3 Ideas to Explore

1. Senior American and Russian officials agreed on Feb. 18 to establish high-level teams to work toward ending the war in Ukraine and finding a path toward normalizing relations, in the most extensive bilateral negotiations in more than three years, according to NYT. After the 4.5 hours of talks, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio described a three-step plan for what the U.S. and Russia planned to do next, NYT reported. First, he said, both countries would negotiate how to remove restrictions placed on each other’s embassies in Moscow and Washington. In addition, he said, the U.S. would engage with Russia about “parameters of what an end” to the Ukraine war would look like. “There’s going to be engagement and consultation with Ukraine, with our partners in Europe and others,” Rubio was quoted by NYT as saying. And finally, he said, Russia and the U.S. would explore new “historic” partnerships, both in geopolitics and in business.¹
   1. After the talks, Trump’s national security adviser Waltz suggested Ukraine's government would have a say, calling it "common sense" that "if you're going to bring both sides together, you have to talk to both sides,” according to CBS. "We are absolutely talking to both sides," Waltz said.
   2. After the talks, Trump’s envoy Witkoff said the U.S has consulted Zelenskyy and Macron, and that the EU was “going to have to be at the table at some point because they have sanctions as well that have been imposed.” But the Russian foreign ministry ruled out a role for Europe in the Ukraine talks and demanded NATO rescind an open-ended 2008 invitation to Kyiv, as it said Moscow was “categorically opposed” to a European peacekeeping deployment, NYT reported.
   3. After the talks Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the discussions were “not bad,” NYT reported. Ushakov said the exact date of the meeting between Putin and Trump has not yet been determined, but it is unlikely to be next week, according to TASS.
   4. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the parties "not only listened, but heard each other,” according to Republic.ru. Lavrov also announced that Russia-U.S. consultations on Ukraine would now be held regularly. Lavrov also said  that he was unaware of a reported U.S. peace proposal for Ukraine that includes agreeing to a ceasefire, holding elections and signing a final peace deal. The so-called “three-stage peace plan” was allegedly proposed by both the United States and Russia, Fox News White House correspondent Jacqui Heinrich reported, citing unnamed foreign diplomatic sources.
   5. The Russian Foreign Ministry said: “agreements were reached on establishing a dialogue to agree on ways to resume cooperation in the economy, including energy, space and other areas of mutual interest.” “The parties agreed to resume communication channels on other international issues, taking into account the special responsibility of Russia and the United States in matters of peace and security as nuclear powers,” the ministry said.
   6. Russian deputy foreign minister Grushko said the Kremlin was “categorically opposed” to European troops deploying to Ukraine “no matter what their role is.” He added that such a move would be “a step towards escalation,” according to FT.
   7. Kremlin spokesman Peskov said any deal should “take into account the possibility of disputing Zelenskyy’s legitimacy” after the Ukrainian president’s term expired last year, according to FT.
   8. Pro-government Russian political analyst Markov claimed that the talks produced "no results" and that "all assessments are abstract,” according to Republic.ru. He noted that a Putin-Trump meeting has not been scheduled and that "it cannot yet be said that Russia and the U.S. are moving closer.”²
2. “A strong transatlantic relationship remains as critical today as it has for the past 75 years,” but “the way the transatlantic partners confront common challenges must change,” according to a newly-released report by the Belfer Center Task Force on Building a European Pillar within the Transatlantic Relationship, which is co-chaired by Ivo Daalder, Camille Grand and Daniela Schwarzer.³ “For Europe—and for NATO—the territorial defense of the continent will be the top priority for years to come,” the task force’s report, entitled “Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar,” argues. “Under a new and sustainable transatlantic bargain, Europeans need to augment their defense capabilities and contributions significantly to take much greater responsibility for the defense of the continent.” As for the United States, it “needs to proactively help Europe build a strong and capable European pillar both by advocating better burden sharing and facilitating a shift in responsibilities to Europe, and reducing roadblocks to European defense investment and collaboration with U.S. defense industry,” according to the report, which was published as the Munich Security Conference took place. One of MSC’s Feb. 15 panels featured Ian Bremmer, Fiona Hill, Dmytro Kuleba, Meghan O’Sullivan and David Sanger; and focused on “Adversarial Alignment.” See a summary of this panel’s analysis and recommendations below.*
3. “If Europe wants to be at the negotiating table rather than being on the menu, it is time to act with unity and clarity, rather than continuing to act surprised, divided and embarrassed,” Camile Grant writes in a commentary for ECFR. First, Europeans need to make clear that their support for Ukraine is not conditioned on continued U.S. support and can be increased.⁴ Second, Europeans need to clarify what they are ready to offer in terms of security guarantees, such as deployment of troops to Ukraine. Finally, “Putin, who probably celebrates his new status as a special negotiation partner of Washington, has not shown any signs of an openness to compromise or closing a deal soon. This creates an opportunity for Europe to shape—even partially—the terms of the deal,” according to Grand.⁵

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Russia's War in Ukraine Has Brought Iran and Belarus Closer Together," Jack Roush, War on the Rocks, 02.17.25.

• “The threat posed by cooperation on defense production between Iran and Belarus underscores the importance of continued material support for Kyiv from both Europe and the United States. Countering cooperation between these two regimes will require an intensification of diplomatic pressure, in conjunction with new efforts to enhance Western-led deterrence. With shifting strategic considerations, what began as a pragmatic relationship based on shared animosity toward and isolation from the West has evolved into a consequential international challenge, revealing the increasingly significant role of a Russian-led “multi-pariah order.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Ukrainians Fear Peace May Strand Them Forever From Lost Homes," Kim Barker, NYT, 02.17.25.

• “Bitterness has greeted suggestions that occupied territory will have to be ceded to Russia: “It’s like ripping off a man’s arm or leg and then saying, ‘Let it be as it is.’”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Russia's Advance in Ukraine Is Slowing. Here's What's Happening and Why," James Marson, Jane Lytvynenko and Andrew Barnett, WSJ, 02.16.25. 

• “The Russian army's advance in Ukraine is slowing, just as President Trump is pressing for talks.”
• “In the first month of 2025, Russia was taking on average nearly six days to occupy an area the size of Manhattan, according to data from DeepState, a Ukrainian group that monitors the front lines. That is more than twice as long as in November. Gains in February have slowed further.”
• “Russia's gains accelerated last fall, particularly in areas to the west of the occupied regional capital of Donetsk. But they have slowed over winter, in part because a lack of foliage makes infantry easy to spot and target with aerial drones, but possibly because of growing exhaustion on the Russian side, analysts said.”

"Fiercest Fighting May Be in Russia, Not Ukraine," Nanna Heitmann, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Ekaterina Bodyagina, NYT, 02.13.25. 

• “The protracted battle for the occupied Russian town of Sudzha and the surrounding countryside has unexpectedly emerged as one of the focal points of a war fought over the fate of the Ukrainian state. Both sides have committed a significant share of their limited reserves to control Sudzha, a once sleepy county seat in the Kursk region, near the two countries’ border.”
• “Both sides see Kursk as must-have territory, an important element in the expected peace talks promised by President Trump. Military analysts say the Ukrainian forces have since poured some of their best reserves into Kursk, hoping to use its conquest as a bargaining chip in negotiations.”
• “With the stakes so high, Russian soldiers fighting in Kursk believe the fighting is about to become even bloodier. “We are expecting Bakhmut 2.0,” said Hades, the Russian commander serving in Akhmat, which is made up in large part from the remnants of Wagner paramilitaries.”
  • “Bakhmut is a Ukrainian town whose ruins Wagner captured in 2023 after a nine-month assault at the cost of tens of thousands of casualties.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Armed Neutrality for Ukraine Is NATO’s Least Poor Option," Jennifer Kavanagh and Christopher McCallion, War on the Rocks, 02.18.25. 

• “[A]rmed neutrality,” would come with no foreign security guarantees, but it would not leave Ukraine defenseless. Ukraine would give up its bid for NATO and likely also E.U. membership permanently — or at least for an extended period — and the country would be turned into a bristling porcupine that would be difficult and costly for Russia to invade in the future, with impenetrable barriers and anti-tank mines on its de facto borders, strong air defense capabilities, and abundant munitions. NATO would likely never agree to commit in writing to limits on Ukraine’s alliance membership, as the alliance has long insisted that no third country has a veto over NATO membership decisions. Moscow, meanwhile, would also be unlikely to accept informal assurances from NATO given what it sees as a history of broken promises from the West. Ukraine could therefore agree to formally withdraw or indefinitely pause its NATO and E.U. membership bids as part of a larger political settlement, or could commit to non-aligned, neutral status in its constitution, as Kyiv has done in the past.”
• “As a neutral state, Ukraine would still need significant military support from the United States and Europe to build an arsenal capable of deterring Russia and defending its territory. The United States and NATO allies have limited stocks remaining and constrained defense production capacity today but, since Russia too will need time to rebuild before it can consider a renewed attack, they will have five to 10 years to help Ukraine build a credible deterrent.”
• “In addition to being Kyiv’s best option, Ukrainian armed neutrality is also the best option for NATO — especially its eastern-most members who have made Article 5 the foundation of their security. Unlike extending NATO membership to Ukraine or offering Kyiv a U.S.- or European-backed security guarantee, armed neutrality does not further threaten the credibility of the alliance’s mutual defense commitment or overburden its members with another resource-intensive and binding obligation.”

“Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered),” U.S. Department of Defense, 02.12.25.

• “As the war approaches its third anniversary, our message is clear: The bloodshed must stop.  And this war must end. President Trump has been clear with the American people – and with many of your leaders – that stopping the fighting and reaching an enduring peace is a top priority. He intends to end this war by diplomacy and bringing both Russia and Ukraine to the table.”
• “We want, like you, a sovereign and prosperous Ukraine. But we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine's pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective.”
• “A durable peace for Ukraine must include robust security guarantees to ensure that the war will not begin again. This must not be Minsk 3.0. That said, the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement. Instead any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops.”
• “If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission. And they should not covered under Article 5.      There also must be robust international oversight of the line of contact. To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine.”
• “To further enable effective diplomacy and drive down energy prices that fund the Russian war machine, President Trump is unleashing American energy production and encouraging other nations to do the same. Lower energy prices coupled with more effective enforcement of energy sanctions will help bring Russia to the table.”
• “Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine. … 2% [of GDP devoted to defense spending] is not enough; President Trump has called for 5%, and I agree. … [T]he United States will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency.  Rather, our relationship will prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security.”

