being.
  • We coordinate our actions across various multilateral institutions, including the United Nations and its Security Council, the SCO, the G20 and APEC. We stand united in advocating for a more just multipolar world order. 

“Is President Trump a China Hawk? Views from the Davos mountaintop,” Graham Allison, X, 01.20.25.

  • [In light of both the now over decade-long effort by the United States to ‘pivot’ to Asia, and increasing cooperation between Russia and China following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Allison’s analysis of the Trump administration’s likely foreign and economic policy vis-à-vis China is directly relevant to Russia matters:] Opening the session yesterday, Klaus [Schwab, the founder of the World Economic Forum] noted that there are many reasons for pessimism. At his meeting with the young Global Leaders, he had asked them whether they thought the next quarter century would be better, or alternatively worse, than the past 25 years. Half answered: worse.
  • Responding to Klaus’ call for “constructive optimism” at the luncheon session yesterday, I confessed that I’m cautiously optimistic about the most important bilateral relationship in the world. To put the point provocatively, I suggested we all ask: Is President Trump a China Hawk? That’s the title of an article that I’ve been working on for some time and that will be published next week. Begin with Peter Thiel’s advice not to take Trump literally— but instead, to take him seriously.
  • … [A]s the results of November 5th demonstrate, [Trump] communicates to his target audiences. And whatever else he is, or is not, he is a phenomenon. He has done something most experts declared impossible—something that had never been done before in the 249 years of America’s democracy. Having been declared politically dead, and been the target of the most intense legal effort to imprison his remains, he engineered the greatest political comeback in recorded history.

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"Three nuclear policy challenges for the second Trump administration," Stephen J. Cimbala and Lawrence J. Korb, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 01.16.25. 

  1. Russia’s nuclear threats. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded Ukraine, the United States, and the other NATO members of Russia’s large inventory of nuclear weapons. He also warned them that, under certain circumstances, Russia would not hesitate to use these weapons.
  2. Iran’s nuclearization. The Iranian proxy wars against Israel escalated on all fronts in 2023 and 2024—from the outbreaks of war in Gaza to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other zones of conflict. Rising tensions between Iran and the United States continued despite efforts by the Biden administration to broker cease-fire agreements with Hamas and to conciliate Iran with a possible reboot of the 2015 nuclear deal. Currently, Iran is a de facto threshold nuclear-weapons state, weeks away from the capability to fabricate an atomic bomb.
  3. Implications for arms control. Getting the United States and Russia on the same page for an immediate post-New START regime will be a demanding task requiring that Washington and Moscow improve their relations and agree on at least a provisional peace settlement for the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, China will be reluctant to jump into negotiations about limits on nuclear weapons unless, or until, it has built its strategic nuclear forces to levels that are essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia.
  4. The door remains open to ending the war in Europe, resuming Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control, containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and including China as a nuclear superpower within a trilateral consensus on limiting the arms race. But the same door, swinging in the opposite direction, could yield continued war in Europe, an Iranian nuclear weapons state, and a Chinese outlier within the ranks of nuclear superpowers. Current U.S. plans for nuclear modernization must provide the necessary military tools for maintaining nuclear deterrence stability. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

"Russia’s Options for Naval Basing in the Mediterranean After Syria’s Tartus," Edward Black and Sidharth Kaushal, RUSI, 01.14.25.

  • Turkey: "An arrangement brokered by Turkey that leaves Russia in possession of Tartus remains possible." However, "even if Russia remains at Tartus in the short term, it faces the long-term risk of eviction by a future Syrian government."
  • Libya: "Russia is in talks with a Libyan warlord to move naval assets and military equipment in Syria to the north African country as the Kremlin seeks an alternative foothold in the Mediterranean." Specifically, "Haftar is now leaning towards accepting a Russian request... to move its navy ships from the Syrian port of Tartus to…"
  • Algeria: "Alternative bases in Libya and Algeria offering limited, politically fraught substitutes."
  • Port Sudan: "Russia’s naval base in Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean has served as an important resupply facility in recent years and the establishment of a parallel installation in Port Sudan could alleviate Moscow’s long-term dependence on Syria." 

