I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Rising Nuclear Dangers: Steps to Reduce Risks in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Robert E. Berls, Jr., and Leon Ratz, Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 2016: The authors, experts in nuclear security, argue that due to high tensions and lack of communication between Russia and the U.S. and Russia and NATO, each close encounter between Russian and NATO aircraft and ships “carries an unacceptable risk of escalation.” To prevent accidents in the air and at sea, Moscow, Brussels and Washington need to take measures to minimize risks. These measures include increased high-level dialogue and communication between militaries, such as addressing concerns regarding missile systems in Europe, and a stop to “reckless nuclear rhetoric.”

“The Pentagon Must Think Outside of Its Five-Sided Box,” Ashton Carter, The National Interest, 12.11.16: The author, U.S. Secretary of Defense, argues that the U.S. military needs to continue its “long tradition of gaining a competitive edge over its opponents by thinking and acting in new ways.” Innovation is of utmost importance due to the challenges posed by a new security environment, including: countering Russian belligerence in Europe, “managing historic change in the Asia-Pacific,” increasing defense and deterrence forces in accordance with North Korea’s ongoing nuclear objectives, restraining Iran’s influence in the Middle East and making strides in defeating ISIL. Russia and China’s eagerness “to close the technology gap” has resulted in the diffusion of “high-end military technology” to North Korea, Iran and “even non-state actors,” while U.S. reliance on technology has created new vulnerabilities. To stay on the cutting edge, the U.S. Defense Department is pursuing new technologies including “data science, biotech, cyber defense, electronic warfare, robotics, undersea warfare, autonomy, artificial intelligence and machine learning.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

“The Coming of the Russian Jihad, Part II,” Leon Aron, War on the Rocks, 12.19.16: The author, a scholar of Russian studies, writes that “the Russian jihad continues to remain alive and dangerous.” The North Caucasus is not as secure as authorities had hoped, and the return home of Russian Islamic State fighters is “presenting a direct threat.” A 2013 amendment to the criminal code that allows for the prosecution of those who left Russia to fight with ISIL is being put to use. The number of these cases has grown from 650 in 2015 to 1,000 in 2016 so far. The number of Russians joining ISIL continues to grow, up to 3,417 as of March 2016, the same month when 18 ISIL recruiters were arrested in Moscow. “Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev complained last summer that Russian authorities did not have the means to stem the flow of volunteers to ISIL.” The recruitment network has become “a permanent and effective part of pan-Russian Islam.” The geographic reach of recruitment is also expanding from the North Caucasus into Northern and Western Siberia, with men from key gas and oil-producing regions leaving to fight with ISIL. If this “epidemic” continues, “it will not be just Russia’s problem, it will quickly become ours as well.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security and allegations of Russia’s interference in U.S. elections:

“Russia and Cyber Operations: Challenges and Opportunities for the Next US Administration,” Ben Buchanan, Michael Sulmeyer, Carnegie Endowement, 12.13.16: The authors, experts in cyber security, write that the next U.S. administration must approach Russia’s increasingly sophisticated and aggressive cyber operations as a key concern. Russia has demonstrated a move away from simply gathering information to a willingness to use this information to influence matters abroad. Actions such as the Democratic National Convention hacks over the summer show the importance Russia places on information operations. Russia’s increased interest in developing “offensive capabilities against future targets” also deserves attention. Russian-linked operators have “carried out a variety of operations into critical infrastructure and other key targets.” “BlackEnergy,” a type of malicious code connected to Russian-linked operators, was found in various key targets across Europe. Russian-linked operators have also used the access they’ve gained for destructive means, such as the attack on French television station TV5 Monde in April 2015, which targeted email and administration systems and video transmission components, and caused five million euros in estimated damage. In December 2015, an attack on a power grid in Ukraine that caused over 230,000 people to lose power was the “first publicly-reported blackout caused by cyber operation.” However, these actions do not show the capacity for “truly joint missions” pairing highly potent cyberattacks and military effort. It is not clear if Russia would be able to integrate “cyber capabilities into a battle plan.” Even so, the U.S. needs to improve its operations in defense, detection and deterrence to protect against Russian cyber operations.