"Securing Ukraine: The UK’s Challenge – It Needs to Be Done Right," Neil Melvin, RUSI February 2025. 

• “Europe should double down on the commitments that it has already made to Ukraine. At the NATO Washington summit in July 2024, President Joe Biden launched the Ukraine compact. Building on the G7 long-term security commitments to Ukraine made on the margins of the Vilnius NATO summit the previous year, the Ukraine compact brought together over 20 bilateral security commitments, including from countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This is also the framework for capability coalitions to drive the future development of Ukraine’s armed forces.”
• “The existing security compact should be Europe’s starting point for security commitments to Ukraine. European countries should now take over leadership of the compact as the principal means to provide training and weapons to Kyiv, to develop Ukraine’s defense industry, to share intelligence, and to promote interoperability. The aim should be to work with Ukraine to ensure that it has all that it needs to develop and sustain its own future force which would be capable of deterring Russia, building on its existing battle-hardened troops. This will require not just European leadership but also a long-term political and financial commitment to develop the compact further as a key mechanism of European security.”
• “A strategy, ...  that strengthens UK efforts together with others to build Ukraine’s own defense capabilities, alongside further investment in the UK commitment to northern Europe and the Atlantic would help to stretch Russian forces, preventing Moscow from concentrating on one sub-region, and would thus be a key commitment to collective European deterrence against Moscow.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Ukraine Must Guarantee Its Own Security," Emma Ashford, FA, 02.18.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:⁶

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff with Jennifer Hansler of CNN and Matthew Lee of the Associated Press," U.S. Department of State, 02.18.25.

• “[When asked: “We’re joined now by the U.S. delegation that just wrapped up their meetings with the Russians.  Are you walking away with this with any agreements for any follow-on conversations?”] Rubio said:  Well, I would start by saying we’ve agreed on four principles that I think are important.”
  • “First is that we are going to work – we’re going to point our teams’ respectively to work very quickly to reestablish the functionality of our respective missions in Washington and in Moscow.  For us to be able to continue to move down this road, we need to have diplomatic facilities that are operating and functioning normally.”
  • “The second point is that we’re going to appoint a high-level team from our end to help negotiate and walk – work through the end of the conflict in Ukraine in a way that’s enduring and acceptable to all the parties engaged.”
  • “The third point is to begin to work at a high level as well to begin to discuss and think about and examine both the geopolitical and economic cooperation that could result from an end to the conflict in Ukraine.  Obviously, we have to see that conflict come to a successful and enduring end in order for that to be possible.”
  • “And the last thing we agreed to that is that, while our teams are going to be working on all of this, the four of us who were here today – the five of us that were here today are going to remain engaged in this process to make sure that it’s moving along in a productive way.”
• “[When asked “What does an enduring and successful end look like?  Did you present any proposals to the Russians today?”]”
  • “Well, there are some underlying principles.  This needs to be a permanent end to the war and not a temporary end, as we’ve seen in the past.  We know just the practical reality is that there is going to be some discussion of territory and there is going to be a discussion of security guarantees.  Those are just fundamental basics that will undergird and underlie any type of discussion.”
• “[When asked “What concessions do you expect of the Russians?”], Rubio said: “What’s important to understand is two things.”
  • “The first is the only leader in the world who can make this happen, who can even bring people together to begin to talk about it in a serious way, is President Trump.  He’s the only one in the world who can do that right now.”
  • “The second thing I would say is that in order for a conflict to end, everyone involved in that conflict has to be okay with it, has to be – it has to be acceptable to them.”
• “[When asked “what is the next step now? “]
  • “The next step is multitrack.  The first next step is working through our respective teams at the diplomatic side just to ensure that our diplomatic missions can function.  There’s been a series of reciprocal actions taken over the last ten years that have really diminished our ability to operate in Moscow as an example, and they would argue their ability to operate in Washington.  We’re going to need to have vibrant diplomatic missions that are able to function normally in order to be able to continue these conduits.”
  • “The second is a high-level team, including those who are experts on these topics of the technical side, to begin to engage with their side on parameters of what an end to this conflict would look like.  And on that front, obviously, there’s going to be engagement and consultation with Ukraine, with our partners in Europe, and others.  But ultimately there are – the Russian side will be indispensable to this effort and to – so that process will begin.”
  • “And then the third is – together with those other two – is beginning to engage in identifying the extraordinary opportunities that exists.  Should this conflict come to an acceptable end, the incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians, geopolitically on issues of common interest, and frankly economically on issues that hopefully will be good for the world and will also improve our relations in the long term between these two important countries.  So all three of those efforts will be happening in conjunction with one another.”
  • “Obviously, the diplomatic one is one we think we’d hope to move pretty quickly on because this involves the treatment of our respective missions.  The second one will be difficult, which is the question of Ukraine and the end of that conflict, but I think that’s essential in order for the third piece to even be possible, which is our ability to work together on other geopolitical matters of common interest and, of course, some pretty unique, potentially historic economic partnerships as well.  The key that unlocks the door for those opportunities, however, is the end to this conflict.”
• “Rubio said: If our diplomatic channels are broken, it’s going to be very difficult to consistently engage on a host of topics, including some unrelated irritants that could derail the broader talks on Ukraine.  So there has to be some improvement in the way our missions are able to work and in the environment and the space that they’re given to operate in.  So that’s something we want to move on quickly.  And it’s important to set the table for the other two things that we want to do.”

“U.S. and Russia Pursue Partnership in a Head-Spinning Shift in Relations,” Anton Troianovski and Ismaeel Naar, NYT, 02.18.25. 

• “Senior American and Russian officials agreed on Tuesday to establish teams to work toward ending the war in Ukraine and finding a path toward normalizing relations, in the most extensive negotiations between the two countries in more than three years.”
• “After more than four hours of talks, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that both sides had agreed to work on a peace settlement for Ukraine as well as to explore “the incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians,” both geopolitically and economically.”
• “A senior Kremlin official, Yuri Ushakov, said that both sides had “a very serious discussion on all the issues that we wanted to touch on,” including preparations for a summit meeting between President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin.”
• “We weren’t just listening to each other, but we heard each other,” [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov said afterward. “I have reason to believe that the American side started to better understand our positions.”
• “U.S. oil majors have had very successful business in Russia,” Mr. Dmitriev, who worked with Mr. Witkoff to broker the release last week of an American schoolteacher jailed in Russia, said in a brief interview on Tuesday before the talks began, offering an example of how the countries could rebuild business ties. “We believe at some point they will be coming back, because why would they forego these opportunities that Russia gave them to have access to Russian natural resources?”
  • “Mr. Dmitriev said he would present the American delegation with an estimate showing that American companies lost $300 billion by leaving Russia.”
• “After Tuesday’s meeting, Mr. Rubio described a three-step plan for what the United States and Russia planned to do next. First, he said, both countries would negotiate how to remove restrictions placed on each other’s embassies in Moscow and Washington, which are operating with skeleton staffs after years of tit-for-tat expulsions. In addition, he said, the United States would engage with Russia about “parameters of what an end” to the Ukraine war would look like. “There’s going to be engagement and consultation with Ukraine, with our partners in Europe and others,” Mr. Rubio told reporters. “But ultimately, the Russian side will be indispensable to this effort.” And finally, he said, Russia and the United States would explore new partnerships, both in geopolitics and in business. He described them as “the extraordinary opportunities that exist should this conflict come to an acceptable end.”

"US and Russia Agree to ‘Lay the Groundwork’ for Ending Ukraine War," Felicia Schwartz and Max Seddon, FT, 02.18.25.

• “Russia and the US have agreed to “lay the groundwork for future co-operation” on bolstering ties and ending the Ukraine war, after holding the first high-level talks on the conflict since the early months of Vladimir Putin’s invasion.”
• “Following four-and-a-half hours of negotiations in Riyadh on Tuesday, the US state department said the two sides would appoint “high-level teams” to seek to end the war and establish a diplomatic channel to resolve bilateral issues.”
• “This needs to be a permanent end to the war and not a temporary end as we’ve seen in the past,” said US national security adviser Mike Waltz, who accompanied secretary of state Marco Rubio and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff at the talks. “The practical reality is that there’s going to be some discussion of territory and there’s going to be discussion of security guarantees, those are just fundamental basics,” Waltz added, noting that Trump was “determined to move very quickly”.
• “The state department said that the new diplomatic channel would “lay the groundwork for future co-operation on matters of mutual geopolitical interest and historic economic and investment opportunities which will emerge from a successful end to the conflict in Ukraine”.
• “Asked what concessions Moscow would make, Rubio said any such step would result from “hard, difficult diplomacy” in “closed rooms over a period of time”. He added: “No one is being sidelined here.”
• “Waltz said the US was conducting “shuttle diplomacy” and had consulted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and French President Emmanuel Macron, while Trump will meet UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer next week.”
• “Witkoff said the EU was “going to have to be at the table at some point because they have sanctions as well that have been imposed.” But on Tuesday, the Russian foreign ministry ruled out a role for Europe in Ukraine talks and demanded Nato rescind an open-ended 2008 invitation to Kyiv, as it said Moscow was “categorically opposed” to a European peacekeeping deployment.”
• “Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, who accompanied Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in the Riyadh talks, said the discussions were “not bad”. He added that Russia and the US had “agreed to take each others’ interests into account”, but it was “hard to say” they were “growing closer”. Ushakov said that the US and Russia would work to “create the conditions” for a Trump-Putin meeting, though he said it would probably not take place next week, since “thorough work” was needed first.”

“US-Russia talks spark European fears of Ukraine settlement on Putin’s terms,” Max Seddon, Anastasia Stognei, Henry Foy and Felicia Schwartz, FT, 02.18.25. 

