Russia Analytical Report, Aug. 7-14, 2017
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
“Everything You Need to Know: Russia's Massive Zapad Military Exercise,” Dmitry Gorenburg, The National Interest, 08.07.17: The author, a research scientist in the strategic studies division of CNA, offers a sober overview of Russia’s Zapad military exercise slated for next month, amid “somewhat panicked accounts” of an unprecedented show of force that may set the stage for a large military buildup on NATO’s doorstep. Gorenburg notes that such drills have been held every four years since 1999 and are part of “an annual rotating series of large scale exercises that serve as the capstone to the Russian military’s annual training cycle.” As is the case with past exercises, Zapad has both military and political aims. On the military side, the Russians view Zapad as a way to shore up cooperation with Belarus, the main staging grounds for the drills and “Russia’s most capable military ally,” serving as a “critical buffer zone between Russian and NATO member states.” On the political side, Zapad is meant to highlight “Russia’s preparedness to counter any aggressive actions by NATO or its individual member states.” Still in question, the author observes, is just how many troops will take part. While Russia has claimed only 13,000 will be involved, past exercises have involved 75,000 personnel, and by some Western accounts, there may be more than 100,000.
“Smart Dealing With Russia,” John Mclaughlin, New York Times, 08.10.17: The author, the deputy and acting director of the CIA from 2000 to 2004, offers several recommendations for dealing with Russia amid escalating tensions with the U.S., starting with recognizing what Vladimir Putin wants. The Russian president’s goals, the author writes, are clear: “unchallenged dominance at home; heavy influence over his neighbors; a weakening of Western institutions like NATO and the European Union; and ‘great power’ influence in key regions like the Middle East.” Noting that the Cold War was a simpler battle—a “black-and-white global struggle between two diametrically opposed ideologies, one of which had to die”—Mclaughlin writes that the current clash cannot be about total victory over Russia. “Our strategy has to be about enforcing limits.” This includes strengthening NATO’s unity and deterrence strategy; improving counterintelligence capabilities to counter Russian hacking and influence operations aimed at spreading “fake news”; keeping up the pressure on Russia through sanctions; and giving “Ukraine more sophisticated defensive weapons to protect itself against Russian invaders.”
“What Trump Should Know About the Cuban Missile Crisis; Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Michael Dobbs, The Washington Post, 08.10.17: The author, who wrote an authoritative book about the Cuban missile crisis, argues that the 1962 standoff underscores the danger posed by careless rhetoric as the U.S. again squares off with North Korea over its nuclear program. Dobbs notes that in contrast to U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent threat to bring “fire and fury” down on North Korea, President John F. Kennedy was irate when a State Department spokesman mentioned the mere possibility of “further action” on the part of Washington. The real risk posed by the Cuban missile crisis didn’t come from the designs of U.S., Cuban or Russian leaders, Dobbs writes. “It stemmed from the possibility that the opposing sides could trigger a nuclear conflict that nobody wanted through miscommunication and freak accidents, which became increasingly likely at higher levels of military alert. The same is almost certainly true of the present crisis with North Korea.”
“The Costs of Ignoring Russia,” Dimitri K. Simes, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, president of the Center for the National Interest, writes that the mutual hostility between Russia and the U.S. “threatens an explosive confrontation.” With the two countries positioned as adversaries, few Americans see the benefit of cooperating with Russia due to limited U.S.-Russia economic ties. While dramatic, direct military confrontation that escalates into “global catastrophe” is the least likely end to the continually mounting U.S.-Russia tensions. However, cyberattacks on U.S. financial systems and infrastructure, which are vulnerable, would make the 2016 election interference look mild. U.S. retaliation would not help those already impacted by the attacks. The author also argues that there is a difference between Russia neglecting to help the U.S. with nonproliferation matter and in actively supporting U.S. enemies. “If Russian leaders feel pushed into a corner, they could even consider a deal with ISIS or others whom they oppose today.” Russia also has the option of strengthening its relationship with China. To avoid these possible scenarios, “any responsible U.S. government should want to normalize the relationship with Moscow.”
