This Week’s Highlights 

• Arms control must move beyond the U.S.-Russian framework that has dominated for decades, argue Western foreign policy influentials Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, Kevin Rudd and Ivo Daalder. A logical grouping for expanded discussions would be the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. These five countries should start a dialogue that addresses nuclear issues, the authors write, and over time, they could negotiate measures that would pull back the curtain on their arsenals, convince one another of the defensive nature of those arsenals and open up the possibility of mutual limitations.  
• A solid Russian-Indian relationship is the best guarantee that China won’t exert undue influence over the relatively vulnerable countries of Central Asia, writes Foreign Policy columnist Salvatore Babones. It is also the most likely route to a stable future for Afghanistan, a country where India has a strong diplomatic presence. A flourishing relationship between India and Russia, Babones writes, is also preferable to the alternative scenario in which India becomes a staunch U.S. ally while a desperate Russia is forced to become a junior partner in a renewed Sino-Russian alliance. 
• The EU and the United States from an early stage showed solidarity with the Maidan Revolution, which gave them a stake in its success, especially in the face of Russian aggression, writes Henrik Larsen, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zürich). Ukrainian elites, however, perceived in Western benefactors a greater interest in bolstering Ukraine against Russia than in facilitating the country’s political transformation. According to Larsen, since Ukraine needs the West more than the West needs Ukraine, the elites’ opportunistic disregard for Western conditionalities was self-defeating for the country as a whole.   
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko does not believe that he needs to make a deal with anyone inside Belarus, writes analyst Artyom Shraibman. Moscow faces the question of how to respond to procrastination over reform in Belarus. On the one hand, it might seem that the crisis there has passed, leaving no leverage over Lukashenko. On the other hand, Shraibman writes, he is going to need more money. 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Don’t Expect Russia to Help Save the Iran Deal,” Anna Borshchevskaya, The National Interest, 02.16.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes:

• “Now, as in the past, Moscow continues to play a double game with the West. It acts as both a ready partner and Iran’s lawyer.”
• “Russia looks at international law and institutions through a narrow prism that excludes broader notions such as a ‘rules-based order’ and human rights—notions it perceives as Western rather than universal.”
• “As the Biden administration looks forward to reviving the Iran deal, the past does nonetheless offer valuable lessons. Biden and his team made clear they want to be tough on Russia on a wide range of issues, from U.S. election interference and the SolarWind hack, to jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. These are welcome steps. Still, if Washington is treating Moscow as hostile power in Europe, why give it a free pass with its allies? The United States should dispense with notions of resets with Russia and focus on building a unified strategy that strengthens the U.S. negotiating position. Kremlin obstructionism is not limited to Europe. Biden and his team made it clear they want to focus on great power competition. If they want to do so, there should be no more piecemeal strategies with Moscow.”

Great power rivalry/New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Democracy on the Defense,” Yascha Mounk, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021. The author, an associate professor at Johns Hopkins University, writes:

• “What the world has seen is less a democratic retreat than an authoritarian resurgence. Autocrats, long focused on bare survival, are now on the offensive. The coming decades will feature a long and drawn-out contest between democracy and dictatorship.”
• “The outcome of that contest is not foreordained. To prevail, the United States and its democratic allies need to understand the stakes of this historic moment and work together to protect global democracy in more imaginative and courageous ways than they have in the past. They will also need to solve a dilemma created by the tension between two core objectives: stemming backsliding within their own ranks, on the one hand, and maintaining a unified front against authoritarian regimes such as those in China and Russia, on the other.”
• “Simply put, it will be hard to oppose antidemocratic governments in countries whose support is crucial to confronting full-throated, increasingly assertive authoritarians. Dealing with that dilemma will require a skillful approach that preserves the possibility of cooperation with countries that have questionable democratic bona fides while reserving close partnerships for genuinely democratic allies. It will also mean abandoning ‘democracy promotion’ in favor of ‘democracy protection’—seeking, for the most part, to secure, rather than expand, the democratic world.”

“A Superpower, Like It or Not: Why Americans Must Accept Their Global Role,” Robert Kagan,  Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021. The author, Stephen and Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “All great powers have a deeply ingrained self-perception shaped by historical experience, geography, culture, beliefs and myths. … Henry Kissinger once observed that Iranian leaders had to choose whether they wanted to be ‘a nation or a cause,’ but great powers and aspiring great powers often see themselves as both. Their self-perception shapes their definition of the national interest, of what constitutes genuine security and the actions and resources necessary to achieve it. Often, it is these self-perceptions that drive nations, empires and city-states forward. And sometimes to their ruin.”
• “Much of the drama of the past century resulted from great powers whose aspirations exceeded their capacity. Americans have the opposite problem. Their capacity for global power exceeds their perception of their proper place and role in the world. … As a result, Americans have often played it poorly.”
• “The question is not whether the United States is still capable of prevailing in a global confrontation, either hot or cold, with China or any other revisionist power. It is. The real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war. The United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest.”
• “The time has come to tell Americans that there is no escape from global responsibility, that they have to think beyond the protection of the homeland. They need to understand that the purpose of NATO and other alliances is to defend not against direct threats to U.S. interests but against a breakdown of the order that best serves those interests. They need to be told honestly that the task of maintaining a world order is unending and fraught with costs but preferable to the alternative.” 