• “The main thing for Russia is to achieve its goals in Ukraine, preferably through peaceful means,” Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesperson, said in comments quoted by Russia’s state-owned RIA Novosti agency on Tuesday.”
• “Peskov said any deal should “take into account the possibility of disputing Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s legitimacy” after the Ukrainian president’s term expired last year. Ukraine is under martial law and says it can only hold an election after the fighting stops.”
• “Deputy foreign minister Alexander Grushko was also quoted by Russian newswires as saying the Kremlin was “categorically opposed” to European troops deploying to Ukraine “no matter what their role is”. He added that such a move would be “a step towards escalation”. His comments came after European leaders clashed at a Paris summit over dispatching peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. While the UK offered to put “boots on the ground”, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain expressed reluctance to do so.”
• “Trump said on Monday that Putin “wants to stop the fighting”, adding that he did not believe the Russian president wanted to seize all of Ukraine. “That was my question to him, because if he’s going to go on, that would have been a big problem for us,” Trump said.”

"‘There Are No Results. All Assessments Are Abstract’: Outcomes of U.S.-Russia Talks on Ending the War in Ukraine and Initial Expert Reactions," Pyotr Svyatki, Republic, 02.18.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “On February 18, official negotiations between Russia and the United States on ending the Russia-Ukraine war and future bilateral relations took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for the first time in three years. However, no substantial news emerged from the talks.”
• “As observers awaited the outcome of the meeting, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko made several statements. He reiterated the Kremlin's position that the European Union has no role in negotiations on Ukraine, as there are currently no signs of a breakthrough in relations with Europe. Grushko stated that if Europe seeks to promote peace in Ukraine, it must halt arms supplies to Kyiv. The Russian diplomat described the talks in Riyadh as preliminary consultations meant to outline the basic positions of both sides. He also stressed that Russia categorically opposes the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, considering such a move an escalation.”
• “The Russia-U.S. talks lasted 4.5 hours with a short break and "went well," according to Yuri Ushakov. He noted that "it is difficult to say that [Russia and the U.S.] are moving closer, but the discussion took place." Overall, the delegations had "a very serious conversation on all issues" and agreed to consider each other’s interests and advance bilateral relations, as both sides are interested in doing so.”
• “Kirill Dmitriev described the Riyadh talks as "positive," stating that discussions emphasized the necessity of dialogue between the two countries and future economic cooperation, including global energy prices. He added that both delegations presented their fundamental positions on Ukraine, and while it is "too early to talk about compromises, both sides have started listening to each other."
• “Following the meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the parties "not only listened but heard each other," and Washington has supposedly gained a better understanding of Moscow's stance (such as Russia’s firm opposition to NATO troops in Ukraine). Russia and the U.S. agreed on the need to cooperate in geopolitical, economic, and other areas to prevent open conflicts and resolve issues. Lavrov emphasized that removing obstacles to the work of diplomatic missions is a priority. He also announced that Russia-U.S. consultations on Ukraine would now be held regularly after both sides appoint negotiation teams, though he cautioned that "mutual understanding does not mean a convergence of positions."
• “Pro-government political analyst Sergey Markov wrote on his Telegram channel that, in reality, the Riyadh talks produced "no results" and that "all assessments are abstract." He noted that a Putin-Trump meeting has not been scheduled and that "it cannot yet be said that Russia and the U.S. are moving closer," though both sides have expressed willingness to engage. At the same time, participants acknowledged that the negotiations were positive and respectful, with both parties making efforts to resolve all contentious issues. "The talks were positive but ended without results. That’s where things stand for now," he concluded.”

"Ukraine negotiations: How Europeans can be at the table, not on the menu," Camille Grand, ECFR, 02.14.25.

• “Donald Trump has spoken to Vladimir Putin, and they are ready to begin negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Already, the US has ceded to two major Russian demands. How Europeans respond is crucial for the future of Ukraine and of the continent’s security.”
• “If Europe wants to be at the negotiating table rather than being on the menu, it is time to act with unity and clarity, rather than continuing to act surprised, divided and embarrassed. Some initial statements are going in this direction, but this effort should be actively pursued through several concrete steps to signal a clear message to Kyiv, Moscow and Washington.”
  • “First, and contrary to a common belief in Washington, the EU accounts for the largest share of the financial support to Ukraine and a growing portion of the military assistance. Europeans need to make clear that this support is not conditioned on continued US support, can be further increased if necessary and will continue post-ceasefire. This would meet Pete Hegseth’s expectation that Europeans carry the largest share of this support.”
  • “Second, Europeans need to clarify what they are ready to offer in terms of security guarantees. If indeed the US expects European countries to provide the boots on the ground, Europeans ready to play their part should now clearly state not only their readiness to step in but also the conditions to deploy such a force.”
  • “Third, Europeans should not oppose efforts to halt the conflict but need to make clear that such a negotiation cannot happen without Ukraine’s and Europe’s direct involvement.”
  • “Finally, Putin, who probably celebrates his new status as a special negotiation partner of Washington, has not shown any signs of an openness to compromise or closing a deal soon. This creates an opportunity for Europe to shape—even partially—the terms of the deal. With the future of Ukraine and of European security on the table, Europeans must take a seat before others decide on their role and carve up the spoils.”

"Putin Scores a Big Victory, and Not on the Battlefield," Anton Troianovski, NYT, 02.13.25. 

• “In a lengthy call on Wednesday, President Trump delivered a message to Mr. Putin that encapsulated much of how the Russian leader sees today’s world: that Russia and the United States are two great nations that should negotiate Ukraine’s fate directly and move on to addressing even weightier global affairs.”
• “It was the clearest sign yet that Mr. Putin, despite Russia’s disastrous failures at the outset of his Ukraine invasion in early 2022, could still emerge from the war with a redrawn map of Europe and an expansion of Russia’s influence in it.”
• “The call came on the same day that Mr. Trump’s defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, declared that the United States would not support Ukraine’s desire for NATO membership. It also came as the Senate confirmed Tulsi Gabbard, widely seen as sympathetic to Mr. Putin, as the next director of national intelligence.”
• “Taken together, the developments marked a payoff for Mr. Putin’s monthslong campaign of lavishing praise on Mr. Trump — apparently in the belief that the American president has the power to deliver a Russian victory in Ukraine.”

"Ukraine Needs a Peace of Inches, Not Miles," Michael Kimmage and Maxim Trudolubov, FP, 02.11.25.

• “A diplomatic approach that concedes neither too much nor too little will serve the long-term goal of securing Ukrainian sovereignty. For as long as Putin governs Russia, Ukrainian sovereignty will be imperiled. No amount of negotiation will change Putin’s mind: He has shown far too ruthless a will to sacrifice Russian lives for the sake of dominion over Ukraine. Negotiations should have the more modest goal of depriving the war of its intensity, slowing the war, and at the same time staving off worst-case scenarios. Of these, direct confrontation between Russia and the United States would be the absolute worst. To pressure Russia, show resolve, and have patience, without giving up on compromise, would be to overcome the many mistakes of Minsk diplomacy. It would be progress.”

“Peace Through Weakness in Ukraine?” Editorial Board, WSJ, 02.14.25.

• “Mr. Trump is wrong if he thinks letting Russia dominate Ukraine will result in less U.S. involvement in Europe or enhance deterrence in the Pacific. The U.S. will end up spending far more on defense and deploying more troops in Europe to defend Poland, the Baltic states, and NATO commitments. If he abandons Ukraine, he'll soon find that China is even more emboldened to take Taiwan.”
• “Mr. Trump likes to negotiate from strength, but on Ukraine he sounds like the one who wants a deal more. Mr. Putin, meanwhile, is continuing to bomb Ukraine's cities and power plants and take territory in the east -- albeit at enormous human cost.”
• “If Mr. Trump wants to end the war on honorable terms, he may have to demonstrate he can raise the pressure on Mr. Putin. The U.S. can increase military support to Ukraine, remove limits on the use of weapons, and intensify pressure on Russia elsewhere around the world. Why does the Wagner Group still have a free ride in Africa?”
• “Mr. Trump has to decide if he wants an honorable peace in Ukraine, or risk his own Afghanistan or Vietnam.”

"The Nightmare of a Trump-Putin Deal Leaves Europe in Shock," The Economist, 02.17.25. (Also here.)

• “European leaders filed into the Elysée Palace on February 17th in bright sunshine, and sombre mood. They were still reeling from the message conveyed at the weekend by members of Donald Trump’s administration: that Europeans have no place at peace talks between America and Russia over Ukraine and that “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe,” as the defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, put it. Before the hastily called meeting Sir Keir Starmer, Britain’s prime minister, called it a “generational challenge” for the continent.”
• “But it was not clear by the end of the gathering, organised by Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, if Europe’s leaders were genuinely any readier to meet the challenge. They are certainly no closer to securing a place at talks between America and Russia over Ukraine. Delegations from each of those two countries, led by Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state, and Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, are due to meet on February 18th in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Neither Europeans nor the Ukrainians have been invited.”
• “Nor did the Europeans show any signs of agreement in Paris on a plan to dispatch forces to Ukraine, if there is a peace deal with Russia that is acceptable to Kyiv. Mr Macron first floated the idea of putting boots on the ground last year, and has been trying to rally fellow Europeans to it. Sir Keir has now promised to send British troops as part of such a force, but a day after he said that, he made clear in Paris that any force would need to be underwritten by America, stating “there must be a US backstop, because a US security guarantee is the only way to effectively deter Russia from attacking Ukraine again.” On the same day Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister, ruled out sending troops. Just ahead of the meeting Spain said it was “too early” to discuss troops on the ground. Germany, just days from its own federal election on February 23rd, is also wary. Speaking in Paris Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, insisted that there can be “no division of security” between Europe and America; he was “irritated”, he said, that the question of sending forces was being raised before there was any peace.”

"Putin’s Ukraine," Nataliya Gumenyuk, FA, 02.12.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

"Trump’s Ukraine Plans Mean a $3 Trillion Bill for European Allies," Alberto Nardelli and Jennifer Welch, Bloomberg, 02.12.25. 

• “Trump spoke with Vladimir Putin ..., setting the wheels in motion for peace talks, just as his defense secretary was explaining to his European allies that they are going to have to shoulder most of the burden for any settlement. Bloomberg Economics calculates that protecting Ukraine and expanding their own militaries could cost the continent’s major powers an additional $3.1 trillion over the next 10 years.”
• “The broad contours of a settlement are coming into focus.”
  • “The Base Case: The most likely scenario  for Bloomberg Economics would see occupied territory remain in limbo for the foreseeable future and under de facto Russian control. There could be some land swaps involving Russian territory in the Kursk region that was captured by Kyiv.”
  • “The Best Case: The ideal scenario for Kyiv would see the US and the Europeans commit bilaterally to intervene if Russia reneges on a deal. But the risk of direct conflict with Russia makes even some of Ukraine’s most ardent supporters wary.”
  • “The Worst Case: In the nightmare scenario for Kyiv, Trump might lose interest in Ukraine’s future before any settlement has been reached, shutting off military and financial aid and leaving the Europeans to deal with the problem.”