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
“How Trump Could Improve US-Russia Relations—and Head Off an Arms Race,” Josh Rogin, The Washington Post, 08.13.17: The author, a columnist for the Global Opinions section of The Washington Post, wonders if the Trump administration is capable of shoring up the cracks in U.S.-Russia arms control architecture before it is too late. Although the arms control community is urging for cooperation between Russia and the U.S., some Republicans in Congress are eager to see existing arms deals terminated and U.S. President Donald Trump considers those treaties “bad deals struck by his predecessors.” Though allowed by the Treaty on Open Skies, which is included in the Trump administration’s nonproliferation policy review, Russian jets flying over Washington last week alarmed many. U.S. officials say Russia has been violating the treaty for years by not allowing U.S. planes to fly over key parts of Russian territory. Russia is also accused of violating the INF Treaty. Provisions in the defense authorization bill making its way through Congress include funds for a new U.S. cruise missile that could put the U.S. in violation of the INF Treaty as well. Efforts to reestablish negotiations between the U.S. and Russia and underway, as terminating the INF Treaty would be a loss for the U.S. “But dealing with arms-control issues using tough diplomacy in conjunction with allies could provide Trump a way to achieve what he claims to want most—a path toward improving relations. In the process, he could also avoid another arms race.”
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
“Russian Strategy in the Middle East,” James Sladden, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable and Sarah Grand-Clement, RAND Corporation, August 2017: The authors, analysts with the RAND Corporation, posit that Russia does not have a long-term policy strategy in Syria and the wider region, and that its ability to shape outcomes in the region are limited by financial and political constraints. The country’s involvement in the Middle East is aimed primarily at improving “its short-term economic, military and political advantages while reducing the short-term advantages of prospective adversaries.” The authors note that Russia aims to reclaim its role as the “arms supplier of choice for Arab governments,” and that its “multifaceted diplomatic relations and recent interventionist trend are likely to be superseded by longer-term economic, energy and arms deals.”
Cyber security:
“Amid Washington Russia Frenzy, Kaspersky Faces Backlash: US Spies See a Global Intelligence Network in the Making in Company’s Anti-Virus Software,” Elias Groll, Foreign Policy, 08.11.17: The author, a staff writer for Foreign Policy, takes note of the suspicions raised within the U.S. intelligence community about Kaspersky Labs, the Russia-based cybersecurity firm, over alleged connections to the Kremlin. Although the company, which has some 400 million customers around the world, has itself documented Russian hacking and there’s been no concrete evidence that its software has been compromised, U.S. officials say its very presence in Russia and employment of former high-ranking Russia intelligence officers raises concerns. “Kaspersky draws many of its top executives from the ranks of the Russian intelligence,” Groll notes. And software, as one U.S. intelligence official tells the author, can be easily manipulated.
Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:
- No significant commentary.
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
“Piketty Zeroes In on Putin's Pain Point,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 08.14.17: Columnist Leonid Bershidsky discusses a new working paper by Thomas Piketty, an influential Paris-based economist who has published widely read work on the alarming rise of inequality and has now “turned his attention to Russia.” While the author voices major doubts about part of the paper’s methodology, he believes that some of Piketty’s conclusions “should have important implications for Western policy toward Russia.” Specifically, Bershidsky argues that the West should stop relying on sanctions against Russia and instead target its massive offshore wealth.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“The One Big Problem With New Russia Sanctions: Congress Won't Let Trump Waive Penalties, Which Gives Moscow No Reason to Change Its Behavior,” Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Bloomberg, 08.10.17: The author, an expert in international affairs, writes that the recently passed congressional sanctions on Russia sent two messages. The first is that U.S. lawmakers feel Russia deserves punishment for its election interference, and that Congress does not trust U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision making when it comes to lifting or easing sanctions. The second message, the author argues, also deserves consideration. The intent of these sanctions is to ultimately have Russia change its behavior. “Yet by taking away the administration’s ability to calibrate sanctions in response to improvements in Russian actions, Congress essentially handcuffed the executive branch in terms of trying to change Russian behavior.” With no apparent reward, the likelihood of behavior change is unlikely. The author suggests that in order to avoid the legislation backfiring, Congress should soon indicate a willingness to review and make adjustments to the sanctions.
