Russia Analytical Report, Jan. 12–20, 2026
4 Ideas to Explore
- President Donald Trump “sometimes talks as if he agrees with Vladimir Putin that Russian victory in this bloodbath [in Ukraine] is inevitable,” according to David Ignatius’s column in The Washington Post. However, Ignatius’ conversations in Kyiv with Ukraine’s senior officials convinced him that “this bleak picture is misleading.” “Ukraine will soon deploy a new generation of domestically produced air-defense interceptors, powered by artificial intelligence, that could allow the country to fight on indefinitely,” Ignatius writes. “Putin doesn’t want to make concessions because he still thinks he can win. But Ukraine’s new network of AI-driven air defenses will make that less likely. If Ukraine can protect the civilians on Kyiv’s frozen streets—and reassure them that they won’t face another winter in the deep freeze, even if the war continues—perhaps Putin will reconsider his bet,” according to Ignatius.
- Russia is waging a campaign to freeze Ukraine into political submission by systematically degrading its energy system, according to David Ignatius’s column in WP. The Kremlin has shifted from trying to crash the entire grid to isolating key hubs—Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro—with drone and missile strikes about every two weeks that repeatedly hit freshly repaired infrastructure, keeping these cities dark and cold for days, according to Andrew Kramer and his New York Times co-authors. One recent barrage severed Kyiv from the national grid, knocked out all three of its gas- and coal-fired plants and left hundreds of apartment buildings without heat in temperatures falling as low as -18°C (-0.4°F), while the capital survived on less than a tenth of its usual 2,000‑megawatt demand, the same NYT report notes. Nationwide, there is “not a single power plant left in Ukraine that has not been attacked,” with 612 strikes on energy facilities over the past year, according to Ukrainian Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal’s testimony cited by Illia Novikov of AP and Christopher Miller in the Financial Times. Aid officials describe this as the hardest winter of the war, and Putin is “betting he can break” Ukraine through this “energy terror,” Miller writes in FT.
- The rift between the U.S. and Europe over Greenland is making the transatlantic alliance vulnerable to a Russian attack on NATO territory, according to Lt. Gen. Alexander Sollfrank, head of the German armed forces Joint Force Command. This German commander told The Wall Street Journal that the rift over Greenland, which Donald Trump is threatening to annex, is eroding the alliance’s core “one for all, all for one” deterrent, warning that a failure to respond to even a limited Russian cross‑border provocation against an eastern ally could effectively end the alliance. Sollfrank cautions that a Ukraine cease-fire would not reduce the threat, since Russia’s war-shaped economy and Putin’s need to justify massive casualties lock in long‑term confrontation.
Russia’s global role has shrunk from would‑be great‑power patron to overstretched, unreliable spoiler, according to Alexander Gabuev and Sergey Vakulenko of the Carnegie Endowment. In their article for Foreign Affairs, the duo contend that Moscow’s failure to materially aid Nicolás Maduro despite a 2025 “strategic partnership” fits a wider pattern of overpromising protection and underdelivering when allies like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Iran or Venezuela face serious U.S. or Israeli pressure, revealing Russia as an opportunistic disruptor rather than a credible counter‑hegemon to Washington. Kimberly Marten of Barnard College, Columbia University similarly argues that Russia’s status in the Middle East has eroded sharply since 2023, as it abandoned Assad and offered only rhetorical support to Iran while Turkey and the U.S. expanded influence. Marten concludes that Putin’s domestic position remains secure, but international status loss may push him toward riskier hybrid operations against NATO to restore prestige.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
"Trends in Nuclear Security on the Korean Peninsula: Growing Momentum," Alexander Vorontsov, Valdai Club, 01.19.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- Vorontsov notes that since its first test in 2006, North Korea has conducted four more nuclear tests, with the fifth, in 2017, widely assessed as thermonuclear; the North’s arsenal is commonly estimated at around 50 warheads. In parallel, Pyongyang adopted a “Law on the Policy of Nuclear Armed Forces” in 2022 and amended its constitution in 2023 to enshrine the right to develop a military nuclear program—what Kim Jong Un called the “perpetuation” of the DPRK’s nuclear-force–building policy. At the same time, North Korea has built an extensive range of delivery systems, from ICBMs on liquid and solid fuel to cruise and hypersonic missiles launched from mobile, rail, and submarine platforms.
- The author argues that years of sanctions and promises of “international legal guarantees” modeled on the 1994 Budapest Memorandum have been discredited by recent global developments—from U.S. “tariff wars” to U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025. Against this backdrop, Vorontsov says Pyongyang’s reliance on its own nuclear deterrent appears “justified and irreversible,” especially in Moscow’s view. He underlines that Russia has now openly abandoned the goal of DPRK denuclearization; Russian officials, including the Foreign Ministry, state that for Moscow “no ‘nuclear problem of North Korea’ exists anymore,” because denuclearization has “lost all meaning in the new geopolitical conditions.”
- Vorontsov also highlights a broader shift in the positions of major powers: the new U.S. National Security Strategy (November 2025) and China’s 2025 Arms Control White Paper both drop the long‑standing explicit demand for North Korean denuclearization. This, he notes, alarms Seoul and fuels debate in South Korea about acquiring its own nuclear weapons, an option that enjoys up to 60 percent public support in polls—but which the South Korean government and Washington still firmly reject. In conclusion, Vorontsov argues that leading powers, including the Trump administration, are de facto adapting to North Korea as a nuclear‑armed state and groping for more flexible formulas than the old, absolutist call for “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Iran and its nuclear program:
“How Russia Is Supporting Iran’s Repression,” Nicole Grajewski, Foreign Policy, 01.14.26.1
- Grajewski argues that Moscow will not intervene militarily to save Iran’s regime but is deeply involved in helping it repress protests, providing both hardware (from AK‑pattern rifles, SVDs, T‑72s, MRAPs, and Mi‑17/ Mi‑28 helicopters) and “less‑lethal” systems, and sharing hard‑won experience in managing dissent.
- She details how Russia has helped build Iran’s current internet shutdown strategy: a Russian‑assisted DPI‑based network architecture and lawful‑intercept systems (supplied by vendors such as Protei) allow Tehran to impose “managed connectivity,” immobilizing society while keeping state, banking, and regime services online and enabling targeted surveillance and disruption of protest networks.
- The 2025 Russia‑Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, she notes, explicitly embeds cooperation on “international information security” and managing national internet segments, giving legal cover to this regime‑security collaboration in digital repression.
- Moscow is also flying in new repression tools: around 40 Spartak mine‑resistant armored vehicles were delivered in late 2025 via Il‑76 flights from Russia and Belarus to Tehran, timed to coincide with the current wave of protests and designed for sustained urban internal‑security operations.
- Strategically, Grajewski concludes, Russia is betting that layered, deniable assistance—reinforcing Iran’s coercive capacity and shielding it diplomatically at the UN—can keep the Islamic Republic afloat without the costs of overt intervention, even though Moscow’s ability to shape outcomes would shrink sharply if the crisis escalates into direct confrontation with the United States.
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- The article describes Russia’s most devastating energy attacks of the war against Kyiv: coordinated drone and missile strikes that severed the capital from the national grid, knocked out all three of its gas‑ and coal‑fired power plants, and left roughly 500 apartment buildings without any heat during sub‑freezing temperatures.
- Russian forces have shifted from trying to collapse Ukraine’s entire power system to focusing on isolating three cities—Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro— and repeatedly hitting local infrastructure “about every two weeks,” targeting repair work to keep these hubs dark and cold for days on end.
- On one recent day, Kyiv—normally a 2,000‑megawatt consumer—was surviving on less than a tenth of that; authorities routed the remaining power to critical systems (water pumps, the metro), while many residential districts lost both electricity and district heating and had to rely on low‑output gas‑boiler backups.
- Mayor Vitali Klitschko says the city’s air‑defense shield is running low on Patriot interceptors and has appealed to Western allies for more, warning that Russia is “trying to destroy the mood of the population” and effectively make Kyiv uninhabitable to pressure Ukraine into accepting a disadvantageous Trump‑brokered peace.
- The piece captures growing civilian exhaustion and divisions—some Ukrainians, especially mothers of soldiers, now openly argue for ceding Donbas to stop the bombing—yet many, like lawyer Volodymyr Dorodko and the young family forced to flee Kyiv for a village, insist that conceding territory would only embolden Moscow, even as they struggle to endure “much more than uncomfortable” living conditions.
- “Russia has not spared a single Ukrainian power plant from attack since its all-out invasion,” Ukraine’s new energy minister Denys Shmyhal told lawmakers, adding that Russia conducted “612 attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure objects over last year.”
- “Nobody in the world has ever faced such a challenge,” Shmyhal said in his speech to the Verkhovna Rada.
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed that “some of the country’s air defense systems were out of missiles and at Russia’s mercy until a new shipment arrived Friday morning,” and asked, “But honestly, what do those rules and laws mean when we are at war and we desperately need these missiles?”
- “This is the hardest winter since the escalation of the conflict: punishing cold temperatures and the lack of heating and electricity are affecting millions who are already pushed to the edge by years of violence and economic strain,” Jaime Wah of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies said.
- “If you have spare energy, better give it to people,” Shmyhal urged businesses, adding, “This is the most important thing today. People will be grateful.”
- “A week ago, more than 6,000 residential buildings were without heating, according to DTEK. Dozens of apartment blocks remain without heat, say the company and local authorities,” Miller reported.
- “This week alone,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Sunday, “Russia launched more than 1,300 attack drones, around 1,050 guided aerial bombs and 29 missiles of various types at Ukrainian critical infrastructure,” with “more than 200 drone strikes” overnight targeting multiple regions.
- “Russia is betting it can break us through energy terror,” Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine’s energy minister, told parliament, saying that “there was ‘not a single power plant left in Ukraine that has not been attacked by the enemy.’”
- President Volodymyr Zelensky has branded an $800 billion “prosperity plan” for Ukraine’s postwar recovery, with officials saying roughly $500 billion would need to come from public sources such as grants and low‑interest loans. By comparison, the original Marshall Plan cost about $150 billion in today’s dollars, underscoring how much larger and more ambitious this effort would be. Many Ukrainian economists and business figures quoted in the piece see the $800 billion figure as “wishful thinking,” calibrated to appeal to a business‑first Trump administration rather than grounded in realistic funding prospects.
- Confidential BlackRock slides from 2023 projected that the firm would help mobilize $50–80 billion for Ukraine, before a 2024 presentation cut the goal to $15–30 billion; the project was shelved in mid‑2025 after failing to attract enough investors. European officials, expected to fund most of Ukraine’s recovery, balked at channeling large sums into what they saw as a privately run U.S. vehicle with limited Ukraine experience. Their wariness has revived now that BlackRock is again advising on strategy, raising doubts about the firm’s ability to unlock the vast capital envisioned.
- The draft peace plan and associated recovery blueprint envision a “Ukraine Development Fund” (reviving BlackRock’s original branding) and “multiple funds” focused on high‑growth sectors such as technology, data centers, AI, energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and lithium and wind projects totaling at least $1.1 billion in early concepts. Critics, including some with Trump-world ties, warn that putting BlackRock and other U.S. business interests at the center risks privileging profitable, U.S‑favored sectors over core public needs and sidelining European institutions, even as Washington eyes frozen Russian assets—around $250 billion in Europe—as a potential, but highly contested, funding source.
