I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Iran:

“The New Russian–Iranian Entente in the Middle East,” Clément Therme, IISS, 12.22.16: The author, a scholar of Middle Eastern affairs, writes that “the Russian–Iranian entente” has gone from being treated as a major threat to Western security to a partnership with which the U.S. is cooperating in the fight against ISIS. Unlike the demonization of Russia and Iran under the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, President Barack Obama’s administration has sought a more pragmatic approach to the challenge posed by Iran and Russia. This approach, defined by identifying areas of possible cooperation and engaging in dialogue, should be pursued in order “to avoid the unpredictable consequences of American military intervention in a region with enough security challenges to contend with.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“Is This the Right Time to Relieve the Building Pressure in the Baltics?” Ralph S. Clem, War on the Rocks, 12.20.16: The author, a retired Air Force Reserve intelligence officer and scholar, writes that a potential conflict in the Baltics between Russia and NATO is both controlled by and would likely favor Russia. With both parties growing “increasingly more rancorous,” the author posits that now is “the time to pause and consider ways to step back” from the dangerous military escalation in the Baltics. Structures to facilitate NATO-Russia cooperation already exist. These include the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the Vienna Document on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures, which requires its parties to share information on military forces and events. The author stresses that now is the time to for NATO to engage in dialogue with Russia in order to avoid future conflict.

Nuclear arms control:

“Three Reasons Why Arms Control Might Interest Donald Trump,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 12.19.16: The author, director of the Brookings Institution’s Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, provides three possible reasons why arms control may appeal to incoming U.S. President Donald Trump. The first is improved relations with Russia, as working to limit and reduce nuclear weapons could “provide an impetus for an improved overall relationship with Moscow.” While Trump’s administration would need to tackle arms control issues raised by Moscow, it is possible to “bridge the differences that have stymied arms control discussions the past four years” if the new administration is willing. Arms control would also save money “for conventional needs,” and, for a man as interested in doing deals as Trump, arms control more than any other international issue most closely mirrors deals in the business world, where deals are based on numbers, not principles.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia's Rise in Mideast Creates Enemies,” Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 12.20.16: The author, a journalist, writes that Russia has “successfully ended America's status as the Middle East's sole superpower.” The flood of migrants into Europe has also helped support the rise of political parties sympathetic to Russia across the continent. However, this rise in power comes with drawbacks. As illustrated by the assassination of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey, Russia has taken over America’s place in some Middle Eastern minds as “an alien imperialist power seen as waging war on Muslims and Islam.” Russia and Turkey appear determined to not let the ambassador’s assassination undo the two countries’s rapprochement, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan even raising the idea of Turkey joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the security pact between China and Russia. The author quotes the secretary-general of the Arab League, who says that Moscow’s attempt at gaining significant clout in the Middle East is succeeding.

Cyber security:

“Why I Still Don't Buy the Russian Hacking Story,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 12.22.16: The author, a journalist, writes that although he is “willing to believe that Russia sought to hack the U.S. election,” the evidence for that claim remains lacking. The existing evidence that indicates Moscow’s involvement is from cybersecurity companies studying Advanced Persistent Threat 28 (APT 28), a group that has had a variety of targets in recent years. Called “Fancy Bear” by CrowdStrike, the firm that detected the DNC hack, APT 28 “attacks governments and militaries hostile to Russia or strategically important for it … appears professional and well-financed" and "uses Russian in its malware,” which is “compiled during working hours in the Moscow time zone.” A version of the group’s malware has also been found in a Ukrainian-developed Android application that is simplifies targeting data for Ukrainian artillery units. This discovery led CrowdStrike founder, Dmitri Alperovich, to raise his “medium level confidence” that APT 28 is run by Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, to high. However, the author notes that the data on the Ukrainian artillery units, D-30 howitzers, does not seem reliable. Additionally, the app’s developer, a Ukrainian military officer, “reacted angrily on Facebook to the CrowdStrike report, saying he never published the software on any public forums,” and wrote to the author that he believes the whole thing to be a hoax. As a result, the author finds it “hard to believe that this infected app” provides the necessary evidence to tie the GRU to APT 28, and hopes the U.S. intelligence community’s report on the election hacks will feature more convincing evidence.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“Why US-Russia Trade Still Matters,” John F. Tefft, The Moscow Times, 12.22.16: The author, the current U.S. Ambassador to Russia, writes that trade between Russia and the U.S. continues, something that is “both normal and desirable,” with over 700 U.S. companies seeking advice on the Russian market in 2016. Russian companies are quietly using American solutions to “lower energy consumption, improve quality and reliability, increase worker safety, reduce processing times and raise agricultural productivity across Russia.” The author notes that amid back and forth sanctions, it is important to remember that both sides benefit from the relationships between Russian and American businesses.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