“Russia Sanctions and American Splits,” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.10.17: The author, senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor in chief of Carnegie.ru, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s retaliation to the new sanctions was carefully timed. Putin ordered the seizure of U.S. diplomatic properties and the expulsion of U.S. diplomats after the sanctions had been approved by Congress, but before they were signed into law by U.S. President Donald Trump. This move showed that Putin was “punishing the America of the United States Congress, not the America of Trump.” As a result, Trump’s angry tweet regarding the sanctions was directed not at Russia, but at his own Congress. The author argues that the Kremlin took a risk by betting on the personal relationship between Trump and Putin, but the risk did not pay off. To Russian eyes, these new sanctions imposed so many months after the election look like “a second round of punishment for the same alleged crime,” driven by America’s domestic politics. Additionally, by focusing so much on trying to punish Russia and Trump, U.S. lawmakers “forgot about their friends in Europe.” Thus, the division between the U.S. and Europe that Russia is allegedly hoping for, may come to pass.
“Putin's Goal: Revenge and Restoration,” Leon Aron, Wall Street Journal, 08.09.17: The author, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, writes that while Russia has received a lot of attention lately, not much of it has been afforded to asking why Russian President Vladimir Putin is making these moves and what the U.S. can expect next. The author argues that for Putin, the global order is “unfair and immoral, having been hijacked by America.” In this global order, aside from a few select categories, Western wins equal Russian loses. As a result, Putin has taken it upon himself to restore Russia’s place in the world. Russia’s election interference in 2016 was not a onetime thing, but rather one part of a more expansive policy. The author calls this “a dangerous game.” Foreign policy achievements form the basis of Putin’s domestic legitimacy, where a stagnant economy, rising poverty and increasing distaste for corruption threaten that legitimacy. While Putin’s victory in Russia’s March 2018 presidential election is a foregone conclusions, Putin wants “more than a win … an outpouring of loyalty and adulation” that will keep his regime afloat for another six years. Going forward, there is the risk of miscalculation by Putin that could bring the old Cold War rivals to the brink of war once again, as in the Cuban missile crisis. The author advises that only “unambiguous setbacks” in Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere can put a stop to Putin’s “zero-sum game of revenge and restoration.”
“A Roadmap for US-Russia Relations,” Edited by Andrey Kortunov and Olga Oliker, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2017: The authors, a collection of experts on U.S.-Russia relations, argue that cooperation in areas of both mutual interest and difference are important to stabilizing the relationship and guarding against future conflict. Deepening and broadening the two countries’ economic relationship could act as a stabilizing force, and the authors provide detailed near-term and long-term recommendations. Cooperation in the energy sector, one of the first casualties of the current decline in the relationship, is still possible on the methodological and scientific level. The Arctic has remained “somewhat insulated from the overall decline in the relationship.” As such, it can be an area for constructive engagement, and both countries should work to keep the region stable and peaceful. The authors discuss the issue of Euro-Atlantic stability and provide recommendations for avoiding renewed conflict in the region, while the Middle East is an area of “overlapping and conflicting interests” for Russia and the U.S. Regarding strategic stability, the authors recommend “transition to a new paradigm.” Cybersecurity is an area of growing complexity, where the current level of cooperation is “reflective of the overall relationship.” Counterterrorism is an area for increased cooperation; however, the approaches Russia and the U.S. take to combat terrorism are different and at times conflicting.
