This Week’s Highlights

• Moscow is finally realizing that even if Trump survives the many scandals that surround him, he won’t be able to deliver major improvements in U.S.-Russian ties, argues Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center. The only upside for the Kremlin, Gabuev writes, is that any political struggle to remove Trump from office that may follow will leave American politics and society more divided than ever.
• The FBI’s systematic effort to win the cooperation of Russia’s oligarchs, including Oleg Deripaska, does not appear to have scored any successes, report Kenneth P. Vogel and Matthew Rosenberg of the New York Times.
• Yeltsin might have been more assertive vis-a-vis the U.S. if he could have relied on the kind of cash and military power Putin can, writes Bloomberg’s Leonid Bershidsky, but the columnist doubts that Yeltsin would have pushed Russia away from the West as radically as Putin has.
• Few expect Putin to fully relinquish power in six years, writes Kathrin Hille of the Financial Times. Many analysts believe he will create a position for himself that allows him to retain influence over whoever takes the most senior official post—but even such maneuvers could disrupt Putin’s Chechnya governance model, according to Hille.
• If Alexander Khodakovsky becomes the new head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, it would be in sync with the current trend of replacing popular leaders with in-system security officers, writes journalist Konstantin Skorkin. The move would close a chapter in the revolutionary history of the DPR and might indicate that Moscow is prepared to reintegrate Donbass into Ukraine and transfer power in the unrecognized republics to leaders who are more acceptable to Kiev, according to Skorkin.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“‘Two halves of the same walnut’: The politics of New START extension and strategic nuclear modernization,” Frank A. Rose, Brookings Institution, 08.30.18: The author, a senior fellow for security and strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, writes: “[E]xperts … have called on the Trump administration to extend the U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). … However, many of those same experts have also called for the cancellation of several U.S. nuclear delivery systems … At the same time, recent press reports indicate that senior members of the Trump administration are long-standing opponents of New START … It is unclear whether the Trump administration will be able to maintain the domestic political consensus for the strategic nuclear modernization program that prevailed at the end of the Obama administration. … However, … the Trump administration could … extend New START. … [I]t would … help maintain support among congressional Democrats for strategic modernization. … [A]rms control advocates would be wise to remember that the Senate’s ultimate support for New START was directly tied to funding the modernization of the strategic nuclear triad and the related DOE infrastructure. … President Harry Truman once said that the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine were “two halves of the same walnut,” arguing that both were necessary to maintain stability and security in Europe. In many ways, New START and the strategic nuclear modernization program are similar, as it is hard to see how the United States will be able maintain a bipartisan consensus for one without the other.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Can We Stop the Next Syrian Bloodbath?” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 08.30.18: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes: “As the Syrian tragedy lurches toward a bloody final showdown in Idlib province, the Trump administration is struggling to check Russia and the Assad regime from an assault there … [I]t's hard to muster much hope they can reverse seven years of American failure. But at least the administration has … signaled that the United States has enduring interests in Syria … ‘Right now, our job is to help create quagmires [for Russia and the Syrian regime] until we get what we want,’ says one administration official … This approach involves reassuring the three key U.S. allies on Syria's border—Israel, Turkey and Jordan—of continued American involvement. … U.S. goals in Syria have been sketched publicly by Pompeo and Mattis: withdrawal of all Iranian-commanded forces from the country … and a political transition that can prevent Syria from becoming a terrorist base again and stabilize it enough that refugees can return to their homes. The challenge is convincing Syria's neighbors that America's influence still matters, particularly when Russia and the Assad regime seem poised for victory. … If the United States really means to be back in the Syria game, it must prevent the Idlib bloodbath—and then encourage … coexistence across the country.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Agents Tried to Flip Russian Oligarchs. The Fallout Spread to Trump,” Kenneth P. Vogel and Matthew Rosenberg, New York Times, 09.01.18: The authors, reporters for the news outlet, write: “Between 2014 and 2016, the FBI and the Justice Department unsuccessfully tried to turn Mr. [Oleg] Deripaska into an informant. They signaled that they might provide help with his trouble in getting visas for the United States or even explore other steps to address his legal problems. In exchange, they were hoping for information on Russian organized crime and, later, on possible Russian aid to President Trump’s 2016 campaign … Two of the players in the effort were Bruce G. Ohr, the Justice Department official who has recently become a target of attacks by Mr. Trump, and Christopher Steele, the former British spy who compiled a dossier of purported links between the Trump campaign and Russia. … The systematic effort to win the cooperation of the oligarchs, which has not previously been revealed, does not appear to have scored any successes. And in Mr. Deripaska’s case, he told the American investigators that he disagreed with their theories about Russian organized crime and Kremlin collusion in the campaign … Mr. Deripaska even notified the Kremlin about the American efforts to cultivate him.”