“Biden’s Rough Start With the World,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 02.16.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Driven by existential concerns about climate change, the erosion of democracy world-wide, and the rise of China, the new administration wants more U.S. allies to take difficult stands in support of Washington's global vision. This is not going to be popular.”
• “Many governments in Asia share U.S. concerns about China but feel threatened by America's propensity to proselytize for democracy. In the Middle East, key aspects of the Biden agenda alienate virtually everyone. Many Latin Americans see Chinese money and influence as a healthy offset to U.S. hemispheric dominance. While Europeans share some American concerns about China and Russia, Paris and Berlin see little reason to accept Washington's prescriptions for dealing with them.”
• “The Biden administration sees a renewed American commitment to multilateralism as a way to sign allies up to an ambitious U.S.-led agenda. But many allies, even close and deeply democratic ones, embrace multilateralism as a way to limit America's ability to press policies on them that they don't like.”

“Russia’s Nuclear Activity in 2019: Increasing Strength And Pressure,” Maxim Starchak, Atlantic Council, February 2021. The author, a fellow at the Centre for International and Defense Policy of Queen’s University, writes:

• “In 2019, we witnessed both an increase in combat training and a rise in the quantity of nuclear triad units on active patrol. Russia provokes and tests the military command of NATO and other U.S. allies. Aircraft and submarines continue to approach as closely as possible the borders of other countries. The geography of Russia’s nuclear presence is expanding.”
• “However, the industrial and testing abilities of Russia are not capable of meeting the scope and deadlines outlined by the Ministry of Defense. There is no increase in launches of ICBMs. Political and military maneuvers to increase or maintain high nuclear triad activity are still relevant. Russia strives to demonstrate force aimed at the deterrence of NATO countries and exerts pressure on them. And without nuclear weapons control treaties, nuclear triad activity will likely only increase in the coming years with the introduction of new or upgraded nuclear weapon carriers.”
• “Nuclear weapons will continue to be an active mechanism in Russian policy.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“When Allies Go Nuclear. How to Prevent the Next Proliferation Threat,” Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, Kevin Rudd and Ivo Daalder, Foreign Affairs, 02.12.21. The authors of the article, adapted from Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies, a task force report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, write:

• “In the 1960s … reassured that they would be protected from nuclear attack and intimidation, U.S. allies in Asia and Europe decided not to develop their own nuclear capabilities. But now they may be rethinking that decision. … U.S. allies face a growing military threat from nuclear-armed powers, as China and Russia each become more aggressive and modernize their nuclear forces. … And in the United States, allies see a government that has walked away from long-standing arms control agreements and a population that no longer seems committed to global engagement.”
• “In Poland, there have been calls to bolster Europe’s nuclear deterrence, with Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the country’s governing party, welcoming the idea of the EU as a nuclear power with an arsenal equal to that of Russia’s. … Similar sentiments are emerging in Asia.”
• “The United States needs to overhaul its approach to arms control globally. Biden took a wise first step when he agreed to extend the New START treaty with Russia … the next step should be a new bilateral agreement that would seek to cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, including those in storage, as well as novel nuclear delivery systems, such as hypersonic weapons.”
• “That said, arms control must move beyond the U.S.-Russian framework that has dominated for decades. A logical grouping for expanded discussions would be the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.”
• “As a first step, the United States and Russia could invite the other three members to observe the inspections that Washington and Moscow conduct as part of their existing arms control obligations … Subsequently, all five countries could agree to exchange information about their nuclear capabilities, notify each other of forthcoming missile and other tests and take other steps to enhance transparency. Eventually, each country could commit to limiting its nuclear forces to the lowest possible level.”

“Setting a Course Away from the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” Garrett Hinck and Pranay Vaddi, War on the Rocks, 02.16.21. The authors, a Ph.D. student at Columbia University and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, write:

• “President Biden should task the Defense and State Departments, along with National Nuclear Security Administration and Intelligence Community, to examine three major technical and policy issues.”
• “First, the administration should order a review of Minuteman life extension options based on a wider range of parameters … The purpose of this study would be to examine the technical viability of Minuteman life extension in a range of force structures, while establishing the cost for refurbishment in scenarios where the eventual purchase of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent was not assumed.”
• “Second, following this technical review, the administration should commission a study of alternative U.S. force structures and arms control policy similar to the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review. The Department of Defense and Strategic Command should examine the risks of moving U.S. strategic nuclear forces to a dyad composed only of bombers and ballistic missile submarines based on the current rate of Minuteman retirement … Another force structure worthy of examination would be a triad with fewer … deployed ICBMs.”
• “Third, the State Department should examine how various forms of arms control could make each force structure option more viable. Policymakers should consider whether reductions in Russia’s silo ICBM force could further enable U.S. movement toward a dyad, and what the trade-offs may be for U.S. negotiators. One priority for the United States should be to seek Russian reductions in silo-based, heavy ICBMs … and push for reducing the total number of Russia’s deployed warheads on existing multi-warhead ICBM systems. Arms control agreements that shape Russia’s nuclear posture toward more stabilizing weapons and policies will do a great deal to mitigate the risks of reducing America’s ICBM arsenal.”