“Europeans plan for troops to back Ukraine ceasefire — but want U.S. support,” Ellen Francis, WP, 02.17.25.

• “The prospect of troops in Ukraine has gained traction among European leaders as the Trump administration moves fast toward direct negotiations with Moscow, with U.S. and Russian officials expected to meet in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday.”
• “While Washington has ruled out U.S. troops in Ukraine, European officials say the Trump team has not excluded the prospect of supporting a European force — and has asked what kind of U.S. backing might be necessary.  The European requests include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and potential air cover or help with air defenses to protect the force, four officials briefed on the discussions said.”
• “The latest iteration of European planning envisions a "reassurance" or "deterrence" force of a few brigades, possibly 25,000 to 30,000 troops, who would not be stationed along the contact line but would stand ready as a show of force if Russian forces restarted the war, they said. The troops could be backstopped by more forces outside Ukraine in case they need to ramp up and move quickly.”
• “France has done more advanced military planning than others and estimates that it could commit nearly 10,000 troops, although other European allies have so far been more uneasy or contending with constrained militaries, two of the officials said.”
• “European leaders have quietly held discussions on troops in Ukraine for months but have yet to draft a concrete plan, with some countries hesitant about committing troops or moving forward without more clarity from the United States about its intentions for Ukraine.”
• “[One] key question for the Europeans is how to respond if Russia were to attack the force. One proposal was for a mutual-defense clause among countries involved in the European coalition.”

“Team Trump’s shakedown diplomacy. America has just tried to grab Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth,” The Economist, 02.16.25. 

• “The American demand was brutal. President Volodymyr Zelensky had hoped to present his offer to give America access to Ukraine’s rare minerals directly to Donald Trump. When America’s treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, turned up in Kyiv a few days ahead of this weekend’s Munich Security Conference, Mr Zelensky then hoped he’d be talking about continued financial support. Instead, the Ukrainian president unexpectedly found himself presented with a memorandum. The proposal demanded his country’s mineral wealth in its entirety. Mr Zelensky had “an hour” to agree, according to three sources with knowledge of the exchange.”
• “Unaccustomed to such blunt treatment, the Ukrainian president declined, and pushed the discussion to the Munich conference. There, the Americans pressed once more, demanding Ukraine pledge “$500bn worth” of natural resources as a back payment for military aid supposedly already delivered. By the end of Saturday, February 15th, the Ukrainian team had negotiated a stay of execution, and agreed to start a process of negotiation. At a press huddle in Munich, Mr Zelensky cautioned that the American proposal contained none of the security guarantees that Ukraine needs. “We can think about how to divide resources once security guarantees are clear,” he said.”
• “Ukraine already supplies 4-7% of the world’s titanium, used for paint dyes and aerospace manufacturing, and holds as much as 10-20% of global reserves. The ore is mined from Soviet-era mining towns like Irshansk in Zhytomyr province. There are meanwhile four known deposits of lithium, critical for electric-vehicle battery production, within the territory Ukraine still controls. The most useful of these deposits, however, is located in Shevchenkivske in Donetsk province, just 5km from the current front line. Another sits in Berdiansk in Zaporizhia province, which is under Russian occupation. The Economist understands Russia may have offered a backchannel proposal to the Trump team for access to those resources.”
• “Even if Ukraine does agree to Mr Trump’s demands, it will be some time before the American president could begin to see a dividend. “A very-best-case scenario for new extraction projects would be the end of his four-year term,” says Mr Nikolayenko. “That’s not to say that existing projects couldn’t be taken away from oligarchs, though they might have something to say about that.”

"Killing With Kindness: Why Putin Is Proving So Amenable to Trump," Alexander Baunov, CEIP, 02.17.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• “Trump seeks a quick end to the conflict, regardless of the terms, and the Kremlin appears ready to help him. Not only has Putin shown that he is willing to tell Trump what he wants to hear (the 2020 presidential election was stolen; he would have stopped the Ukraine war from happening; Zelensky is swindling America) and signaled that he is ready for peace, he has also handed Trump a free win by releasing a jailed American.”
• “It is not at all clear how ending the war under Trump’s oversight will enshrine the global anti-imperialist uprising Putin supposedly leads. But the Russian leader is so fixated on Ukraine that he will equate the recognition of his rights there with the new world order itself. If killing Trump with kindness gets Putin closer to his goals, then that is what he will do.”

"On Russian-American Consultations," Russian Foreign Ministry, 02.18.25.Clues from Russian Views.  

• “In accordance with the agreement between Russian President V.V. Putin and U.S. President D. Trump on intensifying contacts on international issues and the bilateral agenda, Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov and Russian Presidential Aide Yu. V. Ushakov held talks in Riyadh on February 18 with a US delegation consisting of Secretary of State M. Rubio, Assistant to the President for National Security M. Waltz and Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East S. Witkoff.”
• “A wide range of issues were discussed, including prospects for normalizing bilateral relations. The parties agreed to quickly appoint ambassadors and begin consultations at the level of deputy heads of the foreign affairs agencies to eliminate restrictions on the activities of the diplomatic missions of the two countries. Agreements were reached on establishing a dialogue to agree on ways to resume cooperation in the economy, including energy, space and other areas of mutual interest.”
• “An exchange of views on the situation around Ukraine took place. The mutual commitment to resolving the conflict was confirmed. The Russian side emphasized the need to eliminate its root causes, create conditions for a strong and long-term peace, and ensure the security and legitimate interests of all countries in the region.”
• “The parties agreed to resume communication channels on other international issues, taking into account the special responsibility of Russia and the United States in matters of peace and security as nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Interest in continuing joint work to prepare a meeting between the Russian and American presidents was confirmed.”

"The Plundering of Europe," Ilya Fabrichnikov, Russia in Global Affairs, 02.17.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The "Ukrainian project," if successfully implemented, would have turned the EU into a full-fledged global center of power, capable of influencing all of Eurasia through the trade flows it controls.”
• “The new U.S. administration will do what it has done for the past half-century (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan): discard the ballast of political commitments, problems, and losses, shifting the burden of responsibility onto regional authorities. As we already heard at the Munich Security Conference, this is not an American war, nor an American obligation, and Europe itself is no longer a foreign policy priority for the White House.”
• “But what should the European Union do, having engaged in a game that does not match its military-political and economic potential—one that, as is now clear, was entirely based on strategic access to cheap Russian energy and the American security umbrella? Judging by Europe's reaction to the news from Munich, no one had anticipated the withdrawal of their partners, as the entire project was designed with reliance on American organizational and financial resources. European institutions are now scrambling into "crisis mode," planning emergency conferences and working groups to determine the next course of action. However, for now, no one in the European corridors of power is considering abandoning the "Ukrainian project."

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "U.S., Russia's First High-Level Talks in Years Yield New Initiatives," Michael R. Gordon, WSJ, 02.18.25.
• "How Can It End? A Step-by-Step Guide to a Possible Ukraine Deal," Anton Troianovski, NYT, 02.17.25.
• "U.S. Plan for a Quick Ukraine Ceasefire Is a Non-Starter," Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute, 02.11.25.
• "US Clarity Underscores Ukraine’s Peril," Jack Watling, RUSI, 02.14.25.
• "Trump’s Senseless Capitulation to Putin Is a Betrayal of Ukraine—And Terrible Dealmaking," Timothy Garton Ash, ECFR, 02.14.25.
• "Ukraine’s Daunting Choice: Trading Its Land and People for Future Security," Ralph Clem, Erik Herron, Timothy Hoheneder and Khrystyna Pelchar, War on the Rocks, 02.13.25.
• "‘Putin Wants All of Ukraine’: Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on Vance’s Message in Munich, Kyiv’s Options, and Moscow’s Long Game," BBC via Meduza, 02.18.25.
• "The Global South, Not Europe, Should Play Peacekeeper in Ukraine," Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom, FP, 02.13.25.
• "The Economic Consequences of the (Ukraine) Peace," Robin Wigglesworth, FT, 02.13.25.
• "Europe Needs to Make Its Own Plan for Peace in Ukraine – and Rouse Its People to the Threat From Russia," Armida van Rij, Chatham House, 02.15.25.
• "The Only Viable Peace for Ukraine," Vasyl Filipchuk, FP, 02.14.25.
• "Ukraine: America’s Diplomatic Blitz," Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 02.14.25.
• "From Anamnesis to Diagnosis at the Munich Security Conference," Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 02.14.25. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump Team Leaves Behind an Alliance in Crisis,” David E. Sanger and Steven Erlanger, NYT, 02.16.25.

• “For those in search of Trump’s strategy on Ukraine: Relax,” said Douglas Lute, who served both Democratic and Republican presidents in senior national security positions. “There is no strategy.”
• “To many in Munich, the past few weeks have already alienated Europeans and destroyed much of the unity created over the past three years in providing arms, aid and intelligence to Ukraine. It is hard to know how lasting the breach will be, but for some like Norbert Röttgen, a member of Germany’s Parliament for the Christian Democratic Union, the party expected to run the next government after elections next week, it is time for Europeans to recognize the world has changed. “This is a new reality, a break with traditional European American policy that security in Europe is a genuine U.S. national interest,” he said. “But this administration does not consider it a primary U.S. interest, and this is a fundamental shift.”
• “He pointed in particular to Mr. Vance’s speech on Friday. There was no talk of common bonds, or a plan for Ukraine, or the goals of a peace negotiation. Instead, Mr. Vance delivered a blistering attack on European democracy for restricting the power of the far right. Mr. Vance then met with the leader of the far-right German political party that Elon Musk has backed and which is running second in the opinion polls. “The spirit of the Vance speech was hostility,” Mr. Röttgen said.”
• “The speed of the embrace of Mr. Putin also shocked those in Munich. In the Biden years, the strategy was to isolate the Russian leader. Mr. Trump broke with that approach when he engaged in a 90-minute phone call with Mr. Putin, without prior consultation with his allies.”
• “Europeans are now afraid that they may find themselves as pawns in a negotiation conducted without their active participation, even if their own borders are in question and they are expected to take up the largest burden of defending them. That is reminiscent of a Europe and a world of a previous age, of regional empires and the rule of the strong with little concern for the rest.”
• “Boris Pistorius, the defense minister of Germany, said troop withdrawals were discussed with Mr. Hegseth in Brussels. “We would have to compensate for what the Americans are doing less of in Europe,” Mr. Pistorius said. “But that can’t happen overnight.”

