5 Ideas to Explore

1. Judging from Xi Jinping’s Dec. 12 comments at a meeting with Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, the Chinese leader may have heard the Dec. 8 proposition by Donald Trump that “China can help” with reaching a deal to peacefully end the Russian-Ukrainian war. “On the Ukraine crisis, China has repeatedly emphasized the need to uphold the three principles of no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no provocation by any party, to promote the easing of the situation as soon as possible,” Xi was quoted by Xinhua as saying at the meeting with the visiting Kremlin official. In his account of the meeting, Medvedev confirmed that his host—who released a 12-point peace plan for Ukraine last year and that included calls for a de-escalation and a ceasefire—"outlined China’s ideas of a possible settlement.” In fact, “The Kremlin may consider accepting such a cease-fire as a tactical concession to Trump—essentially to appease him—only if it lays the further groundwork for persuading Ukraine to accept Russian demands in full,” according to Tatyana Stanovaya of R.Politik.
2. The incoming Trump administration has to answer three questions with regards to peaceful resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, according to ex-Foreign Minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba. “First, how do we convince Putin to accept it [a peace plan]? ... Second, how do we ensure that war does not come back? A ceasefire will not be sufficient either for Ukraine’s or Europe’s security. And third, what will be the price for America if Ukraine falls?” Kuleba told RM. Ukraine must have a say in negotiating not only ceasefire, but also demilitarized zones, and any constitutional amendments, according to Anatol Lieven of Quincy Institute. However, “certain other basic questions are not up to Ukraine to decide” and they include “what Western security guarantees can and should be given to Ukraine,” response to Ukraine’s request for NATO membership, and which Western sanctions would be lifted, Lieven writes in FP.
3. “Moscow and Beijing had long coordinated and increasingly aligned their efforts, but the [2022 Ukraine] war gave rise to a new, more active and more determined alignment,” CFR Senior Fellow Robert Blackwill and Center for a New American Security CEO Richard Fontaine write in a special report for CFR. “For all the real limits to their partnership, the two are bound by shared opposition to a U.S.-led world that, they believe, affords them too little security, status, and freedom of action,” they write. “Ensuring that Europe and Asia remain free of hostile domination is, of course, not a new objective of U.S. foreign policy. In this fresh effort, the United States and its allies have everything they need to succeed,” the duo argue.[1]
4. While having refrained from employing Oreshnik in Russia’s response to use of ATACMS by Ukraine against targets in ‘mainland’ Russia last week, it was this MRBM that Vladimir Putin chose when rattling his nuclear saber at the West again this week (even as he denied doing so). Putin referred to this nuclear capable MBRM twice in two separate parts of his address to the annual expanded meeting of the Russian MoD’s board on Dec. 16. “The serial production of such complexes to protect Russia and our allies’ security should begin in the near future,” he told the top brass in the first half of his speech. The Russian president then returned to this missile, which would be key to Russia’s abandoning of what it claims is self-imposed obligation to continue de facto observing the INF treaty, again in concluding remarks, repeating his earlier claim that a salvo of such MBRMs will be “comparable in power to using nuclear weapons.” He also claimed that “share of such [up-to-date] weapons in the strategic nuclear forces has already reached 95%” and remarked that “the outgoing year has been crucial in achieving the goals of the special military operation,” which is what Russia calls its war against Ukraine. Putin’s defense minister Andrei Belousov also addressed the meeting, urging the Russian armed forced to get ready for a war with NATO within the next decade. That instead of using Oreshnik (as the U.S. expected) Russia chose shorter-range missiles in its Dec. 13 retaliation  against Ukraine’s Dec. 11 use of ATACMS against a military facility in Russia’s Taganrog, is significant. Multiple reasons could be behind this choice: e.g. scarcity of Oreshniks and Putin’s desire to avoid deterioration of relations with Trump—who has criticized outgoing President Biden’s liberalization of use of ATACMS—ahead of Trump’s inauguration.
5. When it comes to Syria, “one thing is certain: Putin is not going to simply abandon Russia’s military bases in Syria and calmly accept a major strategic setback—that would not only erode Russia’s reputation as a great power but also diminish his own domestic political standing,” according to Thomas Graham of CFR. That Russia will find a way to work with the victorious leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria is “not beyond the realms of possibility,” according to Nikita Smagin. 

Please note that due to Harvard University’s Dec. 23, 2024—Jan. 1, 2025 recess, the next issue of the Russia Analytical Digest is to be published on Jan. 6, 2024.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Ukraine-related excerpts from “The Armed Conflict Survey-2024,” IISS, December 2024.

• Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was by far the most significant conflict in the region over the reporting period. It has had profound consequences not only for the region, including by aggravating many of the dynamics underpinning other conflict risks in Europe and Eurasia, but also for the world.
• The war has also begun to spread into Russia itself. While acts of sabotage and arson carried out by Ukrainian partisans and dissident Russians continued during the reporting period, the level of attacks within Russia has been significantly increased by the development of new long-range Ukrainian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). In August 2024, Ukrainian forces also launched direct cross-border raids into Kursk region. Russia, for its part, has adapted its UAV and missile tactics against Ukraine as well. In the second half of 2023, the country launched a sustained campaign of targeting Ukrainian ports in Odesa region, but this was ineffective in limiting Ukrainian shipping, which instead increased. From December 2023, Russia has carried out a sustained campaign of targeting power infrastructure across Ukraine, which has heavily depleted power production there, leading to the worst and widest blackouts to date. These are expected to be sustained through the forthcoming winter due to challenges in repair timelines and continued attacks.
• The lack of accepted, legitimate borders by the countries that share them has been a recurring driver of conflict in the region… Another major cause of instability in the region is Russia’s aspirations to reinstate influence and dominance over the former countries of the Soviet Union (a region the Kremlin describes as the ‘near abroad’) as well as restore its position as a revisionist global power.
• An end to Russia’s war against Ukraine in the foreseeable future appears unlikely. The two sides remain far apart on any possible peace terms… A sustainable end to the war, rather than a temporary ceasefire, would require a host of wider political, legal, economic and security issues to be resolved. These include questions around territorial control and recognition thereof, the terms under which sanctions imposed on Russia might be lifted, the potential for reparation payments to Ukraine, the future of frozen Russian assets, accountability for war crimes, the return of Ukrainian citizens deported to Russia, and the structure of future security guarantees. A settlement would therefore require a complex diplomatic process.
• The course of the Russia–Ukraine war remains dependent on the wider contest of resolve between Russia and the West… The war also continues to have potential implications for the future unity of Western security alliances, in particular NATO. 
• China’s policy is another key variable. Direct Chinese materiel support could mitigate the disadvantage Russia faces with respect to the West and thus help sustain its war effort. However, if China decreases its support for Russia or aligns with the West more directly in diplomatic efforts to end the crisis.
• "Commanders in Putin's Long War: Purged, Reshuffled, and Disgruntled," Pavel Baev, Ifri, 12.12.24.[i2] 

Military aid to Ukraine

“The Price of Russian Victory,” Elaine McCusker, FA, 12.13.24.

• To figure out just how much money supporting Kyiv saves Washington, in a report to be released in January, my colleagues and I at the American Enterprise Institute added up the expenses the United States would face if Russia defeats Ukraine and then positions forces along NATO’s border. We considered the military capability, capacity, and posture the United States would need to deter and, potentially, defeat Russia should the Kremlin attack a NATO ally—while still preventing further conflict with emboldened adversaries in the Pacific and Middle East.
• The resulting number is exorbitant. According to our calculations, defeat in Ukraine would require the United States to spend $808 billion more on defense over the next five years than it has budgeted. Since 2022, by contrast, Congress has appropriated $112 billion to the Defense Department to assist Kyiv. That means the aid provided to Ukraine through the Pentagon is less than 14% of what it would cost Washington to defend Europe against a victorious Russia. (That $112 billion is also mostly spent at home, on domestic weapons production.) Put another way, allowing Russia to defeat Ukraine would cost the United States about seven times more than preventing a Russian victory. Aiding Ukraine, then, is clearly the right financial decision.
• Without U.S. support, Russia would advance in 2025 as Kyiv runs out of weapons. By 2026, Ukraine would lose effective air defense, allowing Russia to conduct continual large-scale bombings of military and civilian infrastructure. Faced with such an onslaught, Ukraine’s conventional forces would fight valiantly, but they would have little hope of holding out. The country’s military would likely collapse by the end of that year, allowing Russia to seize Kyiv and then drive to the NATO border. Moscow, in other words, would be unequivocally victorious.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin would be happy with such a victory. But he would be unlikely to be sated… After subjugating Ukraine, the Kremlin would likely reconstitute Russia’s combat units in Belarus and in western Ukraine, on the border with NATO members Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Russia would also likely begin stationing missiles, aircraft, and other military equipment near the Baltic states and Moldova. Moscow would then establish interlocking air defense systems along the NATO frontier, from the Black Sea to the Arctic. Ukraine’s resources would help Moscow threaten the rest of eastern Europe.  
• If Kyiv prevails over Moscow, Russia would retreat behind its own borders with a defeated and diminished military, a struggling economy, weakened partnerships, and a healthy dose of domestic challenges. Ukraine, by contrast, would be vibrant and free, with a thriving industrial base and a modern military. Washington would thus be able to scale down its deployments and capabilities in Europe. It would still maintain a presence there, but it would be able to dedicate more resources and attention to the Pacific—a desire of many U.S. presidents, including Donald Trump.
• Not only is the United States safer when it is engaged, but it is also more fiscally responsible. It is expensive to deter a war, yet it is more expensive to fight one. Washington is facing a multitude of global threats, and so it is understandable that officials would second-guess the cost of helping Kyiv. But given the stakes, Americans must have clarity on the long-term costs, not just the upfront expenses. Supporting Ukraine is not only morally right but financially right. It is a prudent investment in U.S. interests.

“What a Victorious Ukraine Can Offer Europe,” Michael Hikari Cecire, FP, 12.12.24.

• The bad news is that Europe needs a credible conventional deterrent in the near future. The good news? It has one right under its collective nose: Ukraine.
• Ukraine can then offer Europe a highly militarily credible conventional deterrent, and key insights for European deterrence, defense, and resilience.
• Should Ukraine emerge from the war more or less intact, it will be exhausted, bloodied, and bruised, carrying the scars and traumas of an epochal war of liberation. But it will also be a, if not the, premier land power in Europe.
• Ukrainians have experience integrating varied and secondhand weapons systems from across the world and forming them into coherent and lethal operational elements.
• Still, should the United States suspend arms shipments again, as they did earlier this year, Russian momentum could turn into localized breakthroughs and provide Moscow with a commanding negotiating position in potential ceasefire talks.
• On its own, Europe may lack the sufficient conventional deterrence posture to give Moscow too much pause.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Europe Needs to Swiftly Fulfill Its Aid Pledges to Ukraine," Marc Champion, Bloomberg Opinion, 12.16.24.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Tighter Sanctions Can Help End the Russia-Ukraine War,” Edward Fishman, CFR, 12.13.24.