 “The Russian Question. Moscow May No Longer be a Superpower, but Its Revanchist Politics are Unsettling the International order. How Should Donald Trump Deal With Vladimir Putin?” Niall Ferguson, Foreign Policy, 12.23.16: The author, a historian, writes that “the Russian Question” may prove the most difficult question of 21st century geopolitics. According to Henry Kissinger’s latest book, Russia’s unique position straddling two continents and the geopolitics it learned through the conquests and defeats of nomadic hordes give Russia an unusual perception of international order. In fact, “Russia, it might be inferred, is the power least interested in world order.” Although Moscow is clearly ready to utilize cyberwarfare to its benefit, the current hacking controversy is providing more noise than substance, as Russian attempts to influence Western elections and vice-versa are nothing new. Additionally, Trump did not say anything during the election that “binds him to be Putin’s confederate.” Today’s world order was not unavoidable—had the August 1991 coup in Moscow been successful and kept the Soviet Union intact, or had the Soviet Union’s dissolution been accompanied by greater and more violent regional and ethnic conflicts or had Russia’s economy thrived in the vein of Asian economies—each possibility would have led to a very different kind of world. Who is at fault for the current tense state of U.S.-Russia relations? The author notes that he underestimated how much the expansion of NATO and the EU was disturbing to the Russians during the George W. Bush administration. However, “[t]he biggest miscalculation was the willingness of the Bush administration to consider Ukraine for NATO membership and the later backing by the Obama administration of EU efforts to offer Ukraine an association agreement.” “Misreading Russia” is a persistent mistake of U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration, leading to mistakes such as the lack of U.S. involvement in the Minsk agreements as well as allowing Russian President Vladimir Putin into the Syrian conflict. The author advises incoming U.S. President Donald Trump to tell Putin to expect no relief from sanctions until armed forces are withdrawn from Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s future is its own business. The author further advises Trump to state that the U.S. is prepared to let Crimea decide its future, and to talk about a new treaty confirming Ukraine’s neutral, nonaligned status; in return, Russia needs to cooperate with the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to establish peace in North Africa and the Middle East. However, Russia may or may not cooperate with other powers, as disorder in the Middle East and North Africa will actually benefit Russia’s economy. Solving “the Russian Question” is not the U.S.’s responsibility, but Russia’s. The author advises the incoming Trump administration to heed Henry Kissinger’s advice to stay “closer to each of Russia and China than they are to one another” in order to begin righting “the geopolitical mess bequeathed it by Barack Obama.”

“Order From Chaos. Trump and Russia: Expect a Change in Tone. But in Substance?” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 01.04.17: The author, director of the Brookings Institution’s Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, writes that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has been laudatory of Russian President Vladimir Putin since before the 2016 election, which “appeals to Mr. Putin’s ego.” Trump’s pro-Russia rhetoric throughout his election campaign, including suggestions of recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and questioning the terms of NATO, has also been welcomed by Moscow. “An improved tone to U.S.-Russia relations could be useful, but the larger question is whether that would be matched by a change in substance.” For instance, many of Trump’s pro-Russia campaign comments are in opposition to the views of many Republicans. Trump’s desire to do deals that advance U.S. interests may also prove difficult. In Syria and Ukraine, the deals Trump would make with Russia would improve U.S.-Russia relations—accepting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and recognizing Crimea’s annexation, respectively—but for what would they be in return? Trump’s view on arms control remain unclear, but issues like missile defense “could provoke questions among Republicans on Capitol Hill.”

“How We Fool Ourselves on Russia,” William Burns, New York Times, 01.07.17: The author, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former deputy secretary of state, writes that the near future of U.S.-Russia relations will continue to be defined by tensions. While the idea of a personal connection between leaders as a first step to warming the relationship is tempting, it “is a foolish starting point for sensible policy.” Downplaying or dismissing Russia’s interference in the U.S. election is also a poor choice. This interference was likely based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s belief that for Russia to rise as a great power, the American-led order must fall, while Putin’s own hold on power “depends on the existence of external threats.” The next steps for the U.S. need to continue the Obama administration’s actions in response to Russia’s hacking, reassure European allies of the U.S. commitment to NATO, focus on Ukraine and to “be wary of superficially appealing notions like a common war on Islamic extremism or a common effort to ‘contain’ China.” The authors writes that through his experience, he has “learned that firmness and vigilance, and a healthy grasp of the limits of the possible” are the best approaches for dealing with Putin. “If we play it methodically, confident in our enduring strengths, and unapologetic about our values, we can eventually build a more stable relationship, without illusions.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries:

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia's Post-Soviet Journey. From Europe to Eurasia,” Dmitri Trenin, Foreign Affairs, 12.25.16. 