“Conversation on Adversarial Alignment,” Munich Security Conference, Speakers: Ian Bremmer, Fiona Hill and Dmytro Kuleba. Mod.: David Sanger. Opening remarks: Meghan O’Sullivan. 02.15.25. Summarized by RM associate Chris Conway.

• “Adversarial alignment between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea is built much more on quid pro quo for the war in Ukraine than strong ideological convergences.”
  • “Fiona Hill argues that Russia did not embark upon its invasion with intentions of a closer relationship with China, Iran, North Korea.”
  • “Relationships have become closer between these countries since Russia needs them for its war effort: North Korea has Soviet arms stocks, Iran has drones, and China has chips, large energy markets, and deep capital reserves. “A quid pro quo is emerging.”
  • “Before the war, Russia opposed expanding North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs. It now supports expansion because of assistance rendered during the war. According to Hill, “all the dynamics have changed.”
• “The Global South has internalized the “wildly popular” view that Ukraine is an American proxy war.”
  • “Dmytro Kuleba recalls conversations with Chinese counterparts who expressed the opinion that “China cannot let the U.S. win this war.”
  • “Fiona Hill similarly concludes that Xi Jinping seeks to avoid Russian “defeat” in Ukraine as something that would undermine China’s own position.”
  • “Hill adds that there is a very strong personal relationship between Xi and Putin that underpins Russo-Chinese cooperation. They are the same age and have similar worldviews. Additionally, Xi a cultural Russophile.”
  • “Kuleba concludes that Russia is acting as a Chinese proxy: doing its “dirty work” as the “armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.”
• “China is diverging from Russia, Iran and North Korea in its worldview and grand strategy.”
  • “China does not consider itself a rogue state: it is the main creditor for the Global South. China need needs global stability to prosper. The idea that China is a chaos actor bent on global destabilization in the same vein as Russia, Iran and North Korea is, in Bremmer’s view, “utterly wrong”.”
  • “According to Ian Bremmer, China is “clearly the odd-man-out here” compared with Russia, Iran and North Korea.”
• “The discussants reach the conclusion that Trump is providing China with ample opportunities to deepen hitherto-elusive relations with the U.S.’s European allies and replace the U.S. as the power arbiter in global multilateral institutions.”
  • “Bremmer argues that, in distinction from China, Trump and Putin are ideologically convergent “chaos actors.” Both “want to destroy Europe” and “want the EU to be over,” supporting the likes of Viktor Orbán and AfD.”
  • “Trump is removing the U.S. from European multilateral security architecture, which is exactly what Russia wants.”
  • “Kuleba sees the situation in stark terms: “either Europe wakes up, or it is doomed.”
  • “This situation helps China: Kuleba outlines that China “dreams of splitting the U.S. and EU apart” and replacing the U.S. as the preeminent actor in global multilateral institutions like the UN.”
• “Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Chinese efforts have focused on fashioning itself as “the sole power that can fix problems.”  
  • “According to Kuleba, although China will likely not be a party at the initial peace talks, Xi wants Trump to call him to help bring the Russians on-side.”
  • “China wants to be seen by the world as the real mediator, says Kuleba. It is helped by the fact that “not a single country in the world, including Putin, sees [the U.S.] as a mediator.”
• “Regarding war negotiations, “the only person that is in a real rush is President Trump”. This will exert drag on peace proceedings.”
  • “Both Ukraine and Russia have the resources to continue fighting at least until summer. In Ukraine’s case, Kuleba believes that European countries will be able to plug the gap if needed and have been shocked into doing so by Trump and Vance’s recent comments.”
  • “Putin and Zelenskyy will exert pressure on Trump to forestall a rapid conclusion to the war, knowing that “anything fast can only happen at their expense.”
  • “The most difficult problem to overcome is [Putin] does not trust the West.” Putin will want guarantees that future U.S. presidents will not reverse agreements made between himself and Trump.”

“A New Transatlantic Bargain The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar,” co-chairs Ivo Daalder, Camille Grand and Daniela Schwarzer, Belfer Center, February 2025. 

• “A dangerous world confronts Europe and the United States equally and neither can address the threats and challenges successfully on its own. In particular, the United States remains the world’s strongest power, but as it seeks to compete successfully against the rising ambitions of China and others, it benefits greatly from capable partners who share its fundamental interests and values. A strong transatlantic relationship therefore remains as critical today as it has for the past seventy-five years.”
• “But the way the transatlantic partners confront common challenges must change. For Europe—and for NATO—the territorial defense of the continent will be the top priority for years to come. However, as competition for U.S. attention and resources mounts because of growing security threats elsewhere, the burden of—and responsibility for—the security and defense of Europe must lie primarily with Europe. This requires a fundamental review of the nature of the relationship on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, Washington is already asking more of Europe to deter and confront security challenges emanating from China, Iran, and terrorist actors in the Middle East and North Africa—these challenges too require capability and resources.”
• “The desire to build a stronger European defense pillar and greater burden-sharing is not new—it has been tried in one way or another during much of NATO’s history, starting with the idea of creating a European Defense Community in the early 1950s. But these efforts all failed. Europeans frequently differed amongst themselves on what form the pillar should take or within which institutional structures it should be embedded. American leaders routinely warned about the need to avoid duplication, divisions, and discrimination, and have resisted any reduction in Washington’s involvement or say. As a result, European countries developed a debilitating dependence on the American commitment to ensure their defense and security, and the United States developed a habit of exercising security dominance under the guise of leadership.”
• “This unequal relationship is unsustainable. Eighty years after the end of World War II, Europe has the financial resources and the technological and military ingenuity to defend its own continent against an economically and conventionally much weaker military foe. The reelection of Donald Trump underscores that Americans are increasingly unwilling to continue underwriting Europe’s security under the terms of the traditional bargain. Now is the time to move toward a genuine European strengthening of NATO to make the transatlantic Alliance more forceful and balanced, and accommodate both U.S. and European interests. A stronger European pillar is vital to sustaining the long-term future of the transatlantic relationship. Building a European pillar capable of operating with the American pillar in a much more balanced relationship is therefore a must. And doing so will require major adjustments and commitments by both sides.”
• “Under a new and sustainable transatlantic bargain:”
  • “Europeans need to augment their defense capabilities and contributions significantly to take much greater responsibility for the defense of the continent.”
  • “The United States needs to proactively help Europe build a strong and capable European pillar both by advocating better burden sharing and facilitating a shift in responsibilities to Europe, and reducing roadblocks to European defense investment and collaboration with U.S. defense industry.”

"NATO Is Ukraine's Future and Always Will Be," Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 02.15.25. 

• “Of 32 members of the alliance, which unanimously must admit any new member, only nine have seriously advocated for Ukraine. These are mostly countries that unfortunately don't make up with their front-line status what they lack in manpower and gross domestic product.”
• “So the harrumphing of a handful of countries about the U.S. giving away the store depends on a great deal of disingenuousness plus the big dogs keeping mum or mouthing slogans about Ukraine's "irreversible path" to membership (i.e., once it stops mattering).”
• “The right kind of peace deal would be a quasi-template for the alliance's own future. It would internalize one big lesson of the war: Russia is a conventional military power that can be thwarted, defeated and deterred by conventional means. It would internalize a second lesson. Banished would be the convenient nuclear fatalism that Germany especially has relied on over the decades to justify its passivity. Europe's security no longer needs to depend on Washington's willingness to risk nuclear war over Estonia. In the post-Cold War world, nuclear threats turn out to be of little actual use to an aggressor at least against the first party-victim of its aggression. If the Ukraine war proves anything, the nuclear taboo holds for a country like Russia because, to put it simply, Russia still needs customers for its oil if it's to survive.”
• “Mr. Putin has learned his military is no match for a properly equipped NATO force. His Ukraine misadventure is rapidly degrading his ability to compete in the long run. Mr. Putin will continue to pretend his war isn't a disastrous miscalculation for which his country will be paying for generations to come. The peanut gallery should not be fooled.”

"Vance’s Real Warning to Europe," Gideon Rachman, FT, 02.17.25. 

• “When JD Vance took the stage at the Munich Security Conference last week, he issued a stern warning. The U.S. vice-president told the assembled politicians and diplomats that free speech and democracy are under attack from European elites: “The threat I worry the most about vis-à-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s… the threat from within.” If Vance hoped to persuade his audience, rather than simply insult it, he failed.”
• “What Vance did was to subvert the ideas of freedom, democracy and shared values that have underpinned the western alliance for 80 years. In his world the battle for freedom in Europe is no longer about deterring an autocratic and aggressive Russia, as it was for Harry Truman or Ronald Reagan. Vance’s fight for freedom is a battle to save “western civilization,” as defined by Elon Musk and others, from the twin threats of mass immigration and the “woke mind virus.”
• “The Trump administration’s ideology means that, in important respects, it now feels more affinity with Putin than Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Putin is seen as a warrior fighting for his country and for conservative values; the Ukrainian is dismissed as a freeloader with all the wrong friends in Europe.”
• “Vance’s arguments were classic Russian-style “whataboutism.”
• “Trump clearly intends to cut a deal on Ukraine with Putin over the heads of Zelenskyy and the Europeans. That could have tragic consequences for Ukraine, which may soon be asked to accept loss of territory without security guarantees for the future. The alternative would be to try to fight on without American help.”
• “Europeans need to start preparing fast for the day when the U.S. security guarantee to Europe is definitively removed. That must involve building up autonomous defense industries. It should also mean a European mutual defense pact, outside NATO, that extends beyond the EU—to include Britain, Norway and others… Europe must now start the painful process of “de-risking” its relationship with the U.S., looking for areas of dangerous dependence on America and stripping them out of the system.”
• “Many Europeans will balk at these ideas, dismissing them as impossible. But they need to understand that their freedom is now at stake. Vance was right about that. Just not in the way he thought.”

