This Week's Highlights:

• There is a growing certainty in the West that Russia has adopted an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear strategy, but the evidence of a dropped threshold for Russian nuclear use is weak, according to Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy. Bruno Tertrais agrees, noting that no known large-scale Russian military exercise has included simulation of nuclear-weapons use nuclear-weapons use for at least a decade.
• Vladimir Putin told Shimon Peres back in 2016 that the reason for Russia’s annexation of Crimea was to keep its neighbor out of NATO. “I didn’t care [about Crimea being part of Ukraine], until … you needed the Ukrainians in NATO. What for? I didn’t touch them,” he said, according to Benn Steil.
• Even if Russia’s interference in the 2016 election exploited new technologies, it was “fundamentally old-school espionage,” writes Scott Shane. One 30-year veteran of the CIA told him: “‘If you ask an intelligence officer, did the Russians break the rules or do something bizarre, the answer is no, not at all…’” According to Dmitri Trenin, “while RT and Sputnik were hardly friendly to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, their activities, alongside those of any number of suspected Russian hackers and their partners, were not more than a drop in the ocean.” University of Chicago economist Konstantin Sonin holds a similar view: “I still don't see a mechanism through which an operation on a $5 million scale can seriously affect the outcome of a campaign in which one side spent $600 million and the other more than $1 billion.”
• “We are not watching Cold War, the sequel,” according to Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronski. “The Kremlin doesn’t want to run the world.”
• In crisis situations, like the one defused recently after reports that a U.S. airstrike killed Russians in Syria, apologizing can be perhaps the riskiest way to defuse a crisis, according to Austin Carson.
• Ukraine’s future depends “as much on winning its internal war on corruption and fixing its broken government as on keeping Russia contained in the east,” according to Melinda Haring and Maxim Eristavi. Andrew Higgins reports on some relevant examples—namely, on a surge in military spending that has fueled corruption in Ukraine, where officials and businessmen are “often the same people” and the Defense Ministry has been paying suspiciously exorbitant sums for ambulances.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Russia’s Clash With the West Is About Geography, Not Ideology. The Marshall Plan recognized the limits of U.S. power in Europe. To be successful, so must diplomacy with Moscow today,” Benn Steil, Foreign Policy, 02.12.18: The author, the director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that the West’s conflict with Russia derives from the misconception that “the Cold War had been driven by ideology and not geography.” The “eternal fear of invasion drove [Russia’s] foreign policy then and continues to do so now… No mountain ranges or bodies of water protected its western borders. For centuries, it suffered repeated invasions. That landscape and history encouraged the emergence of a highly centralized and autocratic leadership obsessed with internal and external security.” The author continues: “Putin’s views are perhaps best captured by a private conversation he had with the former Israeli leader Shimon Peres shortly before the latter’s death, in 2016. ‘What do [the Americans] need NATO for?’ Peres recalled him asking. ‘Which army do they want to fight? They think I didn’t know that Crimea is Russian, and that Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine as a gift? I didn’t care, until then you needed the Ukrainians in NATO. What for? I didn’t touch them.’ These are not the words of an ideologue. … Western leaders do not need to sympathize with Russia, but if they wish to make effective foreign policies, they do need to understand it. Communism may have vanished from Europe, but the region’s geography has not changed. Russia is, as it has always been, too large and powerful to embed within Western institutions without fundamentally changing them and too vulnerable to Western encroachment to acquiesce in its own exclusion.”

“The Disruptor,” Dmitri Trenin, Security Times, 02.16.18: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “Today, Russia is variously and officially described in the United States as a competitor, rival or adversary—but not yet the enemy, a title implying war. … Three of the U.S. Government’s guiding documents—the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review—adopted in the last six weeks point to great-power rivalry as a salient feature of the global geopolitical and security landscape. While Russia is no longer America’s principal challenger—that title has gone to China—it is considered to be the main disruptor of the liberal world order designed, led and policed by Washington. … However, it would be quite a stretch to claim that Russia has the power to do much political disruption within Western countries. While RT and Sputnik were hardly friendly to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, their activities, alongside those of any number of suspected Russian hackers and their partners, were not more than a drop in the ocean. Indeed, blaming Russia for all sorts of recent disappointments, including the Brexit vote and the strong electoral performance of some of non-systemic parties in Europe, from Germany’s AfD to the Austrian FPÖ to France’s Front National, works to downplay the failures of the ruling elites in various countries to respond to the fast-moving changes in their own societies." In championing voices of dissent in Western countries, the author writes, “Russians are aiming to do to the West something akin to what the Voice of America or Deutsche Welle did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War: promote local alternatives to not only official government policies, but the established political narratives as well. This is an undeniable irritant, yet Russia is hardly the creator of the divisions it tries to fan.”