- Tramsen argues that Trump’s 2025 freeze of almost all U.S. foreign aid abruptly ended seven decades of American dominance in humanitarian food assistance, creating a vacuum in places like Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and South Sudan that Russia and China have moved quickly to fill.
- Russia is using “grain diplomacy” as explicit geopolitical leverage: its promise of 200,000 tons of free grain to six African states in 2025 coincides with the deployment of its Africa Corps and negotiations for bases and mining access, trading wheat for security partnerships, UN votes, and strategic footholds.
- Moscow’s model is transactional and constrained by its own export realities (Russian wheat exports fell nearly 29% year‑on‑year in mid‑2025), but still turns hunger into a bargaining chip: grain today is tied to arms, military presence, and diplomatic alignment tomorrow.
- Tramsen contrasts this with China’s more durable “agricultural colonialism,” but concludes both models replace needs‑based U.S. food aid with systems that convert dependency on grain and ag‑tech into long‑term political leverage—turning food security into a tool of Russian and Chinese statecraft rather than a humanitarian good.
See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- “Russian Strikes Force Kyiv Schools to Close Amid Rolling Blackouts,” Constant Méheut, New York Times, 01.16.26."
- “How Russia’s winter attack campaign threatens to fracture Ukraine’s power grid," Meduza, 01.19.26.
Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “It’s a bitterly cold Saturday night here [in Kyiv], the temperature 10 degrees Fahrenheit and falling... This grim winter scene is a snapshot of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal strategy for victory. By pounding Ukraine’s sources of power and heat, he hopes to freeze the country into submission. President Donald Trump sometimes talks as if he agrees with Putin that Russian victory in this bloodbath is inevitable — and that Kyiv must give up territory in a peace deal.”
- “But conversations here Sunday with Ukraine’s new Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and other senior officials convinced me that this bleak picture is misleading. Ukraine will soon deploy a new generation of domestically produced air-defense interceptors, powered by artificial intelligence, that could allow the country to fight on indefinitely.”
- “It’s not about us winning, but about us becoming unconquerable,” said Andrii Hrytseniuk, chief executive of Brave1, a technology incubator that has coordinated Ukraine’s astonishing battlefield innovation with drones and AI. “The war stops when the enemy realizes that its political goals cannot be achieved,” he argued.
- “The war has produced an extraordinary arms-industry boom: ... Ukraine’s defense manufacturing capacity has surged 35-fold — growing from $1 billion in 2022 to an estimated $35 billion in 2025. The defense ministry authorized more than 1,300 new models of domestically made weaponry for service in 2025, a 25 percent increase over the previous year.”
- “Ukraine wages a brave nightly battle against as many as 1,000 missiles and drones, but the attacks have made life miserable for civilians.”
- “Putin doesn’t want to make concessions because he still thinks he can win. But Ukraine’s new network of AI-driven air defenses will make that less likely. If Ukraine can protect the civilians on Kyiv’s frozen streets — and reassure them that they won’t face another winter in the deep freeze, even if the war continues — perhaps Putin will reconsider his bet.”
- “Russia started the war with around 10,000 tanks … but that has dropped to somewhere over 3,000. It can produce only about 200 per year,” Neil MacFarquhar wrote. That implies Russia has lost or sidelined roughly two-thirds of its prewar tank fleet. At current production rates, returning to prewar numbers would take well over a decade.
- “More than 190 weapon systems have been modernized, according to newspapers published by the Defense Ministry,” the author noted. The scale suggests broad, incremental upgrades across the arsenal rather than a small number of flagship platforms. It indicates a focus on adapting existing systems to the drone-saturated battlefield.
- “Massing forces near the front line has become a death trap. A roughly 20-mile-wide stretch between the opposing armies has become what military analysts call a ‘transparent battlefield,’” according to the author. Within that 20-mile zone, drones can detect, track, and strike most movements. This severely limits Russia’s ability to assemble large formations for offensive operations.
- “Drones have become the primary weapon against soldiers and equipment, with 70 percent of Russia’s combat deaths attributed to them as of early 2025,” MacFarquhar reported. That means seven out of ten Russian fatalities are now caused by unmanned systems rather than traditional firepower. The statistic underscores how decisively drones dominate lethality in this war.
- “The most significant recent change in Russian tactics has been deploying small detachments of two to five soldiers on motorcycles or in all-terrain vehicles, trying to penetrate deep behind enemy lines to kill drone operators.”
- Absent training, some [Russian] soldiers and military bloggers have assembled lengthy “survival guides” to advise troops on everything from clothing and weapons to confronting a drone attack.”
- Ukraine has largely pushed Russian forces back from Kupiansk in the northeast thanks to the deployment of some of its best‑trained formations—elite assault regiments and top drone operators—while simultaneously pulling back around Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia, where undermanned, exhausted brigades have struggled to hold.
- The piece highlights Kyiv’s increasing reliance on a shrinking pool of experienced “firefighter” units that are rushed from crisis to crisis along the front; when these elite units are concentrated in one sector (as at Kupiansk), other sectors (such as around Huliaipole and toward Zaporizhzhia city) become vulnerable to Russian advances.
- A platoon sergeant from the 13th “Khartia” brigade describes the Kupiansk operation as a slow, secretive push through forests and urban terrain, using passwords and visual markers to distinguish friend from foe, but notes that after nearly four years of war “we don’t have a lot of people”—those motivated volunteered in 2022–23, while millions now evade or avoid service.
- New defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov told parliament that 2 million Ukrainians are wanted for mobilization evasion and 200,000 are listed as AWOL, underscoring the manpower crisis that forces Kyiv to prioritize assault formations for equipment and replacements, often at the expense of territorial and regular brigades.
- Russian forces have used their larger manpower to push “across a wide front,” edging to within about 15 km of Zaporizhzhia city and advancing roughly 15 km near Huliaipole over two months; Ukrainian commanders say this tactic is designed to stretch their limited reserves thin and prevent them from reinforcing the Donbas axis that Moscow still treats as the main prize.
“Russia’s slow advance now threatens Zaporizhia,” The Economist, 01.14.26.
- The article reports that Russian forces are creeping closer to the city of Zaporizhia, with frontline villages such as Malokaterynivka just 7km from Russian positions and FPV drone strikes now reaching the city’s southern districts, signaling a slow but steady advance beyond Donbas.
- In December, Vladimir Putin ordered the capture of the remaining, unoccupied part of Zaporizhia region, but Ukrainian officers interviewed believe Moscow’s realistic goal is to get close enough to subject the city to constant FPV‑drone and artillery attacks, terrorize civilians, and pressure Kyiv into concessions rather than actually storming the large industrial center.
- Russia already controls about three‑quarters of Zaporizhia province, including Europe’s largest nuclear power plant some 55km from the city, and is increasingly using long‑range Shahed drones (with payloads up to 90kg) instead of repurposed S‑300 missiles to hit Zaporizhia’s infrastructure, causing widespread power cuts and repeated civilian damage.
- Ukrainian analysts quoted say that by ramping up pressure around Zaporizhia, Russia is both tying down Ukrainian troops that might otherwise reinforce Donbas and expanding the zones it can strike with conventional artillery, deepening the strategic threat to Ukraine’s southeast even without a full‑scale assault on the city.
- Ukrainian commanders say there are now “fewer than 100” Russian foot soldiers scattered in Kupyansk’s center, confined to roughly one square kilometer and constantly hunted in “search and destroy” missions. Drone strikes hit small infiltration groups emerging from a disused gas pipeline and river crossings, with footage showing Russian bodies piled at exits and along the Oskil. The authors note that this tight Russian footprint, and the denial of heavy-equipment access, turns what Moscow claimed as a captured city into a liability rather than a bargaining chip.
- For months, Russia has been sending small groups as far as nine miles through the gas pipeline, sometimes on electric scooters, and repeatedly rebuilding new entrances after Ukrainian drones dropped 33‑pound bombs on underwater sections. Ukrainian units describe the fight as “whack‑a‑mole,” with Russia “throwing in 10” men knowing “maybe two will get to a position.” At the current tempo, one Ukrainian lieutenant colonel estimates that fully clearing the city could take another six months, given the size of Kupyansk and the complexity of rooting out dozens of hiding soldiers under constant drone surveillance.
- The article frames Kupyansk as one of Kyiv’s few clear battlefield gains of the past year and a direct counter to Russian narratives in ongoing peace talks. Moscow initially seized the rail hub in 2022, lost it later that year, and then poured major manpower and equipment into trying to retake it in 2025 as Ukrainian lines weakened. Ukrainian officers argue that holding and cleaning up Kupyansk both blocks Russia from using the city as a territorial “bargaining chip” and “gives our president one of those cards” at the negotiating table—proof that, with adequate drones and trained assault units, Ukraine can still push Russian forces back.
- “War as a test of will.”
- “Ukraine is not losing, and Russia is not winning.”
- “Western politicians have so far been unable to reconcile the difficult choices necessary to ensure a Ukrainian victory.”
- “Russia continues to dominate the war of narratives.”
- “The ties that bind the West are not as immutable as imagined.”
- “Ukraine’s continued resistance is a boost for nuclear non-proliferation.”
- “Hubris remains a strategic weakness.”
- “The Ukrainian economy has also not collapsed, and neither has the Russian one (yet).”
- “Diplomacy is war by other means.”
- “The rules of international order are being rewritten.”
- Mykhailo Fedorov, 33, one of the longest‑serving members of Zelensky’s government, has been appointed Ukraine’s fourth defense minister since the full‑scale invasion; he previously served over six years as minister of digital transformation and deputy prime minister, where he built the Diia e‑government app from a digital driver’s‑license platform into a 23‑million‑user services hub.
- A former digital marketer from Zaporizhzhia who joined Zelensky’s team via work for Kvartal 95, Fedorov became the president’s go‑to “digital solutions” figure, mediating with the IT sector and cybersecurity community, setting up backup data centers abroad, and playing a key role in military tech projects such as Starlink integration and the Army+ app once the war began.
- As defense minister, he has promised a hard‑nosed, data‑driven approach: a full audit of territorial recruitment and social support centers (with 2 million Ukrainians wanted for draft evasion and 200,000 listed as AWOL), a focus on military reform, frontline infrastructure, and anticorruption, and the introduction of IT‑style performance metrics across defense units, insisting to parliament that he aims to be a “realist” rather than a populist.
- “What local public channels write does not correspond to reality: for now there is only a thin ice crust on the Dinipro river, which cannot support a person’s weight,” Strana.ua reported.
- “Freezing has affected only individual channels, while the main Dnipro riverbed in the Kherson area is not bound by ice,” the outlet noted.
- At the same time, Strana.ua warned that “if the cold weather lasts long enough and the Dnipro is bound by solid ice, this could sharply change the military situation on a huge section of the front,” since “the front line runs along the Dnipro from Kherson at the river’s mouth to Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on the Kakhovka reservoir in Zaporizhzhia region.”
- The article observes that both sides might theoretically “try to cross the Dnipro over the ice,” but says this would be “a very difficult task” across “completely open terrain,” where “the enemy could at any moment strike the ice with artillery or guided bombs and assault groups would go under the water with no chance of rescue.”