“How to Support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Without Signing It,” Jayita Sarkar, Lawfare, 02.07.21. The author, an assistant professor at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies, writes:

• “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on Jan. 22, 2021, only two days after a new U.S. administration was sworn in. The treaty is the first multilateral legal document to outlaw nuclear weapons.”
• “Article 6 of the TPNW, entitled ‘Victim assistance and environmental remediation,’ calls on state parties to ‘adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide []social and economic inclusion’ to those affected by nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.”
• “By selectively supporting the TPNW through Article 6 commitments while not acceding to it, the Biden administration can be at the forefront of an anti-racist global nuclear agenda. It can promote the U.S. image abroad, which has been tarnished by the Trump administration’s four years of isolationist ‘America First’ rhetoric. It could also win support at home. According to a 2020 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 66 percent of Americans want a world without nuclear weapons.”
• “The present moment offers the promise of unprecedented change in global nuclear politics. When the 10th NPT Review Conference takes place in New York in August 2021 (postponed from 2020), it will be the first time in the history of the nuclear age that there will be another nuclear treaty demanding attention and action. The Biden administration could seize the day and make history.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

Review of David Shimer’s 2020 book, “Rigged: America, Russia, and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference,” review by Angela Stent, Survival, February–March 2021. In this book review, Stent, a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, writes:

• “A persistent question dogged Donald Trump’s presidency after 2016: how far was Russia responsible for putting him in the White House, given what is now known about its social-media manipulation and cyber interference during the election campaign? And how much did Russia continue to interfere in U.S. domestic politics during his presidency and into the 2020 presidential race? These issues have made Russia a uniquely toxic subject in American politics because, for many of Trump’s opponents, Russia and Trump are virtually synonymous.”
• “David Shimer addresses the 2016 campaign by situating the issue of electoral interference in the broader context of a century of covert U.S. and Soviet/Russian attempts to influence voting outcomes around the world. He stresses that, while Russian interference in the 2016 election represented continuity with previous practices, ‘the digital age has irrevocably enhanced the weapon of covert electoral interference.’”
• “The first half of the book covers accounts of electoral interference that are well known to those familiar with Cold War history … The second half of the book focuses on contemporary Russia. … Once Putin … came to power, the intelligence services resumed their former modus operandi. Putin, convinced that the United States was behind the mass opposition demonstrations in Russia in 2011, determined that it was appropriate to interfere in U.S. elections.”
• “The 2019 Mueller report detailed how Russia used both social media and cyber penetration against Hillary Clinton’s candidacy in 2016. Shimer postulates that Russian actions might have affected the election outcome by influencing how people viewed her presidential bid. What is indisputable is that Russia was able to take advantage of the deep divisions in American society to exacerbate its fissures.”
• “Shimer reminds us that, once in office, Trump never showed any interest in securing America’s elections, concluding that the president was ‘the newest member of a distinct club: leaders who came to power psychologically indebted to foreign actors and insecure about their electoral legitimacy.’”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Germany aims for new deal with Washington on Nord Stream 2,” Erika Solomon, Guy Chazan and Katrina Manson, Financial Times, 02.16.21. The authors report that:

• “The hope of experts in Berlin is that Blinken’s arrival at the U.S. Department of State could usher in a fresh approach to NS2 [Nord Stream II]— and potentially a resolution of the stand-off. After all, in his book he argued that it was more important for Washington to nurture its allies than dictate their economic relations with Moscow.”
• “Andreas Nick, an MP with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, is one of those encouraged by Blinken’s book. ‘My impression is that [he] doesn’t think sanctions are the right way to deal with an ally, and we trust him,’ he said.”
• “In Berlin, ministers are now working on creative solutions they can present to President Joe Biden’s team that may persuade them to drop sanctions. One idea being floated is the concept of ‘snapbacks’—a mechanism that would allow Germany to shut off Nord Stream 2 if Russia puts pressure on Ukraine, say, by arbitrarily cutting supplies through its gas transit system. … Another idea … is for Germany to impose a kind of moratorium on commissioning the pipeline until Russia shows goodwill.”
• “As Berlin searches for solutions, early signs from Washington suggest the Biden administration is keen to lower the temperature of the debate over NS2. Two people briefed on the matter said Blinken has indicated an openness to minimizing sanctions. A spokesperson for the state department did not comment on the claims but stressed sanctions were only one tool.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“America’s India Problem Is All About Russia,” Salvatore Babones, Foreign Policy, 02.16.21. The author, a Foreign Policy columnist and an adjunct scholar at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, writes:

• “The United States should actually welcome India’s purchase of Russian arms. … When it comes to confronting China across Eurasia, the United States needs India much more than India needs the United States. For India, the United States is a welcome and valued security partner but too far away and not particularly reliable. For the United States, India is its only friend in the region that is willing and able to act as a counterbalance to China. If Washington wants New Delhi’s help in solving the region’s many smoldering conflicts, it will have to show some forbearance on sanctions. Better to let Russia off the sanctions hook than to catch India in the CAATSA net.”
• “If the United States wants to contain China, Russia or both, it needs other countries to do the heavy lifting—at least on land. U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially maritime, and as the United States winds down its presence in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that substantial U.S. ground forces will ever return to the Asian mainland other than the 8th Army still stationed in South Korea. A solid Russian-Indian relationship is the best guarantee that China won’t exert undue influence over the relatively vulnerable countries of Central Asia. It is also the most likely route to a stable future for Afghanistan, a country where India has a strong diplomatic presence.”
• “A flourishing relationship between India and Russia is also preferable to the alternative scenario in which India becomes a staunch U.S. ally while a desperate Russia is forced to become a junior partner in a renewed Sino-Russian alliance. India’s main value to the United States is as an independent power in its own right; Washington has absolutely no interest in taking on new security obligations in Kashmir or the Himalayas. Meanwhile, Russia’s relatively equal relationship with India promises a stable partnership that can keep the peace without either country gaining the upper hand.”

“Moscow’s Climate Change Dilemma,” Olivia Lazard, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.09.21. The author, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, writes:

• “It is not the Biden administration that Russia should be concerned about when it comes to climate, but its own inaction, which Moscow risks paying for in both economic and security terms over the coming decade.”
• “The EU and the United States are both talking about carbon taxes and carbon adjustment mechanisms, which will impact Russian markets. Markets and public institutions are moving toward decarbonization and demethanization. Russia may benefit from last price hikes coming from long-lasting fossil dependency, but the winds will eventually change. By maintaining its economic dependency on hydrocarbon extraction and pollution, it is sowing the seeds of its eventual collapse.”
• “Rather than seeing Biden and his climate policy as a potential threat to Russia’s economy and standing in the world, therefore, Moscow could decide to change strategy and design its own path to enable it to compete in a transitioning world. It is ultimately up to Russia.”
• “Ideally, Moscow should demonstrate quickly that it is willing and able to cooperate with the Biden administration on climate action. It can do so in many ways, starting with ceasing disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States and the EU, including on climate change. Russia can make itself ready to engage with the United States on protecting the Arctic, and, naturally, it can also start working on upping its nationally determined contributions for the Paris agreement ahead of COP26.”
• “This is something that Washington can and should help with. The United States and Russia are top contributors to climate change because of their fossil fuel-exporting economies. Rather than hesitating whether or not to leverage LNG exports in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, Washington could approach Moscow with a proposition for an emissions reduction treaty, following a logic similar to nuclear disarmament, thereby establishing clear benchmarks for decarbonization that should be incentivized: in this case, by an economic plan to support Russia’s transition.”

“Joe Biden should look to Emmanuel Macron for a European ally,” Philip Stephens, Financial Times, 02.11.21. The author, associate editor of the news outlet and director of its editorial board, writes:

• “Europe’s right to make up its own mind does not of itself demand breaking with Washington. In Macron’s construction it might well be the right to work with the U.S. Sure, Macron continues to insist on the need for political engagement with Russian President Vladimir Putin. But French policymakers know that a Europe able fully to defend itself is an option on the distant horizon. Like Biden, Macron needs allies ready to step beyond rhetorical idealism.”
• “Merkel speaks the language of Atlanticism. She is privately dismissive of strategic autonomy. … None of this, however, can be allowed to threaten Germany's economic interests—not least its business dealings with China and Russia. Berlin cannot be expected to choose between human rights and the overseas sales of, say, Volkswagen, BMW or Mercedes.”
• “Merkel forced the pace for the EU to conclude a new investment pact with Beijing before Biden took office. And she stands full square behind Nord Stream 2, the Kremlin-backed project to build a new gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. The loser? Ukraine, a nation that has had one part of its territory annexed and another occupied by Russia.”
• “If Biden wants a reliable European partner, he would do better to look to America’s oldest ally.”

“George Shultz Had a Wise and Discerning Heart,” Henry A. Kissinger, Wall Street Journal, 02.11.21. The author, former U.S. secretary of state, writes:

• “Contrary to today's revisionist narrative, the U.S.-China relationship at that time was based on specific, shared strategic benefits. With his Soviet counterpart, George negotiated the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the only Cold War agreement that eliminated a category of nuclear weapons. The crowning achievement of George's diplomacy was to see the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion.”
• “His recognition of nuclear dangers in no way impaired his dedication to national defense. But he felt it his duty to remind his country that weapons of increasing destructiveness, accuracy and automaticity -- which had been accumulating all over the world for more than half a century—must not be left to accident, evil intention or miscalculation. Weapons of mass destruction must be controlled, within nations and among them, for the safety of all of us.”
• “George's outstanding attribute was his combination of wisdom and humility. Solomon's prayer was for ‘a discerning heart,’ and that blessing was extended to George. As a statesman, he would gain the whole world yet never forfeit his soul.”