“The (Former) Soviet Empire Strikes Back,” Richard Sokolsky, Paul Stronski, National Interest, 02.13.18: The authors, fellows at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, write: “It took quite a while but the Trump administration, in the recently released National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, is finally talking about Russia as a strategic competitor. But before the national-security bureaucracy gathers a head of steam to wage Cold War 2.0, Washington should take a deep collective breath and approach this challenge with patience, realism, prudence and restraint to avoid overreaching as it seeks to protect core American interests. … Russia’s global activism is deeply rooted in Putin’s vision of what he wants the world to look like and Russia’s global role and position in this world. Moscow is not doing this, moreover, just because it resents the West’s power and wants to undermine Western democratic, security and economic institutions, although it certainly does. Russia is also going global because of its lackluster economy at home and desire for more business abroad—and because being seen as the U.S. equal on the global stage and standing up to America is good politics. … It is important to remember that the Kremlin is not operating from some master plan and we are not watching Cold War, the sequel. The Kremlin doesn’t want to run the world.”

“The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,” Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, War on the Rocks, 02.20.18: The authors—the director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an arms control and nonproliferation consultant at PIR Center, Moscow, respectively—write: “There is a growing certainty in the West that Russia has adopted an ‘escalate to de-escalate’  nuclear strategy, which lowers the bar for nuclear weapons use to a terrifyingly low level. Importantly, it’s referenced as fact in the Trump administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review, which argues that the United States itself therefore needs new low-yield nuclear weapons to deter Russia at lower levels of conflict. But the evidence of a dropped threshold for Russian nuclear employment is weak. Moreover, even if this was Russia’s doctrine, a shift to more American reliance on lower-yield nuclear weapons would be the wrong solution to the problem. … To this day, Russian ‘escalation’ advocates occasionally publish an article, still hoping to change the policy—but continue to fail. … Nor does Russian doctrine call for the use of nuclear weapons if Moscow is losing a conventional conflict. … Russian exercises, brinkmanship and occasional saber rattling are  meant in part to remind the United States (and NATO) that major nuclear powers do not fight wars with each other because the dangers of doing so are simply too great… So how should the United States be responding to Russia’s nuclear strategy? The best prescription seems to be sticking to conventional weapons to fight and deter conventional wars while relying on existing robust nuclear arsenals to deter nuclear attack.”

“Does Russia really include limited nuclear strikes in its large-scale military exercises? Bruno Tertrais,” IISS, 02.15.18: The author, deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, writes that the dominant narrative about Russia’s nuclear strategy, “that Moscow is getting ready to use low-yield, theater nuclear weapons to stop NATO from defeating Russia’s forces,” relies on “weak evidence—and there is strong evidence to counter most" such claims. The author continues: “Exercises are important in understanding Russian nuclear posture, because, as the saying goes, Moscow trains as it fights and fights as it trains. So what do large-scale ones such as Zapad (Western front) and Vostok (Eastern front) tell us? What they tell us is that the last time a Zapad included nuclear use was almost 20 years ago, in 1999—Russia was explicit about it—and that no known large-scale theater military exercise has included nuclear-weapons use for at least a decade. This is unsurprising: Russia now ‘wins’—or at least ‘resists’—without nuclear weapons. It would not make sense for Russia to hide a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons or a low nuclear threshold—because it knows that this is what scares us.”

