Russia Analytical Report, Aug. 29-Sept. 6, 2022

5 Ideas to Explore

  1. It will become impossible for Russia to finance its war in Ukraine at the current level of $500 million a day as Western sanctions on the Russian economy will increasingly bite, according to Oleg Itskhoki’s estimates. Itskhoki and other Russian economists polled by Meduza believe the full brunt of these punitive measures are yet to be felt by the country’s economy. “Russia’s economy is not going to collapse in a way that forces a halt to the Kremlin’s war effort,” but the country does “face a sharp recession, a long grind of lower living standards and little hope for a quick rebound,” according Chris Miller, a U.S. expert on Russian economy.
  2. The U.S. should not seek to transform Russia or China because advocating for regime change would likely prove irrelevant or counterproductive, according to Richard Haas. The U.S. should prioritize the promotion of order over the promotion of democracy, Haas argues in Foreign Affairs. That might prove to be a very difficult mission for the U.S. if Russia is indeed “promoting something else entirely: world disorder with no rules,” as Angela Stent tells Foreign Policy.
  3. Mikhail Gorbachev remembered for his role in peaceful disintegration of the Soviet empire: Following the death of the Soviet leader on Aug. 30, Vladislav Zubok writes that Gorbachev’s greatest achievement was bringing “a peaceful end to the Cold War,” but notes that his place in Russian history is “still to be determined” with Russian nationalists blaming him for allowing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Graham Allison also credits the last Soviet leader with ending the Cold War. “If you ask yourself which single individual contributed most to the resolution without war of four decades of Cold War between the U.S.-led free world and the Soviet Union, it was Mikhail Gorbachev,” Allison writes. Gorbachev should also be remembered for his refusal to use force to prevent the disintegration of the socialist bloc that preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to Paula J. Dobriansky. One should not, however, forget the economic turmoil that followed the end of Gorbachev’s rule, according to Paul Krugman. “Russia turned away from socialism and toward a market economy. And the results were disastrous,” Krugman reminds us.
  4. It’s a myth that Moscow is winning the energy battle, according to Fatih Birol. First its short-term revenue gain is more than offset by the loss of both trust and markets that it faces for many years to come. Second, there will be significant medium-term impacts of the tougher international sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector. The growing share of Russian oil production had been set to come from resources that will be hard to recover without Western know-how. Third, Russia’s LNG expansion plans are now back on the drawing board in part because of the sanctions, Birol writes in FT.
  5. Has the Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated that tanks are obsolete? Not so, according to Rob Lee. “Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support and Ukrainian artillery” rather than by the obsolesce of tanks as such, this retired U.S. Marine writes in War on the Rocks. Meanwhile, a contributor to the U.S. Marine Gazette saw Russia’s “program of missile strikes” in Ukraine exploiting a “capability that was nothing short of revolutionary.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Is Kindling for World War III,” Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, NI, 08.31.22.

  • “Washington should ... take several steps but two of the most important are dialing in ‘peaceful’ reactors as prepositioned nuclear weapons into its strategic deterrence strategy and rethinking its enthusiasm for exporting reactors even into war zones.”
    • “The first task requires clarifying when, and, if it ever, it would make sense for U.S. forces to fire on reactors overseas. It also entails determining how our forces might best deter and protect against attacks on friends’ reactors meant to harm or coerce them.”
    • “The second task demands examining what can be done physically to protect existing reactors overseas where U.S. troops are or might be deployed. It also requires assessing how prudent constructing new nuclear plants might be in or near likely war zones and where those zones might lie.”

“Russian Roulette at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” Lillian Posner of Think Global Health at CFR, Think Global Health, 08.29.22.