"António Costa Says Europe Needs to Negotiate ‘New Security Architecture’ with Russia," Roula Khalaf and Henry Foy, FT, 02.17.25. 

• “The EU must be involved in negotiations with Russia over the end of the Ukraine war in order to map out Europe’s future security architecture, the European Council president has said. The call comes as António Costa and other senior European leaders prepare to meet in Paris to discuss their response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to begin talks to end the almost three-year war with Russia’s Vladimir Putin.”
• “If Trump really wants that the Europeans assume greater responsibility for their own security, then of course the Europeans need to be the key actor in designing the new security architecture,” Costa told the Financial Times. “It is not only about Ukraine,” Costa, who represents the bloc’s 27 national leaders, said in an interview at the Munich Security Conference this weekend. “The negotiations on the new security architecture need to take into account that Russia is a global threat, not only a threat to Ukraine.”

"War or Peace in Ukraine: U.S. Moves and European Choices," François Heisbourg, Survival, 02.07.25. 

• “Ukraine is unlikely to be able to cope on the battlefield if Donald Trump’s administration cuts off new requests for aid. A Russian military victory against Ukraine would entail massive increases in the burden borne by NATO’s current members to preclude Moscow’s intended reversal of the strategic effects of the break-up of the Soviet Union.”
• “Even a Ukraine territorially diminished by way of a deal imposed by Trump would likely end successful post-Second World War efforts to counter the unilateral annexation of a European state’s legal territory and potentially change Russia’s assessment of what Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty means in practice.”
• “If the United States also substantially withdrew from Europe, as Trump has at times suggested it could, the Europeans would have to incur defense costs far exceeding 3% of GDP to make up for the unavailable U.S. capabilities. Europe may not have the strategic focus and unity of purpose necessary to meet these challenges.”

"A New Spy Unit Is Leading Russia's Shadow War Against the West," Bojan Pancevski, WSJ, 02.15.25.

• “Russia's spy services have a shadowy new unit taking aim at the West with covert attacks across Europe and elsewhere, Western intelligence officials say. Known as the Department of Special Tasks, it is based in the Russian military-intelligence headquarters, a sprawling glass-and-steel complex on the outskirts of Moscow known as the aquarium. Its operations, which haven't been previously reported, have included attempted killings, sabotage and a plot to put incendiary devices on planes.”
• “The department's creation reflects Moscow's wartime footing against the West, the officials said. It was set up in 2023 in response to Western support for Ukraine and includes veterans of some of Russia's most daring clandestine operations in recent years, according to two European intelligence chiefs and other U.S., European and Russian security officials. The Kremlin sees the West as complicit in Ukraine's attacks on Russia such as the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, the killings of senior officials in Moscow, and Ukrainian strikes using long-range Western missiles, according to these officials. Ukraine has denied it was behind the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines.”
• “The new department, which is known to Western intelligence officials by its Russian acronym SSD, is believed to be behind a host of recent attacks against the West, including the attempted killing of the chief executive of a German arms maker and a plot to put incendiary devices on planes used by shipping giant DHL.”
• “The SSD has at least three broad tasks, according to Western intelligence officials: carrying out killings and sabotage overseas, infiltrating Western companies and universities, and recruiting and training foreign agents. The department has been seeking to recruit agents from Ukraine, developing nations and countries seen as friendly to Russia, such as Serbia. The department also runs an elite special operations center, known as Senezh, where Russia trains some of its special forces. Two men—Col. Gen. Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Ivan Sergeevich Kasianenko—oversee the operations of the SSD.”
• “Hostile activities by the SSD peaked last summer, but have subsided recently, according to U.S. and European officials. The lull in activity could be aimed at creating diplomatic space for Moscow to negotiate with the new U.S. administration, according to the two European intelligence chiefs.”

“Multipolarization: Munich Security Report 2025,” February 2025.

• “Today’s international system shows elements of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, and nonpolarity. Yet an ongoing power shift toward a greater number of states vying for influence is clearly discernible. And multipolarization is not only evident in the diffusion of material power but also in the fact that the world has become more polarized ideologically.”
• “For the EU, which embodies the liberal international order, the growing contestation of core elements of the order poses a particularly grave challenge (Chapter 4). Russia’s war against Ukraine and the rise of nationalist populism in many European societies, among others, are putting key elements of the EU’s liberal vision in jeopardy.”
• “In this century, no state has made greater efforts to upend the international order than Russia. Moscow envisions a multipolar world order made up of “civilizational states,” as Russia perceives itself (Chapter 5). Smaller countries – for Russia, Ukraine counts as such – fall within a civilizational state’s sphere of influence. Despite discrepancies between Moscow’s self-image and its actual power base, Russia is successfully disrupting efforts to stabilize the international order.”
  • “At the same time, it faces increasing economic problems and the consequences of imperial overstretch. Whether the country can implement its vision of multipolar spheres of influence will depend on the pushback of others.”
• “Indian leaders’ criticism of the existing international order and their embrace of the notion of multipolarity is inseparably linked to India’s quest for a place among the world’s leading powers (Chapter 6).”
• “Japan is a quintessential status quo power (Chapter 7). Deeply invested in liberal internationalism and US primacy, it is especially perturbed by the end of the unipolar moment, the rise of China, and the prospect of a new multipolar order.”
• “Brazilian leaders view the emergence of a multipolar order as an opportunity to reform outdated power structures and give countries of the Global South a stronger voice (Chapter 8).”
• “South Africa’s embrace of the notion of multipolarity cannot be separated from its criticism of the existing international order, especially of unrepresentative international institutions (Chapter 9).”
• “Visions of multipolarity are thus also polarized. This makes it increasingly difficult to adapt the existing order peacefully, avoid new arms races, prevent violent conflicts within and among states, allow for more inclusive economic growth, and jointly address shared threats like climate change, which respondents to the Munich Security Index have consistently rated highly. As the great and not-so-great powers cannot tackle these challenges alone, their cooperation will be crucial.”

"Russia’s Lavrov Says He’s Unaware of Reported ‘3-Stage’ Ukraine Peace Plan," MT, 02.18.25.Clues from Russian Views.⁷

• “Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Tuesday that he was unaware of a reported U.S. peace proposal for Ukraine that includes agreeing to a ceasefire, holding elections and signing a final peace deal.”
• “The so-called “three-stage peace plan” was allegedly proposed by both the United States and Russia, Fox News White House correspondent Jacqui Heinrich reported during the U.S.-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia, citing unnamed foreign diplomatic sources.”
• “According to Heinrich, Ukraine has argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin believes a pro-Moscow “puppet” candidate would win in new elections and agree to concessions favoring Russia.”
• “She cited a Ukrainian readout reportedly shared with diplomatic sources, which also suggested that both Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump view Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s chances of re-election as “low.”
• “Moscow has repeatedly dismissed Zelensky’s legitimacy as president, arguing that his term in office expired when elections were postponed under martial law last spring. However, Heinrich later reported that a U.S. source had amended the initial claim, clarifying that the election stage had only been “floated” and might become “part of future talks, but not today.” The White House has yet to comment but is expected to address the reports soon, she added.”
• “I haven’t seen this information, I haven’t seen this news,” Lavrov told reporters when asked about the alleged proposal after the Russian delegation’s nearly five-hour-long talks with U.S. negotiators in Riyadh. Lavrov said he had also inquired about earlier reports that U.S. envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg had shared “unorthodox” plans for Ukraine with European allies. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski had previously suggested that the undisclosed plans and U.S. negotiating tactics “raise some hopes.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The World's Policeman Goes Rogue," Anders Fogh Rasmussen, WSJ, 02.11.25.
• "The Superpower Has Left the Building: Munich 2025," Richard Fontaine, War on the Rocks, 02.17.25.
• "Donald Trump’s Assault on Europe," The Economist, 02.16.25.
• "A Message to Europe From Western Disunion," Walter Russell Mead, WSJ, 02.18.25.
• "Putin Has Long Wanted More Power in Europe. Trump Could Grant It," Paul Sonne, NYT, 02.16.25. 
• "Europe Fails to Seize the Moment on Ukraine," Matthew Savill, RUSI, 02.18.25.
• “Europe’s wake-up call,” Tony Barber, FT, 02.15.25.
• "The Transatlantic Alliance in the Age of Trump: The Coming Collisions," Max Bergmann, CSIS, 02.14.25.
• “The Trump administration's most dangerous misstep,” David Ignatius, 02.12.25.
• "Volodymyr Zelensky: The Oracle of Munich," Andrew Kuchins, NI, 02.17.25.
• "The Transatlantic Alliance as We’ve Known It Is Dead," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 02.17.25.
• "Ukraine ‘peace dividend’ will be paid by Europe," Pierre Briancon, Reuters, 02.13.25.
• "Trump’s Surprise Attack on Europe," Joschka Fischer, Project Syndicate, 02.18.25.
• "Ukraine, NATO, and War Termination," Eric Ciaramella and Eric Green, Center for Preventive Action (CFR), 02.14.25. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"China Doesn't Want to Lead an Axis," Sergey Radchenko, FA, 02.18.25. 

“America’s rivalry with China will intensify, but must not escalate into war, writes Nicholas Burns,” The Economist, 02.13.25. 