“Possible Scenarios of Russian Intervention in Latvia," Janis Berzins, American Enterprise Institute, 02.12.18: The author, a senior fellow at the Potomac Foundation, writes: “The threats Russia poses in Latvia vary from ongoing, low-level political support for pro-Russian candidates to unlikely but possible outright invasion aimed at creating a land bridge between the Russian mainland and the exclave of Kaliningrad. … Russia’s Achilles’ heel is Kaliningrad, which is separated from the mainland by Lithuania. Therefore, in a conventional military operation, the probable objective would be to establish a corridor to connect Kaliningrad with mainland Russia using the Baltic States. … To achieve this objective, it would be necessary to launch an operation focusing mostly on Latvia and Lithuania while using enough forces to keep the Estonian military busy and dissuade it from helping its southern neighbors. … Building up societal awareness of and resistance to Russian political subversion and increasing military deterrence are the best ways to resist potential Russian aggression.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“Unintended Escalation: 5 Lessons From Israel for the Russia-NATO Standoff,” Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, Russia Matters, 02.14.18: The author, a professor at the Lauder School of Government, writes that Israel’s unplanned military conflicts in 2006 and 2014 offer lessons in managing the ongoing tensions between Russia and NATO—and particularly in what to do if tensions spiral out of control into an unintended conflict. In conducting their postmortems of the unplanned wars with Hamas and Hezbollah, Israeli strategists found a handful of patterns: “Adversaries tend to demonize each other and see one another as intentionally challenging the status quo. When the situation began escalating from tactical accidents to major operation, both sides perceived the other as the aggressor and attributed to each other much more ambitious combat aims and operational intentions than they actually had. … Intelligence-based early warnings proved irrelevant. Unintended escalation is neither an aggressive intent nor a war plan. Therefore, it can neither be deterred nor anticipated, and preparations for it are nonexistent. … Escalation was not slow and gradual, but rapid and full-blown. … The termination mechanism leading to de-escalation was cumbersome, as an awareness that the fighting is unintended is a necessary but insufficient condition for de-escalation. … The main takeaway from the Israeli experience for decision makers on both sides of the Russia-NATO standoff should be a demand to constantly cross-check their assumptions about the adversary.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“The Nuclear Posture Review signals a new arms race,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post, 02.13.18: The author, the editor and publisher of the Nation magazine, writes: “Despite numerous close calls and false alarms, the world has avoided a nuclear war since the start of the Cold War. The Nuclear Posture Review suggests that nuclear weapons make violence less likely. … In reality, the world will either find a way to get rid of nuclear weapons completely or they will eventually be used, either intentionally or by mistake. This reality deserves greater attention in the media and Congress. We need to revive momentum for reducing nuclear weapons, not for ‘modernizing’ them.”

“Another arms race? No and nyet," Maggie Tennis and Strobe Talbott, Brookings, 02.20.18: The authors, a research assistant and distinguished fellow at the Brookings Institution, write that President Trump “ignores America’s responsibility since the dawn of the atomic age to avoid Armageddon and maintain a commitment to arms control and nonproliferation.” They continue: “His words suggest willingness in both the administration and Congress to risk key nuclear treaties, like the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty, for the sake of muscle-flexing and displays of military might. This trend is misguided, and ruinous. Without concerted efforts to maintain INF and New START, the arms control regime could fall apart.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia and the U.S. just defused a potential crisis in Syria—and showed us how to back away from a war,” Austin Carson, Washington Post, 02.20.18: The author, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, writes that the recent reported deaths of dozens of Russians in Syria at the hands of U.S.-backed Syrian forces “reminds us that the fog of war is hazardous [and] … illustrates one way that adversaries, tacitly or explicitly, can cooperate to minimize the danger of escalation.” The author outlines several strategies to prevent an incident like the one in Syria from escalating out of control: “Keep it on the down low. … Distance governments from the incident. … By framing an incident as unofficial or accidental, authorities can disperse media coverage, reduce domestic controversy and decouple the government's reputation from the incident. … Admit and apologize. A third option is to express diplomatic regret and try to move diplomacy forward… Apologizing can be a very risky way—perhaps the riskiest—to defuse a crisis.” History also offers lessons for averting an escalating conflict: “First, very few incidents are like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, quickly exploding from local to international—and leaders can shape what happens, as the United States and Russia just did with the Syria incident. … A gloomier lesson is that knowing such techniques can invite leaders to meddle overseas, confident that a dangerous clash can be defused.”