- “Since 2023, the recruitment of additional Ukrainian men and women for military service has become increasingly challenging for Kyiv,” the authors wrote, warning of “a growing gap between those who serve and those who have been able to evade mobilization,” which they say “is demoralizing and creates growing problems for Ukrainian social-political cohesion.”
- They argue that “the main factors responsible for the AFU’s manpower shortage are Ukrainian institutional weakness and corruption, social fatigue and mental exhaustion, deficiencies in military training and leadership, demographic and economic constraints, and the impact of Russian propaganda.”
- “A 2024 mobilization law, as well as some further reforms currently being implemented or planned, are addressing the discrepancy between Ukraine’s ongoing need for soldiers and the growing reluctance of men and women to serve in the military,” Umland and Hedenskog wrote, noting measures from “salary hikes” and “bonuses upon signing a contract” to “preferential service terms for young people aged 18 to 24” – but concede “these advances have not yet stopped the growth of the Ukrainian state’s deficit of active servicemen and women.”
- “Military recruitment has become a credibility issue for Ukraine,” the authors cautioned, recalling that “in the past, some US analysts argued… that as long as Ukraine provided the necessary manpower, the United States and Europe could support Kyiv with weapons and funds.”
- Looking ahead, they stress that “Kyiv’s friends should support Ukraine with all the political, economic, and military leverage they have to safeguard the country’s sovereignty during the ongoing US-led process for a negotiated settlement to the war,” warning that Russian demands to limit “the size of its army and its ability to receive assistance from external partners… would further exacerbate the challenges Ukraine faces in its self-defense… and increase the likelihood of future Russian aggression.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Military aid to Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
- Lieven argues that extending current port- and territorial‑waters measures against Russia’s “shadow fleet” to seizing Russian‑flagged cargo ships on the high seas would legally be an act of war, not normal sanctions enforcement, and risks triggering the direct NATO–Russia clash both sides have so far avoided.
- He warns that Moscow would likely retaliate by escorting tankers with warships and submarines and by seizing Western ships or cargoes, creating situations where a single sunk vessel and dead sailors would produce intense pressure for tit‑for‑tat escalation, with Russia’s conventional weakness making early recourse to nuclear threats more likely.
- A particular danger, he notes, is the Kaliningrad exclave: if Lithuania cut land access and NATO blockaded it by sea as part of escalation, Russia would see this as an existential threat; any attempt to break a blockade or corridor by force would probably fail conventionally, pushing Moscow toward nuclear options to avoid regime‑ending humiliation.
- Beyond the security risks, Lieven stresses that Europeans who join such seizures would become totally dependent on U.S. military backing, leaving them unable to resist other Trump moves—such as a grab for Greenland—and effectively sacrificing an actual NATO ally (Denmark) to support a non‑ally (Ukraine).
- He concludes that high‑seas seizures would destroy Western claims to uphold international maritime law, echoing the flimsy legalism used to justify the Iraq war, and set a precedent others—especially China—could exploit; if Washington and London normalize attacks on neutral shipping, many states may increasingly see Beijing as the more consistent defender of international order.
“Where’s Congress on Russia Sanctions?” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 01.14.26.
- The board backs Sen. Lindsey Graham’s bill, now with more than 80 Senate co-sponsors, which would let Trump impose tariffs of up to 500% on countries buying Russian oil—principally India and China—as a way to raise the Kremlin’s war costs and increase U.S. leverage in Ukraine talks.
- They argue Russia’s economy is “under increasing strain,” yet Vladimir Putin “still refuses to make any concessions for peace,” continues ballistic‑missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, and rejects any post‑war Western troop presence in Ukraine, making tougher economic pressure essential.
- The editorial praises Trump’s recent campaign of boarding and seizing “shadow fleet” tankers, including those suddenly reflagged as Russian, saying this shows welcome resolve in enforcing oil sanctions on Moscow, Tehran, and Caracas rather than being deterred by flag‑of‑convenience tricks.
- It casts Russia as the financial and military hub of a hostile axis—China, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela—highlighting that Iran supplies drones, North Korea shells and troops, and China buys Russian oil and parts, while Moscow returns favors with cash, training jets, and nuclear cover for Pyongyang.
- The board urges Congress not to “sleep on a window of opportunity” created by Trump’s apparent support and bipartisan backing, arguing that the sanctions bill would help cut a “major source of finance for Russia’s war of conquest” and raise the costs of this broader anti‑U.S. coalition.
“Europe must turn the tables on Putin before talking,” Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 01.15.26.
- Sandbu argues that if Europe wants a meaningful role in any U.S.–Russia talks over Ukraine, it must first “change the balance of power” by showing it is both able and willing to impose substantially greater costs on Russia, rather than just promising future sanctions relief if Putin stops the war.
- He notes that Russia’s war economy is under unprecedented strain, making this a moment when extra pressure would bite hardest; Europe should therefore tighten and enforce sanctions, focus on cutting Russian hydrocarbon revenues, and systematically go after the shadow fleet—following the UK’s recent decision to seize a Russian‑flagged Venezuelan oil tanker and “find” a legal basis to target such ships.
- Europe’s biggest latent weapon, Sandbu writes, is the €200+ billion in frozen Russian central bank reserves: regulators should urgently ring‑fence these assets into separate entities (e.g., carved out of Euroclear and key banks) both to reduce financial‑stability risks and to pave the way for eventual seizure or use as collateral for Ukrainian reparations.
- Only once it has demonstrated that Russian aggression will lead to permanent economic and financial losses—through higher sanctions, reduced fossil‑fuel income, and credible moves toward using frozen reserves—should Europe consider opening a direct political channel to Putin; otherwise, a “seat at the table” is just note‑taking while others decide Ukraine’s fate.
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Ukraine-related negotiations:
- “I’ve been encouraged that the Trump team, led by his son‑in‑law Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, and Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, seems to be serious about providing security guarantees for Ukraine that are, as they put it, Article 5‑like, NATO‑like guarantees,” David Ignatius said. He noted they “worked hard on this in Paris during the meeting of the coalition of the willing” and “understand that without security guarantees, the war will simply restart and Trump will end up in a mess. That is not in his interest.”
- Ignatius stressed that, despite Russian pressure, Kyiv is not in a position where it must accept a bad deal. “Ukraine does not have to make a deal right now because it is still very much in the fight,” he said, pointing to Ukrainian defenses near Pokrovsk and “amazing” innovation with drones. “The fears of a breakthrough…have proved premature,” he added, arguing that this battlefield resilience strengthens Ukraine’s hand in any negotiations.
- On Russia’s stance, Ignatius acknowledged: “Yes, so far the Russians have effectively said no” to the emerging joint U.S.–EU–Ukrainian position. But he emphasized that the ability to block unacceptable terms is not Putin’s monopoly: “Ukraine’s greatest strength since this war began has been its ability to say no… ‘No, we’re not going to make that deal. You cannot force us to make that deal.’” He added, “At some point, I believe there will be a deal that is in Ukraine’s interest, and I hope Ukraine will be able to negotiate a settlement to end this war.”
- Ignatius underlined that pressure on Moscow is likely to increase. “In the United States, Senator Lindsey Graham…appears to have finally secured President Trump’s backing for a new Ukraine sanctions bill that would likely pass Congress easily,” he said, calling it a step that would give Washington “significant new leverage.” He also highlighted “the growing campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet, by whatever means necessary,” and Ukraine’s expanding ability to hit Russian energy infrastructure with drones and new systems such as the Flamingo cruise missile.
- Asked whether Ukrainians risk being “sold out,” Ignatius argued that Ukraine’s own agency remains crucial. “The power to say no does not belong only to Putin. It belongs to Ukraine, to President Zelensky, and to the Ukrainian people,” he said. He believes that as long as Ukraine maintains battlefield resilience, deepens EU integration, and demonstrates seriousness about fighting corruption, “a deal will emerge that serves Ukraine’s interests”—and that Kyiv will be in a position to accept it on its own terms, not under diktat from either Moscow or Washington.
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- Samuel Greene and Christopher Walker argue that Russia is waging a borderless “shadow war” in which Ukraine is only the most visible front. Moscow’s real aim, they say, is to fracture a wider coalition that includes Europe as a whole and Russian exiles living there. What once was called “hybrid” warfare has become openly violent covert action: drones disrupting air travel, anchors damaging Baltic undersea cables, explosives targeting rail lines, and assassination attempts against exiles and defense-industry executives—all meant not to shape opinion, but to damage critical infrastructure and sap Europe’s will to resist.
- They contend that Western responses—focused on resilience, information-sharing, and legal or regulatory tools—are failing because they treat each incident as an isolated crime and cling to a high threshold for “war” that Russia deliberately skirts. Greene and Walker call for clear triggers for automatic NATO consultations under Article 4, backed by pre-agreed cyber and intelligence actions, tighter controls on Russia-linked shipping and aviation, and rapid measures to constrain Russia’s war-making capacity. Where covert operations endanger lives or critical systems, NATO must be prepared, they argue, to carry out calibrated military steps, from cyberattacks to physical strikes on Russian targets. Europe’s success, they conclude, should be measured less by rhetoric and more by predictable, robust deterrence that ensures every act of shadow warfare elicits a meaningful response.
- “The rift between the U.S. and Europe over Greenland is making the trans-Atlantic alliance vulnerable to a Russian attack on NATO territory,” Lt. Gen. Alexander Sollfrank warned. He said the dispute risks eroding NATO’s deterrent power by undermining its cohesion: “The strength [of NATO] is ‘one for all, all for one.’ If that breaks, the core idea is gone.” In his view, Russia—“which attacks us daily”—is “certainly a very interested observer of these current discussions.”
- Sollfrank said he doesn’t believe Russia currently has the capacity for “a broad offensive against NATO” but judged it “willing and able to provoke a cross-border skirmish” against an eastern member, “possibly one of the Baltic States,” to try to change Europe’s security architecture. Such an attack, he noted, would likely trigger Article 5 and force allies to decide whether to respond; failure to do so “would effectively end the alliance.” Germany, he stressed, would “fight with everything we have.”
- A cease-fire in Ukraine “wouldn’t necessarily diminish the threat posed by Russia,” Sollfrank argued. Instead, he said, Russia’s economy “had been reshaped by war” and President Vladimir Putin “needed the conflict to legitimize his rule and justify to the public about a million dead and wounded soldiers since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.” At the same time, he was scathing about Moscow’s battlefield performance: “They advance at a snail’s pace while destroying their own soldiers…. We used to talk about great Russian military thinkers… today, none of that is visible.”
- “It’s not for peaceful purposes,” Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said of Russian-Chinese joint patrols in Arctic waters. “They’re not studying the seals and the polar bears. They’re out there doing bathymetric surveys and trying to figure out how they can counter NATO capabilities on and under the sea.” The NATO commander warned that this activity “could grow very quickly, and we need to be mindful of it and ready for it.”
- “In the Arctic and the high north, we see a similar trend,” Grynkewich said, linking the region to broader cooperation among Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. “Russian and Chinese vessels are conducting more and more joint patrols. Chinese icebreakers and research vessels are in Arctic waters, and their research is not for peaceful purposes. It’s to gain a military advantage.”