• “After three turbulent years as America’s ambassador to China, [Ambassador Burns has] returned home reflecting on [four] lessons that will be crucial for the future of relations between these countries—and for peace in Asia. First, America and China will be competing for power and influence into the next decade and probably beyond—and too many Americans in both parties underappreciate the fierceness of this struggle. The contest will play out in military, technological and economic terms, as well as over profound issues of freedom. China and America have the world’s two largest economies and strongest armed forces; their competition for power will know few boundaries. President Xi Jinping is the strongest, most lethal adversary we’ve faced. Under his rule China seeks to unseat American leadership in the Asia-Pacific, become the region’s paramount power and shape a global order to its liking.”
• “During my time in Beijing, competition for technology supremacy moved to center stage. It will be at its most intense in AI, as DeepSeek’s sudden entry into the AI race suggests. Meanwhile, our trade relationship will be increasingly difficult to manage. America’s third-largest trade partner is China, and China’s largest export market is America. Yet both sides are cutting their supply-chain dependency on the other in advanced semiconductors, critical minerals and more. China’s aggressive dumping of excess manufacturing led then-President Joe Biden rightly to raise tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, semiconductors and lithium batteries. Now President Donald Trump is implementing tariffs of his own. Both presidents have been serious about levelling the trade relationship for American firms.”
• “China and America are also waging a bitter battle of ideas. China defends authoritarianism, whereas America, at least until now, has championed democracy and the rule of law. This battle, which includes what those two systems deliver in practical terms, could play out for years. Here, moves by the Trump administration are concerning. The administration’s evisceration of USAID and its vital work in global health and development is a major mistake that will cripple America in our competition with China, including our efforts to match the appeal to developing countries of its Belt and Road Initiative. The firing of 10,000 USAID professionals is deeply wrong. It is shameful how the administration has mistreated dedicated public servants and made wild, unsubstantiated charges against them.”
• “A second lesson from my time in Beijing is: be good to your allies. They are force multipliers in countering China. One of Mr. Biden’s signature successes was to strengthen America’s position in the Indo-Pacific by reinforcing our military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, as well as deepening our partnership with India. This group and our allies in Europe must continue to work together to limit China’s aggressive ambitions, above all in the Indo-Pacific.”
• “A third lesson is age-old: foreign policy begins at home. Too many Republican and Democratic leaders underestimate China’s accelerating industrial and technological power. America must match it by modernizing its infrastructure. Mr Biden pushed Congress to pass historic bills covering infrastructure, semiconductors and renewable energy. I hope the Trump administration will not abandon these efforts—that would weaken our ability to compete with China.”
• “Yet for all the fierceness of the contest, a fourth lesson is crucial. Competition must not dominate the whole relationship, or open conflict might ensue. American and Chinese leaders must commit to managing their differences and work together when interests align. The supreme test that Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi face is to manage intense competition between their countries while avoiding a war neither side wants.”

“New Containment: Western strategy for the Moscow-Beijing axis,” Dmitry Gudkov, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Dmitry Nekrasov, Case Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, 02.06.25.^  Clues from Russian Views.

• “The first steps of the new American administration give reason to believe that President D. Trump intends to achieve a truce in the near future, as he considers himself a great peacemaker and considers the continuation of the war an ethically and financially catastrophic scenario. Now it is difficult to say whether the White House will be able to agree with the Kremlin on any agreement, and whether Ukraine will be ready to agree to the proposed option. However, even if an agreement is reached soon, the Russian president's willingness to comply with any agreements should be called into account, and any deal that can be concluded today with the concessions to Russia of the territories it has seized will be rejected by the majority of Ukrainian voters.”
• “Thus, the truce will not finally resolve the conflict, but the risk of a new escalation will remain significant. In this situation, the West will have to solve at least three tasks, very similar to those it successfully fulfilled during the Cold War. First, to prevent a sharp aggravation of the situation, which could require a radical military response and plunge the world into a global nuclear conflict. As the Cold War experience teaches, even irreconcilable contradictions do not necessarily lead to a world war, but we know other examples when the world rolled into a global meat grinder even in the absence of any significant contradictions.”
• “Secondly, to flexibly combine the methods of economic weakening of the enemy, well-known from the times of the "Cold War," with the possibilities that have arisen in the new economic situation. Thirdly, to restrain the export of authoritarian practices to the countries of the "world's South" as much as possible and prevent the expansion of the community of countries that are more or another oriented towards China and Russia. Such an assessment of the emerging reality means that no "post-historical" society on a global scale will come in the foreseeable future; that the West is fundamentally wrong in its forecasts regarding the future of not only Russia, but also of China…”
• “It is not easy to admit this—after all, dozens of leading specialists, not to mention politicians and representatives of big business, have built their careers or made their fortunes on the approval of the opposite, whether in theory or in practice. Nevertheless, in our opinion, we should be talking about a large-scale change in the Western strategy in relation to Putin's Russia, and rather a wider range of countries that pose a potential threat to modern democracies.”
• “The last decade convinces us of the impossibility of the "end of the end of the story." And this is not the first such ideological "insight." Even the First World War was considered by many as a "war to stop all wars," and during the Second World War, the architecture of the future of universal peace was discussed. However, every time after the triumph of progress and freedom over archaic and dictatorship, preparations for a new fight began quite quickly. In the 1920s, it was initiated by Germany, which lost the war; in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union, which had not achieved all its goals; in the 2010s, Russia, whose leadership considered its country humiliated by the results of the Cold War. None of these turns repeated the previous one—certain lessons were learned from what was happening, but new mistakes were often made.”
  • “One way or another, we can confidently say only one thing: it is a mistake to believe that a particular country can be a friend and ally of the West without being incorporated into its political structures.”

"The Arctic Is Testing the Limits of the Sino-Russian Partnership," Andrei Dagaev, CEIP, 02.18.25. 

• “Russia and China play up their scientific and cultural cooperation on Arctic issues, but their practical use has been doubtful. While academic contacts are often cited as a success story for Russia and China, they grew less frequent after February 2022. Chinese students still attend academic conferences in Russia, and joint expeditions to the Arctic continue, but these initiatives do little to meaningfully deepen Sino-Russian cooperation on regional issues.”
• “The fact is that expectations that China might expand its presence in the Arctic through partnership with Russia have not been fulfilled. For Beijing, the priority remains having the freedom to work with all the Arctic’s interested parties. As such, while China continued to fulfill Russia’s technology orders for energy projects in the Arctic and import energy from the region, it has refrained from investing further in Russia’s Arctic initiatives out of fear of sanctions.”
• “China genuinely values its relationships with the Arctic’s other powers, and does not want to risk alienating them by getting overly close to Russia. Since becoming an Arctic Council observer, Beijing has looked for opportunities to work not only with Moscow but also with others in the region, including Iceland and Norway. Admittedly, its proposals are given less and less consideration nowadays, with national security concerns usually cited as the reason.”

“Despite these setbacks, China remains set on the internationalization of Arctic projects and committed to multilateralism in the region. With war raging, Russia is less likely than ever to help China in this endeavor. Claiming neutrality while simultaneously developing relations with Russia, China has taken a wait-and-see position toward its strategic partner, with respect to the Arctic as well as in general. And as Beijing waits for the resolution of Russia’s conflict with the West, it continues to take what it can from Moscow, starting with its know-how—by now a familiar dynamic in their relationship.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"The Disrupter in Chief Can't End a War Like This," David French, NYT, 02.17.25.

• “Can a nation be truly free and independent if it doesn't possess a nuclear arsenal? That question is being answered right now, on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. If a nation's conventional military can stop an aggressive, nuclear-armed nation in a defensive struggle, then there is hope for the viability of conventional deterrence.”
• “If, however, a conventionally armed nation is doomed to fail—because it lacks the resources (including the allies) to defend itself—then look for more countries to pursue nuclear weapons. They will choose self-defense over subservience.”
• “So far, most of the discussion of the risk of nuclear war in Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been focused on a perceived immediate danger—that Russia will use nuclear weapons to achieve victory on the battlefield or to retaliate for Ukraine's use of Western weapons on Russian soil… [but] Will our abandoned allies be content with vassal status in the face of aggressive, nuclear-armed powers such as Russia, China and (to a lesser extent) North Korea? Or will they seek their own ultimate security guarantee, the nuclear weapon that would render any invasion of their sovereign territory utter madness?”
• “Why wouldn't South Korea pursue a nuclear deterrent? Could an enormous strategic shift overcome even Japan's deep-seated resistance to nuclear weapons? Poland is in the middle of an intense and expensive military buildup, but wouldn't an atomic arsenal make it even more secure?”

"Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG): Three Essential Steps for Reversing the Slide to Nuclear War," ELN, 02.14.25. 

1. “Prevent a return to explosive nuclear testing and strengthen the existing testing moratoria… Leaders of all nuclear-armed states should reaffirm their commitment to sustain the existing moratoria on explosive nuclear testing.”
2. “Advance nuclear fail-safe in every nation with nuclear arms… Leaders of the N5 nations should now engage and demonstrate leadership on this topic. Acting unilaterally, bilaterally, trilaterally, or as a group, they should develop appropriate statements covering their commitment to nuclear fail-safe in advance of the 2026 NPT Review Conference.”
3. “Affirm and strengthen the fundamental principles governing the use of outer space.”

Counterterrorism:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The Islamic State Is Making a Comeback," Colin P. Clarke, FP, 02.17.25. 

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

"Will Europe Return to Putin’s Gas?," The Economist, 02.16.25. 

• “The first proper winter in three years had already reignited energy debates. With temperatures frigid and Asian competition for supplies fierce, the spot price at the Dutch Transfer Title Facility (TTF), Europe’s gas-trading hub, hit €58 ($61) per megawatt hour (MWh) on Feb. 10th, its highest in two years (see chart). Then, on Feb. 12th, came Donald Trump’s announcement that negotiations over an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine would start “immediately”—a statement that financial markets appear to be taking seriously.”
• “Little surprise, therefore, that some European officials are greedily eyeing Russian gas. Lower energy bills might revive moribund European industry and placate households. Jari Stehn of Goldman Sachs, a bank, has forecast that an end to the war could produce a 0.5% rise in European GDP, with most of that coming from cheaper natural gas. Renewed flows could also encourage Vladimir Putin to negotiate a peace deal and then stick to it, proponents suggest. Hungary and Slovakia are making the case. In a recent interview with The Economist, Friedrich Merz, who is likely soon to be chancellor of Germany, said that there would be no return to Russian gas “for the time being,” but conspicuously failed to rule out the possibility.”
• “Any such deal would represent an astonishing turnaround. The European Commission’s position is that it is “not making any links” between the restart of Russian flows and any Ukrainian peace talks. Indeed, its stated ambition is to import no Russian gas or oil at all by 2027, so as to reduce dependence on its hostile neighbor.”
• “Ultimately, the decision about whether to turn on the taps will be made by countries at both ends of the pipelines and those the conduits traverse: Russia, Germany and Ukraine, as well as a few other eastern European states. Their leaders will come under severe pressure from other countries, too.”
• “Ukraine is adamant it will not renew its deal with Russia, but workarounds are being studied. Slovakia’s national gas firm is establishing a subsidiary in Ukraine and applying for a transport license, which would enable shipments from Russia. There is a more extreme option, too: resuming sales via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which once transported 55 bcm a year to Europe, and perhaps even Nord Stream 2, a conduit of the same capacity that has never entered operation.”
• “The full return of Russian supplies might crush prices around the world, meaning that many American drillers would become unprofitable and billions of dollars of investment in LNG projects would suddenly be worthless. On the other hand, Donald Trump would like a Nobel peace prize, and the return of some Russian gas as part of a peace deal might seem a price worth paying.”