“Russia’s Role in the US Elections: The Case for Caution,” George Beebe, The National Interest, 12.16.16: The author, former chief of Russia analysis at the CIA, writes that the “vexing and politically charged analytic problem” of the day is Russia’s plausible intrusions in the 2016 U.S. elections. Despite Moscow’s clear preference for Donald Trump and the forensic data found in the intrusions that is traceable back to Russia, the author urges caution based on “the analytics lessons learned from post-mortem reviews of the Iraq WMD failure.” To avoid the “same cognitive traps,” the U.S. Intelligence Community should explore alternative explanations and look for disconfirming information to avoid “confirmation bias.” The author also advises “a walk in the other guy’s shoes,” and reminds readers that “high stakes require great caution.” “The intrusions highlight the importance of addressing broader questions of how we protect the integrity of our political system and deal with other cyber actors who might have an interest in intrusions.” A counterattack could potentially damage cooperation with Moscow against ISIL, drive Russia and China closer together “and even escalate into kinetic warfare,” while a response that is too soft could “invite even more damaging Russian interference in US affairs.”

“Russia is Neither Friend Nor Foe,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 12.13.16: The author, a foreign policy expert, writes that the information that Russia allegedly helped to access and expose confirmed the pre-existing concerns American voters had regarding Hillary Clinton’s “reliability and honesty.” The evidence pointing to this intrusion by Russia into the U.S. election “needs to be clarified and assessed” and taken into account when deciding what the future of U.S.-Russia relations will look like. However, the dubious credibility of U.S. media and political institutions and the possibility of a new Cold War could have been avoided if U.S. national security and mainstream media “had a series of serious conversations a few years back.” The interception and leak of a February 2014 phone conversation between the assistant secretary of state and the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine by unknown actors assumed to be linked to Russia brought several factors to the fore: U.S. officials were made aware that trusting the “relatively flimsy” cyber security of their phones and computers could be easily overcome, exposure of “the gap between public idealistic rhetoric and private, behind-the-scenes maneuvering” was attempted and it was a warning that Moscow was watching and learning from the U.S. Going forward, if the U.S. wants to continue to resist “codifying international practices that would restrict what countries can do in cyberspace,” Washington needs to accept that other countries have similar cyberspace capabilities to influence developments in other countries or the U.S. needs to make a greater effort to increase cyber defenses at home. Either way, the new U.S. administration needs to acknowledge that while Russia may not be a friend, it doesn’t necessarily have to be a foe, either.

“What Rex Tillerson's Nomination Means for Russia Policy,” Tom Switzer, The National Interest, 12.13.16: The author, an expert on U.S. foreign policy, writes that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump “has an idea of where he wants to go in dealing with the Kremlin and he is going there.” By nominating Rex Tillerson for the position of secretary of state, Trump is taking a step in that direction. Russia’s possible interference in the U.S. elections is “hardly surprising,” and is in line with the ways in which “great powers often try to influence events in other nations.” The author contrasts a July 1996 article that ran in TIME magazine with the headline ““YANKS TO THE RESCUE: The secret story of how American advisers helped Yeltsin win” with a September 2016 article from the same magazine: “How Russia Wants to Undermine the U.S. Election.” The double-standard of international behavior that the U.S. applies to itself and to other countries cannot continue if the U.S. wants to continue to be a “credible rule-setter.” Tillerson’s nomination suggests that U.S. foreign policy is in for “a period of major reappraisal,” one that will restore dialogue with Russia. The reality of power, not western ideals, should inform the Trump administration’s Russia policy.