“Putin's latest aggression could silence U.S. media operations in Russia,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 02.13.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) faces a grave threat from another source: the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin. Perhaps calculating that the turmoil in the agency had made it vulnerable, Mr. Putin has targeted the RFE/RL news operation in Russia and the television outlet Current Time, a joint operation with the VOA. Russian regulators have assessed the U.S. media heavy and mounting fines and are threatening criminal prosecutions of their personnel because of their failure to comply with onerous new requirements for labeling their journalism as the product of ‘foreign agents.’”
• “Mr. Putin's clear intent is to force the shutdown of the U.S. media operations in Russia—something that would deal a crippling blow to what remains of independent journalism in the country at a critical moment.”
• “In the absence of a respite, the organization will probably have to shut down its Russian operations even as the opposition movement led by Alexei Navalny gains momentum ahead of parliamentary elections later this year. Meanwhile, Mr. Putin's formula for shutting down RFE/RL could be adopted by other autocratic regimes, from Belarus to Kazakhstan.”
• “The Biden administration has pledged to push back against Mr. Putin's aggressions, unlike the curiously passive Mr. Trump. In this case, one option would be to threaten the reciprocal closure of Russian government broadcasters in the United States, such as Sputnik and RT. At a minimum, the State Department should pursue sanctions under the Magnitsky Act against Russian officials involved in the campaign against U.S media.”

“Biden must make a tough decision on Afghanistan—and quickly,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 02.09.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “The Biden administration now has mere weeks to decide whether to follow through on the withdrawal of the remaining American forces and contractors by May 1.”
• “The most likely consequence of a full U.S. and NATO withdrawal by May, a study group established by Congress concluded, would be the resumption of full-scale civil war among the Taliban, the Afghan government and other factions.”
• “The study group suggests that Afghanistan's neighbors, including Pakistan, Russia, India and perhaps Iran, could be enlisted to pressure the Taliban to accept an extension of the May 1 deadline; those nations have a common interest in Afghanistan not becoming a sinkhole of terrorism. Without such a deal, a delayed withdrawal could cause the Taliban to resume attacks on U.S. forces, which it has stopped in the past year. It's possible, too, that more troops would be needed to prevent a collapse of government forces, which have been under mounting pressure from the insurgents.”
• “Those difficult steps are nevertheless preferable to abandoning Afghanistan. The United States, said the report, ‘is prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan. It should not, however, simply hand a victory to the Taliban.’”

“Four Ways the Kremlin Could Block Western Social Networks in Russia,” Ilya Klishin, The Moscow Times, 02.12.21. The author, the former digital director of the New York-based Russian-language RTVI channel, writes:

• “The way the authorities have unceremoniously thrown opposition leader Alexei Navalny in jail and dealt mercilessly with two successive nationwide protests demanding his release, has made it clear that the Kremlin will be tightening the screws on Russian society up until parliamentary elections this fall. … This has led many to question whether Russia’s … small independent media outlets and international social networks will be shut down.”
• “Roskomnadzor … has been making loud but empty threats for years that it would block such giants as Facebook and Twitter. Instead, it has settled for leveling an occasional symbolic fine against them, never publicizing the amount but parading the fact on state-controlled evening news. … And, at least since 2013, the task of controlling public opinion has been accomplished by troll factories.”
• “Although these measures have worked for the last eight years, they might not prove as effective now that the government has gradually begun to cross the line. … But if the government plans to actually shut down the social networks … there are four main scenarios by which they might do so.”
• “Scenario 1. This is the toughest approach and would involve blocking all foreign social networks—Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube—retaining only their domestic competitors. … Scenario 2. Warning shots. The authorities focus their wrath on a single social network in a bid to frighten them all into obedience.”
• “Scenario 3. Negotiation. Russia’s censors probably prefer this option, holding out hope that they could convince the foreign platforms to promptly “comply with Russian laws” by removing, for example, opposition videos or calls for public protests. … Scenario 4. This is the most likely and realistic option. The ruling authorities will instruct Russian mobile operators and Internet service providers to sabotage the functioning of the foreign social networks.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“How Has Society Changed in the Wake of the Winter Protests?” Andrei Kolesnikov, The Moscow Times/Vtimes, 02.09.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The incredible sacrifices made by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, including on a personal level, have boosted his trust ratings across the country by an average of just one percentage point in January and February 2021, compared with November 2020. According to research from the independent Levada Center pollster, he is now in sixth place among politicians, two percentage points behind Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.”  
• “But through his extraordinary conduct, Navalny has drawn usually passive citizens out of their usual indifference—the level of disapproval with the government has grown by six percentage points to 56 percent from September.”
• “The sociological indicators are sobering. We need to understand that in Russia, where the same person has ruled for 20 years … stirring the average citizen is not so easy.  If we remove the eternal Putin from the approval and trust ratings we find a stark void … Navalny is a politician. And in the opposition sphere he has the very same monopoly that Putin enjoys in the state sphere.” 
• “The working people—as opposed to the hipsters—back the current authorities. … Navalny has the support of the young, a group which just several years ago was far more conformist in character. His approval rating is high, at 36 percent, in the 18–24 age group, and comparatively high, at 23 percent, among those aged 25–39. In the very youngest group the approval level for the opposition leader is 43 percent.”
• “Navalny has secured for himself the status of a political fighter for power, but, having become a sacrificial lamb and a symbol of a civic movement against the regime, has also acquired moral weight.  This is important in the sense that civil society, to which he perhaps has been building a bridge, as yet unfinished, is now to a great degree on his side. He now has the chance to become not only a political, but also a civic leader. This is far more perilous for the Kremlin.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Botched Moscow visit is a wake-up call for the EU. Behind a diplomatic debacle lies the absence of a strategy on Russia,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 02.11.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Borrell’s trip was ill-timed and badly advised given European outrage over the attempted murder of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, his jailing on trumped-up charges and the clampdown on subsequent mass protests across the country. There was no clear purpose for it.”
• “When Russia needed to see European strength it was shown weakness. Behind Borrell’s mishaps, there is an absence of EU strategy on dealing with the Kremlin. … Borrell went to Moscow with no stick and half a carrot … Acting independently from Washington for the sake of it does not constitute a credible foreign policy.”
• “The EU’s real leverage stems from its policies on trade, regulation and market access. Its weakness lies in its inability to match strategic interests with economic ones. Meanwhile, the presidents of the commission and European Council are carving out bigger foreign policy roles for themselves.”
• “Borrell described his ‘very complicated’ trip to Moscow as a turning point for relations with Russia. If one good thing can come out of this diplomatic debacle it is that it might galvanize the EU into stronger action. By humiliating Borrell, Moscow humiliated the EU. It cannot go unanswered.”