“A Reversal of Fortunes for Russia and the West. The World Looks Very Different Since the Fall of the Soviet Union 25 Years Ago,” Frederick Studemann, Financial Times, 12.19.16: The author, a columnist, writes that in a year of trial and tribulation for most, Russian President Vladimir Putin has achieved victories, restoring Russia’s relevance and global power. However, the author says “the Russian [political] system is not as secure as it seems,” in need of reform and conflict resolution. While things may appear steady, the lesson of the early 1990s—that systems can and do change rapidly—should not be forgotten.

“The Kremlin’s Economic Grip on Europe,”  Martin Vladimirov, Ruslan Stefanov, Foreign Policy, 12.23.16: The authors, an energy security expert and an economics expert, write that Russian influence in Europe is seeking “to weaken the credibility and moral authority of the EU.” A recent study on Russian influence has found that Russia’s economic footprint in several Central and Eastern European countries ranged from 11% of the economy in Hungary and Slovakia to 22% in Bulgaria over the last ten years. The main channel of Russia’s influence has been through the energy sector, with consumption of Russian gas in these countries remaining above 80% of total gas consumption since 2004. Moscow has also looked to increase its corporate influence in other areas; Russian investments make up around 10% of the GDP in Bulgaria, Serbia and Latvia. To counter this, the author advises the EU to “substantially enhance anticorruption and development assistance mechanisms” and to commit firmly  “to the values of liberal European governance: transparency, independent regulatory oversight, rule of law and economies diversified away from Russian energy flows.”

China:

“Could Mikhail Gorbachev Have Saved the Soviet Union?” Chris Miller, Foreign Policy, 12.21.16: The author, a Russia scholar, writes that Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to end “the Communist Party’s political monopoly” in the Soviet Union was met with resistance by the leaders of the Chinese Communist party. As Beijing studied changes in the Soviet Union’s politics and society, the Soviet Union also kept an eye on China, which played a role in the Soviet Union’s political debates in the 1980s. Where China moved toward a market economy without liberal politics, Russia embraced liberal politics while plunging into economic trouble, leading many to blame Gorbachev’s attempt “to democratize Soviet politics” for the chaos of the 1990s. Although Gorbachev was praised for “his liberalizing policies” at the time, in hindsight, China’s Deng Xiaoping’s choices, including putting down the Tiananmen Square protests with force, “appeared vindicated” by the end of the 1990s. Deng chose to sacrifice liberalization to ensure stability. The post-Soviet chaos remains a reason why Chinese leaders insist on its Communist Party’s tight hold on power. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, likened Gorbachev to “a traitor like Leon Trotsky,” an idea that was echoed in December 2012 by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Deng’s youngest son was quoted saying that his father “thinks Gorbachev is an idiot.” The author notes, “In Russia, many agree.”  Where Deng was able to compromise, allowing Chinese elites to retain power in exchange for their support, economic reform in the Soviet Union necessitated the destruction of the power base that benefited from economic inefficiency. This created the possibility of a military coup for Gorbachev, “a threat Deng never faced.” The author writes that Gorbachev’s loss was not a result of an “unreformable” Soviet economy, but rather a result of the “vast political power …  entrusted to groups that had every reason to sabotage the efforts to resolve the country’s decades-long financial dilemmas.” “In his quest to reform his country and steer it away from calamity, Gorbachev brought about the very process that would eventually lead to the Soviet Union’s collapse.”

Ukraine:

“How Ukraine Can Make Peace With Russia,” Victor Pinchuk, Wall Street Journal, 01.03.17: The author, a wealthy Ukrainian businessman, writes that Ukrainians are concerned about both the incoming pro-Russia U.S. administration and the upcoming elections in Europe, which could also see pro-Kremlin leaders elected into office. Rather than making “ever-shriller appeals,” the author writes, “we must also adapt to the new reality, and help our international friends help us.” While Ukraine needs to remain firm in its struggle to safeguard its sovereignty and territory and Moscow must adhere to the Minsk agreements, areas of compromise should also be sought. These areas include putting EU membership aspirations on hold for the near future and not letting Crimea bar a possible end to the war in eastern Ukraine. It will take time for Ukraine’s economy to grow, at which point “Crimea will then want to live in this future Ukraine—just as East Germans wanted to become part of West Germany.” Accepting the results of local elections may also be a compromise necessary to save lives. Hopes of a NATO membership for Ukraine should also be put aside to avoid “an international crisis of unprecedented scope.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.

Selection of commentary for this digest is curated by Simon Saradzhyan.