Cyber security/AI: 

"Understanding Cyber Effects in Modern Warfare," Jason Healey, WotR, 01.21.25. 

  • Policymakers, practitioners, and analysts should be accordingly cautious with any claims about cyber operations in warfare which are not specific about the where, what, and why. Capabilities that have been worthless in one category of the framework may be game changing in another category or in the next war. To avoid overly broad and incorrect conclusions, analysts must avoid generalities and clarify which aspects of cyber capabilities in warfare their research seeks to explain.
  • Innovation in offensive cyber operations may come less from technological change itself (though artificial intelligence might be an exception) than by the creativity and brazenness of threat actors and the increased digital dependence of modern societies. Not many years ago, there was a scarcity of examples of cyber capabilities during wartime. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is an unfortunately rich dataset: the Ukrainian government reported being involved in remediating 128 per month in the first half of 2023.
  • Policymakers, practitioners, and analysts must therefore also be wary about broad claims about what cyber operations cannot do. They cannot simply extrapolate from grey zone warfare, in times of relative peace when states did not invade each other for territorial gain. Humanity is still in the opening decades of the digital age and there are many more decades, and wars, to come. More war will mean more innovation so that cyber capabilities will continue to be used in surprising ways. 

Energy exports from CIS:

"What the End of Ukraine Gas Transit Means for Kyiv, Moscow, and Europe," Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 01.15.25. 

  • At 8 a.m. on Jan. 1, 2025, the supply of Russian gas crossing the Ukrainian border on its way to Europe was turned off, ending a sixty-year era. The response to the shutoff was notably calm considering that in 2009, a two-week halt in Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine caused panic and a large-scale crisis. This time around, gas prices in Europe rose slightly, and only Moldova had real problems.
  • By the end of 2024, Ukrainian transit of Russian gas to Europe was already a fraction of what it once was: 15 billion cubic meters, 13 billion of which went to Slovakia and onward to the EU, with the rest going to Moldova. Europe must now find an alternative to that missing gas, either by purchasing LNG or reducing consumption, including through greater use of coal.
  • Three years ago, Europe was the main gas market for Russia and Gazprom, but Russia already sustained its biggest losses on this front back in 2022. The volumes that will be lost as a result of the end of Ukrainian transit are a pale shadow of a once vast portfolio. In 2025, Gazprom will export 38 billion cubic meters to China, about 25 billion cubic meters to Türkiye, and 15 billion cubic meters to Europe via the TurkStream pipeline across the Black Sea. The 15 billion cubic meters that Gazprom has lost due to the suspension of Ukrainian transit would therefore have made up about 16% of this export portfolio: a noticeable but not fundamental volume.
  • In recent years, Naftogaz of Ukraine recorded revenues for gas transit of over $1 billion on its accounts, under which Gazprom agreed to deliver a certain amount of gas via Ukraine. However, Gazprom paid about $400 million for reduced volumes sent via Ukraine.

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general: 

“Toward a New Russia Policy: An Agenda for the Trump Administration," Thomas E. Graham, NI, 01.16.25. 

  • President Trump is right that resolving the [Russian-Ukrainian] conflict and ensuring an enduring peace is urgent, but he will find that task is embedded in the broader question of European security. Before he launched the war, Putin made clear that his goal was to revise the post-Cold War settlement, which he believed was imposed on Russia at a time of extreme weakness. NATO expansion, in particular, drove Russia to the margins of Europe, depriving it of the buffer zone in Eastern Europe that it considered critical to its security and standing as a great power.
  • Putin has railed against loose talk in the United States of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia or effecting regime change, which he interprets as evidence of Washington’s aim to eliminate Russia as a great power rival. Nevertheless, he wants to engage the United States in a serious dialogue on global affairs, in part because even contentious talks with the world’s preeminent power would validate Russia’s status as a world power.
  • In these circumstances, a narrowly focused strategy for ending the Russia-Ukraine war will fall far short of its goal. To succeed, Trump will need a full-blown Russia policy… At most, containment might have a role to play in Europe in preventing Russia’s further expansion westward… However, diplomacy will also be essential to easing tensions along the frontier. That will require arms control measures and confidence-building measures akin to those used during the Cold War but adapted to current realities… United States needs to acknowledge that Russia will remain a key pillar of the international order for decades. Accordingly, the goal should be managing relations through firm defense of our principles and astute compromises and trade-offs within and across issues to advance American interests or to harness Russian power and ambitions for American purposes.