  • "A repeat of Chernobyl [at Zaporizhzhia NPP] appears unlikely, observed Professor Timothy Mousseau, who studies the biological effects of nuclear disasters at the University of South Carolina, who says that while a missile strike has the potential to release a cloud of radioactive particles, it would not be a sustained nuclear reaction, and there wouldn't be the same kind of meltdown and massive release of fresh particles that result from fission of uranium and plutonium. "
  • [But if a meltdown does occur, it would] “pose tremendous risks to human and environmental health. The power plant sits alongside the Dnipro River, Europe's fourth largest, which if contaminated, could spread radioactivity all the way to the Black Sea. In the immediate area of the plant, staff and soldiers could become violently ill. Some of them have protective gear, but others are completely exposed, and within half an hour could be overcome with fever, nausea and vomiting due to the radiation, which in severe cases can be fatal. Outside the plant, those who have inhaled radioactive smoke or were exposed to lower levels of radiation are now at risk of various cancers that could affect them down the line.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant developments.

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“The Tank Is Not Obsolete, and Other Observations About the Future of Combat,” Rob Lee of FPRI, War on the Rocks, 09.06.22.

  • “After six months of war in Ukraine, some observers have insisted that ‘we are seeing the very nature of combat change’ and that tanks, along with fighter jets and warships, ‘are being pushed into obsolescence.’ But it is too soon to write off the tank, and we should resist jumping to other sweeping conclusions about the future of warfare based on a conflict whose lessons are not yet clear. There is still much about this war that is not known from open sources, and there is good reason to think that the conditions that marked its early phases will not necessarily be relevant to future conflicts.”
  • “The available data from Ukraine, as well as the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, indicate that tanks are still critical in modern warfare and their vulnerabilities have been exaggerated. Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support and Ukrainian artillery.”
  • “While the Russian military would have been better served in Ukraine by having more infantry and fewer tanks, tanks will continue to be important systems in ground warfare. They remain a key ground component of combined-arms warfare, without which other arms are more vulnerable. Infantry are vulnerable when attempting to seize defensive positions, meaning tanks still play a critical role during offensive operations. Anti-tank guided missiles certainly cannot replace the tank’s role in supporting maneuver.”
  • “Crucially, NATO tanks generally have better crew protection than Russia’s, and NATO militaries would be unlikely to eschew combined arms as the Russian military did in the early stages of its invasion. So not all lessons from this war directly apply to NATO. Drawing similar sweeping conclusions based on Russian tank losses from this period would also be a mistake. The evidence from Ukraine reveals that tanks are still very relevant in modern warfare.”

“The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Part II: The mental and moral realms,” Marinus, Marine Corps Gazette via Imetatronink and Johnson’s Russia List , August 2022.

  • “One way to shed a little light upon this conundrum is to treat Russian operations on each of the three major fronts of the war as a distinct campaign. … [E]ach of these campaigns followed a model that had been part of the Russian operational repertoire for a very long time. Such a scheme, however, fails to explain why the Russian leadership applied particular models to particular sets of operations. Resolving that question requires an examination of the mental and moral purposes served by each of these three campaigns.”
    • “[D]uring the first few days of the Russian invasion ... the fast-moving Russian columns .... convinced the Ukrainians to weaken their main field army, then fighting in the Donbas region, to bolster the defenses of distant cities.”
    • “[T]heir counterparts in the south took permanent possession of comparable cities.”
    • “Russian operations in the north and south of Ukraine made very little use of field artillery. … In the east, however, the Russians conducted bombardments that, in terms of both duration and intensity, rivaled those of the great artillery contests of the world wars.”
  • “The Russian program of guided missile strikes, conducted in parallel to the three ground campaigns, created a number of moral effects favorable to the Russian war effort.”
  • “The three ground campaigns conducted by the Russians in Ukraine … owed much to traditional models. At the same time, the program of missile strikes exploited a capability that was nothing short of revolutionary. … [T]he Russians rarely forgot that, in addition to being a physical struggle, war is both a mental contest and a moral argument.”
  • “The Russian invasion of Ukraine may mark the start of a new cold war … If that is the case, then we will face an adversary who, while drawing much of value from the Soviet military tradition, has been liberated from both the brutality inherent in the legacy of Lenin and the blinders imposed by Marxism. What would be even worse, we may find ourselves fighting disciples of John R. Boyd.”

“Ukraine digs in for a long winter campaign,” Lawrence Freedman, FT, 09.02.22.