- “In short, the Arctic and Northern Europe, by extension, has become a front line for strategic competition,” the commander said. He added that NATO is responding by strengthening its deterrent posture, including Baltic Sentry to protect undersea infrastructure and placing “all NATO activities in the Arctic under one command,” Joint Force Command Norfolk. “With seven of eight Arctic nations inside the alliance, the other one being Russia, we will and we can get this right,” Grynkewich said.
"Trump’s Greenland Threats Overshadow Ukraine War at Davos," The Moscow Times, 01.20.26.
- “President Donald Trump’s threats to annex Greenland and impose punitive tariffs on European countries who oppose him are set to dominate the annual World Economic Forum meeting this week,” the Moscow Times reports from Davos. A former U.S. diplomat said “Europe was anxious when Trump was elected. It’s even more anxious now, largely because of Greenland,” underscoring how an intra‑alliance Arctic dispute is eclipsing even the Ukraine war in European risk calculations.
- Trump is “attending this year’s meeting in person” and “due to address the forum on Wednesday afternoon,” the article notes. “What Trump does will be the top story,” the former diplomat told the paper, highlighting how U.S. actions over Greenland and tariffs could reshape NATO cohesion and transatlantic unity even as the war in Ukraine grinds on.
- As the first full day of Davos events got underway, “Trump shared text messages from French President Emmanuel Macron and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Truth Social” that showed European leaders were “keen to engage him on Greenland.” This signals that key NATO figures are trying to head off an intra‑alliance crisis at the very moment the alliance is supposed to be focused on deterring Russia.
"What Spheres of Influence Are—and Aren’t," Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 01.19.26.
- “[Even] those who recognize that Russia might have reason to be concerned by Ukraine’s drift toward NATO… insist that such a decision should be solely up to NATO and Kyiv and not subject to a Russian veto,” writes Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. He argues that while such interference is rightly seen as illegitimate, it is naive to think it can be abolished, because “powerful states are invariably sensitive to what is going on near their own territory” and will use their leverage.
- “As I argued way back in 2015, this is one reason why efforts to incorporate Ukraine into the Western liberal sphere were risky: Russia cared more than we did (though not more than most Ukrainians) and would therefore be willing to escalate in ways we were not,” Walt notes. The same logic, he adds, explains why “backing from Russia, China, or Iran is of little help to Latin American states when the United States is really roused,” illustrating how spheres of influence grow from unequal stakes and risk tolerance.
- “For example, it would be well‑nigh impossible for Russia to transport and sustain an army of more than half a million soldiers in Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa, but it can and has deployed that many troops in neighboring Ukraine (albeit not without difficulty),” Walt writes. Geographic proximity, he argues, makes it far easier for great powers to coerce neighbors and far harder for distant rivals to offset that pressure.
- Recalling the Cold War, Walt writes that “peace rested in good part on the fact that two nuclear‑armed superpowers stared each other down across the Iron Curtain,” yet “neither side fully accepted the other’s ‘right’ to exercise predominant influence in its sphere.” “If Americans had done so,” he observes, “President Ronald Reagan would never have given a speech in Berlin telling Soviet leaders to ‘tear down this wall.’” Even between the United States and Soviet Russia, he concludes, spheres of influence did not end rivalry.
- “The bottom line is that as long as the world is divided into independent states with vastly different capabilities, spheres of influence will be both an unavoidable feature of the international landscape and an unreliable method for promoting peace,” Walt concludes. To foster stability, he argues, states must recognize that “challenging another great power’s sphere of influence is a dangerous endeavor”—as Western policy toward Russia showed—but also that having leaders “get out their maps and decide who gets what where” will not stop them from competing for advantage later.
- “Earlier this month, following a week-long chase on high seas in which Russia deployed a nuclear submarine and aircraft, U.S. forces boarded and seized a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the Atlantic Ocean,” Francesca Ebel wrote. The tanker, originally called the Bella 1, had been sanctioned by the United States in 2024 as part of a “shadow fleet” moving illicit Iranian oil. The incident underscores how a single, week-long operation involving multiple high-end Russian assets still ended with the United States capturing the vessel.
- “After Russian air defenses mistakenly downed an Azerbaijan Airlines flight, killing 38, Putin was forced to apologize,” the author noted. That compares with “nearly 300 people” killed when Russian-backed separatists shot down MH17 in 2014, a disaster Moscow has never admitted responsibility for. The figures highlight how mounting civilian death tolls tied to Russian actions are eroding its standing and forcing rare public contrition.
- “Russia’s war against Ukraine has now lasted longer than its participation in World War II,” Ebel wrote. Critics in the pro‑war community pegged the current conflict at “1,418 days,” explicitly measuring it against the Soviet Union’s World War II timeline. The comparison frames the Ukraine war as a grinding, open‑ended struggle with no decisive victory in sight.
- “In the nearly four years that Russia has been bogged down in eastern Ukraine, Nazi forces marched nearly to Moscow before the Red Army drove them back and captured Berlin,” the author quoted from the Telegram channel Our Regnum. That channel argues that after roughly the same number of days, the U.S.S.R. in World War II had reversed its fortunes and taken the enemy capital. By contrast, modern Russia is portrayed as stalled and suffering “defeat” despite similar time spent at war.
- A recent study “revealed levels of pessimism in Russian society increased sharply last year,” according to political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, as cited by Ebel. Schulmann notes that peace has become an “almost universal desire” in Russian society, following nearly four years of war and unmet hopes that Trump’s presidency would end the conflict. The polling trend quantifies a steep psychological and political cost that now shapes how Russians view Putin and the war.
- Gabuev and Vakulenko argue that Russia’s failure to materially help Nicolás Maduro during the U.S. raid—despite a May 2025 “strategic partnership” treaty—exposes Moscow as an unreliable patron whose promises to defend authoritarian allies routinely evaporate when they face real external pressure.
- They place Venezuela in a broader pattern: since launching the full‑scale war on Ukraine, Russia has lacked the resources and focus to shore up key partners, standing by as Assad fell in Syria and offering Iran little more than rhetoric during U.S.–Israeli strikes, while loans, oil deals, and weapons transfers deliver scant strategic payoff beyond a few UN votes and elite graft.
- The authors conclude that Moscow is still capable of acting as a spoiler in secondary theaters—exploiting vacuums in places like Syria or the Central African Republic—but is neither willing nor able to confront a determined United States in far‑flung regions, so Washington should treat it less as a global juggernaut than as an opportunistic disruptor.
“Why Putin Still Prefers War: Russia’s Growing Resolve to Fight On in Ukraine,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Foreign Affairs, 01.13.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- Kolesnikov argues that, echoing Soviet diplomat Valentin Falin’s dictum that “confrontation is a choice,” Vladimir Putin has consciously chosen to prolong the war in Ukraine, rejecting Trump’s generous territorial and economic inducements because the conflict has become integral to his regime’s identity and power.
- Throughout 2025, he writes, Putin used “pseudo‑negotiations” with Trump—summits, calls, envoys—to keep Washington engaged while continuing offensive operations in Donbas and “Novorossiya,” calculating that the United States could remain a de facto partner even as Russia pursues military solutions.
- Kolesnikov stresses that mounting economic strain—higher VAT, new fees on imports and electronics, rising utility bills, stagnating growth, and a collapse of foreign investment from $40 billion (2021) to $3 billion—has not altered the Kremlin’s course; instead, war spending, payouts to soldiers, and a new “social contract” asking Russians to tighten their belts for victory underpin Putin’s willingness to fight on.
- Kolesnikov concludes that Putin’s Russia now “exports chaos” much as Trump’s United States does, in a world where no new rules have replaced Cold War–era constraints and where the personal choices of three leaders—Putin, Trump, and Xi—drive strategic instability; as long as Putin’s system remains internally authoritarian and externally revisionist, he suggests, even a Ukraine peace deal would merely shift the confrontation into a colder, hybrid phase.
- Haass contrasts U.S. post‑WWII regime change in Germany and Japan with its Cold War approach to the Soviet Union, noting that Washington explicitly rejected “rollback” of the USSR as too dangerous in the nuclear age and instead pursued Kennan’s long, patient strategy of containment aimed at shaping Soviet foreign policy rather than overthrowing the regime.
- He argues that the eventual collapse of Soviet communism showed how internal forces in the USSR—nationalism and Gorbachev’s reforms—produced regime change indirectly, with Western pressure and NATO cohesion creating conditions for transformation without a U.S. attempt to topple the Soviet state.
- Drawing on this history, Haass warns that trying to force regime change in other hard‑line, security‑obsessed states (such as Iran today) faces the same structural problems the U.S. identified with the Soviet Union—nuclear risk, weak alternatives, and huge long‑term commitments—and thus should be considered only rarely and with far more caution than recent U.S. practice in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
- Belfer Center director Meghan O’Sullivan argues that although Trump’s “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela is far smaller, faster, and less legally grounded than the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it risks repeating many of the same “day after” mistakes. In Iraq, a quick military win gave way to chaos because Washington assumed ministries and security forces would keep functioning, underestimated how trauma, poverty, and repression would translate into looting and insurgency once fear evaporated, and had no real plan if the regime collapsed. She warns that Venezuela’s hollowed‑out institutions, impoverished and sanctioned population, and security services dependent on drug and oil smuggling could similarly unravel once Maduro is removed and illicit revenue is squeezed.
- A first core lesson from Iraq, she writes, is that the United States “must not presume that a regime will survive after its top leader is removed,” and must be ready to provide basic law and order if the Bolivarian state fragments. A second is that the narrative “the United States is after oil alone” will be particularly toxic. In Iraq, that belief spread even though Washington never seized the fields and delayed foreign contracts until after elections; it “fueled a nascent insurgency and disillusioned a large majority of citizens.” Trump’s “bald focus on controlling Venezuela’s oil,” including public talk of seizing reserves, is already feeding similar suspicions at home and abroad—and provides propaganda fodder to rivals such as Russia, which has long cast U.S. policy in Latin America as neo‑colonial resource grabs.
- O’Sullivan also stresses that building more legitimate, representative governance is a pragmatic necessity, not just liberal idealism. In Iraq, only a broad‑based political system with checks and balances could plausibly convince Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish communities they would share in the country’s potential wealth; yet early missteps, including excluding key Sunni actors and bungled sequencing of elections, helped fuel violence. In Venezuela, she argues, Washington should leverage the fact that there are already credible opposition figures—Edmundo González and banned candidate María Corina Machado—while ensuring “noncriminal ‘Chavistas’” and lower‑level officers are part of the transition, so as not to push parts of society (and their external patrons such as Russia) into permanent resistance.
“‘Strong countries don’t treat allies like this’: Meduza’s sources say Russian elites are questioning how Putin’s inaction on Venezuela and Iran fits with a ‘multipolar world’,” Andrey Pertsev, Meduza, 01.14.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- Pertsev reports that parts of the Russian elite were shocked by the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro and Trump’s moves to assert control over Venezuela, noting that Moscow had long called Caracas an “ally” and hinted it would come to its aid, yet did nothing when Washington “decapitated” the government.