“U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC Casualties in Syria—Fact vs Fiction,” Michael Kofman’s Blog, 02.14.18:  The author, a senior research scientist at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center, seeks to address inaccuracies regarding reports of large-scale Russian casualties in a U.S. strike on an advancing column of Syrian forces in early February. Actual casualties among PMCs (mercenaries working for private military companies), the author writes, “are likely somewhere on the order of 13-15 dead and a relatively equal number wounded. Closer to a dozen than dozens.” He continues: “According to DoD statements … the attacking force approximated ‘300 pro-regime forces’ in a surprise push towards SDF positions on February 7. Thus, the fantastic figures of hundreds dead, including Igor Girkin’s 644, can be safely thrown out the window. … The exact reason for why this episode took place is naturally unclear, but it may be connected to the overall friction between Syrian forces wanting to seize energy infrastructure, gas and oil from SDF forces. The latter took it from ISIS, and of course need the resources, just as the Syrian regime needs the money to sustain a rump state. There are also Russian interests there looming in the background, among people interested in contracts handling Syrian energy extraction post-conflict, and hoping that PMCs can secure potential energy cash cows. This episode may be due to poor coordination, deliberate probing, or as often happens in war—a confluence of events yields compound risk as mistakes and misjudgments stack.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Stop Letting the Russians Get Away With It, Mr. Trump,” New York Times editorial, 02.16.18: The Times editorial board writes: “For the past year, Donald Trump has repeatedly denied the existence of a profound national security threat. … On Friday, Robert Mueller, the special counsel investigating Russia’s role in the 2016 election, filed criminal charges of fraud and identity theft against 13 Russian citizens and three Russian organizations, all alleged to have operated a sophisticated influence campaign intended to ‘sow discord in the U.S. political system.’ … The question is whether Mr. Trump will at last accept the fact of Russian interference and take aggressive measures to protect American democracy. For starters, he could impose the sanctions on Russia that Congress overwhelmingly passed, and that he signed into law, last summer. Of course, this would require him to overcome his mysterious resistance to acting against Russia and to focus on protecting his own country.”

“Russia Isn’t the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do It, Too,” Scott Shane, New York Times, 02.17.18: The author, the newspaper’s national security reporter and a former Moscow correspondent, writes that the U.S. has its own long history of meddling in foreign elections. “Bags of cash delivered to a Rome hotel for favored Italian candidates. Scandalous stories leaked to foreign newspapers to swing an election in Nicaragua. Millions of pamphlets, posters and stickers printed to defeat an incumbent in Serbia. The long arm of Vladimir Putin? No, just a small sample of the United States’ history of intervention in foreign elections. … Most Americans are understandably shocked by what they view as an unprecedented attack on our political system. But intelligence veterans, and scholars who have studied covert operations, have a different, and quite revealing, view. ‘If you ask an intelligence officer, did the Russians break the rules or do something bizarre, the answer is no, not at all,’ said Steven L. Hall, who retired in 2015 after 30 years at the C.I.A., where he was the chief of Russian operations. The United States ‘absolutely’ has carried out such election influence operations historically, he said, ‘and I hope we keep doing it.’… This broader history of election meddling has largely been missing from the flood of reporting on the Russian intervention and the investigation of whether the Trump campaign was involved. It is a reminder that the Russian campaign in 2016 was fundamentally old-school espionage, even if it exploited new technologies.” American influence operations are often couched in terms like “promoting democracy,” the author writes. “What does [promoting] democracy mean? Can it include secretly undermining an authoritarian ruler or helping challengers who embrace democratic values? How about financing civic organizations? … Most Americans view such efforts as benign—indeed, charitable. But Mr. Putin sees them as hostile.”