• It is time for the United States to take a new approach. To impose significant pressure on Russia, the United States should use secondary sanctions to crack down on Russian oil revenues. The most straightforward way to do this is to leverage secondary sanctions as the main enforcement mechanism of the price cap—in other words, threatening secondary sanctions on anyone that buys Russian oil for a price that exceeds the cap. In such a scenario, the United States would threaten sanctions on Emirati traders and Indian and Chinese refineries unless their purchases comply with the cap. While this approach is viable, it is not optimal; it still requires the G7 to align on a specific price, and it is unlikely that there would be consensus for a threshold much lower than $60 per barrel. As a result, it would take time to bite—and time is not a luxury Ukraine enjoys.
• A better approach is to use the threat of secondary sanctions to sequester Russian oil revenues in restricted overseas accounts. Under such a regime, foreign firms would be allowed to pay Russia for its oil only if such payments were made into a bank account in their home country. The bank, in turn, would be permitted to release the funds only to finance unsanctioned bilateral trade. Any violation of those terms would risk secondary sanctions. Such a scheme was deployed against Iran in 2012, leading to over $100 billion in Iran’s oil revenues trapped in restricted overseas accounts.
• This approach is optimal for use against Russia for several reasons. It would impose no restrictions on the volume of Russia’s oil sales, so it would be unlikely to affect oil prices. But it would immediately limit the way Russia could use its oil earnings. It could thus be expected to curtail Russia’s procurement of technology and components for its war machine. Moreover, it would give the United States an additional pool of frozen Russian funds that it could leverage in future peace negotiations. This is important, as the most sizable pool of frozen Russian assets—the central bank reserves—is already earmarked for rebuilding Ukraine, which will cost upward of $450 billion.
• Sanctions are a marathon, not a sprint. And the bleak macroeconomic news out of Russia of late suggests that the West may well be performing better than first meets the eye. The ultimate test of the sanctions, however, is whether they can help accelerate the timeline of a just peace between Russia and Ukraine. Over the coming months, President-elect Trump will try to secure such a peace. Whether he succeeds or fails depends largely on whether the West can give Putin a reason to negotiate in good faith—by mustering the will to tighten sanctions.

“Why do the U.S. and its allies want to seize Russian reserves to aid Ukraine?,” Sam Boocker, Brookings, 12.11.24.

• After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s foreign exchange reserves held by the U.S. and its allies were frozen. Since then, some officials and commentators have proposed seizing those assets, which amount to nearly $300 billion, and using the proceeds to defend and rebuild Ukraine. Russian reserves could provide Ukrainians much-needed support as the war drags into its third year. This policy is not without risk or controversy: Seizing foreign exchange reserves has little economic or legal precedent and uncertain long-run effects. This post explains the efforts to seize Russia’s reserves and the possible consequences for the global financial system.
• As of mid-February 2024, estimates show that the U.S. and allies have sent $280 billion to Ukraine in military, financial, and humanitarian aid. Seizing Russian reserves helps allied governments continue to support Ukraine by reducing the burden on taxpayers and making Russia foot the bill for its own aggression… As former World Bank president Robert Zoellick writes, seizing reserves is “elegant justice” and a desperately needed infusion for Ukraine.
• Most U.S. allies remain wary of seizing Russian assets directly… Advocates for seizure argue that Russia’s assets can be seized under the international law of countermeasures, which provides nations a pathway to implement certain otherwise unlawful remedies in proportional response to the unlawful actions of another state. But many officials and legal scholars argue that there is no precedent, and asset seizure is inconsistent with conventional understandings of how countermeasures should operate, including that they be reversible and primarily implemented by directly affected states.
• Russian officials have promised retaliatory asset seizures if the U.S. and allies send reserves to Ukraine. Russian state media reports that the Kremlin has identified roughly $290 billion in U.S. and allied assets in Russia. 
• Seizing Russian reserves could also pose long-term risks to the U.S.- and European-led global financial system. States, fearing the security of their dollar- or euro-denominated assets, may shift their reserves out of U.S. and allied jurisdictions and into alternate currencies, such as the Chinese renminbi. 
• Agathe Demarais, senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, notes that the risks of seizing Russian reserves can be partially offset through multilateral action: “Washington would very much prefer to spread the potential blowback that such a step would entail across like-minded allies.” Because the G7, EU, and Australia are unique in their ability to provide large quantities of safe and liquid assets over long periods, acting together reduces the risk of reserve outflows because there are very few viable alternatives. By building a framework with clear rules, the U.S. and allies can assure foreign central banks that their reserves will not be seized arbitrarily.

“It’s high time to make Russia pay. G7’s $50bn loan is no substitute for transferring blocked foreign exchange reserves to Ukraine,” Martin Sandbu, FT, 12.12.24.

• Kaja Kallas, the EU’s new foreign policy chief, has called for the west to seize Russian central bank reserves for Ukraine’s benefit. That is something her own bloc and its allies have so far resisted. Instead, these days G7 countries are pushing their “extraordinary revenue acceleration” loans for Ukraine over the line, with the U.S. Treasury announcing on Tuesday that it had disbursed its share. This will make good on the G7 promise in June to provide Kyiv with $50 billion of financing on the back of future profits from blocked Russian foreign exchange reserves.
• Now that the scheme is ready, it is important to bust some myths that the politicians behind the scheme have been all too happy to allow to take hold.
  • First, it does not make Russia pay. On the contrary, the entire scheme is designed to maximize the amounts that can be provided to Ukraine without actually touching Moscow’s immobilized central bank reserves themselves—only the profits Euroclear makes by storing them. 
  • Second, the arrangement also avoids making western taxpayers sacrifice anything. While Ukraine’s G7 backers are borrowing money in the market, they are passing that on to Kyiv as another loan. The European Commission makes perfectly clear in its guide to the credit “waterfall structure” in the arrangement that the Ukrainian state is on the hook for. If sanctions are lifted and Moscow regains access to its reserves, or Russia fails to pay sufficient reparations, Kyiv would stand to be bankrupted by this supposed generosity.
• [There have emerged] new possibilities for transferring Russia’s reserves to Ukraine. These have not been contemplated but could be. 
  • One is if Washington, Ottawa or London decided to break with EU recalcitrance, and treated the relevant amounts of Euroclear deposits in their jurisdictions as Moscow’s money and moved to confiscate it. 
  • Another is if European authorities used prudential banking regulation to split out the Russia-related part of Euroclear Bank’s balance sheet into a separate banking entity, which could then be bought out and directed to invest its assets in Ukraine, as I have described before. That would in effect make Russia pay for its destruction without ever changing its title to its reserves (which was not possible with securities holdings).
• If the EU is to be a strategic actor on the world stage, not being intimidated is the way to proceed.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The Impact of Russia Sanctions on Central Asia," Maximilian Hess, FPRI, 12.16.24.
• "Russia and North Korea: New Horizons of Anti-Sanction Cooperation," Andrey Gubin, Valdai Discussion Club, December 14, 2024. In Russian.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine. Convince Kyiv to Trade Land for NATO Membership,” Michael McFaul, 12.12.24.

• After he convinces Putin to negotiate, Trump must also persuade Zelensky to stop fighting. That will be a significant challenge, as doing so will require the Ukrainian president to give up the quest to liberate all Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian soldiers. In giving up land, Zelensky would also have to abandon his citizens in those occupied regions or find a way to guarantee that they would be allowed to emigrate to western Ukraine. No democratically elected leader makes such a concession lightly. A poll conducted this fall showed that 88% of Ukrainians still believe that Ukraine will win the war. Ukrainian soldiers, many of whom now fight to avenge their comrades killed in combat, will find it very difficult to lay down their weapons.
• Zelensky and the Ukrainian people will not make such a sacrifice without receiving something of value in return: NATO membership. 
• Skeptics argue that Putin will never accept Ukraine’s joining NATO. But Ukraine and NATO members do not need to ask for Putin’s permission. Putin has no place in negotiations between Ukraine and the alliance. Allowing him to disrupt or put off these deliberations would be a sign of American weakness not only to Moscow but also to Beijing.
• Of course, one more person needs to be convinced of the merits of this peace plan: Trump… Trump could explain to the American people that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would allow the United States to spend less on European defense and free up resources to contain China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a move should win the support of the many China hawks in Trump’s new administration.
• This plan would prevent the kind of collapse and conquest that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It would also produce a lasting peace in Europe, not a temporary cease-fire easily broken by Russia in the future. If Trump succeeded in brokering this settlement, he could become a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, an honor he covets. The odds may be stacked against such a plan. Neither Putin nor Zelensky will be easily coaxed to the table, and Trump might resent the imperative of having to maintain, and even expand, support for Ukraine as a means to force negotiations. But an endless war or capitulation to Putin would be far worse.

“Dmytro Kuleba Says Pressuring Russia, Supporting Ukraine, Only Viable Strategy,” Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Russia Matters, 12.12.24. Clues from Ukrainian views.

• On Dec. 6 Russia Matters Editor Ivan Arreguín-Toft (IAT) interviewed former Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba (DK), on Kuleba’s views on where the war in Ukraine—and more broadly, regional and international security—are likely headed. The interview has been edited for clarity. 
• IAT: you've said that on the current trajectory Ukraine may lose Donbass entirely in 2024. What can Ukraine and its allies do to change that trajectory now?
• DK: well, first, I didn't say we were going to lose Donbass. I said that if things do not change, we will lose the war… And what needs to change, put simply, [is that] we have to make no half decisions. The problem with the current strategy is not that it is flawed by definition. The problem is that it has never been implemented in full. 
  • The strategy, put pressure on Russia, support Ukraine is the only viable strategy. My question is very simple, if the West is incapable or unwilling to win the war in Ukraine, then what war will it be capable and willing to win? The strategy to put pressure on Russia and support Ukraine is good, but when your measures of supporting Ukraine are essentially half measures, if not one-third measures, and the same goes for measures taken to put pressure on Russia, then do not get surprised that the strategy doesn't seem to be working. 
• IAT: [if security guarantees are the key to Ukraine agreeing to peace,] What security guarantees would Ukraine consider guarantees when the West has already, as you said, so far only advanced half measures?
• DK: There are three issues that can compel Russia to negotiate. The first one is [frozen Russian assets], the second one is [Ukrainian territory], and the third one is NATO… The most difficult issue for the West will, of course, be the NATO issue. This is the only matter about which its own interest and its own security are directly concerned. The problem with NATO will be the following: If our goal is just to establish a ceasefire, that's one thing. But if our goal is to prevent another war from happening, this is a completely other thing. 
• A Western thinker will be tempted to think that he can concede NATO for the sake of establishing a ceasefire. But the same person will have to face a grim reality that the only way to prevent the next war is to bring Ukraine into NATO. This is very counterintuitive, but the only way to contain Ukrainian revanchism in the future will be by keeping Ukraine in NATO. Because the next generation of Ukrainian politicians will be forced to focus on the recovery of the country after the war. But the generation after will be focused on one thing: revenge.

“Keep Ukraine Out of Talks to End Its War. The Trump administration needs to engage Moscow and avoid, at first, involving Kyiv,” Anatol Lieven, FP, 12.16.24.

• The incoming Trump administration seems genuinely committed to finding peace in Ukraine. Whether it’s capable of the extremely complicated diplomacy required is a very different question. One issue that will have to be decided at the very start of the process is at what stage, and on what issues, Ukraine should be involved in the process. 
  • The first and most fundamental goal of the talks (as in all such negotiations) will be for each side to clearly establish, on the one hand, its vital interests and absolute and nonnegotiable conditions and, on the other hand, what points it is prepared, in principle, to compromise on.
• The three parties involved are Ukraine, Russia and the United States. The initial stages of the negotiations, however, should be between the United States and Russia. It goes without saying that certain aspects of an eventual agreement will require Ukraine’s full assent, and that without this assent a settlement isn’t possible. These aspects include the terms of a ceasefire, the nature and extent of any demilitarized zones, and any constitutional amendments guaranteeing the linguistic and cultural rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine. U.S. negotiators will have to be fully cognizant and respectful of Kyiv’s views on Ukraine’s vital interests.
• Given certain categorical—and entirely legitimate—Ukrainian positions, a number of key issues seem to be a priori off the table, and if Russia insists on them, no agreement will be possible. The most important initial task of Gen. Kellogg and his team will therefore be to discover whether the Russian government regards these conditions as nonnegotiable, or whether Moscow is prepared to compromise on them if the Trump administration is prepared to compromise on wider issues.
  • The first nonnegotiable issue from Ukraine’s and the U.S.’ point of view is Ukrainian and Western legal recognition of Russia’s claimed annexations.
  • The second nonnegotiable issue is Putin’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the territory it still holds in the four provinces of Ukraine that Russia claims to have annexed. 
• However, certain other basic questions are not up to Ukraine to decide. They are chiefly up to the United States, and it is the U.S. administration that will have to negotiate them. 
  • Today, key aspects of the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian armed forces depend on the United States, since it is only the United States that can provide Ukraine with long-range missiles and the intelligence to guide them. 
  • The question of which Western sanctions to lift or suspend as part of a deal with Moscow is also up to the United States and EU.
  • Ukraine can, of course, ask to join NATO, but the decision of whether to accept a new member lies not with that country but with the existing members—and each of them has a veto on the issue. 
  • The question of what Western security guarantees can and should be given to Ukraine as part of a settlement is also not up to Ukraine to answer.  