“Time to Think About a World Without Putin: The Russian leader is contemplating his mortality—as are his backers,” Jeff Hawn and Sim Tack, Foreign Policy, 02.10.21. The authors, a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics and an analyst at Force Analysis, write:

• “The West needs to start considering what a Russia without Putin will look like, dissecting the new system and watching for opportunities to cultivate and support people within these power structures who can steer Russia on a course more conducive to U.S. interest.”
• “To that end, the United States also needs to be extremely calculating in its use of targeted sanctions against members of the Russian government, and be flexible enough to ease or eliminate sanctions as a sign of good faith. The application of sanctions has multiplied profusely in recent years, and risks alienating a future generation of leaders who feel themselves cut off from and alien to the West. The United States must be mindful that future shifts in how Russia is governed and who is leading it are at most two decades away, and work towards dealing not just with Moscow today, but with the leaders of the future.”

“Germany’s bridges to Russia split open Europe,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 02.15.21. The author, Europe editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “In a newspaper interview, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s president, defended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, intended to deliver Russian gas to Germany across the Baltic Sea, as one of the few bridges between Russia and Europe in an otherwise deteriorating diplomatic and security climate. Steinmeier went on to say that ‘for us Germans, there is another dimension’—the more than 20 million Soviet people killed in the second world war.”
• “The trouble with Steinmeier’s defense of Nord Stream 2 as repayment of a moral debt to Russia is that the president made no mention of other countries laid waste between 1939 and 1945 at Nazi hands. … Russians are not the sole successor nation [to the USSR] in terms of moral debts, as Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin was quick to point out.”
• “The striking feature of Germany’s engagement with Russia is its broad cross-party support. Chancellor Angela Merkel has kept EU sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and armed intervention in southeastern Ukraine, but she is supportive of Nord Stream 2. … Heiko Maas, Germany’s Social Democratic foreign minister, defends Berlin’s dealings with Moscow on the grounds that Western countries must take care not to push Russia into closer economic and military cooperation with China. … [R]ightwing populist Alternative for Germany and the leftist Die Linke parties … disagree with the CDU and SPD on most things, but not on reaching out to Russia.”
• “Yet what is the Kremlin giving Germany in return? The Bundestag was the target of a cyber attack in 2015 that the German authorities blamed on Russia. Four years later, an exiled Chechen rebel leader was murdered in Berlin on what prosecutors say were the Russian government’s orders.”
• “In short, the argument that a close economic and energy relationship with Russia brings dividends in European security appears shaky, at least in the Putin era. The question German politicians should ask themselves is … whether Nord Stream 2 and other bridges to Russia are achieving any worthwhile results.”