  • “Talk of liberating Kherson as the coming stage of the war began in late May, and President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly gave the order to retake the south in July, after which there were a few limited pushes against Russian positions. Indeed, one reason the recent operations might have caught the Russians by surprise is that they were anticipated for so long there was speculation Kyiv had lost its nerve.”
  • “In practice, however, the campaign had already begun. Since late June, the Ukrainians have been taking out ammunition dumps, command posts and air defenses. More recently they have been cutting off lines of retreat and supply, by attacking bridges over the Dnipro river, notably the Antonivka, the crossing closest to Kherson. Attacks behind the lines have also stepped up—including on Ukrainians collaborating with the Russians—and some spectacular hits on military facilities in Crimea.”
  • “This campaign is not simply directed at retaking territory but at Russia’s will to continue with a futile and costly war. If it works, it will do so by convincing Moscow that its position is untenable.”

“After the start of the war, experts said that the sanctions would bring down the Russian economy. But this did not happen. Why? We posed this question to the economists we trust ourselves,” Meduza, 09.05.22. Clues from Russian Views

  • Ruben Enikolopov, ex-rector and visiting professor at the Russian School of Economics: “The effect of sanctions is [similar to] how a frog is warmed up: it may seem that everything is fine, but the process is lengthy. When change [occurs] slowly, people do not react as [sharply] to it, although on a longer planning horizon we will see that the changes are monstrous—and how the Russian economy is hopelessly behind the leading countries.”
  • Alexander Isakov, economist at Bloomberg Economics for Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: “The effect of the sanctions turned out to be about the same as in the first big wave of restrictions - in 2014-2015. And the same as in cases of financial sanctions in other countries like South Africa or Iran. They slow down structural growth, but in principle, for a state that has a healthy balance sheet, low debt and a positive current account, they do not have a sudden effect.”
  • Evgeny Nadorshin, chief economist of consulting company PF Capital, former adviser to the Russian Minister of Economic Development: “Sanctions that relate to oil and oil products may only make themselves felt at the turn of 2022-2023. [Therefore] I do not share the optimistic comments of the authorities that the peak of the decline in consumption has passed, and in general the decline [of GDP] this year will be 3%. My feeling is that 2023 will not be a year of growth in any scenario.”
  • Oleg Itskhoki, professor of economics at UCLA: “Even if Europe refuses to buy Russian oil and gas, Russia will sell it to India, China and Indonesia. Probably, this will happen with losses in supply volumes, but in many respects, substitution will occur. … According to experts, one day of the war cost $500 million, which is about the same amount that Russia received from energy exports to Europe during this period [per day]. In fact, it turns out that Europe covered Russia's expenses for the war. This will obviously not happen again: these revenues are declining and it will simply be impossible to finance a war on the same scale.”

“Is Russia’s Economy on the Brink?,” Chris Miller of the Fletcher School, FA, 09.02.22. 

  • No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The War in Ukraine and the Return of Realpolitik,” Georgetown University’s Charles A. Kupchan, NI, 09.02.22.

  • “NATO has wisely avoided direct involvement in the fighting in order to avert war with Russia. But the alliance’s unwillingness to militarily defend Ukraine has exposed a troubling disconnect between the organization’s stated goal of making the country a member and its judgment that protecting Ukraine is not worth the cost. In effect, the United States and its allies, even as they impose severe sanctions on Russia and send arms to Ukraine, have revealed that they do not deem the defense of the country to be a vital interest. But if that is the case, then why have NATO members wanted to extend to Ukraine a security guarantee that would obligate them to go to war in its defense?”
  • “NATO should extend security guarantees to countries that are of intrinsic strategic importance to the United States and its allies—it should not make countries strategically important by extending them such guarantees. In a world that is rapidly reverting to the logic of power politics … NATO cannot afford to be profligate in handing out such guarantees. Strategic prudence requires distinguishing critical interests from lesser ones, and conducting statecraft accordingly. Strategic prudence also requires that the West prepare for the return of sustained militarized rivalry with Russia.”
  • “The return of a two-bloc world that plays by the rules of realpolitik means that the West will need to dial back its efforts to expand the liberal order, instead returning to a strategy of patient containment aimed at preserving geopolitical stability and avoiding great power war.”
  • “Both sides of the Atlantic have hard work to do if they are to get their own houses in order and reinvigorate the globe’s anchor of liberal order. … It would be ironic if the West succeeds in turning Putin’s gamble in Ukraine into a resounding defeat, only to see liberal democracies then succumb to the enemy within.”