“To talk about the pro-Russian views of the future owner of the Oval Office is rash and naïve," Kommersant, 01.15.25.^ Clues from Russian Views.

  • "[An interview of former Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Ivanovich Antonov by Elena Chernenko:] The current hostile policy of the United States does not allow us to talk about the prospects for the resumption of the arms control negotiation process. Antonov: Our positions on the safety equation are known. Changes in Russia's nuclear doctrine in the United States have been recorded. They also remember there the words of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin about the possible clarification of the policy in this area depending on the external conditions, including those related to the Ukrainian crisis."
  • "It is important that we continue to consider nuclear weapons as an instrument to prevent war. I am firmly convinced that even after the expiration of the START term, our country will continue to pursue the policy of a responsible partner in the world. We will not get involved in the nuclear arms race, but attention to the improvement of the nuclear triad will remain in the focus of the Russian leadership."
  • "Chernenko: Representatives of the outgoing American administration have repeatedly said that the United States and Russia should conduct a dialogue on arms control and reducing nuclear risks precisely because of the current tough confrontation, and not in spite of it. Antonov: It is impossible to separate arms control from the general context of Russian-American relations, from the state of affairs in the field of international security. Russia is called the enemy… everywhere in the West there are calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Moscow. They don't want to take into account fundamental Russian security concerns. Ukraine continues to be incited to war with us, supplying more and more modern weapons to kill Russians."

For full opening statements by some of Trump’s top post nominees, who would play key roles in shaping U.S. policies toward Russia and who recently testified in confirmation hearings, see:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Chartbook 345 A ‘house of cards’? Russia's war economy in 2025,” Adam Tooze, Substack, 01.14.25. 

  • As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, as the world braces for Trump’s inauguration, as the military and diplomatic balance threatens to shift against Ukraine there has been a noticeable shift amongst Western commentators on the economic front. The economy has always been counted as a strong suit for Russia. In an attritional struggle it surely had the advantage. But is that true?
  • When the war began, many had hoped that sanctions would quickly collapse the Russian economy. Instead, Russia’s economy grew as wartime spending raised incomes and supercharged Russia’s consumer. High energy prices and years of accumulating reserves meant that Russian economic officials could deftly handle the impact of higher transaction costs. Does that mean that past is prologue and Russia has hidden reserves of strength? Maybe. However, it might also mean something else about the longer course of the Russian economy: it has been operating below potential since 2014…” Is that room for growth now used up? That is the central question for the coming years.
  • Faced with the prospects of negotiations, it may suit Western pundits to conjure up the specter of financial collapse in Russia. But, if we actually want to get a realistic assessment of Russia’s long-run power potential, images like a “House of Cards” are an indulgence. What we need to know is how Russia’s political economy is actually put together. 

“What’s Wrong with Craig Kennedy’s Estimates?” Sergey Aleksashenko, Substack, 01.13.25. 

  • Most importantly, Craig Kennedy [in his post which is entitled “Russia’s Hidden War Debt” and which claims that “Since mid-2022, this off-budget financing scheme has helped drive an unprecedented $415 billion surge in overall corporate borrowing in Russia] did not indicate the source of the data from which he got the figure of $415 billion. ... The Bank of Russia says that the corporate sector's debt to banks (loans and bonds) as of mid-2022 (the point from which Kennedy begins his analysis) amounted to 37.5 trillion rubles, and as of November 1, 2024 (the last point)—65.9 trillion rubles. That is, the total increase in ruble debt amounted to 28.4 trillion rubles. Very roughly, we can say that the entire debt of the corporate sector increased by $280 billion.
  • It is important to take into account that after the start of the war, the business attitude to currency risks changed significantly, which resulted in a reduction in the absolute value of the corporate sector's foreign currency debt. According to the Bank of Russia, it amounted to $37 billion. I think it would be logical to assume that the reduction in foreign currency loans was offset by an increase in ruble debt.
  • After the start of the war, the Russian economy lost access to external financing and the total external debt of the Russian corporate sector has decreased by $55 billion since mid-2022. Considering that the Bank of Russia does not take into account loans issued by shareholders to their companies in this indicator, I think we can assume that at least 75% of this amount was offset by an increase in ruble debt.
  • Kennedy's most important methodological error is that he equates loans with budget financing. Loans are repayable.