“How to Interfere in a Foreign Election,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 08.19.18: The author, a senior fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, writes: “The year was 1996. Russia was electing a president to succeed Boris Yeltsin … President Bill Clinton decided that American interests would be best served by finding a way to re-elect Yeltsin despite his deep unpopularity. Yeltsin was ill, chronically alcoholic and seen in Washington as easy to control. … [T]he public and private resources of the United States were thrown behind a Russian presidential candidate. … Four American political consultants moved to Moscow to help direct Yeltsin’s campaign. … They organized focus groups and designed advertising messages aimed at stoking voters’ fears of civil unrest. When they saw a CNN report from Moscow saying that voters were gravitating toward Yeltsin because they feared unrest, one of the consultants shouted in triumph: “It worked!” … Yeltsin won the election with a reported 54 percent of the vote. … The New York Times called it ‘a victory for Russia.’ In fact, it was the opposite: a victory by a foreign power that wanted to place its candidate in the Russian presidency. … This was the first direct interference in a presidential election in the history of U.S.-Russia relations. … [A]t the end of 1999 … [Yeltsin] shocked his country and the world by resigning. As his final act, he named his successor: a little-known intelligence officer named Vladimir Putin. … If the United States had not crashed into a presidential election in Russia 22 years ago, we almost certainly would not be dealing with Putin today.”

“So Long, Russia. And Thanks!” Holman W. Jenkins Jr, Wall Street Journal, 08.29.18: The author, a member of the new outlet’s editorial board, writes: “While it would be problematic to assume voters gave Mr. Trump a pass for prior crimes, it's equally problematic to launch a hunt for crimes that didn't seem worthwhile to the myrmidons of the state before he was elected president. … What we're also going to learn is that even if the federal government is paralyzed for the next two years, even if our politics is more deeply embittered, Mr. Trump can flourish in such an environment. … In the meantime, goodbye to Russia. You served your purpose. Vladimir Putin's effect on the 2016 election, we can now admit, was trivial—his real influence has come almost entirely through the willingness of U.S. combatants to exploit Russia in pursuit of their own power ambitions and vendettas.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russia’s Energy Stranglehold Threatens German Influence: Why is Angela Merkel allowing her country to be cut off from its hinterland?” Tom Tugendhat, Financial Times, 08.24.18: The author, a conservative British lawmaker and chairman of the U.K.’s House of Commons foreign affairs select committee, writes: “Today, Russian gas flows through Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine to consumers in Germany. … But the changes being discussed would cut out the eastern states, making them more vulnerable to being picked off … She [Merkel] knows too that if Germany stands alone it can be silenced more easily … That would leave a future chancellor with a tough decision: risk an immediate energy war with Moscow or act to prevent Russia rebuilding the network of vassal states … But these countries … are an integrated part of its defense and economic orbit. Without them Germany is a frontier state, not the heart of a continent. … There is a longstanding and romantic attachment in Germany, especially in leftwing circles, to Russia. … But perhaps the most obvious reason is that without the nuclear power which Ms. Merkel’s government abandoned after the Fukushima disaster … Germany now has little choice.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin Missed Historic Opportunity: Transcripts from the 1990s show how the US could have helped put Russia on a different course,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 08.31.18: The author, a journalist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “The transcripts of calls and personal conversations between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, published by the Clinton Presidential Library, reveal a complex relationship. … American Russia experts … said the freshly declassified documents refute the Kremlin’s narrative of a humiliated, cheated Russia … For Russian readers, they add substance to the story of victimization. … Clinton clearly tried to convey to Yeltsin a message of partnership rather than contempt. But the problem … was with the power dynamics. … [E]ven as Clinton stressed to Yeltsin that he wanted the possibility of NATO membership to be open to Russia …U.S. policy was still to be ‘organized against Russia’ in case it turned rogue. … Yeltsin wasn’t taken in; he knew exactly what was going on, and he stressed to Clinton that he accepted his offers of loose cooperation with NATO only because he had no other choice. … Yeltsin might have been more assertive if he could have relied on the kind of cash and military power Putin can. But I doubt he would have pushed Russia away from the West as radically as Putin has. Rather, he would have been in a better position to promote his grand vision of a Europe that includes a democratic, Westernized Russia and relies on it for resources and, at least partly, for security.”