“Two Cold Wars in a New Bipolar World,” Columbia University’s Robert Legvold, NI, 09.04.22.

  • “[W]hat if the dominant feature of international politics in the decades ahead turns out to be two interlocking cold wars in a new bipolar world? One is already in place. The United States and Russia have been in a new cold war since the eruption of the Ukrainian crisis eight years ago.”
  • “Vladimir Putin’s tragic roll of the dice, however, has pushed the new U.S.-Russian cold war to a qualitatively deeper level. … The war in Ukraine also diminished the differences between the old and new cold wars. As the crisis deepened, Putin’s loose but menacing talk about Russia’s nuclear options has revived fears from an earlier era. And as the repression within Russia mounts and Putin and his closest advisors drum with growing passion on, as they claim, the alien, desiccated values guiding the United States and other Western societies, the cultural chasm separating East from West parallels the ideological animosity of the Cold War. The only remaining distinction between the two cold wars is that of scope.”
  • “A U.S.-China cold war, as during the original Cold War, would engulf and reshape the entire international system—its institutions, alliance structures, economic flows, and zones of conflict. The two countries are not yet at this point of confrontation. Their intensifying rivalry does not, for now, share the characteristics of either the original or the new U.S.-Russia cold wars; but, unless trends are consciously redirected, that is where they are headed.”
  • “The rudiments of a U.S.-China cold war are thus in place. Crossing the threshold into a formal cold war will occur if the following three trends deepen and then merge. First, if the tension surrounding the U.S.-China military rivalry grows, further distorting increasingly tense economic relations. Second, if the overall strategy of the other country comes to be seen by one or both countries as seriously intent on undoing its domestic order. And third, if the geostrategic competition is seen by one side as tilting decisively in the other’s favor. If the essence of a cold war is a relationship with all the elements of war short of guns firing, but with the risk that they could, that is where the United States and China will then be. That is where the United States and Russia are.”

“How U.S. Grand Strategy Is Changed by Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, 09.02.22.

  • Angela Stent of the Brookings Institution: “Russia and China have both called for a new post-Western order in which the United States can no longer set the agenda. Beijing seeks a global order where China can set the rules with the United States, but where there will still be rules. Russia, judging by its actions in Ukraine and its nightly television propaganda barrages, is promoting something else entirely: world disorder with no rules. The United States’ grand strategic challenge is to ensure that a post-post-Cold War world will indeed maintain rules—including, most importantly, those designed to avoid large-scale armed conflict.”
  • Stephen M. Walt of Harvard Univesity: “If preventing the emergence of a rival hegemon in a vital strategic region remains a cardinal principle of U.S. grand strategy, then pivoting to Asia is essential, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. ... The impending European recession will only exacerbate these tendencies … If this trend is not reversed, Washington will find itself doing more than is needed in Europe but not enough in Asia. For U.S. grand strategy, that would be a fundamental error.”
  • Liana Fix of the Körber Foundation: “The United States should look beyond NATO when assessing Europe’s strategic importance. Until Europeans can assume more responsibility for their own security … the economic realm is where they can be very powerful. Washington will need partners in the looming conflicts of the future, where China will be an economic as much as a security challenge. ... Of course, China is in a whole other economic league from Russia, and Europeans will need convincing reasons to put their economic ties to China in jeopardy.”
  • Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary general and a former Danish prime minister: “The United States and its allies need to provide Ukraine with all it needs to defend its independence for the long term. If the West fails to do this, … Putin will not stop in Ukraine.”