"No, Russia is not on the verge of a banking crisis," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 01.17.25. 

  • Ominous projections of a financial crisis ready to engulf Russia have been circulating this week through media outlets and social networks. In short, the theory is that Russia is spending almost twice as much on the war as official figures suggest, pushing the banking system toward a collapse in which the authorities might end up freezing deposits.
    • Claims of an imminent catastrophe first appeared in a Substack post on Saturday authored by Craig Kennedy, a Russia expert at Harvard’s Davis Center who spent many years with Morgan Stanley. Kennedy’s analysis was then used by the Financial Times’ economics editor Martin Sundby in an opinion piece published the following day.
      • Kennedy’s initial post described a “low-profile, off-budget financing scheme” to raise funds for the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. He suggested that sharp increases in corporate borrowing in Russia since the full-scale invasion of 2022—up more than 60% over two years to 19.4% GDP—were linked to increases in military spending. Apparently, up to 60% of these loans (as much as $249 billion) are funding military-linked businesses, he argued.
  • In our view, all things being equal, it’s unlikely that the economy will implode soon, forcing Russia to scale back its military campaign in Ukraine; or that deposits will be frozen. That doesn’t mean, however, that nothing will ever happen to deposits, nor that the banking sector will always be trouble-free. However, there are far bigger threats to the Russian economy at the moment: for example, a lack of transparent decision-making, little independent expertise, and the classification of much economic data all undermines trust in the authorities. This is more likely to, eventually, lead to some sort of hard-to-predict, man made crisis. 

"Putin Is Not Yet Desperate," Alexandra Prokopenko, FA, 01.21.25. 

"The number of Russian dollar billionaires has returned to its pre-war level, and the wealthiest among them are mainly those under sanctions," Re: Russia, 01.15.25. 

  • During the war with Ukraine, the number of dollar billionaires in Russia has not decreased: the number of super-rich Russians, whose wealth equals or exceeds $1 billion, has remained virtually unchanged.
  • As of the beginning of 2025, the wealth of Russian billionaires is equivalent to 27% of Russia’s GDP. Following Russia, almost at the same level, is India, and only then — the United States (24%). In most developed Western countries, this ratio is in the range of 12–18%. In Brazil, China, and Mexico, it is around 8%. The list is closed by the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea (4–7%).
  • The total wealth of Russian dollar billionaires decreased by 5.62%, from $607.2 billion to $573.1 billion. This is a small decrease considering that the ruble has depreciated by about a quarter compared to 2021.
  • Of the billionaires listed in 2021, only 55 of them (45%) were under sanctions. Among them, 22 increased their wealth, another 22 decreased it (40%), and 11 dropped out of the Forbes billionaire list (20%). In contrast, among those who were not yet sanctioned, 60% ceased to be billionaires, and only 20% managed to increase their wealth.
  • The fact that sanctions have had a largely beneficial effect on the fortunes of a significant number of billionaires should not be too surprising. This effect is related to the high level of oligarchization (concentration of wealth) of business in Russia. In these conditions, the benefits of Western companies leaving, the redistribution of their assets, and state investments in the military and infrastructure sectors have largely been appropriated by big business. At the same time, such sources of capital growth are now mostly exhausted, while the business of Russian billionaires who have parted with their Western subsidiaries has become less diversified.

"‘Zero Sum’: History, Anecdotes From 35 Years of Business in Russia,” Sergey Aleksashenko, RM, 01.16.25.