“EU support for Russian democracy is inadequate,” Constanze Stelzenmüller, Financial Times, 02.09.21. The author, a German international relations analyst, policy and law scholar and journalist, writes:

• “’A very complicated visit,’ was the verdict of the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on his trip to Moscow last week to protest at the jailing of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. In a statement published on Sunday, he added: ‘An aggressively-staged press conference and the expulsion of three EU diplomats during my visit indicate that the Russian authorities did not want to seize this opportunity to have a more constructive dialogue with the EU.’”
• “To be fair, Borrell’s disastrous sally was only one in a series of inadequate and incoherent European responses to the repression of Russia-wide demonstrations of as many as 120,000 people which culminated in the arrests of at least 10,000 protesters.”
• “It is time to shift the focus of Europe’s Russia policy: away from diplomats and pipelines, to principles and people. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe, and of the European Convention on Human Rights. Violations of human rights in Russia are therefore the business of all Europeans. Direct support for Russian civil society could backfire given Putin’s well-known paranoia about foreign interference. Europeans should make it clear that what they are offering is solidarity with the desire of Russians for decent governance—on their terms, not ours.”
• “Generous stipends and visas for Russian students to study in Europe would be a disinterested and practical gesture. … Even more importantly, European governments should target the assets and estates that Putin’s henchmen and oligarch enablers have amassed in Europe.”
• “Lastly, we Europeans need to crack down hard on the tools that the Kremlin uses to weaken our own democracies and to divide us: propaganda, disinformation, cyberaggression and corruption. Germany should also suspend Nord Stream 2, or at least signal that it would not veto European sanctions against it.”

“How Russia Deals With the West After Navalny's Jailing,” Vladimir Frolov, The Moscow Times, 02.10.21. The author, a Russian political analyst and columnist, writes:

• “Moscow—facing a crisis over the poisoning and arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny—has settled on a strategy for future relations with the collective West that can be summed up as follows: ‘Forgive the United States, ignore France and punish Germany—via the European Union.’”
• “Navalny’s arrest and earlier poisoning…create an awkward political situation for Western leaders. They cannot have any dealings with senior Russian officials without also demanding the release of the Russian opposition leader.”
• “Thus, Russian diplomacy now has the task of making the Navalny case seem as routine as possible. … The main thing is to avoid letting the West use the Navalny issue as a means for prying into and meddling with Russia’s domestic affairs and politics.
• “With the U.S., Moscow has opted to restore systematic, high-level diplomatic relations and high profile formats of interaction, including a mechanism for the two presidents to meet on a regular basis. … Ignoring France is a simple strategy that requires of Moscow little more than exercising restraint in how it assesses French President Emmanuel Macron’s policies and the situation in the country.”
• “Moscow understands that Navalny’s stay in Germany creates a moral and political obligation for Merkel to interfere further in Russia’s internal affairs. In the Kremlin’s view, this jeopardizes for the foreseeable future the key foreign policy goal of ensuring Russia’s ‘full sovereignty from outside influence.’ The Kremlin’s solution to this dilemma is to discredit Merkel personally while leaving the door open for a pragmatic dialogue with the future German leadership. … Because Germany plays a leading role in the European Union and Berlin promotes a unified European response to Navalny’s poisoning, Moscow feels it must mount a tough response to punish the EU.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“A new survey of the Ukraine-Russia conflict finds deeply divided views in the contested Donbas region,” John O'Loughlin, Gwendolyn Sasse, Gerard Toal and Kristin M. Bakke, The Washington Post, 02.12.21. The authors of the article write:

• “After nearly seven years of division, how do ordinary people in both parts of the Donbas feel about the situation? In a simultaneous survey in the government-controlled and breakaway areas, our research reveals two populations with very different attitudes about the war that divided them and their future territorial status.”
• “Two-thirds of the respondents in the DNR/LNR blame either the Ukrainian government or the West for the war. By contrast, most in the Kyiv-controlled territories attribute blame equally to their own government and to Russia.”
• “In Kyiv-controlled Donbas, a strong majority thinks that the separatist regions should be returned to Ukraine without any special consideration of autonomy. In contrast, in the breakaway territory controlled by the DPR/LNR and funded by Russia, over half of the respondents want to join Russia, either with or without some autonomous status. Less than one-tenth want independence and only 12 percent want to be reintegrated into Ukraine.”
• “What these latest results suggests is that time may be on the side of those who want this conflict. The longer the war simmers, the more partition endures, the wider the divide becomes.”

“Dilemmas of Aiding Ukraine,” Henrik Larsen, Survival, February 2021. The author, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zürich), writes:

• “In view of the West’s experience with Ukraine since 2014, governments and institutions considering extending major support to a state undergoing significant political change must make a sound assessment of the geopolitical importance of doing so and long-term sustainability of the effort. Approaches that are initially conservative or agnostic have the advantage of preserving the option of retraction, while a substantial commitment of financial aid and political prestige at the outset can lead to self-perpetuating frustration.”
• “The EU and the United States from an early stage showed solidarity with the Maidan Revolution, which gave them a stake in its success, especially in the face of Russian aggression. Ukrainian elites, however, perceived in Western benefactors a greater interest in bolstering Ukraine against Russia than in facilitating the country’s political transformation. Since Ukraine needs the West more than the West needs Ukraine, the elites’ opportunistic disregard for Western conditionalities were self-defeating for the country as a whole. Be that as it may, had Western benefactors sought political transformation rather than mere economic stabilization from the beginning, and calibrated their conditionalities accordingly, they would not have incentivized their Ukrainian beneficiaries to backslide so cynically.”
• “The IMF, the United States and the EU continue to hold considerable sway over key aspects of Ukraine’s transition. To retain it, they must provide consistent signals that their support is not open-ended but rather conditioned on socially and politically meaningful reforms, such as state accountability and the return of oligopolistic rent and stolen assets to the national treasury. Ukraine cannot afford more failure, and it falls to its international benefactors to devise the right incentives for avoiding it.”