“Four Scenarios for Ukraine’s Endgame,” Rajan Menon, NYT, 12.16.24.

• Almost three years after Vladimir Putin ordered Russia’s troops to invade Ukraine, the war is entering what could be its final phase, and a deal to end it seems likelier than ever. Ukraine is struggling: It has been steadily losing ground since the summer, its army faces an increasingly severe shortage of soldiers, and Russia has gained six times more territory so far this year than it did in all of 2023… Russia, too, has problems. Ukraine and its allies estimate that the Russian Army’s dead and wounded could be around 700,000, and geolocated tallies have suggested that more than 14,000 pieces of Russian military equipment have been destroyed. Casualties—which Britain’s ministry of defense estimated to average around 1,500 a day in the first half of November—and losses of weaponry on this scale cannot be sustained indefinitely.
• A deal will eventually be done [and…] here are four possible scenarios for Ukraine’s future security.

1. NATO Membership: "Mr. Zelensky wants NATO membership, but this hope will probably remain unfulfilled. Unanimity is required to admit a new member to NATO, and the closest the alliance has come to being of one mind on Ukraine was in 2008, when it announced that Ukraine would join its ranks at some unspecified future date."
2. Coalition of the Willing: "Alternatively, a coalition of the willing could pledge to protect Ukraine. The trouble is that Ukraine will want the United States to be among the guarantors. It views NATO as essentially a U.S. guarantee of protection and won’t consider any coalition reliable unless it’s fortified by American troops and weaponry."
3. European Security Guarantee: "What might an endgame in which Europe takes the lead look like? Several European nations have discussed the possibility of stationing troops in postwar Ukraine. Last week, Mr. Macron, who has stressed that Europe must do more for its own defense, met with Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, to discuss deploying European soldiers in Ukraine after a peace settlement."
4. Armed Neutrality: "Another possible model—call it armed neutrality—will be the one Ukraine least prefers. It would require Russia to pledge not to attack Ukraine and for Ukraine to forswear both NATO membership and the deployment of foreign troops and armaments on its soil. Armed neutrality would leave Ukraine more vulnerable compared with the other solutions. It may also be the most achievable outcome."

“Xi meets United Russia party chairman Medvedev,” Xinhua, 12.13.24. Clues from Chinese Views.

• Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Chinese president, met here… with Chairman of the United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties 75 years ago, China and Russia have blazed a new path featuring mutual respect, harmonious coexistence and win-win cooperation between major and neighboring countries, setting an example of new-type international relations as well as relations between major neighboring countries, Xi said. He said China is willing to work with Russia to strengthen the synergy of development strategies, tap the intrinsic momentum of bilateral cooperation, and continuously bring benefits to the two countries and peoples.
• China and Russia should strengthen communication and coordination within such multilateral frameworks as the United Nations (UN), the BRICS cooperation mechanism and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, firmly uphold the international system with the UN at its core, and practice true multilateralism so as to make the international order more just and equitable and jointly safeguard global strategic stability and international fairness and justice, Xi said.
• Xi pointed out that since the establishment of relations between the CPC and the United Russia party more than 20 years ago, the two sides have conducted high-level and constructive interactions, strengthened exchanges and mutual learning on party and state governance, continuously enriched the content of institutionalized exchanges between the two parties, and helped consolidate political and strategic mutual trust between China and Russia.
• As important forces promoting human progress, the two parties should further coordinate and cooperate closely, lead the global governance in the right direction, and pool the consensus of friendly political parties in countries around the world, especially in the Global South countries, to push the world forward in the right direction, Xi said.
• On the Ukraine crisis, China has repeatedly emphasized the need to uphold the three principles of no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no provocation by any party, to promote the easing of the situation as soon as possible, Xi said. He added that China will continue to adhere to its consistent position and work with the international community to create favorable conditions for the political settlement of the crisis.
• The Russian side will unswervingly implement the consensus reached by the two heads of state and promote strategic coordination, Medvedev said.
• Medvedev said that the Russian side speaks highly of China's position on the Ukraine crisis, pays attention to the Group of Friends for Peace on the Ukraine crisis, an initiative put forward by China, Brazil and other countries, and is willing to actively promote the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis.

"Anticipating Talks on Ukraine," in "Weekly Digest: 9 December–15 December 2024," Tatyana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 12.15.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• It remains unclear what position Trump will take in talks with Putin after assuming office in January. He appears inclined to reject Ukraine’s NATO bid, shift the burden of military assistance to the EU, and support a well-armed Ukraine—funded by European nations. He also seems to favor persuading Ukraine to accept Russian control over parts of its territory. Furthermore, in an interview with Time, Trump opposed allowing Ukraine to strike Russian territory with long-range missiles.
• While the Kremlin expresses support for efforts to “seek a peaceful solution”, it maintains that a swift resolution to the conflict is unlikely. Moscow insists on addressing the root causes of the issue, which it believes require large-scale negotiations with the West on strategic security. The Kremlin has signaled that it is not interested in a cease-fire unless it incorporates Russian terms, and that Ukraine must take the first step by lifting the decree that bans negotiations with Russia. Additionally, Moscow continues to question Zelensky’s legitimacy. Notably, on 13 Dec., Peskov stated that the deployment of European troops could be discussed, but only after Russia achieves its objectives. However, one should not rule out a brief one-sided cease-fire around Christmas as a gesture by Putin to appear “constructive.” This move would likely be aimed at creating geopolitical conditions that pressure the West into urging Ukraine to concede to Russia, rather than reflecting genuine flexibility.
• Moscow has grown increasingly concerned that Trump aims to push for an “immediate cease-fire” as an end in itself, intending to demonstrate his effectiveness in halting the war shortly after taking office. For Putin, this approach is fundamentally flawed, as it will not further Russia’s goals in the conflict (even if to may have its advantages for Moscow too). According to R.Politik's understanding, the Kremlin may consider accepting such a cease-fire as a tactical concession to Trump—essentially to appease him—only if it lays the further groundwork for persuading Ukraine to accept Russian demands in full.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin Is Vulnerable, and the U.S. and Europe Should Capitalize on It," Bloomberg Editorial Board, 12.16.24.
• “What A Ukraine Peace Plan Could Look Like,” Mike Eckel, RFE/RL, 12.13.24.        
• “European 'peacekeepers' in Ukraine? A horrible idea. Trump and other leaders reportedly discussed the plan but it's a trial balloon that should be shot down immediately,” Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 12.16.24.
• “Can Trump Really End the War in Ukraine?” interview with Oleksandra Matviichuk, a Ukrainian human rights defender, FP, 12.16.24.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Price of American Retreat,” Mitch McConnell, FA, 12.16.24.

• When he begins his second term as president, Donald Trump will inherit a world far more hostile to U.S. interests than the one he left behind four years ago. China has intensified its efforts to expand its military, political, and economic influence worldwide. Russia is fighting a brutal and unjustified war in Ukraine. Iran remains undeterred in its campaign to destroy Israel, dominate the Middle East, and develop a nuclear weapons capability. And these three U.S. adversaries, along with North Korea, are now working together more closely than ever to undermine the U.S.-led order that has underpinned Western peace and prosperity for nearly a century.
• Trump would be wise to build his foreign policy on the enduring cornerstone of U.S. leadership: hard power. To reverse the neglect of military strength, his administration must commit to a significant and sustained increase in defense spending, generational investments in the defense industrial base, and urgent reforms to speed the United States’ development of new capabilities and to expand allies’ and partners’ access to them.
• [Trump] must not repeat the mistakes of President Barack Obama’s so-called pivot to Asia. The Obama administration failed to back up its policy with sufficient investments in U.S. military power… Partners in Asia came to understand what the pivot meant for them: that they would receive a larger slice of a shrinking pie of American attention and capabilities. Partners in Europe, for their part, were not happy to see Washington ignore the Russian threat. Republicans who consider Ukraine a distraction from the Indo-Pacific should recall what happened the last time a president sought to reprioritize one region by withdrawing from another. In the Middle East, Obama’s premature withdrawal from Iraq left a vacuum for Iran and the Islamic State to fill, and the ensuing chaos there consumed Washington for years. By 2014, as Obama struggled to consummate the pivot to Asia, dithered on the Middle East, and failed to enforce his own “redline” on Syria’s use of chemical weapons, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded eastern Ukraine and seized Crimea.
• Standing up to China will require Trump to reject the myopic advice that he prioritize that challenge by abandoning Ukraine. A Russian victory would not only damage the United States’ interest in European security and increase U.S. military requirements in Europe; it would also compound the threats from China, Iran, and North Korea. 
• Despite Biden’s tough campaign rhetoric about Russia, his policy of détente with the Kremlin resembled Obama’s reset. As it became clear that Putin would launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I urged Biden to offer meaningful lethal aid to Ukraine and expand the U.S. military footprint in Europe. But the president demurred. Even after the invasion, the Biden administration’s assistance to Ukraine was beset by hesitation, needless restrictions, and endless deliberation. 
• Not a single Republican legislator who voted for Ukraine lost a primary. Despite legitimate misgivings about Biden’s approach, a majority of my GOP colleagues appreciated that support for Ukraine is an investment in U.S. national security. They recognized that most of the money was going to the U.S. defense industrial base or military and that this security assistance, a mere fraction of the annual defense budget, was helping Ukraine degrade the military of a common adversary. But more work is required. For now, Putin’s indifference to his own people’s suffering has allowed him to increase his defense industrial base’s capacity to pump arms and soldiers into Ukraine. His ability to do this in perpetuity is questionable; Russian victory is inevitable only if the West abandons Ukraine.
• The most inconvenient truth for those calling on Trump to abandon Europe is that European allies recognize the growing links between China and Russia and increasingly see China as a “systemic rival.” 
• Critics ignore the growing strategic alignment of China and Russia, Russia’s own influence in Asia (including its increasingly capable Pacific fleet), and the inescapable reality that U.S. competition with both powers is global. In the Middle East, for example, Russia has undermined U.S. interests for years through its intervention in Syria and partnership with Iran. Putin’s use of Iranian attack drones in Ukraine should have come as no surprise: the West’s collective failure to stand up to Iran earlier has allowed it to become a more powerful partner to China and Russia. Beyond embracing Iran, the two countries have also sought to deepen their relationship with traditional U.S. partners in the region.
• Trump must reject the myopic advice that he prioritize China by abandoning Ukraine.
• During this American holiday from hard power, China and Russia have invested in asymmetric capabilities to offset the U.S. military edge. Today, their munitions in many categories can outrange U.S. versions, and their production can outpace the United States’. This is to say nothing of their numerical advantage in key platforms, from missiles to surface vessels. Quantity has a quality of its own. What’s more, the wars of the future may well last longer and require far more munitions than policymakers have assumed, as both Israeli and Ukrainian munitions-expenditure rates suggest.
• There is plenty of evidence that the globalist optimism of the 1990s was unfounded. Welcoming China and Russia into the World Trade Organization has not transformed their governments or economies, at least not in ways beneficial to the free world. 
• The United States urgently needs to reach a bipartisan consensus on the centrality of hard power to U.S. foreign policy. This fact must override both left-wing faith in hollow internationalism and right-wing flirtation with isolation and decline. The time to restore American hard power is now.