  • Charles Hecker's book "Zero Sum: The Arc of International Business in Russia” is an account of the rise and fall of international companies in Russia—a story spanning from the euphoric late-Soviet 1980s to the tragic breakdown of business relations after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The author knows Russia and Russian reality firsthand. … He has developed a wide circle of contacts, many of whom have been doing business in Russia for many years, and have shared their memories, assessments and judgments with the author, on which much of the book is based. … The author's ability to combine these opinions with his experience as a journalist and consultant enriches the book, even if objectivity is sometimes affected.
  • Hecker organizes his analysis around turning points in Russia's recent history. The first chapters examine the first wave of Western companies entering the Soviet Union, lured by the promise of untapped potential. The combination of enormous risk and reward mark this era as companies navigated the volatile environment of the 1990s and early 2000s, shifting to the Putin era, when rising authoritarianism and geopolitical ambitions gradually changed the "rules of the game." According to Hecker, the business community didn't want to adequately assess, and therefore to respond to, Russia's changing economic environment and political trajectory.
  • The annexation of Crimea in 2014, which signaled the beginning of a change in the international stance toward Russia, became a turning point for international business. Hecker describes foreign companies' growing challenges, from increased regulation to reputational risks. Then, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent departure of hundreds of international companies from Russia serve as the book's climax, but the author does not declare it was a comprehensive breakdown in relations between Russia and the global business community.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Defense and aerospace:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

"India’s Faustian pact with Russia is strengthening," The Economist, 01.13.25. 

  • India has for the past few years cheerfully bought Russian oil for less than the $60-per-barrel price cap imposed by Western sanctions, becoming the world’s second-biggest buyer of the stuff after China. In 2021 just 2% of India’s oil imports came from Russia. Between April and October 2024 nearly 40% did. ICRA, a rating agency, estimates that discounted Russian oil has saved India at least $13 billion since the war in Ukraine began.
  • Rather than winding down an old cold-war friendship, as Western officials hoped, India is deepening defense, energy and other ties with a partner it sees as a source of prosperity and security and as a linchpin of its “multi-aligned” foreign policy.
  • India continues to view Russia as its primary source of top-end weaponry, much of which America and its allies remain reluctant to share… Yet here too India faces risks. Its defense co-operation with Russia has been plagued by problems, including the delayed delivery of the last two of five S-400 missile systems that it bought in 2018. Poor performance of some Russian weaponry in Ukraine has caused concern among Indian military leaders. And India has postponed or cancelled talks on several deals to buy or upgrade Russian equipment, citing logistical issues arising from the Ukraine war.
  • Mr. Putin’s India trip [in early 2025], meanwhile, has been presented as a routine exercise following the two leaders’ vow to meet annually.
  • For Indian officials the risks of strengthening ties with Russia appear to be acceptable. But they may be underestimating a longer-term problem. Russia is a useful short-term source of energy and technology. But its demographic and economic prospects are grim, even were peace to return. India is also exposing itself to fallout from Russia’s inevitable domestic turmoil.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Ukraine:

"Transformation Under Fire – An Analysis of Ukraine’s Security Sector Since 1991," Lea Ellmanns, Oleksiy Melnyk and Wolf-Christian Paes, IISS, 01.17.25. 

  • On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly escalating the lower-intensity conflict ongoing in the country’s east since February 2014. The resilience Ukraine displayed during the first months of the invasion surprised many: Kyiv had been expected to fall within days. To understand why Ukraine was able to defend its territory against overwhelming material odds, it is instructive to look back at the development of Ukraine’s security sector. Since 1991, Ukraine’s security sector has undergone a profound transformation in response to transitions, crises and, finally, full-fledged armed conflict. This report, which was finalized as the third year of full-scale Russian aggression draws to a close, discusses the changes to Ukraine’s security sector since its independence from the Soviet Union, specifically examining military and paramilitary forces.
  • This report details the challenges associated with transforming part of the former Soviet Union’s security apparatus in the framework of a wider transition process. It therefore emphasizes the prioritisation of internal over external security threats during the period 1991–2014, which resulted in the deterioration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s capabilities. Subsequently, it details some of the transformations and reforms implemented in Ukraine’s security sector in response to the multi-level crises in 2014, including the ‘Revolution of Dignity,’ Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s aggression in the Donbas. During the subsequent period, reforms focused heavily on increasing the effectiveness of military and paramilitary forces. Moreover, the report outlines the emergence of irregular armed groups, widely known as the volunteer battalions, and their later integration into the formal security sector. In combination, the transformations achieved during this time greatly contributed to Ukraine’s resilience against the full-scale invasion in 2022. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Azerbaijani Defiance of Russia Over Air Disaster Is the New Normal," Alexey Gusev, Carnegie Politika, 01.17.25.