“How to Build a Better Order: Limiting Great Power Rivalry in an Anarchic World,” Harvard Kennedy School’s Dani Rodrik and Stephen M. Walt, FA, September/October 2022.

“We propose a simple, four-part framework to guide relations among major powers. This framework presupposes only minimal agreement on core principles—at least at first—and acknowledges that there will be enduring disagreements about how many issues should be addressed. Rather than imposing a detailed set of prescriptive rules … this framework would function as a ‘meta-regime:’ a device for guiding a process through which rival states or even adversaries could seek agreement or accommodation on a host of issues. When they do not agree, as will often be the case, adopting the framework can still enhance communication among them, clarify why they disagree and offer them incentives to avoid inflicting harm on others, even as they seek to protect their own interests.”

“The Dangerous Decade. A Foreign Policy for a World in Crisis,” CFR’s Richard Haass, FA, September/October 2022.

“In Praise of Lesser Evils. Can Realism Repair Foreign Policy?” Emma Ashford of Georgetown University, FA, September/October 2022.

“Ukraine Holds the Future: The War Between Democracy and Nihilism,” Yale’s Timothy Snyder, FA, September/October 2022.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Vostok military exercises indicate that Russia is far from isolated,” Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute, Responsible Statecraft, 09.01.22.

  • “The next iteration of Russia’s quadrennial Vostok exercise has just begun in its far east region, involving more than 50,000 troops, 140 aircraft and 60 warships.”
  • “The true significance of Vostok 2022 is not size, but its participants. This year, the list of countries from outside the former Soviet Union joining as participants or observers is much longer and, apart from Mongolia, also includes Algeria, Syria, Laos, Nicaragua and India. … Of these, China is clearly the most significant.”
  • “Since 2018, Vostok has not simulated an invasion by China, which was at least partly a focus of its previous versions. There is no evidence, at least yet, that Moscow and Beijing have moved to the stage of joint operational planning for wartime contingencies. Still, in many ways, China and Russia can be said to be informal allies, a development brought on in substantial measure by the simultaneous containment strategies of Washington toward both.”
  • “More than six months into a brutal war, the United States and its European allies have made almost no headway in adding to their coalition ranged against Russia. Except for Japan, and to an extent Singapore, the major Asian and Eurasian states are not only not in, but some of them seem to be building even deeper ties with Russia. Washington may wish to reflect as to why its Russia strategy is failing to excite most Asians.”

“Russia’s Turn to the East: Between Choice and Necessity,” Timofei Bordachev of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Valdai Club, 09.01.22. Clues from Russian Views

  • “The conflict, which is in fact a hybrid war, between Russia and the U.S. and Europe, can be seen as a condition that will make the ‘turn to the East’ no longer an option, but a necessity, and thus force the Russian state to take it seriously. ... [O]ne can make several assumptions that are directly related to what place relations with Asia will occupy for Russia in the coming years.”
    • “First, relations with China and, especially, other Asian states are still no way to resolve problems of an existential nature.”
    • “Second, Russia will have to solve the key tasks of national development on its own, without relying on external sources of technology, not to mention finances.”
    • “Third, it must be taken into account that even the most active ties in Asia cannot supplant relations with the states of the Islamic world, neighboring countries and, in fact, Europe, where not everyone is inclined to build walls on their eastern border.”
  • “Relations with the Asian countries are indeed becoming not a choice, but a necessity. However, this does not mean the choice to pursue complete change in the most important guidelines affecting the national foreign and economic policy. Rather, it has an important tactical significance and, with due diligence on our part, can lead in the future to a more adequate Russian presence in world affairs, the center of which is increasingly shifting to Asia.”

“How to Teach Beijing a Lesson in Ukraine,” former U.S. national security adviser Robert C. O’Brien, FP, 09.01.22.

  • “How hard Russia is hit with the West’s punitive economic tools will influence how China moves forward. Already, one Chinese think tank, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, is declaring that Putin is not only beating sanctions, but he is also massively profiting from his war in the face of sanctions due to the spike in oil prices.”
  • “Accordingly, the United States and the West more broadly must move beyond the current half-measure sanctions on Russia. That means full sanctions on Russia’s Central Bank and the full removal of all Russian transactions from the SWIFT international payment messaging system. It is time to defund Putin’s war machine and send a strong message to Xi: The West can and will decouple its economies from dictatorships when they invade their neighbors.”