“Russian Hackers and American Hacks; The CIA That Misjudged Putin for Years is Now Sure of His Motives,” Wall Street Journal editorial, 12.12.16: The authors write that it is highly unlikely that Russia was “the sole prophetic exception” in an election season where very few thought Donald Trump would win. There are several possible motives behind the hacking that began in spring 2015, including a desire to stir up doubt in the results of the U.S. election or to blackmail Clinton officials once in office. The CIA’s claim to have “high confidence” regarding the motives of Russian President Vladimir Putin is surprising: “These are the same seers who missed the Russian invasion of Crimea, missed the incursion into southern Ukraine, and missed Mr. Putin's foray into Syria.” The authors argue for U.S. intelligence services to release the evidence they have: “Let's see if the Kremlin really did steal RNC emails, and let's also hear from those who don't share CIA Director John Brennan's ‘high confidence.’”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“A Blueprint for Donald Trump to Fix Relations With Russia,” Graham Allison  and Dimitri K. Simes, The National Interest, January-February 2017: The authors, experts in foreign policy, argue that Russia offers the new U.S. administration both a challenge and “a significant opportunity,” as Russia’s choices have profound impacts on U.S. interests and global issues. “First and foremost, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in thirty minutes.” Russia and Russian intelligence is integral to the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation and in preventing terrorist attacks around the globe. Russia is a leader in science and technology and its “potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate.” As things stand, Russia and the U.S. could find themselves in a catastrophic war neither wants. While the Obama administration has tacitly encouraged Russia to “repent, reverse course and follow in the footsteps of Germany and Japan in accepting its place in a unipolar, American-led international order,” Russia is “too big, too powerful and too committed to maintaining its sovereignty as a great power to become a supplicant in an American-dominated world order.” The authors urge the Trump administration to pursue the alternative posed by Henry Kissinger: integrate Russia into an international order that takes Moscow’s “minimum essential interests” into consideration. To do so, the incoming administration must: meet early with Russian President Vladimir Putin and reinstate a dialogue with Russia; change its approach in Syria and join Europe in trying to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis; strengthen its military to deter Russian aggression against NATO allies; consider Russia’s response when making policy decisions and expand the relationship’s economic foundation.

“With Trump, the US Foreign Policy Framework is at Risk,” Robert Zoellick, Financial Times, 12.14.16: The author, former president of the World Bank, writes that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump “may prefer to run a case-by-case foreign policy.” The international framework established by the U.S. in the wake of World War II is at risk, with fragmentation in Europe, turbulence in the Middle East and a Russia that is extending its power in these regions and looking to “constrain the U.S. within a system of competing powers.” As for Asia, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believes that China prefers a system of “tributary states.” When inevitable crises test the incoming Trump administration, “their responses need to reflect a strategic framework of U.S. interest and leadership.” The U.S. needs: continental security, strong international alliances, to modernize its international economic ties, to be alert to changes in the Western Hemisphere, advance its military and technology and also to “put forward a worldview.”

“Three Steps to Set the Tone on Russia,” Thomas E. Graham, The National Interest, 12.12.16: The author, an expert on Russian and Eurasian affairs, writes that upon taking office, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and his administration need to focus on preventing the U.S. relationship with Russia “from becoming a strictly adversarial one.” This will include managing the crises in the Middle East and Europe to ensure that they do escalate “into direct conflict with unknown consequences.” To do so, Trump must: reinstate communication to avoid potentially disastrous misunderstandings and to successfully conduct policy, tone down the rhetoric demonizing Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin and name a senior official to manage the relationship with Russia. These steps are “far from sufficient.” The author argues for “a comprehensive policy, a holistic approach” that takes Russia in a global context and examines the global consequences of America’s Russia policy. “This will not be easy to do—it will require time and energy and imagination—but it is not beyond our reach.”

“11 Suggestions for a New Era of US-Russia Relations,” Robert Hunter, The National Interest, 12.14.16: The author, a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, advises the new administration to choose advisers with diverse opinions and to get a “thorough and honest assessment” of the reasons behind the current U.S.-Russia relationship, as well as a new evaluation of Russian interests. He counsels recommitting the U.S. to its allies in Europe and advises meeting with European leaders prior to meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The author suggests consulting with former U.S. national security officials and presidents and keeping allies, partners and Congress well informed regarding strategy and decisions.  