  • The apparently accidental downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet by Russian air defenses on Dec. 25, 2024, is fast becoming a defining moment in the evolving ties between the Kremlin and former Soviet republics. Instead of a relationship between an “imperial center” and “satellites,” we are increasingly seeing a more complex system of mutual agreements. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a trailblazer in this regard, refusing to let Moscow off the hook for the air disaster.
  • While the Russian civilian and military authorities acted according to time-honored bureaucratic traditions of seeking to evade responsibility for as long as possible, Baku demanded Moscow admit its guilt, launch a transparent investigation, and punish those at fault. Pressure was applied at the highest level. When the tragedy occurred, Aliyev was traveling to St. Petersburg, but he immediately ordered his plane to turn around and return to Azerbaijan.
  • This was a prelude to a further cooling of ties. Several days later, Aliyev said the aircraft had been shot down by a land-based system and expressed outrage over efforts by the Russian side to “fudge the issue.” Even a phone call and evasive apology from Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to put the issue to rest. At a meeting with the relatives of the victims on Jan. 6, Aliyev again stated that “the responsibility for the catastrophe lies with representatives of Russia.”
  • Going forward, Aliyev will be able to use this incident to strengthen his position in other negotiations with Moscow, such as talks on the so-called Zangezur Corridor—the mooted transport route through Armenian territory to connect Azerbaijan with the exclave of Nakhchivan—which Aliyev insists must involve Azerbaijani border guards. 

"Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal: A Golden Opportunity for Trump," Garo Paylan, WSJ, 01.13.25.

  • Much of the groundwork has already been laid by the Biden administration, which has supported Armenia's shift away from Russia's grip and encouraged bilateral talks with Azerbaijan. It has also tried to nudge Azerbaijan, the militarily stronger of the two, toward accepting Armenia's overtures for peace. But President Biden didn't get personally involved by writing to the leaders of both countries until he was already a lame duck.
  • Mr. Trump can swoop in and close the deal. The new president could invite Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the White House for a historic accord. Without senior-level U.S. engagement, the negotiations risk stalling, leaving room for Azerbaijan to continue its military threats on Armenia or Russia to reassert its influence in the region. A personal push from Mr. Trump could secure the deal that ends decades of hostility in a region long dominated by Russian meddling.
  • Peace in the South Caucasus would deliver benefits to the U.S. and its allies by helping post-Soviet republics to reclaim economic sovereignty and hold off a neoimperialist Russia. A peace treaty could expand access to the Middle Corridor, a vital trade route linking European markets to Central Asia's resources, including energy and rare-earth metals, unlocking opportunities for development, trade and energy cooperation.
  • Mr. Trump's personal touch could also improve relations with a difficult ally, Turkey.
  • Promoting peace could also have domestic political benefits for Mr. Trump. American Christians could be moved by the prospect of supporting a Christian nation surrounded by autocratic regimes, and the influential Armenian diaspora in the U.S. would support the effort. Mr. Trump should seize this opportunity and call both leaders in his first week in office.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Footnotes

  1. The following two nominees also testified before Senate committees last week: Scott Turner, nominee for Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, appeared before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee on Jan. 16, and Lee Zeldin, nominee for Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, appeared before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on Jan. 16. However, these posts typically do not play major roles in shaping Russia policies.
  2. See links to their statements in the subsection on great powers.
  3. Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage, several U.S. and European intelligence told WP.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Kristina Kormilitsyna, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP.

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