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Time to Rethink America’s Nuclear Strategy,” Francis J. Gavin of Johns Hopkins University, FA, 09.05.22.

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security:

  • No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Three myths about the global energy crisis,” Fatih Birol of the International Energy Agency, FT, 09.05.22.

  • “As the global energy crisis continues to hurt households, businesses and entire economies worldwide, it’s important to separate fact from fiction. There are three narratives in particular that I hear about the current situation that I think are wrong—in some cases dangerously so.”
    • “The first is that Moscow is winning the energy battle.”
      • “[I]ts short-term revenue gain is more than offset by the loss of both trust and markets that it faces for many years to come. Moscow is doing itself long-term harm by alienating the EU, its biggest customer by far and a strategic partner. Russia’s place in the international energy system is changing fundamentally, and not to its advantage.”
      • “This narrative also ignores the significant medium-term impacts of the tougher international sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector. This particularly concerns its ability to produce oil and transport gas.”
      • “A growing share of Russian oil production had been set to come from more complex oilfields, including offshore, Arctic or otherwise hard-to-recover resources. The absence of western companies, technologies and service providers as a result of sanctions presents substantial risks for the country’s capacity to exploit those resources.”
      • “Russia was banking on liquefied natural gas as the main way to diversify its exports away from a heavy reliance on Europe. ... Russia’s LNG expansion plans are now back on the drawing board.”
  • “The second fallacy is that today’s global energy crisis is a clean energy crisis. ... When people misleadingly blame clean energy and climate policies for today’s energy crisis they are, intentionally or not, moving the spotlight away from the real culprits—the gas supply crunch and Russia.”
  • “The third mistaken idea is that today’s energy crisis is a huge setback that will hinder us from tackling climate change. I don’t see it that way. This crisis is a stark reminder of the unsustainability of the current energy system, which is dominated by fossil fuels. We have the chance to make this a historic turning point towards a cleaner, more affordable and more secure energy system.”

“A potential new snag for Putin: The retreat of Jack Frost,” WP’s David Von Drehle, WP, 09.02.22.

  • “Winter has been Russia's great strategic asset in previous wars, literally freezing the ambitions of Napoleon and Hitler in their tracks on the long road to Moscow. The season has become Putin's last hope for salvaging an outcome in Ukraine that he might call victory. If voters in Germany, Italy and other Western countries get cold enough without the Russian gas they rely on for their heaters, they could force their governments to back away from NATO's unified support for Zelensky.”
  • “But even Jack Frost might turn his back on Putin. New long-range forecasts strongly suggest that Europe is headed toward a generally mild fall and early winter. La Nina, a change in atmospheric patterns associated with the cooling of surface temperatures in parts of the Pacific Ocean, will most likely deliver warmer-than-normal temperatures to most of the continent. This would reduce the strain on natural gas supplies—though it certainly won't end the need for sacrifice and resolve.”

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Russia’s Unfounded Claims of Secret U.S. Bioweapons Linger On and On,” NYT’s Steven Lee Myers, NYT, 09.04.22.

  • “Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in Ukraine began more than six months ago, some of the most outlandish and yet enduring have been those accusing the United States of operating clandestine biological research programs to wreak havoc around the globe.”
  • “In Geneva this week, Russia has commanded an international forum to air its unsupported assertions again. The Biological Weapons Convention … gives member nations the authority to request a formal hearing of violations, and Russia has invoked the first one in a quarter-century. … Even when unsupported by fact, the accusations have played into pre-existing attitudes toward American dominance in foreign affairs. The consequence has been to sow division and doubt—not necessarily to build support for Russia’s invasion, but to deflect some of the blame to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”
  • “Even before the war in Ukraine, Russia raised alarms about U.S. efforts to establish closer defense and research ties with several of Russia’s neighbors, including other former republics of the Soviet Union. The United States has poured millions of dollars of assistance into those countries, under the Biological Threat Reduction Program. The initiative was originally intended to dismantle the remnants of Soviet-era nuclear, chemical and biological weapons after the Cold War, including in Ukraine. It has expanded to focus on supporting biological research laboratories that are crucial to monitor and prevent diseases from spreading.”
  • “Although Russian officials repeatedly promised to provide proof of the secret weapons research in Ukraine, they have not yet done so.”