“Has World War III Already Begun? An axis of autocracies led by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea is challenging the democratic world order,” Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 12.13.24.

• As Syrian rebels approached Damascus last weekend, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Moscow's main Arab ally, as a minor episode in a planet-wide struggle.
• Though leaders in the West may scoff at Lavrov's attempt to downplay Moscow's geopolitical setback in Syria, they broadly agree with his view that the world is increasingly split into two rival camps. 
• "It's the era of global confrontation," Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský said. "The violence happening right now in the world proves one thing: We don't have anymore the conflicts that are separated from each other and that could be handled separately. There is one common effort to destroy the international order, and we have to do everything to prevent that." The recent arrival of North Korean troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, he added, has made this linkage clear.
• A turning point for a closer partnership among these autocracies came in 2014, when the West responded to Russia's first invasion of Ukraine only with mild sanctions, convincing Putin of the democracies' weakness. The following year, Russia and Iran joined hands in Syria to rescue the Assad regime from a looming collapse. Cut off from some Western technologies, Russia also became increasingly dependent on China. Bonds among the four countries were cemented by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine—a war that Russia is fighting with indispensable Chinese support and weapons from North Korea and Iran. 
• "Big-power rivalry is accelerating and driving the world apart," said Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization think tank in Beijing and a former Chinese government adviser. "We are probably on the brink of World War III. You have a spillover of the Russia-Ukraine war, of the Gaza war, and Syria is just another domino. We need to be really careful not to have more dominoes."
• Some norms that applied throughout the Cold War have already been broken: The territory of one global power is being struck with missiles provided by another. Ukraine in recent months repeatedly hit military installations inside Russia with American ATACMS missiles, in an attempt to repel a Russian invasion that has used artillery, drones and missiles from North Korea and Iran.
• Since 2022, Putin has successfully resorted to nuclear blackmail to intimidate the U.S. and its allies into throttling support for Ukraine. At the same time, Russian agents have engaged in a fast-expanding campaign of violence across Europe, attacking military industries and communications infrastructure on a scale that Western governments describe as unprecedented.
• Despite this escalation, the major powers are not fighting one another directly—at least not yet. "It's not a world war by any stretch of imagination. It's still a proxy war," said Sen. James Risch, a Republican from Idaho, who is slated to become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next month.
• Assad's fall represents only a tactical loss for the converging autocratic powers. On the front that matters most, in Ukraine, momentum has shifted to Moscow's side in the past year, in large part because of ammunition and weapons supplied to Russia by North Korea and Iran—and, since October, an infusion of some 12,000 North Korean troops.
• U.S. officials estimate that some 90% of semiconductors and 70% of machine tools used by Russian military industries currently come from China. So far, Beijing has stopped short of directly supplying lethal weapons, though it is shipping large quantities of dual-use goods, they say.
• The fact that Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have different political systems and ideologies, and aren't joined by a formal alliance like NATO, had lulled Western governments into complacency, said Andrew Shearer, Australia's chief of national intelligence.
• "There is a certain transactional symbiosis among them, where each fulfills the needs of the other," said U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo, the commander of the Indo-Pacific command. "To think that we will be able to drive a wedge between them is a fantasy."
• "This is an axis of evil that is working together and for a long time now," said Ukraine's deputy minister of defense, Sergiy Boyev. "This global alliance is currently furthering the aggression against Ukraine. But it also has many additional targets."

“Russia is weaker than you think,” Fareed Zakaria, WP, 12.13.24.

• The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria should be a reminder of a general truth that often gets obscured in the blizzard of conflicting and contradictory news stories that absorb us day to day: The West's adversaries are often weaker than we think.
• Bashar al-Assad's fall points to a direct lesson: Russia's growing weakness. Moscow had been Syria's patron for over half a century. Syria was Russia's last major client state in the Middle East. Moscow had spent huge amounts of blood and treasure supporting Assad over the past decade. To lose that position is to become what Barack Obama dismissively called Russia—"a regional power." In fact, even in Russia's own region, relations have deteriorated with Armenia, a longtime ally that Russia failed to defend from Azerbaijani aggression because it's bogged down in Ukraine. Russian forces in Africa are also increasingly facing pressure from a variety of militant groups.
• Vladimir Putin's Russia now resembles the Soviet Union in the 1970s. While it is still assertive and interventionist abroad, its economy at home is increasingly weak and distorted by its conversion into a wartime operation. But just as the external expansionism and internal mobilization could not mask Soviet decay forever, so today Putin's bravado should not scare us. Think about it: If Russia were winning in Ukraine, would Putin threaten to use nuclear weapons?
• Now is not the time to ease up the pressure on Russia. 
• In a social media post after Assad's fall, Donald Trump said that Russia was in a "weakened state" because of Ukraine and a bad economy, noting that "600,000 Russian soldiers lay wounded or dead, in a war that should never have started." That is exactly right. He also wrote that it was time for Putin to act, implying that the problem with getting a ceasefire or peace deal is Russia, not Ukraine. This is a refreshing shift from what had seemed in the past his tendency to blame Ukraine for getting invaded.
• In that post, Trump also said that he knew "Vladimir" well. Then he surely knows that on this issue, the chief challenge he will face once back in the White House is getting "Vladimir" to abandon his dream of reconstructing Russia's czarist empire. Putin has pursued that vision since his first days in office, launching a savage war in Chechnya soon after coming to power, invading Georgia in 2008, annexing Crimea in 2014 and attempting to conquer all of Ukraine in 2022. If Trump can convince Putin of that, he will be able to do what he has always said was his goal: end the war in Ukraine.

“Fall of Syrian Regime Exposes Limits of Russia's Global Ambitions; Kremlin projects abroad are crumbling as Moscow focuses on Ukraine conflict,” Thomas Grove, WSJ, 12.14.24.

• With Assad gone, Russia's arrangement in Syria is in doubt. The future of its bases there is now subject to negotiations with the new Syrian leadership… If Russia is stripped of its main leverage in the region, it will have to look elsewhere, including to Algeria, Sudan or Libya, for potential replacement bases—though few options offer the same advantages as Syria's Tartus port, one of Russia's few accessible warm-water ports.
• The fall of Damascus has forced the question for Moscow: keep playing costly great power games to compete with the U.S. and China, or cut its losses and retrench to exert strength in its own backyard. Some advisers close to the Kremlin have decided on the latter, betting that to do otherwise isn't worth the effort or financial burden.
• "The least important thing in the world today is the issue of status and prestige," Fyodor Lukyanov, the head of a Kremlin advisory council on defense and foreign policy, wrote in one of Moscow's most influential policy journals the day after Assad fled to Moscow. He added that Russia should rethink its role as a regional power. "Returning to an international level…is no longer worth it."
• The crumbling of one of Russia's closest allies strikes a blow against the Kremlin's brand in Africa, where leaders saw Russia as a guarantor for their regimes against domestic and foreign enemies. "If you're an African leader relying on Russian muscle to stay in power, the fall of Assad's Syria is an important cautionary tale," said Daniel Drezner, a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. "Though the fact Assad landed in Moscow after all, does prove Russia doesn't leave its own behind."
• The Ukrainian conflict has also diverted resources away from another major front for Russian power projection: the Arctic… its jet fighters and submarines based in the Arctic, which hosts some of Moscow's most important nuclear assets. But Russia's need for cash, and increasingly weakened economic position, have given Beijing greater latitude to piggy back on Russia's Arctic efforts. As a result, Moscow has ceded some control over its jealously guarded Northern Sea Route to China, which is increasingly seen as the main beneficiary of the route. That has given Beijing greater influence over rules and protocol on the route, said a former Russian official briefed on the matter.
• It isn't clear how Russia's diminished status will affect potential discussions over Ukraine with President-elect Donald Trump, who wants to bring both Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the negotiating table and end the fighting. Some Russia analysts expect Putin to pummel Ukraine even harder, both on the battlefield and in negotiations, to demonstrate his resolve. "If the Syria case means anything, it only increases the importance of Ukraine to Putin," said Oleg Ignatov, senior Russia analyst for International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based nongovernmental organization. "If he didn't go all in over Syria, Ukraine is where he believes he must achieve his goals."

“What's At Stake in Ukraine: European Security in a Broader Context—Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Stephen Blank, FPRI, 12.14.24.

• Clearly the Russian threat to Ukraine, Belarus, and Europe in general is multi-dimensional and not exclusively militaristic. Despite the urgent necessity for NATO to rearm itself and Ukraine, it is equally necessary to attack, if not eliminate the non-military sources of Russia’s power to continue waging war on Europe as it has done for a generation. Not only does this mean bringing Ukraine and eventually Belarus into the European Union if not NATO. It also, inter alia, means genuinely transitioning away from dependence upon Russian energy to a greener economy across the West. 
• Since Russia is on the verge of swallowing up Belarus as its revealed strategic plans indicate, it is no less urgent to fashion an equally multi-dimensional strategy for Belarus. Indeed, too many Western governments or political movements both in the United States and Europe continue to deny the necessity for actively resisting Russia’s multi-dimensional coercive strategy. Instead they remain unwilling to face the long-standing and possibly increasing threat to Europe from Russia, as seen in the numerous recent statements by governments who see the threat and call it out.
• But beyond the immediate multiform Russian threats confronting the West we have the opportunity, provided we think and act strategically, to strengthen many of the dimensions of European security, including Belarus’ progress and the reduction of energy dependence upon Russia by grasping the interconnections that have led to the current war and the implications of failure to do so. For if Ukraine is enabled to win, we can take giant steps forward to a Europe whole and free. But if we shirk our responsibilities and, more to the point, our interests, not only will Ukraine fall but with it the very ideas of European security and an international order.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Brush With Russia in Baltic Points to New Flashpoint in NATO-Moscow Shadow War; Sabotage, warning shots, disruption of air traffic and dangerous military maneuvering are all part of intensifying clandestine campaign in Europe, officials say,” Bojan Pancevski, WSJ, 12.15.24.
• “Running Spies Is Not a Game for Amateurs,” Michael V. Hayden, John Sipher, NYT, 12.12.24.
• "As Putin Presses His Hybrid War, Europe Presses the 'Snooze' Button," Lee Hockstader, WP, 12.16.24
• “NATO’s Northeast Countries Have a Template for Europe’s New Security Reality,” Dan Baer and Sophia Besch, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 10, 2024.
• "Russia's Axis of Autocrats," Liana Fix and Thorsten Benner, IP Quarterly, 15.12.24.
• “Timing of Intervention: From Practice to Data,” Ivan Safranchuk, Russia in Global Affairs, 11.12.24. In Russian.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“No Limits? The China-Russia Relationship and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, CFR, 12.13.24.