“President Trump, I'm Russian and I'm Not Laughing: I fear the indictment of Russian internet trolls may lead to less freedom for both Americans and Russians,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 02.19.18: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes that the indictment of 13 Russians for attempting to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election raises concerns about “U.S.-Russian relations and ... attitudes toward free speech.” The author continues: “As economist Konstantin Sonin, a University of Chicago professor, posted on Facebook, ‘I still don't see a mechanism through which an operation on a $5 million scale can seriously affect the outcome of a campaign in which one side spent $600 million and the other more than $1 billion.’ … Limiting foreigners' ability to troll U.S. politicians, or even the political process as a whole, could be the first step toward doing the same for Americans. The next time someone rolls out a cage containing an actor impersonating a presidential candidate, it could be seen as a legitimate reason to investigate. … The other reason I'm not laughing is that the U.S. is on the verge of a misunderstanding that can be dangerous to me as a Russian citizen and to millions of other Russians living, working or just traveling in the West. … The Internet Research Agency trolls got visas to travel to the U.S. for personal reasons, but instead, according to the indictment, they ‘gathered intelligence.’ The obvious next step for the U.S. is to decide that, since so many Russians work for the regime in unofficial capacities, all Russians are automatically suspect.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Restoring equilibrium: U.S. policy options for countering and engaging Russia,” Sergey Aleksashenko, Pavel K. Baev, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Steven Pifer, Alina Polyakova, Angela Stent, Strobe Talbott, Thomas Wright, Torrey Taussig and Bruce Jones, Brookings, February 2018: The authors, foreign policy experts affiliated with the Brookings Institution, write: “Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy is driven by a zero-sum worldview that sees the liberal international order as inherently threatening to his political regime. As a result, agreement—or even mutual understanding—between Russia and the West over fundamental security issues, such as the future of NATO, is unlikely while Putin remains in the Kremlin. … A core strategic challenge for the United States is to restore equilibrium in theaters of political and hybrid warfare. This may require countermeasures such as intensified economic sanctions and offensive measures to expose Kremlin-implicated corruption. Deterrence of Russia’s revisionist conduct can be achieved only if the West signals credibly that it has the capacity and will to impose serious costs, and assumes some risks of escalation. … At the same time, the United States and Europe should combine pressure with an openness to cooperation on discrete issues of common interest. This could include a high-level U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability. At a minimum, the United States and Russia should maintain channels to reduce the possibility of inadvertent escalation, particularly where the two countries’ militaries are operating in close proximity. And the United States should signal its willingness, over time, to improve relations with Russia if Moscow reconsiders its revanchism.”

“Why Trump’s Bid to Improve U.S.-Russian Relations Backfired in Congress,” Mikhail Alexseev, PONARS, February 2018: The author, a professor of political science at San Diego State University, writes: “One should not interpret Congressional support for Russia sanctions as a side effect of the multi-faceted Russiagate scandal. … [P]ublic opinion polarization about Putin, Russia, election meddling, and the sanctions produced no additional action on the part of Republicans (who dominate Congress). If Russiagate contributed to anti-Trump bipartisanship on sanctions it was through the incentivizing of Democrats—who in fact had generally been softer on Russia than the Republicans prior to the 2016 elections—to toughen their stand and to combine it with the drive to thoroughly investigate Russia’s putative role in Trump’s victory.” Congress’ independent approach on Russia, the author writes, shows that “despite the fragmentation of news consumption along ideological divides, U.S. legislators are capable of forming consistent positions on national security threats and finding the inputs of the U.S. intelligence officers valuable. Above and beyond, the ongoing executive-legislative sagas demonstrate that the U.S. Constitution is alive and well and that Congressional decision-making implications are worth analyzing thoroughly if the course of U.S. foreign policy is to be assessed presciently.”

“If You Want to Shame Russia, Words Aren't Enough,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, National Interest, 02.13.18: The author, a professor at the Naval War College and contributing editor to the National Interest, writes: “Walter Lippman’s advice remains as relevant today as it did seventy years ago: when it comes to Russia, we cannot have an imbalance between our statements and our actions. Haphazard sanctions, military gestures and grand statements will neither deter Russia nor bring about a change in action. We must either rightsize the rhetoric to align with the punitive force we are willing to employ, or sit down and bargain, from a position of strength, acceptable compromises.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“Building a New Ukraine; Since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, we've made great progress. But much remains to be done,” Volodymyr Groysman, Wall Street Journal, 02.19.18: The author, prime minister of Ukraine, writes that the country has made considerable progress in recent years: “In addressing the challenge of transforming the country into a modern, democratic European state, in only a short period of time we stabilized the economy and have sustained two consecutive years of growth in gross domestic product. Indeed, more has been done to reform the country in the past four years than at any time since independence in 1991.  Major improvements continue. … It is now vital to sustain and build on these positive trends. To catch up with the leading countries in our region, we need to grow twice as fast as the average—at least 5% to 7% per year. … We will continue to fight for this future. Ukraine has the chance to become a better state for its citizens, a stronger partner for its international allies and an attractive destination for investors.”

“Can Ukraine Win Its War on Corruption? What's Ahead for the Country's Reform Movement,” Melinda Haring and Maxim Eristavi, Foreign Affairs, 02.15.18.