“Russian Speaking Patriotism in Ukraine: Under-Researched and Misunderstood,” Taras Kuzio, NYU Jordan Center, February 2020. The author, a professor in the department of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, writes:

• “Five factors explain the failure of Putin’s ‘New Russia’ project and clarify why Ukraine did not disintegrate in 2014 despite pressure from the Russian military and hybrid warfare. … First, post-Soviet studies of Ukraine’s regional diversity ignored the impact of Soviet rule, which had brought Ukrainians together within a Soviet-Ukrainian homeland, albeit as part of the USSR. Soviet Ukrainian civic patriotism and national communism, as well as dissident patriotism and nationalism, were perennial problems for Moscow.”
• “Second, the traditional division of Ukraine into four areas—West, Center, East and South—in both Western and internal Ukrainian surveys has historically been problematic.”
• “Third, anti-(Euro)maidan protests transformed into armed insurgency in only two regions — Crimea and Donbas. This outcome is correlated with the fact that these two regions were always different from the remainder of Eastern and Southern Ukraine in having 30-40% support for ‘separatism.’”
• “Fourth, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, which stands at the core of Putin’s ‘Russian World,’ was often misunderstood. Journalistic and scholarly descriptions of Ukraine that separated it into a ‘Catholic West’ and ‘Russian Orthodox East’ were wrong, since the majority of Orthodox parishes are located in Central and Western Ukraine. In the Donbas, Protestants were nearly as numerous as Russian Orthodox parishes prior to 2014.”
• “Fifth, the terms ‘New Russia’ and ‘Russian World’ were nebulous and often misunderstood in both the East and South of Ukraine. It is  long overdue for Western scholars to come to appreciate and study the phenomenon of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism in order to better understand the Russian-Ukrainian war and how national identity and regional configurations are changing in Ukraine.”

Belarus:

“Is Lukashenko Really Ready to Reform Belarus?” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.16.21. The author, a Belarusian political analyst, writes:

• “Six months after the contested presidential election that sparked mass protests across Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko has presented a plan for overcoming the crisis. … The lack of concrete detail in the plan will still allow Lukashenko to cling to power if he wants to—and if circumstances allow. But there is at least a timeline now for a referendum on a new constitution: the start of 2022.”
• “While outlining constitutional reform that would delegate authority to other branches of power, Lukashenko called for the preservation of a presidential republic, and for the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly to be enshrined in the constitution to ensure stability during the transition period. Lukashenko … also laid down the conditions for his departure: no unrest, and written safety guarantees for his supporters.”
• “The embattled president is dragging out the constitutional reform because he feels that his position is more secure now than back in the fall. … Lukashenko does not believe that he needs to make a deal with anyone inside Belarus.”
• “Now Moscow faces the question of how to respond to procrastination over that process. On the one hand, the Belarusian protests have subsided, and—if public opinion were ignored—it might seem that the crisis has passed, leaving no leverage over Lukashenko. On the other hand, Lukashenko cannot fail to ask for more money. In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a loan of $1.5 billion, of which $1 billion has already been disbursed. Ahead of the upcoming meeting in Sochi at the end of February, Minsk has asked for another $3 billion, according to Kommersant newspaper.”
• “For Russia, showing unequivocal solidarity with Lukashenko will mean that it won’t just be revolutionary energy gathering pace beneath that surface, but anti-Russian sentiment too.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Unfinished Business in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict,” Thomas de Waal, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.11.21. The author, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, writes:

• “The November trilateral agreement radically changes the geopolitical configuration of the region, giving Moscow a central role it last held in the Soviet era three decades ago. As a result of the agreement, a Russian peacekeeping mission of 1,960 men was deployed to both Karabakh and the Lachin corridor between Karabakh and Armenia for an initial five years, with the possibility of renewal.”
• “Russia has little reason to push for a rapid normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan that could call time on its peacekeeping mission. Yet it also needs to see sufficient stabilization of relations between the two countries to facilitate its other agenda—the restoration of transport links, which connect Russia by road and rail to Armenia, Iran and Turkey but bypass Georgia, with its high mountain roads and pro-Western orientation.”
• “Furthermore, some Russians will see good reason for rapprochement with Turkey to pursue a shared aim of limiting Western involvement in the region. Yet Moscow will also want to share responsibility for the threats the conflict still poses and the costs of reconstruction, and therefore has a rationale to continue to be a multilateral actor, working together with Western powers.”