“The Problem Isn’t Putin, It’s Russia,” Thomas Graham, Politico, 08.12.17: The author, a managing director at Kissinger Associates, Inc., writes that Washington’s problem is not so much with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but rather with Russia as a whole. The author points to the historically rocky relationship that began when the U.S. emerged as a world power in the late 19th century. The world has changed, but the two countries’ contentious areas remain constant: “values, zones of influence, the principles of world order.” Moments of cooperation have been brief, and not nearly as friendly as traditionally depicted. As the Soviet Union fell, the U.S. felt that its Cold War victory “meant that Russia, like all other countries, had little choice but to adopt the liberal democratic free-market order.” In the grip of societal and economic crisis, Russia “did not so much support as acquiesce” to these plans. Once crisis had abated, “historical tensions reemerged.” The author argues that the U.S. needs to accept that Russia will likely never be a liberal democracy and that Washington will have to contend with Russia, which will remain a major global player for a reasons ranging from its strategic geographic position to its adept use of emerging technologies. Currently, Washington’s preferred method of dealing with Russia is containment reinforced by sanctions, but this is not a sustainable option for the long term. The author suggests engaging with Russia “pragmatically and … managing the geopolitical rivalry” to reduce the risk of conflict. The U.S. should defend its interests, but be open to discussion and compromise. Both the U.S. and Russia “must recognize that the mounting global disorder necessitates a more balanced relationship that … would advance the interests of both.”
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“Demands on Russian Foreign Policy and Its Drivers: Looking Out Five Years,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.10.17: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that it is important to examine what drives Russian foreign policy and its possible changes in the short term. Moscow’s primary foreign policy priorities include: withstanding pressure from Washington and U.S. allies; curbing NATO expansions and reclaiming status as a global great power; and furthering ties with China, but not entering into an alliance. Furthering the Eurasian Economic Union is not a priority, even though the Kremlin claims it is. Moscow’s priorities also do not include taking the Baltic States, Ukraine or even Ukraine’s Donbas region by force. Additionally, “Moscow has crossed the lines that it had steered clear of after the breakup of the Communist system” and involved itself in Western politics. The author also argues that publically available evidence suggests that Russian manipulation of the 2016 election and the imposition of “its choice on the American people” is unlikely. Looking ahead, the stakes are high for both the West and Russia as Putin enters his next presidential term in March 2018 and “a post-Putin future” approaches.
China:
- No significant commentary.
Ukraine:
“Why Giving Ukraine Lethal Weapons Would Be a Massive Mistake,” Charles Kupchan, The Washington Post, 08.07.17: The author, a member of the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017, argues that the U.S. should not be sending lethal weapons to Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Thinking that increased Russian casualties would cause Russia to pull out of the Ukraine conflict “is to dramatically misread the Kremlin.” Russian President Vladimir Putin would be more likely to try to match Ukraine’s improved military capability. If Moscow’s response turns out to be escalation, Washington has little to answer with. Additionally, arming Ukraine would create division between the U.S. and its major European allies, who have been working towards a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The author calls sending lethal weapons to Ukraine “a recipe for military escalation and transatlantic discord.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Russia-West Balancing Act Grows Ever More Wobbly in Belarus,” Ivan Nechepurenko, New York Times, 08.13.17: The author, a reporter for the New York Times, writes that Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has been “playing Russia and the West against each other” for the last twenty years. Belarus acts as a both a buffer for the West and a ward and ally of the Kremlin, but with Russia’s Zapad military exercises scheduled in the country in September, the balancing act may be over. As the Russian soldiers arrive in Belarus, the fear is that they will not leave. If Lukashenko decides to side with Russia, he risks his country’s sovereignty, while a turn to the West could see a reaction from the Kremlin similar to the one Ukraine experienced after former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power. Most analysts expect that if push comes to shove, Lukashenko will turn to Moscow.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“A New Russian for the Old President,” Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.09.17: The author, a journalist for Russian newspaper Kommersant, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent conversations with ordinary Russians are orchestrated by Kremlin officials, meant to show the president that his citizenry is concerned with the same questions he is. As his 2018 reelection campaign approaches, Putin has been speaking with citizens ranging from children to fishermen on a variety of issues. However, “the substance and format of these conversations” recently changed, shifting the target of the conversations from voters to Putin himself. The author argues this indicates the regime’s increasing personalism, where everything is about Putin. “… meeting the president is presented as an opportunity to learn more about him rather than as an opportunity to solve one’s problem.” However, for ordinary Russians, hearing workers discuss historical falsifications or U.S.-Russia relations is largely reminiscent “of the late Soviet period, when people would say one thing on TV and something totally different in their kitchens.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.