- Kremlin- and government‑linked sources tell Meduza that Putin’s silence on both Maduro’s arrest and the U.S. seizure of a Russia‑flagged shadow‑fleet tanker reflects a calculation that Russia has “no resources for a response” because everything is tied up in Ukraine—and a desire to “avoid picking a fight with Trump.”
- One senior source says these “attacks on Russia’s allies” badly undermine Putin’s narrative of a “multipolar world” and Russia as a dependable partner: “after Venezuela, it will be much harder to push these ideas… it’s an image loss: strong countries don’t treat allies like this.”
- At the same time, many in the Kremlin’s domestic politics team, regional officials, and non‑oil business elites see Trump’s focus on the Western Hemisphere as beneficial, assuming he has “no time for Ukraine or Eastern Europe,” even if that assumption may not match reality.
- The article notes that state media were given talking points to frame Venezuela as proof Putin was right to “untie Russia from the West” and highlight U.S. plans to annex Greenland or strike Mexico, while coverage of Iran’s protests has been left deliberately vague—and that for most ordinary Russians, events in Venezuela and Iran barely register beyond reinforcing the message that if “the U.S. behaves this way” there, Russia is justified in acting similarly in Ukraine.
“Ceremony for presenting letters of credence,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, 01.15.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Placing a greater emphasis on having all members of the international community respect international law, as well as facilitating the advent of new emerging trends and a fair multipolar world order can be viewed as a reasonable solution,” Vladimir Putin said.
- “I would like to note that Russia is sincerely committed to the ideals of a multipolar world,” Putin declared, adding that the country “has always pursued and will continue to pursue a balanced, constructive foreign policy course that takes into account both our national interests and the objective trends of global development,” Putin said.
- “We must proceed from the understanding that security must be truly comprehensive and, therefore, equal and indivisible, and it cannot be ensured for some at the expense of the security of others,” the Russian president argued.
- Referring to NATO and Ukraine, Putin claimed that “the crisis around Ukraine… became a direct consequence of years of ignoring Russia’s legitimate interests and a deliberate policy of creating threats to our security, including the advancement of the NATO bloc towards Russia’s borders—contrary to the public promises made to us,” Putin said.
- “Let me remind you that Russia has repeatedly put forward initiatives to build a new, reliable, and fair architecture of European and global security,” Putin said, insisting that “we have proposed options and rational solutions that could satisfy everyone in America, Europe, Asia, and across the world,” Putin added.
- “We believe it would be worthwhile to return to a substantive discussion of these proposals to establish the conditions under which a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine could be achieved—and the sooner, the better,” Putin said, adding that “it is precisely a long-term and sustainable peace, one that reliably ensures the security of all and everyone, that our country strives for,” Putin stated.
- “Not everywhere, including in Kiev and the capitals that support it, are they ready for this,” Putin asserted, “but we hope that an awareness of this necessity will come sooner or later. Until then, Russia will continue to consistently pursue its objectives,” Putin said.
- Speaking about EU members, Putin noted that “the current state of bilateral ties between the aforementioned countries and Russia leaves much to be desired,” saying that “dialogue and contacts—through no fault of ours, I must emphasize—have been reduced to a minimum, both at the official level and in business and civil society circles,” Putin said.
- “It is my hope that, in time, the situation will nevertheless change, and our nations will return to normal, constructive dialogue based on respect for national interests and due consideration of legitimate security concerns,” Putin said about European states, adding that “Russia has been and remains committed to such approaches and is prepared to restore the required level of relations,” Putin concluded.
- “For Russian President Vladimir Putin two bigger—but less mentioned—questions, to which he does not yet have answers, are these: whether Trump aims to lower global oil prices and whether U.S. pressure on Russia’s ‘shadow fleet,’ which handles Russian oil exports, will trigger a bigger change in policy toward Ukraine,” Stephen Sestanovich wrote.
- “Already, some Russian oil is reportedly selling for as little as $35 per barrel,” Sestanovich noted, warning that “a significant drop in energy export revenues would be far more significant for Putin than either the multilateral diplomatic gains or the bilateral economic costs” of losing Venezuela.
- He argued that “Trump’s seizure of Maduro has coincided with new warnings aimed at Moscow—‘I’m not thrilled with Putin,’ the U.S. president recently said,” adding that Putin “has to worry that this link will harden and that Venezuela-related actions against Russian shipping will begin to affect the war itself, the one undertaking that matters to him most.”
- Looking ahead, Sestanovich concluded that “a more ambitious U.S. assault on oil prices and a heightened pressure campaign to support Ukraine could still be low-probability outcomes of Washington’s actions in Venezuela. Yet no other results would have remotely comparable meaning for Putin. He has to be watching them closely.”
"Greenland is ground zero for Arctic ‘Great Game’," Richard Milne, Financial Times, 01.20.26.
- “Greenland is ground zero for a new world order of great powers and their spheres of domination if we’re not careful,” Klaus Dodds, co-author of Unfrozen: The Fight for The Future of the Arctic, told the FT. The Arctic scholar warned that Trump’s bid to take over the island is “disastrous for smaller states,” replacing the old “High North, Low Tension” model with a Great Game dynamic where big powers carve up influence and Nordic countries lose their traditional room for maneuver.
- “Greenland is the front door for hemispheric defense,” said Thomas Dans, a Trump appointee who heads the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. “It may sound like American chauvinism … and it is. We’re done apologizing about that,” he added, arguing that the U.S. cannot “rely on a small country on the other side of the world to provide security for the front door of America.” His comments encapsulate the administration’s view of the Arctic as a U.S.-controlled security perimeter, not a shared space.
- “Arctic security is much more inclusive,” Dodds said, contrasting Europe’s emphasis on protecting “local communities, local people” with Trump’s focus on “hemispheric defense,” which is “much more hard security.” Under that logic, he argued, “whatever the smaller states offer is never going to be enough for the U.S.,” and a U.S. move on Greenland could spur Russia to target Svalbard and China to expand its Arctic footprint via the Northern Sea Route.
- Trump himself framed his interest bluntly: “I love maps. And I always said, ‘Look at the size of this, it’s massive, and that should be part of the United States’. It’s not different from a real estate deal. It’s just a little bit larger, to put it mildly,” he told U.S. journalists in 2021. Milne uses the quote to underline how Trump personalizes and commodifies Greenland, treating the island less as a self-governing territory than as prime property to be acquired.
- “We have been through colonization and we don’t need to go through it again,” said Sara Olsvig, former Greenlandic minister and now chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council. Warning that today’s “great power rivalry… is not going to go away,” she asked whether the international order can “hold together,” adding: “It will be huge chaos if we cannot, and we will all be in trouble.”
See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "On Greenland, Europe must tell Donald Trump that enough is enough," Anders Fogh Rasmussen, The Economist, 01.20.26.
“Greenland or NATO? Trump Can’t Have Both,” William A. Galston, Wall Street Journal, 01.13.26.
“Putin’s Recent Silence Is Worrying,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 01.16.26.
- “Spat Over Greenland: Cui Bono?” Simon Saradzhyan, Wordpress.com, 01.18.26.
- "How to talk Trump down from his Greenland blackmail," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 01.20.26.
- "America Is Missing the Real Problem in the Arctic," Lara Williams, Bloomberg, 01.14.26.
- "All Last Year Trump Tried to Make Peace. In 2026, He Seems to Have Chosen the Path of War," Alexander Baunov, Meduza, 01.20.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- "Europe Can’t Afford a Throwdown Over Greenland," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 01.19.26.
- "Europe Needs Joint Financing and Procurement to Defend Itself," Ulrike Malmendier, Tim Hermann, Philipp Hauber and Claudia Schaffranka, Project Syndicate, 01.20.26.
- "Trump’s New Old World Order," Benn Steil, Project Syndicate, 01.15.26.
- “How to de-risk from America,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 01.12.26.
- Podcast: “The myth of American isolationism,” Robert Kagan and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings, 01.16.26.
- "Baltic Cable-Cutting Is Back," Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, 01.16.26.
- "Raising the Temperature: Anatomy of the First Year of Trump’s ‘Second Coming’," Yevgeny Feldman, Republic, 01.18.26. Clues from Russian Views. (In Russian.)
- "Why Is Putin Silent on Venezuela?" Nina L. Khrushcheva, Project Syndicate, 01.14.26.
- "The Donroe Doctrine Requires a Firm but Calm Response from Europe," Rachel Tausendfreund, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 01.13.26.
- "The Geopolitics of Maduro’s Capture: What Does Operation Absolute Resolve Mean for Russia?" Henry Ziemer, CSIS, 01.20.26.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
“Russia and China Without Visas: Toward a New Quality of Mutual Perception,” Anton Bespalov, Valdai Club, 01.14.26. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- “According to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia’s forecast, by the end of 2025 China will rank third among the most popular foreign destinations for Russian tourists, with tourist flows (including transit) increasing by 30% compared to 2024,” Anton Bespalov wrote.
- The Ministry of Economic Development, he noted, “expects that by 2030 mutual tourist exchanges will be twice the pre‑Covid level.”
- “At the end of 2024, Russia ranked 19th in the list of countries visited by Chinese tourists,” Bespalov observed, adding that “among European states, Russia was in fourth place—after Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain.”
- In Russia, “the share of independent travelers is also steadily growing,” Bespalov wrote: “In domestic tourism it reaches up to 90%, but in outbound tourism tour operators still account for the majority of trips—62% based on 2025 results.”
- Under current geopolitical conditions, Bespalov argued, “a paradoxical situation has developed: China is a cheaper, more convenient and safer destination than Western Europe, even for residents of the European part of Russia,” and “for the new generation of Russian tourists, China is very likely to occupy the same niche that Europe did for tourists of the 2000s.”
Missile defense:
- “Within NATO, the United States is key to the early-warning mission through its Shared Early Warning System (SEWS), which provides near real-time information about missile launches,” Giorgio Di Mizio writes. This capability, he notes, is “largely enabled by its Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), making Washington the sole provider of orbital early warning.” According to the author, European allies are now “seeking to address their shortfall in this area through the development and acquisition of sovereign capabilities, but they face challenges in doing so.”
- “Since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has used the conventionally armed Oreshnik (RS-SS-X-28) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) against Ukraine on two occasions,” the author observes. He adds that the missile “can be fitted reportedly with up to six payload buses, each carrying six unguided munitions,” underscoring the complexity and lethality of the threat profile facing NATO Europe. Di Mizio argues that such systems make “a robust space-based early-warning architecture” essential for European security.
- Describing Europe’s emerging response, Di Mizio notes that France and Germany “signed a Letter of Intent on Joint Early Warning for a European Lookout (JEWEL)” and “committed to each launch up to two GEO satellites, likely to be complemented by HEO systems, in what appears to be a SBIRS-like architecture.” JEWEL, he writes, is intended to provide “a ‘preliminary interoperability backbone’ between Berlin and Paris,” with “one goal … to introduce an operational capability using JEWEL around 2030.”
Nuclear arms:
- Podvig notes that since Russia suspended New START implementation in February 2023, the last official data (as of September 1, 2022) showed 1,549 deployed warheads, 540 deployed launchers, and 759 total launchers, and independent estimates have become much harder.