• China and Russia have been clear about the world they seek. They want no further NATO enlargement, no color revolutions, no globe-spanning U.S. missile defense system, and no American nuclear weapons deployed abroad. They wish to resist actors “representing but the minority on the international scale”—that is, the United States and its allies—who continue to interfere in other states and “incite contradictions, differences and confrontation.” In the world to come, no one would pressure China or Russia on human rights or interfere in their internal affairs. Democracy itself would be redefined and subject to no universal standard. China and Russia would support reunification with Taiwan and oppose alliances in Asia that China finds threatening. They would together oversee the transition to a world in which great powers dominate their regions and no one attempts to impose or enforce global rules.
• The upshot, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates puts it, is that a “new American strategy must recognize that we face a global struggle of indeterminate duration against two great powers that share authoritarianism at home and hostility to the United States.” Because of Russian-Chinese collaboration, the war in Ukraine is longer and more brutal than it would otherwise be, the Indo-Pacific military balance of power has shifted away from the United States more quickly, and more countries dissatisfied with the constraints of Western-led world order are increasingly vocal and active in resisting it.
• Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 erased any last vestiges of the post–Cold War era and ushered in a new, more dangerous era. Moscow and Beijing had long coordinated and increasingly aligned their efforts, but the war gave rise to a new, more active and more determined alignment. For all the real limits to their partnership, the two are bound by shared opposition to a U.S.-led world that, they believe, affords them too little security, status, and freedom of action.
• The era is daunting but also contains real strains of hope. Ensuring that Europe and Asia remain free of hostile domination is, of course, not a new objective of U.S. foreign policy. In this fresh effort, the United States and its allies have everything they need to succeed. Their combined economies are larger than China’s and Russia’s, and their militaries more powerful. Their values are more attractive and their democratic system more stable.[226] U.S. leaders should add to those advantages a clarity of purpose, resolve, and confidence in their system and in the American future. Some critics will say that all this is just too hard for the United States at such a contentious and divisive period in its history. That conclusion, however, would profoundly test the Churchillian theorem that the United States always wakes up late to far-reaching external dangers, but never too late.
• Ensuring that Europe and Asia remain free of hostile domination is, of course, not a new objective of U.S. foreign policy. In this fresh effort, the United States and its allies have everything they need to succeed.

"The Image of China in Russian Public Opinion," Denis Volkov, Levada Center, 12.12.24.

• Polls show that over the past two or three decades, the image of China in Russian public opinion has undergone significant changes, as the country itself has changed greatly during this time. Twenty years ago, only a fifth of Russians believed that China could be counted among the "great powers," today two-thirds of respondents think so (in total, Russians see three great powers in the world: Russia, China, and the United States). Most often, China is counted among the great countries in the Far East—three-quarters of respondents, since it is there that the majority have direct experience of this country. 
• The first associations that come to mind for an ordinary [Russian] person when they hear the words China [when asked by Levada] are mostly positive or neutral. One of the main ones is the Great Wall of China. Most often, respondents say that it is a large country with a huge population. A quarter of all associations are related to Chinese goods—telephones, cars, household appliances… A large proportion of responses contain references to the high level of development of the economy, industry and technology. 

What countries do Russians consider to be great powers

• In 2014, the number of Russians who perceive China as a friendly country doubled—from 20 to 40%, positive assessments increased from 55 to 77%. Similar dynamics were observed after February 2022: a positive attitude towards China reached a record 92%, the perception of the country as friendly—65%. Positive attitudes towards China prevail in all socio-demographic groups and at all ages. The youngest respondents and residents of the Far East, where interaction between the countries is most active, have the most positive attitude towards it… Today, China is largely perceived by Russian public opinion as a counterweight to the West, anti-American.

Countries, which Russians believe to be friendliest to Russia

• The current Russian-Chinese alliance is perceived by many as forced, imposed by external circumstances, and more advantageous to China. This state of affairs causes discomfort and fear of excessive dependence on a stronger and richer neighbor. Against the backdrop of these fears, normalization of relations with the United States and Europe seems to many to be a desirable scenario that will help balance China's influence. In the long term, this may mean a more reserved attitude toward China in Russia.

“On national identity and political choice: the experience of Russia and China,” Dmitry Medvedev, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 12.13.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• [Certain] conclusions should be made about the relationship between national identity and political choice. They are quite obvious.
• 1. The classical principle of Western civilizers "divide et impera" brings untold suffering and troubles to the whole world, serves as a source of numerous ethnic and socio-cultural conflicts, as well as total economic inequality. This was the case earlier in history, and it continues today.
• 2. Today, inciting interethnic or interracial hatred comes down to constructing a national pseudo-identity of any ethnic group in order to split it off from the state-forming people. This is what Washington and its satellites do with Russia, this is what they do with China and many other states. Taiwan is an organic and integral part of the pan-Chinese space, an administrative unit of the People's Republic of China. Attempts to invent a Taiwanese state, nation or language, incited from overseas, are artificial and, as a result, unviable.
• 3. Today, Ukraine faces a choice—to be with Russia or to disappear from the world map. At the same time, Ukrainians are not required to lay down "neither soul nor body" for their freedom. They should humble the pride of "otherness," refuse to oppose themselves to the pan-Russian project and drive out the demons of political Ukrainianism. Our task is to help the residents of Malorossiya and Novorossiya build Ukraine without the hassle of "Ukrainianism." To consolidate in the public consciousness that Russia is irreplaceable for Ukraine in cultural, linguistic and political terms. If the so-called Ukraine continues to follow an aggressive Russophobic course, it will disappear from the world map forever, just as the puppet entity of Manchukuo, artificially created by militarist Japan as a proxy force in China, once evaporated.
• 4. In Galicia and Volyn—today's "fodder base" for political Ukrainianism—there were once powerful social forces oriented toward Russia. During the First World War, they were subjected to genocide. In the context of the Russophobia that is observed in these regions today, the events of the historical period of the early 20th century must be given an impartial assessment.
• 5. Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Attempts to drive a wedge between us are absolutely untenable and criminal from a historical point of view. The Vyhovskys, Mazepas, Skoropadskys and Banderas at different times smashed their heads against the all-Russian wall. It will be the same now.

“This Unreadable Russian Novel Is Xi Jinping’s Spiritual Guide,” John Garnaut and Sam Chetwin George, NYT, 12.15.24.

• In late October, while much of the world was focused on the buildup to the U.S. elections, President Xi Jinping of China was issuing a call for global resistance to the American-led world order. Speaking in Kazan, Russia, at the summit of BRICS nations, he told the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Iran, Egypt and several other countries that the world had entered a pivotal new era “defined by turbulence and transformation.” “Should we allow the world to remain turbulent or push it back on to the right path of peaceful development?” Mr. Xi asked. He invoked, as a spiritual guide for the task ahead, an 1863 Russian novel that glorified revolutionary struggle and inspired Vladimir Lenin.
• The obscure and radical novel that the Chinese leader cited as his inspiration offers a glimpse into Mr. Xi’s mind-set as he prepares to test Donald Trump’s commitment to the institutions and alliances that underpin the U.S.-led order. The book, “What Is to Be Done? Tales of New People,” was written by Nikolai Chernyshevsky in a prison cell in 1862 and 1863, after czarist authorities jailed him for “an evil intent to overthrow the existing order” because of his alleged connections to subversive organizations. The novel is little known in the West, perhaps because its meandering, confusing account of a love triangle in a utopian sewing cooperative is a tough read. 
• The book’s appeal for Mr. Xi lies in its protagonist, Rakhmetov. The scion of a princely family, Rakhmetov rebels against his domineering father at age 16, strengthens his body through hard physical work and moves to St. Petersburg, where he is recruited into an underground group and reborn as an “extraordinary man”—the ultimate revolutionary.
• It also inspired many of Mao Zedong’s radical Red Guards and the urban youths who answered Mao’s call to live with Chinese peasants in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Among these so-called sent-down youths was Mr. Xi. He first read the book as a teenager while living in a cave in rural Shaanxi Province, according to his own account. He was “shocked” by Rakhmetov’s ascetic ways but saw them as ideal for toughening one’s will. Mr. Xi has said he emulated Rakhmetov’s example by removing his mattress, taking cold showers and exercising outside in the rain and snow.
• Mr. Putin remains an essential partner to Mr. Xi. Russian state media reported this year that Mr. Putin planned to give the Chinese leader an old copy of Chernyshevsky’s book for his birthday in June, and he staged the BRICS summit in the Tatarstan region, Rakhmetov’s ancestral home. The two men met in October at the Kazan Kremlin, which sits at the end of what was once named Chernyshevsky Road. But there is no mistaking who is in charge here. It is Mr. Xi who is assuming the mantle of Rakhmetov—the “extraordinary man,” the agent of history—and believes his iron will and visionary leadership will deliver the world from American turbulence.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board. The President took part in an expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board at the National Defense Control Centre of the Russian Federation,” official web site of the Russian president, 12.16.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• I would like to emphasize from the very beginning that the outgoing year has been crucial in achieving the goals of the special military operation. Thanks to the professionalism and courage of our soldiers, the heroic efforts of defense industry workers, and the truly nationwide support for the army and navy, Russian troops maintain a strong strategic initiative along the entire line of contact. This year alone, 189 communities have been liberated. 
• The military-political situation in the world remains challenging and unstable. Bloodshed continues in the Middle East, and there is a high potential for conflict in a number of other regions of the world.
• We observe the current U.S. administration and practically the entire collective West attempting to maintain their global dominance… Meanwhile, NATO countries are boosting their military spending and the alliance’s assault groupings are being formed near the Russian border. For example, the number of U.S. servicemen in Europe has exceeded 100,000.
• Equally concerning is the U.S. activity in developing high-precision ground-based strike systems with a firing range of up to 5,500 kilometers and preparing them for deployment in forward zones. Moreover, the transfer and deployment of these missile systems are already being prepared in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Let me remind you that in the past, these measures were prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which ceased to be in effect at the initiative of the United States… if the United States begins to deploy such systems, then all our voluntary restrictions will be lifted.
• Given the escalating geopolitical tensions, we must adopt additional measures to ensure the security of Russia and its allies… The army and navy are being re-equipped with up-to-date weapons and equipment at an accelerated pace. For example, the share of such weapons in the strategic nuclear forces has already reached 95%.
• Meanwhile, we have specified the fundamental principles for the use of nuclear weapons envisaged in the updated Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. Let me stress once again, so that no one accuses us of trying to scare everyone with nuclear weapons: this is a policy of nuclear deterrence.
• It is… imperative to focus on addressing the following priority tasks while working on the above objectives.
  • First, strategic nuclear forces remain, without a doubt, a key tool for maintaining stability and protecting Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will keep maintaining their potential and balanced growth, and continue working on creating new deterrent force systems and complexes. It is likewise important to keep non-strategic nuclear forces on constant alert and to continue holding exercises involving their potential use.
  • Second, earlier today, I spoke about the risks associated with the United States deploying medium-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We will respond to such threats in a comprehensive manner. 
    • As is well known, Oreshnik medium-range missile system is Russia’s most recently deployed powerful weapon. In November, in response to the attacks using Western weapons which targeted our country’s territory, a ballistic hypersonic missile with a non-nuclear payload was successfully used. The serial production of such complexes to protect Russia and our allies’ security should begin in the near future. Without a doubt, this will be accomplished.
      • The  extremely powerful Oreshnik system… has already proven itself well. Let me repeat once again: specialists know this better, and the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces [Sergei Karakayev], who is here today, told me that he thinks that using several such systems at once can be comparable in power to using nuclear weapons. But it is not nuclear, since there is no nuclear fuel, no nuclear component, and no contamination. This is a very important element in deciding what weapons we can use.
      • We have created more modern sea-based systems than the U.S., such as the Kalibr and the hypersonic Zircon systems. We have created the latest medium-range air-launched missiles Kh-101 with a range that is many times greater than that of a potential enemy: over 4,000 kilometers. This system can be equipped with a special nuclear warhead.
  • Third, it is necessary to more widely implement the experience gained during the special military operation into the combat training of troops, 
  • Fourth, the experience gained from conducting the special military operation should be fully considered when determining the priority areas for the development of domestic weapons and equipment, and the tactics for their use. 
  • Fifth, to reduce the time required for decision-making in unit control on the battlefield, an inter-service information exchange system based on mobile devices has been created and has proven effective. 
  • Sixth, it is necessary to increase the production of robotic systems and unmanned systems of various classes and types. 
  • Seventh, we need to continue to further expand military and military-technical cooperation with allies and partners who are ready and willing to work with us, which includes most countries around the world.

“The Doctrine of Nuclear Non-Deterrence: How the Kremlin turned nuclear blackmail into a tool of conventional warfare,” Re-Russia, 12.09.24.