“The Silence of the Bears,” Alexander Gabuev, Carnegie Moscow Center, Foreign Policy, 08.23.18: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “The shockwaves that followed Tuesday’s simultaneous legal action against Paul Manafort, U.S. President Donald Trump’s former campaign chairman, and Michael Cohen, his onetime personal lawyer, reached Russia very quickly. … Over the last 19 months, Trump has proved to be far more trouble for Moscow than his predecessor, who is openly despised in the Russian capital. … Congressional sanctions against Russia are seen to have been levied only because of Trump’s erratic and unexplainable behavior, which makes him a liability, not an asset. … Moscow is finally realizing that even if Trump survives the many scandals that surround him, he won’t be able to deliver major improvements in U.S.-Russian ties. The only upside for the Kremlin is that any political struggle to remove Trump from office that may follow will leave American politics and society more divided than ever.”

“John McCain Saw Through Vladimir Putin Better Than Anyone,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 08.29.18: The author, vice chairman of the Open Russia movement and chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, writes that in a 2000 debate, U.S. Sen. John McCain said: “‘We know that he [Putin] was an apparatchik. We know that he was a member of the KGB. We know that he came to power because of the military brutality . . . in Chechnya,’ McCain said. ‘I'm very concerned about Mr. Putin. I'm afraid Mr. Putin might be one of those who wants to make the trains run on time.’ McCain's ‘trains’ remark was a historical reference to Benito Mussolini's regime in Italy, and the parallel would prove frightfully close. … McCain certainly was an enemy of those who have turned Russia into an autocracy (and looting ground) at home, and into an instrument of aggression abroad. … I am able to write this thanks in large part to John McCain. Eighteen months ago, when I lay in a Moscow hospital, in a coma after a severe poisoning, McCain took to the floor of the Senate to draw attention to my case. … John McCain will be missed by many. He was a true leader and a dear friend, and it will always be among the greatest blessings of my life to know him.”

“How Russia Would Strike Back if America Launches ‘Dollar’ Sanctions: It won't be pretty,” Josh Cohen, The National Interest, 09.01.18: The author, a former USAID project officer, writes: “In response to proposed Senate legislation that would target Russia’s state-controlled banks by freezing their access to dollars—a step which could genuinely damage the Russian economy—Moscow issued a new threat. ‘If we end up we end up with something like a ban on banking activities or the use of certain currencies, we can clearly call this a declaration of economic war,’ Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated. … U.S. policymakers should be prepared for the Kremlin to retaliate against American interests in any number of possible ways. First, Russia might respond in cyberspace. … The Kremlin could also respond with nuclear saber rattling. … [T]he Russians might decide to formally withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and/or refuse to entertain an extension of the New START Treaty. … Moscow might also escalate its war against Ukraine. … Russia could also increase military tensions elsewhere in Europe as well. It could for example move nuclear-armed missiles into Kaliningrad … Putin could choose to openly increase economic and political support for North Korea, thereby weakening Washington’s ability to pressure North Korea to curtail its nuclear program. … Putin could also administer the coup de grace to Bosnia’s 1995 Dayton Accords … by openly supporting independence for Republika Srpska.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