- He argues the main uncertainty is the silo‑based SS‑18/R‑36M2 force at Dombarovskiy and Uzhur: the missiles are over 33 years old, have not been flight‑tested since 2013, and their silos are being readied for Sarmat, so he judges it likely the R‑36M2s are no longer operational and the silos are effectively empty.
- By contrast, the rest of the ICBM force is clearer: Russia has 198 mobile ICBMs (18 Topol‑M and 180 Yars) across seven divisions, plus 112 silo‑based ICBMs (Topol‑M, silo‑based Yars in Kozelsk and Tatishchevo, and 12 Avangard systems on UR‑100NUTTH boosters), with Yars generally assumed to carry up to four warheads and Topol‑M/Avangard counted as single‑warhead missiles.
- At sea, Russia now fields eight Borei/Borei‑A SSBNs (128 Bulava SLBMs) and five Delta IV SSBNs (80 R‑29RM Sineva/Liner SLBMs), for a total of 208 SLBMs capable of up to 1,088 warheads if fully MIRVed, while the bomber leg has been weakened by Ukraine’s June 2025 “Pautina/Spiderweb” drone attack that likely destroyed about ten Tu‑95MS aircraft.
- Podvig calculates that if all MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs carried their full nominal loads, Russia would field around 2,115 deployed strategic warheads, well above the New START ceiling of 1,550; assuming significant “downloading” (e.g., three warheads on silo‑Yars, two on R‑29RM, three on Bulava), he estimates a more realistic total of about 1,531 deployed warheads—roughly 930 on ICBMs, 544 on SLBMs, and 57 on bombers—implying that Moscow is probably still staying within New START limits in practice.
“Russia Will Nuke Germany and the UK if the War in Ukraine Continues,” transcript of Sergei Karaganov video interview with Tucker Carlson, RIAC, 01.16.26. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- Tucker Carlson: “Why do you think… the leadership of [Germany, France, and the UK] is focused on Russia as the threat?”
- Sergei Karaganov: “… Europe is basically out of gas… It’s dying. And so you’re arguing that their leadership sees a defeat of Russia as the only way back… What is defeat of Russia, just if Russia comes ever close to a defeat? And that would mean that Russia would use nuclear weapons and Europe will be finished physically.”
- TC: “When you say everyone knows that the Russian government, if pressed, would use nuclear weapons against Europe… do you think that the Europeans understand that?”
- SK: “Europeans… believe that war will never come to their territory. They forgot about the war and that is terrible because they have been the source of most wars in the history of humanity. But now they are not afraid. So now, now one of the tasks of Russia, in addition to others, is to bring them to senses, hopefully without using nuclear weapons, only with the threat of their use.”
- TC: “It’s interesting that you say their leaders no longer fear nuclear weapons… Why would any person not fear the threat of a nuclear attack?”
- SK: “Because, well, let's put it this way, we believe that they are like us, but they're not like us. They have had a total degradation of thinking class and of the ruling class. I mean, when the chancellor, quote-unquote, of Germany is talking about, I mean, recreating a Bundeswehr to be the strongest army in, what does that mean? That means that he dooms his country for elimination…”
- TC: “You are quoted in one place saying they no longer fear God, therefore they no longer fear war. How are those two related?”
- SK: “… Europe has lost its core, moral, political, spiritual core. And now they, as you know, most of them have lost the fear, well, the trust in God… Though at least the same elites would not comprehend that if there will really be war… And if it escalates, there will be no Europe. Thanks to God, we have changed our nuclear doctrine… Recently, our president… said that if you continue and you get into a real direct conflict with Europe, there will be nobody in Europe who could talk.”
- TC: “What would happen if your president were to be assassinated by the Ukrainians or Europe or the United States? What would be the next step?”
- SK: “Let's hope that would not happen, but then, of course, that would mean that we will punish, hopefully not the United States, but Europe will be taken away from the map of humanity… if they do not stop this senseless war and stupidity in and around Ukraine, then we would have to start to attack Europe with conventional weapons and then next step will be a wave of nuclear strikes…”
- TC: “How far are we from Russia using nuclear weapons against Europe?”
- SK: “Two years. Naively, well, one year. Well… I've been calling on my government to escalate earlier. But President Putin is very religious and he's cautious. And we have been warning him after the escalations, changing our nuclear doctrine and lowering the nuclear threshold, building up our nuclear potential in Europe and elsewhere, but in the hope that we would stop them before crossing the threshold. As I've said, I think that Putin believes that using nuclear weapons… might be a necessary sin in order to save humanity. That's why I've been calling for limited use of nuclear weapons against Europe, because otherwise, the world would drift into a third world war towards which the Europeans are pushing all of us…”
- TC: “… if there were nuclear strikes from Russia into Europe in the next year or two, as you said there may be, what countries would that include?”
- SK: “…my choice would be Britain and Germany. You take out Britain and Germany with nuclear weapons. I beg Almighty that it wouldn't happen. Yes. Germany should be the first, because Germany is the source of the worst in Europe.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Why Nuclear Arms Control Isn’t Obsolete," Lawrence J. Korb and Stephen Cimbala, The National Interest, 01.13.26.
- "The NPT can’t ignore emerging technologies anymore," Bailey Schiff and Diya Ashtakala, European Leadership Network (ELN), 01.13.26.
Counterterrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security/AI:
- No significant developments.
Energy exports from CIS:
- “Today, officials claim that Venezuela has oil reserves of 300 billion barrels,” Sergey Vakulenko wrote, noting that “until the middle of the 2000s, that figure was estimated to be much lower (80 billion barrels—about the same as both the United States and Russia) because the geologically proven but economically dubious reserves of the Orinoco Belt were counted more conservatively.”
- Vakulenko explained that production has collapsed: “For a while, PdVSA was able to maintain production at 2.5 million barrels a day, but, after 2015, this became steadily harder,” and “production fell to 1 million barrels a day: 2.5 times lower than it had been in the mid-2010s.”
- “It is currently at just 10% of its peak production level,” he wrote of the El Furrial field, adding that “given the nature of Venezuela’s oil industry, such a decline in production might end up being irreversible.”
- On U.S. company claims, Vakulenko recalled that “in 2022, Chevron told the administration of then-president Joe Biden that it could double Venezuelan production from its level of 800,000 barrels a day if it were exempted from sanctions,” but judged that “estimates of annual production growth of between 200,000 and 250,000 barrels a day over four to five years given investment of $10 billion a year seem more realistic.”
- Heavy crude looks even less promising: “The prospects are much less clear when it comes to heavy crude (particularly given that Brent is currently trading at the relatively low level of between $50 and $55 per barrel),” Vakulenko wrote, stressing that “heavy oil projects would need the price of Brent to rise by at least $20 a barrel in order to be profitable.”
Climate change:
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- “Competitive coexistence is not, however, a policy aimed at reshaping Russian intentions or ambitions,” Thomas Graham wrote. “Rather, it is a strategic framework for shaping outcomes, for advancing U.S. interests in a world of multipolar great-power competition in which Russia, like other great powers, cannot be defeated.”
- “In addition, competitive coexistence is not appeasement,” Graham argued. “Indeed, it is grounded in the recognition of permanent rivalry between Russia and the United States and assumes that the United States will vigorously pursue its interests.”
- “That element had been lacking since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 until the second Donald Trump administration restored it as part of a broader effort to normalize relations,” he wrote, referring to sustained dialogue as essential to “risk management” even alongside sanctions and arms transfers.
- By contrast, Graham contended, “Containment ignores or rejects those realities. It frames competition with Russia as a zero-sum game. It tends to dismiss compromise, especially on what it considers principles, as craven appeasement.”
- “In the end, containment seeks victory in the Ukraine War by restoring the status quo ante,” Graham concluded. “Competitive coexistence, by contrast, is forward-looking. It acknowledges the emerging realities and seeks not immediate victory, a goal beyond U.S. capabilities, but rather the steady accumulation of advantage in a world it cannot dominate against rivals it cannot vanquish.”
"America: Deconstructing Brashness. What Should Russia Do?," Fyodor Lukyanov, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 01.11.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine translated. (This individual is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- “Trump’s approach consists in using all the levers available to the United States, acquired over decades of hegemony, to achieve extremely concrete interests,” Fyodor Lukyanov writes. This, he stresses, “is not the recreation of ‘global leadership’” of the 1990s–2010s but a focus on “material benefit,” without even trying to “camouflage what is happening with a value-based veneer.” According to the author, Trump’s reading of the Monroe Doctrine is to create a “‘fortress America’ in the Western Hemisphere” as a long‑term springboard for further forays onto the world stage.
- “What the Trump administration is prepared to neglect are the obligations that America assumed in the previous liberal period,” the author argues. “Including to its closest allies and partners.” If such commitments are “burdensome and do not promise direct benefit,” Lukyanov says, the White House sees “no sense in honoring them,” which explains Washington’s readiness to threaten Denmark over Greenland and unsettle NATO without much concern for institutional stability.
- “Despite his outward unruliness, Trump really does not like risk,” Lukyanov notes. He writes that the president is frightened of being drawn into “long confrontations” and “endless wars,” preferring “a flashy raid with vivid pictures and an instant exit with a declaration of great victory,” as in Venezuela. “Where there is a chance of getting hit back or getting bogged down,” the author observes, Trump favors “caution, backroom work and other means of pressure”—special operations rather than full‑scale wars.
- “In Trump’s and his like‑minded people’s understanding, the concept of ‘great power’ matters,” Lukyanov writes, adding that Trump is “fascinated by leaders who possess the fullness of power, constrained by little or nothing.” Hence, the author says, his “special interest in the leaders of China, Russia, India, North Korea,” and his barely concealed “envy of such methods of rule.” At the same time, “insistence on an American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere does not mean that other great powers, in his view, have analogous rights in their regions,” even if he shows more “understanding” for their interests than earlier advocates of U.S. “global leadership.”
- “The key to normal relations between Russia and Trump’s America is our own resilience and solidity,” Lukyanov concludes. Internal divisions “will be used to turn a state’s policy in the direction desired by the Americans,” he warns, because Trump “respects ‘deals’ not only economic but political” and seeks partners inside other countries. Therefore, he argues, Russia must strengthen its internal cohesion and cooperation with groupings like BRICS, since a stable, consolidated Russia “does not provoke the desire to wedge in anywhere.”
"A Cautious Forecast: What International Relations Will Look Like in 2026," Dmitri Trenin, Profil, 01.09.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine translated. (This individual is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- “A peace agreement on Ukraine that would suit Russia is unlikely to be concluded in 2026,” Dmitri Trenin writes. He predicts that Trump, “for domestic political reasons, may ‘turn’ against Russia,” tightening sanctions on its energy exports and striking at its “shadow fleet,” so that the Kremlin’s “special diplomatic operation” stalls and the “special military” one continues “with renewed force.” In Trenin’s view, the result will be a year of continued fighting in which Russian forces advance slowly while Ukraine, backed by Europe, “manages to hold the front.”
- “The already ongoing Russian–European ‘undeclared war’ will become more intense,” the author argues. He foresees “anonymous” attacks on Russian tankers and deep‑rear facilities being met by “quiet” sabotage against European targets, and says retaliatory strikes “possibly not only on Ukraine” could follow joint Ukrainian–European actions. At the same time, Trenin believes that “a large‑scale direct military conflict” between Russia and Europe in 2026 is “unlikely.”