“Crooked Deals As Kiev Fuels War Machine,” Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 02.19.18: The author, the newspaper’s Moscow correspondent, writes that Ukraine's “soaring” spending on defense and security since the conflict in the east started in 2014, is fueling corruption. “[B]y pumping so much money through the hands of Ukrainian officials and businessmen—often the same people—the surge in military spending has also held back efforts to defeat the corruption and self-dealing that many see as Ukraine's most dangerous enemy. … The problem has throttled the hopes raised in February 2014 by the ouster of Ukraine's notoriously corrupt, pro-Russian former president, Viktor F. Yanukovych. It has also left the country's dispirited Western backers and many Ukrainians wondering what, after two revolutions since independence in 1991, it will take to curb the chronic corruption. … A report last year by the Independent Defense Anti-Corruption Committee said that each [military ambulance], whose chassis is Chinese made, had cost the Ukrainian Defense Ministry $32,000, much more than an ambulance imported from China would cost, and could carry only 800 pounds, far too little for a vehicle that would need a driver, armed guards and medical staff.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“More than a year after the dictator’s death, Tashkent may be coming in from the cold,” Neil Buckley, Financial Times, 02.13.18: The author, a correspondent for the newspaper, writes: “An Uzbek spring could have big consequences. A strategically important regional linchpin, 32-million-strong Uzbekistan is the most populous of Central Asia’s ex-Soviet republics and the only one that borders all the others—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—as well as Afghanistan. … If its reforms deepen, it may show a region dominated by aging authoritarian leaders that political change is possible when they die. As well as promoting integration of … [the] region, an easing of [former dictator Islam] Karimov’s paranoid isolationism could make Uzbekistan a player in the ‘New Great Game,’ the jostling between Russia, China and the U.S. for influence over the heart of Eurasia.” For now, the changes instituted by [new President] Shavkat Mirziyoyev “are more economic than political, and his commitment to real political liberalization remains unclear. … [His] main achievement so far has been to shine a light on public officials through the website for citizen grievances and similar initiatives for lower and regional bodies.”

“The Karabakh Conflict as “Project Minimum” Thomas de Waal, Carnegie Endowment, 02.20.18: The author, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, writes: “Moscow has never pulled the strings in the Karabakh conflict, but it remains the most influential outside actor. … Essentially, the Russian position is: We would like to see the Karabakh conflict resolved, especially if that can preserve or enhance Russian influence in the region, but we will not try to impose a resolution, as that will only damage our relationships with Baku and Yerevan. … That position means Moscow can continue to make promises to both sides and even earn millions selling both of them weapons which they point against each other. … Russia’s strategy … sets the tone for overall international engagement with a conflict universally perceived as being intractable. It can be described as ‘Project Minimum.’”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Surprising Success of Putinomics. Behind Putin's Formula for Holding Onto Power,” Chris Miller, Foreign Affairs, 02.07.18.

“Putin’s poll rivals gain a platform but cannot win,” Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, 02.13.18: The author, a correspondent for the newspaper, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s campaign planners hope the participation of rival candidates “will create enough of a semblance of democracy to bring the apathetic out to the polls, securing a turnout of at least 70 percent.” Beyond this purpose,” the author writes, “even government officials view the arrangement with open cynicism. ‘Of course our elections are still a bit more democratic than in the Soviet Union. A bit like they used to be in the GDR [the former East Germany],’ jokes an official in the presidential administration. ‘They had their raft of token political parties that were all in fact in the [ruling] SED’s pocket. Of course some of those may have had noble goals.’”

“Estonian Spies Understand the Russian Threat. Finally, a comprehensive look at Putin's ambitions backed by real expertise,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 02.13.18: The author, a columnist and long-time Russia watcher, writes that the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s latest annual report accurately identifies several challenges facing the Putin regime, including a younger generation increasingly irritated by its corruption “as symbolized by the lavish lifestyles of senior officials.” The report, the author writes, also correctly determines that the “Kremlin's propaganda monopoly is finding it increasingly difficult to control the narrative in the internet age. And it stresses the strong regional aspect of the growing opposition. Wealth is not spreading evenly throughout the nation's vast territory, to say the least.” While the Estonian report “predicts that Western economic sanctions will shave off 1 percent of Russia’s economic output this year, it argues that the sanctions provide significant political cover for Putin's failure in this realm.” Regarding Ukraine, the report notes that any “seemingly promising Russian proposals—such as the one dealing with the introduction of a peacekeeping force to eastern Ukraine—are only aimed at “making the conflict more entrenched.” The one shortcoming of the report, in the author’s view, is that “it overestimates the Kremlin's exposure to the activities of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and ... the Western sanctions.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.