“Russia’s Massive Vostok Military Exercise Was Intended to Prepare for War With China. So What Happened?” Sebastien Roblin, The National Interest, 09.02.18: The author, a journalist specializing in international security, writes: “In August 2018, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced that more than 300,000 personnel … would engage in the country’s largest ever military exercise, Vostok 2018. … The Vostok exercises were originally intended to prepare for a knock-down, drag-out fight with China. … [B]order clashes during the 1960s and 1970s may have brought China and the Soviet Union closer to fighting massive ground war, or even nuclear war, than Warsaw Pact ever did vis-a-vis NATO. … [B]oth major military powers remain wary of potential future strategic rivalry. … [M]any commentators have focused on the massive scale of Vostok 2018 … arguably a more notable aspect is the invitation of a contingent of 3,200 Chinese troops. If Vostok isn’t meant to defend against China, Moscow and Beijing alike will have everyone know it is because of the ‘very aggressive and unfriendly’ international environment they blame upon the United States. … While both states may oppose American hegemony, they pursue fundamentally different objectives for which neither would sacrifice itself to aid the other … Russia’s invitation of Chinese troop into Vostok 2018 may be an early attempt to foster deeper Sino-Russian security cooperation. Whether such a project will sustain equal appeal to both Russia and China—whose fortunes are moving in profoundly different trajectories—remains to be seen.”

Ukraine:

“The Demise of the Counter-Elite: How Zakharchenko’s Killing Will Change Donbass,” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.04.18: The author, an independent journalist specializing in Donbass affairs, writes: “Alexander Zakharchenko, the head of Ukraine’s self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), was killed in an explosion inside a Donetsk cafe on Aug. 31. … [O]fficials generally blame the killings on Ukrainian agents, and did just that following the death of Zakharchenko. But this is a convenient cover for internal squabbles … The 2014 Donbass crisis swept stale bureaucrats and oligarchs from Ukraine’s then ruling Party of Regions off the political stage. The separatist field commanders who replaced them can be seen as the counter-elite … Under the DPR constitution, if the head of the republic is unable to carry out his duties, they are assumed by the first deputy prime minister: Dmitry Trapeznikov … Another likely candidate … is former Ukrainian security service officer Alexander Khodakovsky. This appointment would be in sync with the current trend of replacing popular leaders with in-system security officers. The move would close a chapter in the revolutionary history of the DPR and would indicate that Moscow is prepared to reintegrate Donbass into Ukraine and transfer power in the unrecognized republics to leaders who are more acceptable to Kiev. … [T]he Kremlin has two reasons to support the reintegration of Donbas into Ukraine. … On the other hand, given that Ukrainian security services have been accused of killing Zakharchenko—one of the signatories of the Minsk agreements—Russia may now have an excuse to withdraw from the peace process and blame Ukraine for its failure. … This may be a prelude to a new escalation of the conflict.”

“How Ukraine Is Fighting Corruption One Heart Stent at a Time,” Oliver Bullough, New York Times, 09.03.18: The author, a journalist, writes: “Cardiovascular disease is by far the leading cause of death in the country … Despite this alarming statistic, however, surgeons have long struggled to obtain stents … The precise amount of money stolen overall under Viktor Yanukovych … may never be known, but a former prosecutor general put it at $100 billion. Neither is it known how many Ukrainians died for want of vaccines, other medicine or treatment … But last year, for the first time in a decade, mortality dropped for heart-attack patients. Twenty percent fewer people died in 2017 than in 2015 in the regions where new procedures were introduced, and surgeons inserted more than 50 percent more stents. … The most effective way to tackle transnational graft may be through such small, pragmatic measures rather than in a single, grand sweep. … After the 2014 revolution, Ukraine’s health ministry asked international bodies to procure medicine and medical equipment on its behalf, using its money. It hoped to cut out the crooked insiders who had been inflating prices for their own benefit. The initiative has been a spectacular success. … As the story of Ukraine’s heart stents shows, the magnitude of the task at hand shouldn’t distract from the importance of incremental gains. Small measures can save lives and money fast—and they show how even the most entrenched corruption can be uprooted, one poisonous weed at a time.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Will Azerbaijan Join the ‘Eurasian NATO’?” Sergei Markedonov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.28.18: The author, an associate professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities, writes: “Azerbaijan, it seems, is seriously contemplating joining … the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). … However interested Baku may be in Western energy projects, Azerbaijan views Russia as a source of international legitimacy, as the Kremlin will not criticize its human rights record or the number of terms its presidents serve. However, Azerbaijan’s accession to the CSTO is far off, and the trajectories of Baku and the ‘Eurasian NATO’ are certain to remain parallel for the foreseeable future. … [U]ntil Baku comes to see accession to the ‘Eurasian NATO’ as critical to regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh—its top political priority—it is unlikely to pursue CSTO membership, just as it has declined to participate in other multilateral initiatives in which Yerevan is involved.”