- “Europe will remain the geographical stronghold of liberal globalism,” Trenin writes, even as its governments stay unpopular at home. He notes that the confrontation with Russia, framed as a defense of “European freedom and civilization from Russian barbarism,” has become the European Union’s “main unifying idea,” but adds that practical militarization will lag behind rhetoric because of tight finances, the need to replace U.S. funding for Kyiv, and fears of “massive voter discontent” if social spending is cut.
- “The shift of U.S. foreign‑policy focus from empire to metropolis deprives Europe of the privileged position it has occupied since the start of the Cold War,” the author contends. Washington’s priority on the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, he says, turns Europe from an object of “cultivation and support” into a “resource” for “Great America,” with NATO retained as an instrument of control while the EU is effectively branded an obstacle. “In 2026,” Trenin concludes, a genuinely multipolar world will keep taking shape, with the key players being “the United States and China, as well as Russia and India,” each seeking to “arrange its geographic area to its own liking.”
“Yulia Navalnaya: Dictators are coming for the lawyers,” Yulia Navalnaya, Washington Post, 01.16.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Imagine a courtroom in which the only voice heard is that of the state, and a legal system in which laws are skewed to conform to the whims of the regime—a world without lawyers, where the persecuted are invisible and suffer in silence,” Yulia Navalnaya wrote.
- “That is why every dictatorship, from China to Tanzania, tries to tame them—or to break them,” Navalnaya said, describing how regimes target lawyers who “insist on normative procedures, demand evidence and testimony, challenge unlawful decisions and laws, and, when necessary, speak uncomfortable truths.”
- “They were accused of ‘participation in an extremist community,’ though their only crime was doing their job,” Navalnaya wrote of Vadim Kobzev, Alexei Liptser and Igor Sergunin, her late husband Alexei Navalny’s lawyers.
- “The state was rolling out a new theory of control: that the defense of a dissident is, in itself, criminal dissidence,” Navalnaya argued, warning that by criminalizing legal defense “every citizen is at the mercy of an investigator, a prosecutor and a judge acting together under instructions from the regime.”
- “In authoritarian societies, lawyers document repression and slow down its momentum, offering moral oxygen to those resisting the regime,” Navalnaya wrote, adding that “their work matters not only in defending the rights of dissidents, but also in ensuring a democratic future. And we must defend them.”
- See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Russia Gains $216 Billion in Gold Rally, Replacing Lost Assets,” Bloomberg News, 01.20.26.
- Since the start of its full-scale war in Ukraine, “the value of the Bank of Russia’s gold holdings has increased by more than $216 billion,” Bloomberg calculates—roughly matching the scale of Russian sovereign assets frozen in Europe. From February 2022 through December 2025, the value of Russia’s gold reserves “more than doubled,” even as foreign-asset reserves fell about 14%.
- Russia’s international reserves “reached $755 billion at the end of last year, including $326.5 billion held in gold,” central bank data show. With bullion above $4,700/oz, gold now accounts for 43% of total reserves, up from 21% before the war—meaning nearly half of Moscow’s reserve buffer is in metal largely outside Western financial jurisdiction.
- The EU has extended a freeze on around €210 billion ($244 billion) of Russian sovereign assets, and Moscow estimates some $300 billion immobilized overall. While those securities and cash “cannot be sold or pledged,” Bloomberg notes that gold “can still be monetized if needed,” effectively restoring much of Russia’s lost financial capacity despite sanctions.
- Russia is the world’s second-largest gold producer, mining over 300 tons annually, but its bullion has been barred from Western markets and delisted by the London Bullion Market Association since 2022. That forces any large-scale sales toward Asian buyers, where the central bank would compete with newly mined Russian gold that also cannot be sold in the West. In the meantime, Russia’s rainy-day reserves grew in 2025 for the first time since President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine while The International Monetary Fund cut its forecast for Russia's economic growth in 2026 by 0.2 percentage points to 0.8%, according to Bloomberg and Reuters.
- “In 2014, [Russian] firms on this list generated about RUB 56 trillion in revenue (vyruchka), equivalent to 77% of Russia’s GDP,” the article notes; by the 2025 ranking, “Russia’s 500 largest companies generated RUB 140.2 trillion in revenue, equivalent to 69.7% of GDP.”
- “Among the 500 largest companies, oil and gas producers account for about 27% of total revenue, or nearly RUB 38 trillion,” Russia.Post wrote, adding that “the contribution of oil and gas to GDP is also declining… from roughly 9–10% of GDP in 2011–12” to an official projection of “around 4%” in 2026, even though “oil and gas remains the single largest sector of the Russian economy.”
- According to RBC’s estimates, “Gazprom again leads with revenue of RUB 10.4 trillion in 2024, followed closely by Rosneft at just over RUB 10.0 trillion,” helped by a weaker ruble, an increase in Power of Siberia exports “from 23 billion cubic meters in 2023 to 31 billion cubic meters in 2024,” and narrowing Urals discounts “from about $20 per barrel in 2023 to $13 per barrel in 2024.”
- The banking sector is highly concentrated: “Russian banks recorded a combined net profit of RUB 3.8 trillion in 2024, the highest level on record,” the article reports, with the financial sector “second by total revenue but only seventh by the number of companies represented,” underscoring how a handful of large, mostly state‑owned banks dominate.
- E‑commerce is booming from a low base: “In 2019–24, total online retail sales expanded between roughly fivefold and sevenfold, reaching RUB 11–12 trillion in 2024,” Russia.Post wrote; marketplaces’ share of e‑commerce “rose from 19% in 2019 to 64% in 2024, with Wildberries and Ozon together controlling nearly 80% of the market,” and “more than RUB 5 trillion flows through these platforms each year, equivalent to about 14% of overall retail sales in the country.”
“Meeting on the development of autonomous systems,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, 01.16.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Our agenda today includes the accelerated and advanced development of Russia’s national industry of unmanned and autonomous technologies,” Vladimir Putin said, calling it “an extensive scope of transport, industrial, and service systems… capable of operating in all environments: on land, in the air, at sea, and in space.”
- “It must be said frankly: this is impressive, both in terms of the boldness and diversity of the designers’ proposals and the way these technologies are fundamentally transforming everyday life, shaping what can truly be called an economy of autonomous systems,” Putin declared.
- Highlighting upcoming milestones, Putin noted that “beginning on March 1, 2026, all civilian unmanned aerial vehicles will be monitored through a unified system based on the ERA‑GLONASS system,” and that in 2025 “a new class of airspace for civilian unmanned aircraft was introduced nationwide,” which he said “creates fundamentally new opportunities for the use of drones in the regions.”
- “These key technologies, along with digital platforms and artificial intelligence, are shaping the future of the entire world,” Putin said, adding that deploying autonomous and unmanned solutions “is certainly not a passing trend but a necessity” and “a path toward strengthening our country’s global competitiveness… and, ultimately, safeguarding Russia’s sovereignty.”
- “We must move more resolutely from trial and error to the extensive deployment of autonomous solutions,” Putin told officials, stressing that “we must lead this process rather than merely manage it,” and insisting that “we must increase the use of autonomous systems in all areas of life many times over.”
See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Russia’s hidden economic weak points: What to watch in 2026," Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 01.17.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- "Business wants to be part of the state: it's becoming increasingly difficult for the civil sector to survive independently," Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 01.20.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- "Russia’s wartime parliamentary elections," Peter Mironenko, The Bell, 01.20.26.Clues from Russian Views.
- "Russia’s Descent Into Tyranny," Nina Khrushcheva, Foreign Affairs, 12.30.25.
- “Putin’s Plan to Save the Empire Is Destroying It—A Harvard Historian on Russia’s Fate,” Serhii Plokhy interview, UNITED24 Media, 01.19.26.
- Book review: “Exit Stalin—reforms and repression in the postwar, pre-collapse USSR,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 01.14.26.
Defense and aerospace:
- "2025 Was a Really, Really Bad Year to Be a Russian Soldier," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 01.17.26.
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:
- “Cyberfraud in Russia has become so widespread that it has drawn the attention of President Vladimir Putin,” Maria Kolomychenko writes. At the end of 2025, she notes, Putin “announced victory over cyberfraud,” claiming fewer leaks and a 33% drop in losses from telephone fraud—claims that “flew in the face of both independent statistics and earlier claims by the authorities.” According to the author, this mismatch has turned cybercrime from a technical issue into a political one.
- “In 2025, one such firm identified 225 data leaks from big companies,” Kolomychenko points out, contrasting this with official assertions that leaks were “thirteen times lower than in 2024.” She recalls that Roskomnadzor itself had reported 135 leaks in 2024, meaning a 13‑fold drop would imply only “ten or eleven” leaks in 2025, yet other ministries were already citing “more than 100” leaks by October. “In other words, the claim that data leaks were thirteen times lower in 2025 is patently false,” the author concludes.
- “According to state-owned Sberbank, telephone scammers stole 120 billion rubles in 2022, over 250 billion rubles in 2023, and no less than 295 billion rubles in 2024,” Kolomychenko writes. She adds that Sberbank’s deputy chairman later warned losses could reach “as much as 360 billion rubles” in 2025, while mobile operator MTS reported scam calls up 30% that year. These figures, she argues, directly contradict Kremlin declarations of victory and show that “telephone scams have multiplied, becoming the most common form of crime in Russia in 2025.”
“All of this has fueled anger not only at the cybercriminals, but also at the authorities who for many years claimed domestic alternatives to Western IT services were safe and secure,” the author notes. She stresses that, despite new “anti-scammer” laws, database theft has “gotten worse amid the fighting in Ukraine” and that the Russian state “simply does not have enough leverage over international hacker groups or the complex and sophisticated networks of telephone scammers.” In her view, the Kremlin’s PR campaign and “inaccurate data” are ultimately “a way of reducing public anger and legitimizing further online restrictions,” rather than evidence of real progress.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:
- Marten argues that Russia’s regional standing has eroded sharply since its 2023 peak: Moscow abandoned Assad as Turkish‑backed rebels toppled him in December 2024, did little for Hezbollah and Hamas when Israel struck them, and offered only rhetorical support as the U.S. and Israel hit Iran’s nuclear and military sites in June 2025, badly damaging Putin’s reputation as a reliable security patron.
- Although Russia clawed back a limited basing deal from Syria’s new president Ahmed al‑Sharaa in late 2025, its position is far weaker than under Assad: Russian forces must move under Syrian Internal Security Service escort and have restricted access to Tartus, while Turkey and the U.S. have expanded their own military and political roles in Syria and the broader region.
- Marten notes that these setbacks, together with Russia’s passivity in Nagorno‑Karabakh and more transactional, cash‑only engagements in Africa, have shifted the local balance of power toward the United States and Turkey and left Arab states more skeptical of Moscow, as seen when Putin was excluded from the 2025 Israel‑Hamas peace talks and forced to abstain on a UN Security Council vote backing Trump’s plan.
- At home, however, Putin is unlikely to pay a political price: as a classic personalist autocrat, he depends on a narrow patronage network rather than public approval, and key cronies such as Gennady Timchenko have been compensated for Middle East losses with lucrative domestic and African projects, preserving elite loyalty.