• It is debatable whether nuclear blackmail has allowed Putin to achieve his objectives. According to sources in Putin's inner circle cited by The Washington Post, the West’s consistent disregard for Moscow’s 'red lines' has demonstrated that the Kremlin’s nuclear threats have lost their effectiveness. CIA Director William Burns, who had been concerned about the risk of nuclear conflict in the autumn of 2022, now suggests that the West should not take Putin's threats seriously. A number of analysts, including Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Centre in Berlin, believe that Putin has set the bar for nuclear escalation too high. 
• At the same time, it is undeniable that during the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat has been an effective tool for the Kremlin, compelling Kyiv’s Western allies to exercise extreme caution in the scale and quality of the assistance provided. As a result, some experts argue that Ukraine has been fighting with 'one hand tied behind its back,' unable to fully exploit opportunities to decisively defeat Russian forces in the early stages of the conflict. The U.S. and the broader West have taken Putin’s 'crisis-level' threats of using tactical nuclear weapons seriously, especially in the event of a complete failure of the Russian invasion. This cautious approach allowed Putin to regroup and build up a military machine that was initially lacking at the outset of the invasion. 
• However, the implications of this relative success may be far-reaching. By demonstrating that Russia can withstand the burden of Western sanctions, Putin has effectively devised a new model of warfare, leveraging its nuclear superiority. This model involves conventional military conflict hovering on the brink of escalating into a nuclear one. The mere presence of such a threat forces the targeted nation to limit its response to aggression to prevent the conflict from reaching the nuclear threshold. Furthermore, it is assumed that a possible exchange of tactical nuclear strikes would not necessarily escalate into a global nuclear war. Although Russia would lose such a conflict, the costs could be prohibitively high and ultimately unpredictable for all parties involved. 
• The relative success of this hybrid conventional warfare model in Ukraine increases the likelihood of its replication in potential confrontations between Russia and European NATO countries—a scenario military analysts are increasingly discussing with greater certainty (Re:Russia: Trump's Challenge and Europe's Dilemma)—or in other conflicts, such as those in the Asia-Pacific region. 
• One way or another, an analysis of the rhetorical nuclear escalation campaign conducted by the Russian authorities over the past two-and-a-half years reveals it not as a series of emotional statements or propagandistic slogans, but as a deliberate and systematic effort to prepare public opinion and elites for the possibility of a limited nuclear conflict. It also aims to normalize such a conflict as a legitimate political and military tool for resolving international disputes. To some extent, this represents a logical extension of the thinking within Putin's circle about how to leverage Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, which had ceased during three decades of peace to function as a tool affirming Russia’s exceptional status in the world. By increasing readiness for nuclear conflict, Putin sees himself as reclaiming the role of a superpower leader. So far, the West has not formulated an adequate response to this strategy. 

“The Oreshnik Ballistic Missile: From Russia with Love?” Sidharth Kaushal and Matthew Savill, RUSI, 12.10.24.

• Existing Russia weapons being used against Ukraine (the Iskander short-range ballistic missile and Kinzhal and Kaliber cruise missiles) are already nuclear-capable, but a large missile like this [Oreshnik] sends a more potent message around potential nuclear use, as well as ‘punishing’ Ukraine for the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow. 
• It seems highly unlikely that Ukraine will suddenly constrain itself in the use of ATACMS or Storm Shadow, at least under the current U.S. administration, having spent months arguing for permission to use them on Russian territory. Images have already emerged of what is allegedly a further use to strike a Russian airbase. And for Russia, massed drone attacks and a mixture of ballistic and cruise missile strikes provide the most tactically useful riposte or form of pressure, especially heading into the winter. The use of Oreshnik is therefore unlikely to significantly alter calculations on how best to launch or deter long-range strikes by either side.
• This exacerbates the deterrence dilemma for Russia in the more significant area, which is broader strategic stability. On the one hand, critical red lines have not been crossed by either side: NATO forces have not directly deployed into Ukraine to fight Russian forces, and Russia has not launched a conventional military attack on NATO countries. And at least some norms have been kept in place, with the Russian pre-launch notification being given to the U.S.. On the other hand, international backers continue to provide support to Ukraine, even if sluggishly (perhaps a win for Russian messaging, but still problematic). Meanwhile, what looks like a Russian sabotage campaign in Europe continues, with no obvious response yet from European countries beyond more public exposure for the issue; and the launch is surely proof that the INF is dead, if anyone was clinging to hopes about a supposed Russian ‘moratorium.’ This state of affairs looks superficially manageable, but Russia has betrayed its anxiety over ongoing international support for Ukraine, and its playing of the nuclear card has undermined rather than reinforced its nuclear deterrent posture. After all, Russia itself has been attacked, with a limited and wholly conventional response. 
• In part, this reflects Russian resilience and willingness to prioritize progress in eastern Ukraine in the autumn. But if Russia were entirely relaxed about the international response to Ukraine and the issue of European missile capabilities, it need not have ‘clarified’ its nuclear policy by using a list of examples that have already been breached. Far from creating ambiguity and reducing NATO/European ambitions, increasingly bloodcurdling Russian threats have largely been ignored. If, as a result of this saber-rattling, Russia’s adversaries assume that the sword will in fact remain sheathed, then Russia will have itself to blame—but this leaves open the possibility that it feels the pressure to escalate somehow with more threatening sabotage or disruption activity, or a more worrying conventional escalation against Ukraine. Finally, the significant expansion of Russia’s intermediate-range arsenal is a possibility if it can free up the resources, but with the Russian missile production rate currently at 130 a month, increasing the scale of production of an IRBM appears unlikely. While a theatre-level nuclear threat represents a challenge much as the SS-20 did, the value of the deployment could be nullified by the acceleration of European and U.S. plans for both strike and missile defense capabilities. 

“Navigating the Fog: An Interview with Professor Sergei A. Karaganov,” Tariq Marzbaan, Al Mayadeen, 12.09.24.

• There already are good targets in Romania and Poland, with the threat of a second or third wave, using nuclear weapons. Russia already sent a powerful signal by a live testing of the new hypersonic multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, the "Oreshnik" missile, against military-industrial targets in Ukraine. If the West does not stop its aggression, missiles will be tested against targets supporting the Kiev regime… The total payload of the "Oreshnik" missile with six nuclear warheads is close to one megaton… At this juncture, I would not recommend a strike against targets in Europe. 
• Unfortunately, we are dealing with [Western] elite, who has lost all sense and reason and also a fear of war… If we do not restore this fear, the world is virtually doomed to a Third World War and a massive use of these and other weapons, destroying existing civilizations and taking away hundreds of millions of lives. 
• The strengthening of nuclear deterrence in Russian policies has two aims: One is to win the war in Ukraine, without sacrificing too many of our best men; and, second, to prevent a Third World War, which is advancing. The third task is to stop the West from regaining its positions, which it held in the world for the last five centuries, which permitted it to suppress other civilizations and to siphon off the world's GNP from other peoples. We hope, and it is my hope, that our victory in Ukraine can be a substitution for a Third World War.
• We do not need any countries to join us in a coalition in a war with NATO, which I hope would not happen. There is, of course, a great ally, which is [Belarus]. If a war with NATO starts, it will immediately become nuclear. And Europe (outside of Russia) would be largely finished. Unfortunately, people lost their understanding of that simple truth. I repeat: any war between Russia and NATO would go nuclear. And, as I have said many times, the U.S. would not enter this war with nuclear weapons. Unless, of course, a bunch of madmen and America-haters occupy the White House and the Pentagon simultaneously. But the victory of Trump with all his kinkiness, offers the hope that he will not follow the current European path. Though Trump is not a friend of Russia and of all peace-loving peoples. But he is a signal of a return of the U.S. to sanity. So I hope that a war between Russian and NATO will never happen. Even though Russia is bound to win, it would be a Pyrrhic victory. We would have to destroy a part of our Russian civilization, a part of ourselves.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see: “Stop the bleeding: How to protect existing NPT disarmament agreements and commitments, ELN, 12.16.24.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

“What Assad’s Fall Means for Russia in the Middle East,” Thomas Graham, CRF, 12.10.24.

• The stunning setback of Assad’s fall from power has occurred. Russia’s immediate concern will be salvaging its strategic military bases in Syria, the naval facility at Tartus, and the Khmeimim air base. They are critical to its ability to project power in the Middle East, they anchor Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean, and they serve as the logistics hub to support Russian operations in North Africa, including its military contractors in Libya and the Sahel. Many observers, including Russian military bloggers close to the Russian Ministry of Defense, argue that Russia will have no choice but to abandon those bases after Assad’s ouster and the victory of Islamic forces it has spent the greater part of the last decade trying to annihilate. The situation, however, remains quite fluid. The anti-Assad forces consist of many competing factions operating in various parts of the country. A long period of instability lies ahead, and Moscow is not without cards to play.
• As it became clear that the rebels were likely to quickly rout Assad’s forces, Moscow changed its rhetoric dramatically. Instead of railing against terrorist forces, it began to call for dialogue among all forces as part of a political process to end the fighting. Despite its rhetorical support for Assad, Russia never really provided much military backing against the rebels—perhaps understanding the fatal weakness of Assad’s demoralized forces hollowed out by corruption. Although it claimed otherwise, Moscow appears to have played a central role in persuading Assad to step down and flee the country. Tellingly, it was the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not an official Syria source—that announced Assad’s decision, and the Syrian president flew to Moscow for political asylum. At the least, the Kremlin will attempt to take credit for facilitating the rebels’ conquest of Damascus with minimal bloodshed.
• In the current period of great uncertainty, it would be premature to draw any far-reaching conclusions about Russia’s presence in Syria and the broader Middle East. One thing is certain: Putin is not going to simply abandon Russia’s military bases in Syria and calmly accept a major strategic setback—that would not only erode Russia’s reputation as a great power but also diminish his own domestic political standing.  

"Can Russia Reach a Deal with Syria's New Rulers?," Nikita Smagin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12.11.24.

• In recent years, it has become clear that Russia has big plans—both economic and political—for the Middle East. Moscow trades intensively with Türkiye, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, is implementing large-scale energy and transport projects in the region, seeks a mediation role in local conflicts, and cooperates with pro-Iran groups to squeeze the United States out of the region. In addition, Russia has not shied away from establishing relations with radical armed groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Houthis in Yemen.  
• The loss of Syria threatens to thwart some of the Kremlin’s ambitions, as Moscow’s two military bases in the country are crucial for the logistics of power projection in the Middle East and Africa.
• Moscow will need to agree on a form of long-term cooperation with those who, until recently, it was calling terrorists. But it has repeatedly shown extreme flexibility on such issues. 
• Admittedly, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Syria’s new rulers, may throw a spanner in the works. After all, Russian planes have been bombing the group’s positions for nine years. Russia’s chances of retaining a presence in Syria therefore depend on whether HTS really has transformed from a group of militants close to Al Qaeda into a pragmatic force that is open to compromise.
• From a purely pragmatic perspective, HTS needs Russia just as much as Russia needs HTS.
  • In particular, Moscow could provide the new Syrian authorities with much-needed international legitimacy, since it’s unlikely that Europe and the United States will be rushing to open embassies in Damascus, while the Kremlin has de facto already done so. (That is also how Russia’s recognition of the Taliban began.)
  • Russia could also be useful for HTS if it wants to become a truly independent group: thus far, its main international backer has been Türkiye, and it’s often considered a Turkish proxy. 
  • In addition, Russia would be a far better counterweight to U.S. influence in Syria than Türkiye or the Gulf states. 
• Such a strategy of trying to trade international recognition of HTS in return for retaining military bases in Syria could lead Russia in two directions. 
  • Firstly, Moscow might opt to establish and provide military support for an Alawite autonomy in Syria’s Latakia (the Alawites fear the Islamists), where Russian bases are located. This would be similar to the way in which the United States has backed Syria’s Kurds, who currently control large tracts of the country’s north.
  • Second, the need to come to an agreement with HTS could push Russia into boosting cooperation with all kinds of radical groups globally. In this way, Russia might end up offering legitimacy to a whole range of radical groups who have seized power in countries across the world—bestowing legitimacy and extending material support in exchange for preferential treatment.   
• If Russia does find a way to work with HTS—which is not beyond the realms of possibility—it will open up a range of new options, and perhaps hand the Kremlin a competitive advantage in the region.