“Beware of Russia’s ‘Creeping Annexation’ of Georgia,” Alexis Mrachek, The National Interest, 09.01.18: The author, a researcher at the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, writes: “Russia continues to violate the ceasefire [with Georgia] and pursues a policy of ‘creeping annexation.’ For instance, since 2008, on at least fifty-six occasions, Russia has brought additional Georgian territory under occupation … In places like Afghanistan and Iraq, Georgia has been a strong ally for the United States. It also works closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. … America last year provided Tbilisi with the Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger air-defense systems. Washington should supplement this military assistance with additional weaponry for Georgia. … The United States also should encourage the four nations siding with Russia to withdraw their recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent … If Russia’s ‘creeping annexation’ of Georgia continues, America could consider responding with an intense round of economic sanctions. These sanctions could target top Russian officials linked to the Russian occupation in Georgia, and could easily be matched by the United States’ European allies.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Saving Colonel Putin: Why Russia’s Pension Reform Just Got More Expensive,” Andrei Kolesnikov, The Moscow Times, 08.31.18: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “For the first time since early 2014 … the president very nearly lost his status [as] a national symbol … [W]ith the announcement of the pension reforms, Putin was relegated in the public eye to a mere representative of the authorities—one … seen as ultimately responsible the unpopular plan. … Explaining in detail why the reform is necessary, Putin took a friendly, fatherly tone. … But he failed to mention that it was he and his government who stopped contributions to the pension fund and instead used that money to pay for the annexation of Crimea. Nor did Putin … say anything about the fact that security service and military personnel will still be entitled to early retirement and other benefits. … The president’s address increased the number of people eligible for benefits and early retirement and that means that the pension reform, which was aimed at saving money, just got a lot more expensive. … [T]he president’s initiatives to rescue his ratings would cost the country 500 billion rubles ($7.3 billion) over six years. And this is all amid the state’s frantic search for money to implement Putin’s May edict to increase social spending … Meanwhile, it is providing the oil giant Rosneft … with tax breaks worth 380 billion rubles simply because one of its oil deposits happens to be flooded. … Putin’s formula for pension reform might allow him to stem his political losses. … But the cost of saving Colonel Putin will turn out to be exorbitantly high for the budget and the economy.”

“Vladimir Putin’s Mission Impossible: Reviving the economy won’t be easy, and he’s the reason,” Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 08.29.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes: “Vladimir Putin faces an enormous challenge. He wants to deliver prosperity to Russians before 2024 … but the economy is no longer cooperating. … Russia’s president has only himself to blame. … After dipping into recession in 2015, Russia remains in a rut. Private investment and productivity are sluggish. Economists don’t expect growth to exceed 2 percent a year in the foreseeable future … If things keep going this way, Russians might get fed up by 2024. That’s dangerous, because the transfer of power—or a constitutional amendment to let Putin stay—will stir more dissatisfaction … The last time Russians took to the streets, in 2011 and 2012, the economy was doing well. An economic program developed by former finance minister Alexei Kudrin … stresses that ‘economic success is impossible’ without the rule of law and a ‘fair and genuinely independent’ judicial system. Yet this fundamental element is absent from Putin’s own plan. … Putin can have Putinism or a more prosperous Russia, but not both. The odds aren’t good that he’ll make the right choice.”

“How Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov Could Destabilise Russia: Former warlord who answers only to Putin runs republic as personal fiefdom,” Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, 08.28.18: The author, the Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes: “Despite describing himself as a Russian patriot, Mr. Kadyrov sees himself as owing fealty only to Mr. Putin. … While this feudalist set-up is not new, it raises broader concerns about long-term political stability in Russia. The Russian constitution limits Mr. Putin to two consecutive terms, the second of which ends in 2024. … Preparations for an eventual transfer of power, which might include constitutional changes, could start as early as next year, said people close to the Kremlin. … Some Russian observers believe that Mr. Kadyrov … could challenge Moscow for more autonomy once Mr. Putin is gone. Others caution that an attempt by a Putin successor to better enforce Russian law in Chechnya might unleash another bloody conflict. … Few expect Mr. Putin to fully relinquish power in six years—many analysts believe he will create a position for himself that allows him to retain influence over whoever takes the most senior official post. But even such maneuvers could disrupt Mr. Putin’s Chechnya governance model.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.