Obituaries and commentaries dedicated to Mikhail Gorbachev:

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“‘Nothing Has Really Changed’: In Moscow, the Fighting Is a World Away,” NYT’s Valerie Hopkins, NYT, 09.06.22.

  • “Muscovites spent the first months after the conflict started anxious and uncertain. Tens of thousands of them fled. But over the summer, the capital largely returned to normal, buoyed by a soaring ruble, a silenced opposition and a news media almost completely under the Kremlin’s control.”
  • “Still, society is changing slowly: While Mr. Putin has sought to infuse a sense of normalcy, he is also working to further militarize Russian society. Along Moscow’s artery roads there are billboards of soldiers listing their rank and title, with a QR code to scan for more information. And there is no shortage of events celebrating Russia’s military might.”

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Africa’s Ukraine Dilemma: Why the Continent Is Caught Between Russia and the West,” Nanjala Nyabola, FA, 09.05.22.

“Russia has made worrying inroads into Africa,” Editorial Board, FT, 09.04.22.

  • “[O]ver the past decade, and at an accelerating pace, Moscow has built a formidable presence in many of the continent’s 54 countries. Its influence is overwhelmingly malign.”
  • “If CAR is a captured state, Mali is heading that way too. In August 2020, when generals overthrew an ineffective civilian administration, demonstrators appeared waving Russian flags and portraits of Vladimir Putin. ... This picture, with variations, is repeated in countries such as Libya and Sudan. Even nominal western allies find a useful counterweight in Moscow. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, the president who has held power for 36 years, has cozied up to Russia. During a recent visit by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, Museveni cooed that Russia had been ‘with us for the last 100 years.’”
  • “The West must up its game. It must desperately pay more attention to a continent that by 2050 will be home to one in four of humankind. If it does not, Russia and others will not be so reticent.”

“War in Ukraine has shaken the EU’s power dynamics,” FT’s Sylvie Kauffmann, FT, 08.30.22.

  • “As a result of the Russian invasion, power dynamics in the EU are changing. Member states formerly occupied by the Soviet Union, and geographically closer to Ukraine and Russia, are not only taken more seriously today—they are also wielding more clout because their mistrust has been vindicated by Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war, and because their position as front-line states makes them strategically more important. This shifting of the center of gravity is challenging the once almighty Franco-German tandem.”
  • “This trend has been obvious in the current debate over a visa ban for Russian citizens in the Schengen area. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky called for it; Poland, Finland, the three Baltic states and the Czech Republic have actively supported it. Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s prime minister and an increasingly influential voice in the EU, made the strongest push.”
  • “Germany openly opposed such a ban, as did Josep Borrell, the EU’s chief diplomat. The Czechs, who hold the rotating presidency of the EU, decided to put it on the agenda of the 27 foreign ministers meeting this week in Prague. The Lithuanian foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, threatened to craft a regional agreement if a deal was not reached among the 27. Eventually, France and Germany had to fight back and work toward a compromise.”
  • “This is not the old east-west divide, nor old Europe versus new. The war in Ukraine has upset existing coalitions. Viktor Orbán’s proximity to the Kremlin has paralyzed the Visegrad group, comprising Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Poland and the Baltic states can now count on the support of Nordic countries such as Finland and Sweden, putting Paris and Berlin on the defensive.”

Ukraine:

“Do Ukrainians want a ceasefire?”, Karina V. Korostelina of George Mason University and Gerard Toal of Virginia Tech, WP/Monkey Cage, 08.30.22.