“Syrian rebels have dealt a blow to Vladimir Putin’s naval ambitions. The loss of a key Mediterranean port could hobble the Russian navy,” The Economist, 12.10.24.

• If Russia’s [naval base in Tartus, Syria] is eventually given its marching orders, this would have a major impact on its naval posture… Tartus became especially important as a logistical hub after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Turkey restricted access to the Black Sea and Russia’s fleet there.
• Without Tartus, Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean are likely to become shorter, more expensive and more sporadic. 
• The loss of Khmeimim [air base] would also be a blow, though a lesser one. The air base has been an important hub for Russian air power. It is “perfectly placed” between Russia and Africa to allow Russia to supply mercenary forces in Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali, notes John Foreman, Britain’s former defense attaché in Moscow. 
•  Mr. Assad’s fall “is a major blow to Putin’s dream of Russia as a global player in a multipolar, post-Western world,” writes Sabine Fischer of the SWP think-tank in Berlin. Many influential Russians appear to have reached much the same conclusion. The new rulers of Syria “create the impression of being rational and civilized”, wrote Fyodor Lukyanov, an analyst close to the Kremlin, adding that Russia’s “absolute priority” was Ukraine. Russia, he concluded, was better off being a regional power, focused on Europe. “Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority to intervene effectively by force outside the former Soviet Union,” agreed Ruslan Pukhov, an expert at the CAST think-tank in Moscow with close ties to the defense establishment. Russia had won fast, but failed to consolidate its victory politically. “The Americans have been through this before in Iraq and Afghanistan,” wrote Mr. Pukhov, “but the Russians, by our national tradition, must necessarily step on the same rake themselves.”

“Ukraine helped Syrian rebels deliver blow to Russia,” David Ignatius, WP, 12.11.24.

• The Syrian rebels who swept to power in Damascus last weekend received drones and other support from Ukrainian intelligence operatives who sought to undermine Russia and its Syrian allies, according to sources familiar with Ukrainian military activities abroad. Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones to the rebel headquarters in Idlib, Syria, four to five weeks ago to help Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the leading rebel group based there, the knowledgeable sources said.
• The aid from Kyiv played only a modest role in overthrowing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Western intelligence sources believe. But it was notable as part of a broader Ukrainian effort to strike covertly at Russian operations in the Middle East, Africa and inside Russia itself.
• Ukraine's covert assistance program in Syria has been an open secret, though senior Biden administration officials said repeatedly in answer to my questions that they weren't aware of it. Ukraine's motivation is obvious: Facing a Russian onslaught inside their country, Ukrainian intelligence has looked for other fronts where it can bloody Russia's nose and undermine its clients..
• Russia clearly was surprised by HTS's rapid advance on Damascus—but interestingly, Russian sources have tried to minimize the Ukrainian role. 
• The Syria operation isn't the only instance of Ukrainian military intelligence operating abroad to harass Russian operatives. The BBC reported in August that Ukraine had helped rebels in northern Mali ambush Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group. The July 27 attack killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malians, the BBC said.
• Like Ukraine's Africa forays and its assault on the Kursk region inside Russia, the covert operation in Syria reflects an attempt to widen the battlefield—and hurt the Russians in areas where they're unprepared. Ukraine's aid wasn't "the drone that broke that camel's back," so to speak. But it helped, in at least a small way, to bring down Russia's most important client in the Middle East. And like Israel in its failure to anticipate Hamas's surge across the Gaza fence on Oct. 7, 2023, Russia saw the Ukrainian-backed rebels coming, but couldn't mobilize to stop the attack and prevent the devastating consequences.

“Assad’s Collapse Is A Blow To Russia’s Middle East Strategy,” Zineb Riboua, NI, 12.11.24.

• The first miscalculation Putin made was eliminating Yevgeny Prigozhin, the previous head of the paramilitary Wagner Group and the architect behind the security infrastructure that enabled Russian mercenaries to operate effectively in Syria. 
• Putin’s second strategic mistake was turning Syria into the centerpiece of Russia’s regional logistics operations. While this reliance may have arisen out of necessity, it has exposed critical vulnerabilities. Russia depends heavily on Syrian military bases to facilitate its arms trafficking, gold smuggling, and the illicit operations of its mercenaries. Notably, a CNN investigation revealed that a military aircraft conducted at least sixteen gold-smuggling flights from Sudan to Latakia—a Syrian port city hosting a Russian military base—serving as a financial lifeline for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Third, the most staggering and critical strategic mistake Putin has made, particularly after invading Ukraine, is underestimating Turkey’s posture and its capacity to respond decisively to threats against its national security interests. Ankara has demonstrated a remarkable ability to organize, mobilize, and counteract actors that challenge its strategic priorities, both within the region and beyond.
• Finally, a glaring flaw in Putin’s strategy lies in his inability to address the risks that accompany his strategic gains. While he has adeptly capitalized on opportunities—such as securing a foothold in Syria, expanding Russia’s air defense network through an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone in the Eastern Mediterranean, and gaining a strategic position to pressure NATO’s southern flank—he has neglected to mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities tied to these accomplishments. Foremost among these risks is Russia’s overreliance on Iran. 
• The fallout from these miscalculations is unmistakable. Russia’s years-long effort to position itself as an alternative security guarantor has unraveled in just a matter of days.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see: “

• “Putin Just Suffered a Huge Defeat,” Hanna Notte, NYT, 12.10.24.
• “Russia has lost prestige after the fall of Assad,” Nikolay Kozhanov, Chatham House, 12.12.24.
• “Putin’s Loss in Syria Exposes Western Failures,” Martin Ivens, Bloomberg, 12.14.24.
• "Assad's Downfall Echoes Across the Mediterranean," Maha Yahya, Carnegie Middle East Center, 12.09.24.
• "What Does Regime Change in Syria Mean for Russian-Turkish Relations?" Dimitar Bechev, Carnegie Politika, 13.12.24.

• "Assad’s Fall: The Legacy of Repression and Foreign Influence Among Syrian Rebels," Kabir Taneja, ORF, 14.12.24.

• "Syria After Assad," Ben Taub, The New Yorker, 23.12.24.

• "How to Hold Syria Together," Emma Sky, Foreign Affairs, 12.12.24.

• "Washington Stands to Miss a Historic Opportunity in Syria," Josh Rogin, The Washington Post, 12.16.24.

• Statement by President Bashar al-Assad on the Circumstances Leading to his Departure from Syria, 12.16.24.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Russian Elites Hope Trump Will Rein In Putin,” Andrei Pertsev, CEIP, 12.05.24.

• Many in the Russian elites are once again pinning their hopes on the Republican president-elect. But there is a fundamental difference from 2016. These hopes are now not for Trump as some sort of “Russian agent,” but as an external force capable—unlike the elites themselves—of solving Russia’s main problem right now.
• Trump’s image as a straight-talking businessman with a colorful past who enjoys the good life appeals to the Russian elites. His actions may not always be predicable, but they can generally be understood and explained through logic.
• The hopes Trump has given rise to are also a reflection of the war fatigue felt by the Russian elites and public as a whole. Russian President Vladimir Putin sketched the outlines of his vision for a ceasefire a long time ago, but it would take Russia years to fully implement its conditions, such as taking control of the Ukrainian regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia—if it is even possible.
• In other words, the Russian president is stubbornly demanding the impossible, which gives the elites the impression that his true desire is to wage an endless war. He is effectively saying, “these are our demands, they don’t want to fulfill them, so we have to continue.” 
• Against the backdrop of uncertainty created by Putin, Trump’s declared intention of ending the war as swiftly as possible appears crystal clear, and the Russian elites could not fail to notice that. They also see Trump’s presidency as an opportunity to neutralize Putin’s messianic impulses with the pragmatism of a Republican: a representative of that “old America” that knows how to get things done and always looks for the advantage for their country.
• Right until the last, the elites did not believe there was really a prospect of war with Ukraine, and that was because they considered Putin a rational politician. Then they clung to the irrational belief that the president was both lucky and knew what he was doing, and so the war would ultimately end in a Russian victory. But almost three years into the bloodshed, it has become clear to a significant part of the elite that Putin does not—and never did—have a clear plan of action, and that the stated goals of the war are nothing but empty rhetoric.
• Entrepreneurs and state managers are already openly talking about serious problems in the economy, but are met with little understanding from the leadership. The president lives in his own little world, as far as possible from rationalists and pragmatists.
• Meanwhile, the irrational state of Russian politics right now offers a voice to those like the political scientist Sergei Karaganov, who has suggested that the Kremlin should not hold back in using nuclear weapons, that it should populate Siberia with people from the annexed territories, and that it should start teaching ideology from kindergarten. Incredible as it might seem, those ideas may well resonate with Putin, who believes in the messianic role of Russia and himself.
• The nuclear saber-rattling of Russia’s senior leadership and ballistic missile strikes do nothing to add to the elites’ sense of stability. In this context, Trump looks like a rational external factor, an apparent pragmatist who can at least try to resolve this dangerous conflict.
• Any such hopes for Trump are largely unfounded. His proposals to freeze the conflict along the front line are unlikely to be enough for Putin, while a refusal from the latter will likely mean a new round of confrontation with the United States, only under a new president.
• Many in Russia yearn for a pragmatic and rational leader.

“Mike Waltz on Russia and Ukraine,” Dasha Zhukauskaite and Angelina Flood, Russia Matters, 12.09.24.

• If confirmed by the Senate, U.S. Rep. Mike Waltz, who has been picked by President-elect Donald Trump to serve as national security adviser, will play one of the lead roles in shaping America’s policies toward Russia, Ukraine and the rest of Eurasia, among other parts of the world. Thus, for those following developments in post-Soviet Eurasia that impact the U.S. in profound ways, it is important to know what Waltz has recently said and done regarding that part of the world.
• During his time in the Congress from 2019–2024, Waltz has articulated an assertive vision for U.S. foreign policy, particularly in addressing challenges posed by Russia, its aggression in Ukraine and its influence in the broader post-Soviet Eurasian region. He has been a vocal critic of the Biden administration’s handling of the Ukraine conflict, advocating for clearer “red lines” and stronger deterrence against Russian escalation in Ukraine, including the Russian leadership’s explicit and implicit threats to use of weapons of mass destruction. In his view, Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats must be met with decisive U.S. resolve to prevent the Kremlin from leveraging its “escalation doctrine” to gain strategic advantages.
• On Ukraine, Waltz has also supported military and economic aid with strings attached, such as Kyiv’s consent to enter peace negotiations with Russia, which he likely articulated during his discussion with visiting top Ukrainian officials this week.¹ 
• Waltz has also supported shared responsibility among NATO allies, urging Europe to meet defense commitments to ensure the U.S. is not disproportionately burdened, including when it comes to supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia. Despite robust support for aid to Ukraine in the first years of the war, beginning in 2024, Waltz began to oppose broader funding measures and standalone appropriations acts. He has opposed the Biden administration’s policies on Ukraine and Iran for overstretching the U.S. militarily without significant benefits for Americans, and has criticized the promise to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” as “a slogan, not a strategy.” 
• Additionally, he has proposed warning Russia that the U.S. will substantially increase aid to Ukraine if Moscow refuses to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine, and has supported leveraging sanctions and energy policies to undermine Russia’s war machine and close loopholes in Russia’s energy exports. Waltz has expressed concern about Russia’s alliances with authoritarian regimes like North Korea. He views Russia’s activities in Eurasia as part of a broader adversarial alignment with China and Iran.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s elite sound the alarm on the economy amid high interest rates,” Catherine Belton, WP, 12.10.24.