“With Russia Policy, Everything Is Connected,” Olga Oliker, The National Interest, 12.13.16: The author, an expert on Russia and Eurasia, writes that the change in U.S. administration is unlikely to alter Russia’s perception of global security as “a zero-sum game,” where a step forward by the U.S. indicates threat, while a step back suggests weakness. She advises that “any deals struck with Russia” must have “clear gains for the United States” that are evident to both Washington and Moscow. “A better relationship on its own is not enough,” but global and U.S. security could be strengthened through progress in nonproliferation, arms control and cooperation on issues in Europe and in Syria.

“How Trump Can Reshape Russian Foreign Policy,” Leon Aron, The National Interest, 12.15.16: The author, an expert in Russian studies, writes that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump needs to set the tone now for U.S.-Russia relations in the future. Trump will want to “encourage Russia to be less confrontational” without risking moves that will sour relations. The first step in doing so is understanding and accepting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy as reality. Factors that will shape the relationship include: Putin’s commitment to his mission to restore Russia to a place of global supremacy, “Putin’s perception of the domestic political imperatives of his regime’s legitimacy and survival,” the popular support for Putin’s foreign policy and the U.S. reaction to Russia’s operations outside its borders. The U.S. must either confront Putin now or see him confident enough to destabilize or invade a NATO member state in eastern Europe. Neither sanctions nor diplomatic pressure will change Russia’s foreign policy; however, eroding the domestic support for Putin’s foreign policy could. The author argues that the foundation of Putin’s regime is based on the external, and shifting it to the internal will ease tensions with the U.S. and contribute to Russia’s economic grown.   

“US and Russia Relations Under Trump and Putin,” Center for American Progress, William Danvers, 12.14.16: The author, an expert on national security issues, writes that the U.S.-Russia relationship needs to be addressed in three key areas: the Syrian conflict, the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s “disinformation campaign and cyberattacks.” In Syria, the author advises limiting immediate goals to management of the humanitarian crisis, while in Ukraine, the Minsk II agreement needs to implemented. In response to Russian cyberattacks, the new U.S. administration should work with Congress, U.S. allies and the private sector to create “a unified response.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

General developments and “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

“45 Years Ago, Kissinger Envisioned a ‘Pivot’ to Russia. Will Trump Make it Happen?” John Pomfret, The Washington Post, 12.14.16: The author, formerly a Washington Post bureau chief in Beijing, writes that in 1972, Henry Kissinger observed to then-U.S. President Richard Nixon that a future U.S. president will likely lean toward Moscow as opposed to Beijing in a “balance-of-power game.” 45 years later, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has expressed a desire to normalize relations with Moscow, causing the author to wonder if Trump will “make a ‘pivot’ toward Moscow and away from Beijing” a capstone of his foreign policy. Today, Russia and China have a businesslike relationship, but Russia “has also chafed under the impression” that it has gone from being China’s “big brother” to the junior of the two. “Trump’s willingness to play Kissinger’s ‘balance-of-power game’ promises a new era of unpredictability in a world where American power is no longer unparalleled and unchallenged.”

Ukraine:

“How to Rebuild Eastern Ukraine. Kiev is Too Corrupt to Do the Job Itself. The Reconstruction of the Donbass Must be Overseen by an Independent Body,” Josh Cohen, Foreign Policy, 12.14.16: The author, a former USAID officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union, writes that almost two years after Russia took over the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, the area “remains a wasteland” with “horrific” living conditions, leveled cities, destroyed roads and bridges and 1.3 million people with little or no access to water. Kiev must act to help the people of Donbass or lose them to Russia. The author advises rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure as the “best way forward,” but the repairs will run from $1.5 billion to $15 billion. With many elites “working both sides of the border,” the process of rebuilding eastern Ukraine needs to be carefully managed to avoid risk. “Luckily for Ukraine, an independent tender commission can mitigate this risk—but only if it is structured properly.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.

Selection of commentary for this digest is curated by Simon Saradzhyan.