  • “To understand the views of war-affected Ukrainians, we organized a face-to-face survey of over 1,800 Ukrainians, half of whom were local residents and half of whom were internally displaced people (IDPs). Participants were selected across three towns—Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Poltava ... in July.”
  • “We offered respondents three options: ‘yes, we need an immediate cease-fire no matter the territorial cost’ (5.6 percent chose this response); ‘yes, we need a cease-fire but only under the right conditions’ (15.4 percent); and ‘no we should only have a cease-fire when we have liberated all our lands’ (70.5 percent).”
  • “We [also] asked respondents ‘What do you consider more important? (1) Save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians or (2) continue the war to free all Ukrainian territories including Crimea and Donbas’—and asked them to indicate whether they felt option (1) or option (2) was very important or slightly important, or if they saw both options as equally important. Is it more important to (1) save lives or (2) free all Ukrainian territories?”
    • “Close to 27 percent of our sample of front line Ukrainians believe that it's more important to save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians rather than continue the war to free all Ukrainian territories including Crimea and Donbas. And 36 percent believe the opposite … Ukrainians overwhelmingly held strong views—both groups saw this topic as ‘very important.’”
    • “Significantly, across all three cities, Ukrainians forcefully displaced because of the war tended to rank saving lives over territorial liberation more than local residents of these cities.”
    • “Given straightforward questions with clear patriotic answers, Ukrainians overwhelmingly affirm their belief in victory. But given indirect and trade-off dilemma questions, important differences of emphasis emerge. Ukrainians understandably want to defeat Russia's aggression, to achieve victory and liberate their lands. They are also understandably torn when faced with the real life-or-death dilemmas of this war. Recognizing differences among Ukrainians is important for all those interested in how Ukraine survives this war, successfully negotiates its end and builds a peaceful future beyond it.”

“Invest in the Future of Ukraine,” Volodymyr Zelensky, WSJ, 09.05.22.

  • “I told the World Economic Forum in May that I plan great leaps ahead for the postwar Ukrainian economy. I committed my administration to creating a favorable environment for investment that would make Ukraine the greatest growth opportunity in Europe since the end of World War II. Today, with the introduction of Advantage Ukraine, I am delivering on that promise. I invite foreign investors and companies with ambition to see the advantage in investing in the future of Ukraine, and to recognize the tremendous growth potential our country presents. We have already identified options for more than $400 billion of potential investment, which reach from public-private partnerships to privatization and private ventures.”
  • “Ukrainians are grateful for the support we have received from around the world, but today I am writing not to ask for favors. Advantage Ukraine, our new program, outlines investment opportunities that will unleash the economic potential of Ukraine while delivering growth for those who have the vision to invest.”

“The Education of Volodymyr Zelensky: A new biography traces the former comedian’s first two years as president of Ukraine,” book review by Jack Detsch, FP, 09.03.22.

  • “Ukrainian journalist Serhii Rudenko’s slim [‘Zelensky: A Biography’] came out in Ukrainian last year, well before this February’s Russian invasion. The author added a few scenes to the recently published English-language edition that depict Zelensky as a wartime leader: in Bucha and in the opening hours of the war. But they add little or nothing to the public record.”
  • “What Rudenko does provide is a portrait of Zelensky during his first nearly two years in office, when his presidency looked a lot like one more season of his popular television show Servant of the People—slapdash and chaotic. (As an actor, Zelensky played a schoolteacher who, in very unlikely circumstances, becomes president. In real life, he gave his political party the same name as his show.)”
  • “‘[S]tarting from Feb. 24, 2022, … we have discovered a completely different Zelensky,’ Rudenko writes in the first pages of the book. ‘A man who was not afraid to accept Putin’s challenge and become the leader of popular resistance to Russian aggression. A president who managed to unite in this fight his supporters and opponents, corrupt officials and fighters against corruption, adults and children, people of different nationalities and faiths. A head of state who is greeted with applause in European parliaments and the U.S. Congress.’  But we are still left to wonder how he got there.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

  • No significant developments.

 

Footnotes

  1. Here and elsewhere italicized text represents contextual commentary by RM staff.