- Drawing on prospect theory and status‑politics research, Marten warns that these status losses may actually make Putin more risk‑acceptant abroad: unable to restore prestige militarily in the Middle East, he is likely to double down on hybrid tactics—sabotage, cyber operations, airspace incursions—against NATO states and Europe to “salve his ego,” raising the temperature of confrontation even if direct war remains unlikely.
"Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s annual press conference," Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 01.20.26. Clues from Russian Views.
- On the Ukraine war and Europe, Lavrov said Western countries “are seriously preparing for a war against the Russian Federation,” naming Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, Friedrich Merz, Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, and Mark Rutte as examples. He claimed Europe has “for years … deliberately cultivated” the crisis to “transform Ukraine into a security threat and a springboard against Russia on our very border,” backing what he called an “openly Nazi regime” in Kyiv.
- Lavrov argued that any settlement on Ukraine must address “the root causes of this crisis,” which he defined as Western efforts to use Ukraine “in their military confrontation against Russia.” He said proposals that “aim to preserve the Nazi regime” on whatever territory remains under Kyiv’s control and offer it security guarantees—while ignoring issues such as Russian language rights and the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church—are “absolutely unacceptable” for Moscow.
- On U.S. policy, Lavrov contrasted the Trump administration with its predecessors, saying it is “the only Western country that is ready to turn to the task of eliminating the root causes of this conflict.” He claimed Moscow accepted U.S. proposals at the August 2025 Anchorage meeting and that “we still hope these understandings remain fully valid,” while accusing European leaders and Zelenskyy of “hysterically” trying to push Washington back toward a simple cease-fire that would let Kyiv “rearm and again pounce on the Russian Federation.”
- Lavrov framed Trump’s broader foreign policy as part of a shift from a “rules‑based order” to “might is right,” but described the current U.S. administration as “pragmatists.” Citing Secretary of State Marco Rubio, he said Washington now recognizes that “national interests of such countries as the U.S. and Russia will not always coincide” but that it would be “a crime” to let those differences “degrade into confrontation, especially into a hot one.” Lavrov said he “fully shares this philosophy.”
- On NATO and Greenland, Lavrov called the Greenland dispute “a relevant example” of how the “Euro‑Atlantic concept of security has discredited itself.” He noted that one NATO country is “about to attack another NATO country,” and that debates are under way “up to the point of whether it is time to close” the alliance. He argued that NATO, the EU, and the OSCE are all “Euro‑Atlantic structures” whose mentality is to “create some construction against the Russian Federation,” and said this is why Moscow is now talking about “Eurasian security” instead.
- Lavrov said Russia sees the Greenland confrontation primarily as an internal Western crisis: “If Western countries wish to talk the talk, it’s their choice and right to do so.” He contrasted this with Russia’s focus on the “Global Majority” and its own Eurasian projects, insisting that Moscow will work with any Western state “interested in talking with Russia and discussing concrete mutually beneficial projects based on the principles of equality.”
- On NATO’s cohesion versus Russia, Lavrov rejected the idea that “isolation of Russia has failed” is still a secret, pointing to the large number of foreign guests at Moscow’s 80th‑anniversary Victory Day parade and at China’s WWII commemorations in 2025. He said most countries “do not wish to forget the memory, lessons, and history of World War II” and used this to argue that Russia is not as isolated as the West claims, even as NATO debates Article 5 credibility amid the Greenland rift.
- On nuclear issues, Lavrov highlighted debates in Japan about revising its non‑nuclear status, saying this goes “beyond building up the army’s offensive capabilities” and includes “revising the non‑nuclear status” in a way “they have been quite open about.” He also mentioned that, in East Asia, U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are increasingly confronted by a Moscow–Beijing–Pyongyang “comprehensive strategic partnership,” including a treaty with the DPRK whose “fraternal and allied assistance was instrumental in liberating the Kursk Region from Ukrainian militants.”
- Lavrov argued that the “Euro‑Atlantic concept” has failed and that Russia is instead promoting a “Greater Eurasian Partnership” and a “pan‑continental architecture of equal and indivisible security.” He stressed that Russia is a “state‑civilization” that “will not renounce its roots” and that amendments to the Russian constitution and the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept mandate “resolute defense of the vital interests of our nation” and “further strengthen[ing] our national sovereignty.”
- At the same time, Lavrov said Moscow is committed to diplomatic solutions on multiple fronts: “Russia remains committed to a diplomatic resolution” in Ukraine, wants de‑escalation in “Venezuela” and “the Iranian situation,” and insists that Iran’s issue be settled “on the basis of respect for Tehran’s rightful and peaceful use of nuclear energy.” He also tied these conflicts to Trump’s proposed “Board of Peace,” saying any such initiative must still be judged by whether it respects UN decisions, such as those on a Palestinian state, and by whether it truly addresses root causes rather than entrenching Western or NATO‑centric security structures.
- “Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro represents a strategic blow for the Kremlin,” Dessie Zagorcheva writes. After “years of sustained effort to block Sofia from joining the eurozone,” Moscow “failed to prevent a decision that anchors Bulgaria more deeply and irreversibly within the European project.” The switch, she argues, “exposed the limits of Russia’s hybrid tactics and narrowed its remaining leverage in the country.”
- “Russia has never fully accepted Bulgaria’s strategic realignment,” the author notes. Instead, Moscow has treated Bulgaria “as contested ground,” using “historical, cultural, religious, and economic ties—including energy dependence” and influence via the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to keep it in what Russia sees as its “sphere of influence.” From the Kremlin’s perspective, she writes, “any deepening of EU integration constrains its ability to exploit bilateral dependencies, apply selective pressure, create divisions within the bloc, and cultivate gray zones of influence on the EU’s eastern flank.”
- “These delays were not merely technical,” Zagorcheva writes of Bulgaria’s repeated postponements of euro adoption. They were “driven by a surge in political and public qualms,” “actively fueled by Russian-linked influence operations and Bulgarian proxy actors aiding the Kremlin,” turning Bulgaria’s stalled path into “a visible indicator of Russia’s ability to impede, though not ultimately prevent, EU integration.”
- “Russia used covert financial networks to spend tens of millions of euros on propaganda and interference in Bulgaria,” the author reports. Social media and sympathetic outlets pushed false claims that the euro would “trigger runaway inflation,” “confiscate citizens’ savings,” and “strip Bulgaria of its national identity,” while the openly pro‑Russian Revival party—“which has an official cooperation agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party”—became “the most visible domestic opponent,” staging protests with Russian flags and even attacking the EU mission in Sofia.
- Despite these efforts, Zagorcheva concludes, “Bulgaria’s pro-European parliamentary majority ultimately delivered.” The country’s entry into the eurozone “serves as a reminder that hybrid interference, while potent and disruptive, does not inevitably determine outcomes—especially when political will and institutional continuity exist.” For now, she writes, Jan. 1 “was a clear setback for Moscow’s ambitions to divide and weaken the EU,” and a signal that “the EU’s gravitational pull remains formidable despite its contestation.”
- See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Dynamics of Russia-EU Interaction in 2024–2025: The Architecture of Confrontation," Yulia Melnikova, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 01.15.26. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- "Approaches of external actors to conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa," Ivan Bocharov, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 01.20.26. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
Ukraine:
“Why Ukraine Matters to the United States,” Bianca Serbin, Center for American Progress, 01.14.26.
- “What struck me most in Kyiv was not exhaustion or fatalism—though both were present—but how aggressively Ukrainians are preparing for the future, even as they live with rolling blackouts, air raid sirens, and a grinding war of attrition,” Bianca Serbin wrote.
- “Ukraine’s future is European—and Ukrainians are acting like it,” Serbin argued, noting that officials, business leaders, and civil society are focused on “courts that treat people fairly, less corruption in daily life, government services that are accessible online… and an economy that can create reliable jobs over time.”
- On U.S. public opinion, Serbin observed that “roughly 6 in 10 Americans continue to support U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including military aid,” and that “the public is distracted, not hostile—and that distinction matters.”
- “What U.S. supporters of Ukraine have not explained clearly enough to the U.S. public is also the simplest reality: Ukraine’s war is testing the rules and norms that have long underpinned American prosperity,” she wrote, stressing that “international stability is an economic asset, not an abstraction.”
- “Ukraine is not asking the United States to fight its war,” Serbin concluded. “It is asking Americans to recognize that U.S. security and prosperity are bound up in the war’s outcome. If the United States wants a world governed by rules rather than coercion, predictability rather than chaos, it cannot afford to step back now.”
- Skorkin argues that the bribery case against Yulia Tymoshenko marks her unexpected return from political obscurity to the center of Ukrainian politics. Once an “icon of the Orange Revolution” and twice prime minister, Tymoshenko had been pushed to the margins by Zelenskyy’s rise and the wartime patriotic consensus, recasting herself as a socially conservative, anti‑globalist populist appealing mainly to rural voters.
- The scandal, he writes, reflects a deeper shift: “the center of Ukrainian politics is once again shifting to parliament.” After several years when the Verkhovna Rada was “all but directly subordinate” to the presidential administration, deputies are regaining leverage, their votes are becoming more valuable, and the fight to control or splinter Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People majority is intensifying.
- Tymoshenko’s supporters claim the charges—bribing MPs and promising them $10,000 a month for “the right” votes—are NABU’s revenge for her role in last summer’s attempt to curb the powers of anti‑corruption bodies. Skorkin sees them instead as part of a broader “purge of the elites” that began with the Mindich tapes, forced the resignation of Andriy Yermak, and has now turned anti‑corruption investigators against parliamentarians, including figures close to Zelenskyy from Kryvyi Rih.
- According to Skorkin, the NABU recordings suggest Tymoshenko’s goal was to “overthrow the majority” by targeting Servant of the People deputies, aligning her with opposition efforts to exploit visible cracks in Zelenskyy’s single‑party rule. Rumors in Kyiv of a “parliamentary coup”—forming a new majority that could appoint a different cabinet, curb the presidency, or even replace Zelenskyy with the speaker—have swirled for months, and Tymoshenko has been loudly calling for the government’s resignation and a “national unity” coalition.
- Tymoshenko has been ordered to post 33 million hryvnia (about $760,000) in bail, banned from leaving Kyiv region, and barred from contacting 66 deputies. True to form, Skorkin notes, she is using the courtroom as a political stage—just as past trials and imprisonment bolstered her image as a persecuted opposition leader. While he doubts she can fully recreate her earlier successes in a transformed, war‑hardened Ukraine, he argues the case shows how the “anti‑corruption earthquake” has shaken the system enough to bring long‑written‑off politicians back into play.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- “The greater Belarus’s isolation from Europe, the more it is forced closer to Russia,” Maria Kalesnikava told the FT. She argues that sanctions, travel restrictions, and minimal official contacts are unintentionally deepening Minsk’s dependence on Moscow. In her view, this makes Belarus “less safe and less predictable for Europe,” turning isolation into a security liability rather than leverage
See this link/ for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Endnotes
The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.
AI was used in production of this digest.
*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.
Slider photo: An engineer collects FPV drones of "General Cherry" company at the workshop in Ukraine, on Dec. 4, 2025. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)
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