• When Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed an annual big-business gathering this month, he could not help but crow about how Western sanctions against the economy had failed… But despite the polite applause that greeted the Russian president, tension has been breaking out into the open among the Russian elite over the mounting cost of sanctions on the economy. Executives from major businesses have been warning in growing numbers that central bank interest rate hikes to combat rampant inflation—caused by sanctions and Putin’s wartime spending spree—could bring the economy to a halt next year.
• There could be a rash of bankruptcies, including in Russia’s strategically sensitive military industry, where the boom in production fueling Russia’s war in Ukraine is forecast to slow next year, the executives have said. The result could be that Russia would no longer be able to replenish the equipment being lost on the battlefield at such high rates. Even President-elect Donald Trump noted in a post on his Truth Social network this weekend about the shocking overthrow of the Kremlin’s ally in Syria, Bashar al-Assad, that Russia had been weakened partly because of “a bad economy.”
• As expectations grow that the central bank will be forced to impose another interest rate hike this month, usually reticent members of Putin’s inner circle have joined in the unprecedented criticism of the policy that has kept the key rate at 21%. However, annual inflation continues to soar beyond 9%, according to official data, raising the prospect of a prolonged “stagflation” or even recession next year.
• Already, the central bank forecasts that growth will sharply slow to 0.5 to 1.5% next year. Tough new U.S. sanctions on 50 Russian banks, including Gazprombank, a key channel for energy payments, further increased transaction costs for Russian importers and exporters and caused the ruble to plummet to its lowest level against the dollar since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The drop in the ruble also fueled inflation, and the rate surged an additional 0.5% between Nov. 26 and Dec. 2, according to the Russian statistics agency Rosstat.
  • Boris Kovalchuk, head of the country’s financial watchdog and son of one of Putin’s closest allies, St. Petersburg banker Yury Kovalchuk, warned Nov. 27 that the interest rate hikes were “limiting the investment possibilities of business and leading to a growth in federal budget spending.” Igor Sechin, another close Putin ally heading the oil giant Rosneft, lambasted the central bank in his company’s quarterly financial report, saying the rate hikes were having a “negative impact on the cost of financing” for the company as well as its contractors and suppliers and were eating into profits.
  • Others are sounding an even louder alarm. Sergei Chemezov, the close Putin ally who heads Russia’s state arms conglomerate RosTec, warned at the end of October that if rates remained at current levels, “practically a majority of our enterprises will go bankrupt,” and he said Russia could be forced to curtail arms exports.
  • Steel magnate Alexei Mordashov, who owns Severstal, warned that “it is more profitable for companies to stop development, even reduce the scale of business and put funds on deposit, than to conduct business and bear the risks associated with it.”
• The Russian Union of Shopping Centers said more than 200 malls face bankruptcy because of the high cost of financing.
• According to data presented by the Russian Economic Development Ministry to the Russian parliament, the surging output in the [arms-making] sector vaguely named “other transport systems and equipment” is due to plummet to 5% growth next year—from 30.2% in 2023, in a sign of the troubles in the tank-manufacturing sector.
• The situation, however, does not seem to be causing worry in the Kremlin. A Russian academic with close ties to senior diplomats said concerns about the economic outlook were not enough to move the state to compromise. “There is no panic mood,” the academic said. “From the point of view of people who sit in the Kremlin, everything is developing more or less well. Russia continues to advance militarily… In these conditions, there is no need to make any serious compromise.”

“The Kremlin Has Limited Options to Shore Up the Ruble,” Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, CEIP, 12.11.24.

• In the last week of November, the Russian currency saw its biggest fall since the spring of 2022. In just two days, the ruble dropped 10% against both the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan. That put the ruble down 20% since the start of September, and almost 25% from the summer highs. For now, the exchange rate has somewhat recovered and poses no major risk for the Russian economy. But it’s another structural limitation on economic growth—alongside shortages of labor resources and production capacity.
• The trigger for the November plunge was U.S. sanctions on Russian lenders, including state-owned Gazprombank… However, there are also longer-term factors at work. In October, the government cut the repatriation requirement for exporters, allowing them to convert a quarter of their foreign currency earnings into rubles (instead of half). Predictably, this led to a fall in the supply of U.S. dollars and yuan. At the same time, demand rose, not least because state spending in the fourth quarter of 2024 jumped by 1.5 trillion rubles ($14.3 billion). Government spending fuels demand that cannot be fully met by domestic production—thus 
• The fundamental reasons for the ruble’s weakness have not gone anywhere, and the dynamic of Russia’s trade flows means the currency is destined to falter and inflation to rise. As the Russian economy slows despite significant state spending, the dynamics of the ruble exchange rate suggest the country is heading for stagflation (a toxic combination of slow growth and rising prices). The root cause is the war and ensuing Western sanctions and militarization of Russia’s economy. The country’s financial authorities don’t have the power to solve this problem—and they’re even afraid to speak about it publicly.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Tough choices for Russia’s Central Bank,” Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 12.13.24.
• "Society‘The Future Will Be Built By The People Who Survive Under The Heel of Putinism’" interview with Oleg Kashin, 12.13.24.
• “United Russia party congress. Vladimir Putin attended a meeting of the 22nd Congress of the United Russia political party,” official web site of the Russian president, 12.14.24.

Defense and aerospace:

During a meeting of the expanded board of the Russian MOD with the participation of President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov spoke about the main directions of development of the armed forces for the next year and in the medium term.[2] Machine translated.

• The activities of the Russian Defense Ministry are aimed at ensuring full readiness for a possible military conflict with NATO in the next decade.
• The first among the priority areas is victory in a special military operation. ... In 2024, the Russian Armed Forces “liberated” 4.5 thousand square kilometers of territory occupied by the enemy during the SVO.
• In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it is proposed to form a new branch of the armed forces - the Unmanned Systems Forces.
• Among the tasks for next year, Belousov named the introduction of all innovations that have proven their effectiveness in the troops, providing assault units with electronic warfare equipment, automation of combat management and the creation of an integrated information environment for decision-making at the tactical level. The minister also instructed to pay special attention to the development of drones. He ordered a full inventory of all military developments, conduct their field tests and organize serial production of the best models.
• Belousov said that over 427 thousand people signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense this year, and called for “not to lose the momentum of this process.”
• The level of national defense spending in the Russian Federation reached 6.3% of GDP, which is 32.5% of the federal budget.
• "Another priority area, the Minister named the modernization of the armed forces, taking into account the build-up of US combat capabilities. Next year, the Ministry of Defense plans to accept four Tu-160M ​​strategic missile carriers, the Knyaz Pozharsky missile submarine into the Strategic Missile Forces, and also scale up the production of the Oreshnik missile system. “We will continue to develop technologies for the creation of air, land and sea-based robotic systems,” Belousov said.
• Deliveries of tanks to the troops this year have increased sevenfold compared to the 2022 level, and drones—23 times
• Belousov also named the following priorities:
  • formation of a feedback system;
  • development of military-technical cooperation;
  • increasing the efficiency of construction and property complexes;
  • optimization of the internal processes of the ministry;
  • creation of a single digital environment for the Ministry of Defense.
• Also see section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

“Tracking Putin’s Most Feared Secret Agency—From Inside a Russian Prison and Beyond,” Evan Gershkovich, with Drew Hinshaw, Joe Parkinson and Thomas Grove, WSJ, 12.12.24.

• "DKRO [the Department for Counterintelligence Operations of FSB] has played an enormous and unreported role" in Russia's largest wave of repression since Stalin, including purging the Defense Ministry after setbacks in Ukraine.
• The agency "accelerated a campaign of arresting American citizens on Russian soil" as trade bait, targeting figures like Paul Whelan and Brittney Griner to secure the release of a Russian hitman.
• "DKRO officers are generously paid" and enjoy perks like bonuses, low-cost mortgages, and top time slots at beach resorts, while maintaining a record of zero defections.
• The agency's power lies in its ability to compel "hundreds of thousands of personnel across Russia" to surveil, intimidate, or arrest foreigners and Russians suspected of collaboration. DKRO's work has turned Russia into a "tightly controlled police state" by arresting spies and collaborators, doubling investigative staffing since the Ukraine war began.
• Rooted in Stalin's SMERSH [WWII anti-spy department], DKRO evolved to become Russia’s "most elite security force," preserving its secrecy and operating under direct oversight from top Kremlin officials. Under Lt. Gen. Dmitry Minaev, DKRO selects "which Americans to arrest and which Russians to trade them for," as seen in its role during prisoner swaps involving U.S. citizens.
• Putin has supercharged espionage cases, with treason convictions rising sharply, as DKRO plays a central role in "satisfying the presidential appetite for spies and traitors—real or imagined." DKRO employs tactics like surveilling diplomats, coercing students to spy, and sabotaging infrastructure abroad while also "recruiting spies and conducting sabotage operations in Eastern Europe." The agency's dominance represents a shift where "counterintelligence has become the pre-eminent FSB branch," vital to Putin’s regime as it wages an intensifying conflict with the West.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Amid Turbulence, Japan’s Russia Policy Remains on Course,” James D.J. Brown, CEIP, 12.04.24.

• Officials in Moscow tend to assume that Japan’s hard line against Russia is the result of U.S. arm-twisting. If that were true, any decrease in pressure from Washington would indeed lead Japan to adopt a less hostile approach. But Tokyo’s strident opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is driven primarily by Japan’s own security imperatives, not U.S. pressure.
• Tokyo fears that if Russia can get away with invading a sovereign country and changing the status quo by force, this will send the message that other powerful states are also free to impose their will on weaker neighbors. Japan is especially worried that Russian aggression in Europe, if successful, could embolden China. 
• A second factor explaining the resilience of Japanese policy is Russia’s own threatening behavior. Russia regularly sends military aircraft, including TU-95 strategic bombers, to approach Japanese airspace. Between April and June 2024, Japanese SDF jets scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft fifty-two times. On Sept. 23, a Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft violated Japanese airspace on three occasions, forcing SDF jets to fire warning flares. Russia’s saber-rattling is intended to intimidate Japan and deter Tokyo from actions that displease Moscow, but it has the opposite effect. 
• Overall, despite being buffeted by external and internal turbulence, Japan’s policies regarding Russia are likely to remain on course. Indeed, far from easing sanctions, Japanese media reported on November 18 that the government is considering the introduction of yet tougher measures. Moscow would be wise to recognize that Japan is standing against Russian aggression and in support of the international system not because of U.S. pressure, but to defend itself.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

“Russia’s Assault on Georgia and Romania,” WSJ Editorial Board, 12.11.24.

Ukraine:

• “Investors need to keep an eye on Ukraine. Now is the time for money managers to at least think about how they would respond if peace broke out,” Katie Martin, FT, 12.10.24.
• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "‘Foreign Agent’ Laws in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan Show Pitfalls of Turning Local Governance Issues into Geopolitical Battles," Emil Dzhuraev, PONARS Eurasia, 12.09.24.
• "Call for the EU to Act Now to Sanction the Violent Regime in Georgia," DGAP, 12.12.24.https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/call-eu-act-now-sanction-violent-regime-georgia
• “Protests threaten Georgia’s Kremlin-friendly government,” The Economist, 12.15.24.

Footnotes

1. For charts and maps that illustrate the Russian-Chinese alignment and that we cannot reproduce for copyright reasons, please see “Where the China-Russia Partnership Is Headed in Seven Charts and Maps,” Clara Fong and Will Merrow, CFR, 12.12.24.
2.  Sources: “Belousov named 42 tasks for the Ministry of Defense, RBC, 12.16.24.” “Highlights from Putin and Belousov’s speeches at the Defense Ministry board meeting,” Kommersant, 12.16.24.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Leo Correa.