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Freeze and Thaw: USAID Withdrawal and the Future of Russia’s Pro-European Civil Society," Kirill Shamiev, ECFR, 02.14.25.
• "Jubilation in Moscow Over Trump’s Gifts to Putin," Alexey Kovalev, FP, 02.14.25. 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“‘Nationalization Has Begun to Hit People Who Seemed to Have “Protection.”’ Andrei Yakovlev’s interview with Tatiana Rybakova, Russia.Post, 02.17.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “[In seeking nationalization of enterprises] The main arguments put forward by the Prosecutor General were not about privatization violations, but about strategic enterprises being in the hands of private owners who do not reside in Russia, which was said to threaten the country’s economic sovereignty and national security. Most of the nationalization cases as early as 2023 were based on these arguments.”
• “Everything has its limits, however. The threats-to-national security argument simply could not be applied to car dealerships (in the case of Rolf and Sergei Petrov) or pasta (Makfa). That is why the argument about corruption was used there: they say the owners either received these assets when they held government posts, or they managed them when they were officials or MPs.”
• “Now… claims to seize property are made not through arbitration courts but through courts of general jurisdiction, which have always been much more loyal to prosecutors. There is nothing new in these charges—this story has been going on for years; it is just that the context has changed.”
• “What is relatively new here, in my view, is the gathering of a new wave of nationalization. There was a wave in 2023/early 2024. After that, last year, Putin spoke at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs congress, where he again stated that this did not represent an overturn of privatization but “individual, specific cases.”
• “Now, it appears, [nationalization] has begun to hit people who seemed to have “protection.” For example, Makfa and the chemical plants that I mentioned apparently did not have sufficient protection. “In the last wave, it was precisely these ‘weak players’ that got hit, with their assets going to others that had strong patrons.”
• “I get the sense that the latest cases really represent property redistribution among groups close to Putin. Apparently, these players’ ability to play hardball has begun to change, as well. The abovementioned Patrushev Sr. is in a weaker position than before. This could serve as the backdrop for other groups with strong positions to try to take something away—hence, perhaps, the story with Domodedovo.”

“Mishustin said that Russia’s GDP has reached a historic record. Is the economy really in its best shape? What about the sanctions? What is hidden behind the government’s daring statements,” Meduza, 02.14.25.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin reported to Vladimir Putin on February 7 that Russian nominal GDP had reached a “historical record” 200 trillion rubles following growth of 4.1% in 2024. Mishustin singled out Russia’s manufacturing industry as the primary driver of growth, “to which [Putin] and the government are paying special attention.” Russian manufacturing grew by 8.6% in 2024.”
• “Mishustin emphasized the resilience of the Russian economy which, he said, has “coped with unprecedented sanctions pressure.”
• “This growth has been fueled by a rapid expansion in state defense spending: Russia’s Ministry of Finance has allocated 1.5 trillion rubles (c. $16 billion) more than anticipated to defense-related spending last year. “Unanticipated expenses arose”, admitted Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. Raiffeisenbank estimates that the state provided 20% of Russian economic growth last year.”
• “Growth has been rapid. Economist Natalya Zubarevich wrote “when I see how the manufacturing industry in Kurgan region grew by 48%, I understand how many additional infantry fighting vehicles the Kurganmash plant.”
• “Monthly revenues for Russian oil are near annual minimums and are threatened by the prospect of increased US production. State spending and international sanctions have depleted Russian currency reserves, threatening state finances in case of a budget crisis. Former finance minister Mikhail Zadornov warned, “in the event of a sharp drop in oil prices—God forbid it happens—it will be enough for no more than half a year of financing budget expenditures.”
• “Putin expressed satisfaction at Mishustin’s report, saying “The result is satisfactory, a good result.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Russian Inflation Is Too High. Does That Matter?" The Economist, 02.13.25.
• "The Real Russian Economy. Sergei Guriev," The Economics Show, FT, 02.17.25. Podcast.
• "New Blood: Putin is Setting Up Russian Veterans to Take Center Stage in Moscow," Harry Francisco Stevens and Thomas Lattanzio, War on the Rocks, 02.12.25.
• "Federal and Regional Dynamics of the Kremlin’s New Cadre Strategy to Adapt to War," Irina Busygina, PONARS Eurasia, 02.10.25.
• "In a Russia-Ukraine Peace Deal, One Issue Is Beyond Questioning," Vladimir Kara-Murza WP, 02.14.25.
• "‘The Union of the Kremlin and the Russian People’: Why the Authorities Have Warmed Up to Russian Nationalists," Re: Russia, 02.13.25.
• "Federal and Regional Dynamics of the Kremlin’s New Cadre Strategy to Adapt to War," Irina Busygina, PONARS Eurasia, 02.10.25.
• "Throttling of YouTube Shows That Russia Is Getting Better at Online Censorship," Alena Epifanova, CEIP, 02.12.25. 

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Trump Vowed to Protect Armenia's Christians. He Can Start Here," David Ignatius, WP, 02.11.25. 

• “With so much suffering in the world, individual cases can get lost. But I want to explain the plight of a man named Ruben Vardanyan, who is a political prisoner on trial in Azerbaijan and is facing a life sentence—and whose case deserves greater attention.”
• “Vardanyan’s crime, if you can call it that, is that he championed Armenian resistance in Nagorno-Karabakh, a remote region in the Caucasus that is legally part of Azerbaijan but whose population was once largely Armenian and self-governing. Not anymore: The region’s 120,000 Armenians fled in September 2023 when Azerbaijani troops invaded. Vardanyan was arrested as he tried to cross the border into Armenia.”
• “Vardanyan’s trial began a week ago in Baku. Azerbaijan has brought 46 charges against him, ranging from terrorism to organized crime. But his troubles really stem from his decision to move to Karabakh in 2022 and become a senior minister in the breakaway government there, as well as an outspoken defender of the Armenian population.”
• “Most Americans don’t know much about Armenia, let alone the Karabakh conflict. But here’s a central fact: Armenia was the first nation in the world to adopt Christianity, and it has paid dearly for its faith in a predominantly Muslim region.”
• “As Vardanyan’s trial moves forward, perhaps he will have a friend in Washington. President Donald Trump said in a Truth Social post on Oct. 23: “When I am President, I will protect persecuted Christians, I will work to stop the violence and ethnic cleansing, and we will restore PEACE between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”
• “Here’s your chance to deliver on that promise, Mr. President, by helping a decent man escape persecution.”

"From Crash to Crisis: How Russia’s Refusal to Take Responsibility for a Downed Passenger Plane Wrecked Relations with Azerbaijan," Meduza, 02.14.25. 

• “Relations between Moscow and Baku have continued to deteriorate ever since a deadly plane crash in Kazakhstan on Christmas Day sparked a diplomatic crisis. Russia’s refusal to take responsibility for downing the Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane has left Azerbaijan indignant, leading Baku to shutter the local Russian House and threaten to take legal action against Russia “in an international court.”
• “Going forward, Russia has few options for putting pressure on Azerbaijan. It could make money transfers more difficult, limit fruit and vegetable imports, or close the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline. However, Azerbaijan’s economic dependence on Russia is not that great, especially in terms of money transfers. Azerbaijani citizens rarely come to Russia to earn money: the unstable ruble exchange rate makes such trips unprofitable, and the land border between Russia and Azerbaijan has been closed since 2020, complicating travel between the two countries.”
• “Moreover, escalating the conflict would certainly lead to retaliatory measures from Baku—and this would be sensitive for Russia, particularly if the measures affect the development of transportation infrastructure and trade with Iran. (Russian, Azerbaijani, and Iranian officials were supposed to hold a meeting about transportation links on Jan. 28, but it never took place—probably due to the ongoing spat between Moscow and Baku).”
• “Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has threatened to sue Russia in an international court. However, Baku is unlikely to make good on this anytime soon. A trial requires all available evidence, and there is no final report on the plane crash (it should be ready within a year) or even a conclusion about its cause. It’s also unclear where Baku would file such a lawsuit since neither Russia nor Azerbaijan recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”
• “Pro-government experts from Baku have cautiously suggested that Azerbaijan could turn to an international arbitration court. However, the conflict may be resolved before Azerbaijan can file a lawsuit. “The doors for dialogue with Russia remain open. Moscow must openly admit its guilt and take responsibility,” Azerbaijan’s state news agency APA reported on February 5.”
• “For now, Baku’s actions allow it to write bold headlines about a “second Malaysian Boeing” (a reference to Russia’s 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines MH17) and put pressure on Moscow to plead guilty and pay compensation to the victims.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Hope and Turmoil: The EU’s Role in Securing Georgia’s Democratic Future," Lion Ax and Constance Victor, ECFR, 02.12.25. 

Footnotes

1. Rubio and Lavrov had also agreed to ongoing cooperation toward economic and investment opportunities, according to NBC.
2. For “Explainer: Who’s Who at the U.S.-Russia Talks in Riyadh,” see this MT story.
3. The list of the task force’s members is available here.
4. Bloomberg Economics calculates that protecting Ukraine and expanding their own militaries could cost the continent’s major powers an additional $3.1 trillion over the next 10 years.
5. The latest iteration of European planning for security for Ukraine envisions a "reassurance" or "deterrence" force of a few brigades, possibly 25,000 to 30,000 troops, who would not be stationed along the contact line, but would stand ready as a show of force if Russian forces restarted the war, according to Ellen Francis of WP.
6. After U.S.-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia, Witkoff said the EU was “going to have to be at the table at some point because they have sanctions as well that have been imposed,” according to FT. Russian financier Dmitriev—who also participated in the talks—said he would present the American delegation with an estimate showing that American companies lost $300 billion by leaving Russia, according to NYT.
7. For more remarks by Lavrov, see: "Speech and Q&A by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Following Talks with U.S. Administration Representatives,"Russian Foreign Ministry, 02.18.25. (In Russian.)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Evelyn Hockstein/Pool Photo via AP.