5 Ideas to Explore

1. Has Vladimir Putin just signaled Russia’s readiness to enter a formal alliance with China? If so, Putin chose a rather remote location and a modest venue to do so. “The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation are allies [soyzniki]  in every sense of the word,” Putin told schoolchildren during a visit to a school in the capital of Russia’s Tuva region on Sept. 2. Russia should work with “our main partners and allies, including such a large and promising country… as the People's Republic of China,” he said during a stopover to Mongolia (which he also called an ally). As recently as last year, Putin denied plans to establish “some kind of a military-political alliance” with China, as did some of his top aides on earlier occasions (though some of them described the bilateral relations as being superior to that of allies). Moreover, Putin and Xi Jinping signed off on a declaration in March 2023 that said their countries are not in a “military-political alliance” [voyenno-politichesky soyuz], insisting that the bilateral relationship is superior to “such a form of interstate interaction.” That Putin would now describe China as Russia’s ally twice during the same event could be a signal to Xi Jinping that Russia is open to entering a formal alliance with Beijing (if the latter decides to abandon what WoR contributors described as "China’s Non-Alliance Policy").*
2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has come under a “barrage of criticism… over the rapid advances” the Russian army is making in the direction of the strategically important city of Pokrovsk,¹ while Ukraine’s own offensive in Russia’s Kursk region is culminating, according to FT and the Economist. Acknowledging the threat to Pokrovsk, Zelenskyy described the situation on the frontline near this Donetsk region city as “extremely difficult,” but claimed that the Russian advance in the area had slowed following the launch of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk on Aug. 6, FT reported. However, according to several military analysts Russian forces have advanced more rapidly in the Donetsk region since Aug. 6 compared with previous months, FT reported. Roman Pohorilyi of Ukraine’s Deep State OSINT project described the fall of key towns such as Novohrodivka and the looming threat to the nearby  Pokrovsk as “complete chaos,” while Oleksandr Kovalenko of Kyiv-based Information Resistance group called the situation on the eastern edge of this city “a complete defensive failure,” according to FT.² If Pokrovsk were to fall, it could pave the way for Russian forces to push toward Dnipro, Ukraine’s fourth-largest city, according to FT and The Times of London. Beyond the situation at the front, Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is an even bigger problem, according to Michael Kofman of CEIP and Rob Lee of FPRI. In their analysis of the recent developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war, Kofman, Lee and Steven Pifer of Brookings have argued that the Kursk incursion has raised morale among Ukrainian troops. 
3. A decisive change in the course of the war is unlikely if U.S. and its allies permit Ukraine to use Western-made systems for deep strikes inside Russia, according to Stephen Biddle of Columbia University. If given such permission, Ukraine could strike distant logistical and command targets, including even the Kremlin, and defense enterprises “would reduce the efficiency of Russia’s offensives,” Biddle writes in FA. In addition, “damaging factories or infrastructure inside Russia” in such strikes “might help boost Ukrainian morale… But even if the West lifts its restraints on Ukrainian deep strike capability, the consequences are unlikely to include a decisive change in the trajectory of the war,” he argued shortly before U.S. was reported to be considering transfer of long-range missiles to Ukraine.³ For one, deep strike systems are expensive, while their precision guidance systems are vulnerable to disruption by countermeasures. In addition, Ukraine would need to deploy its new capabilities on a large scale and all at once, which would be problematic, according to Biddle. Thus, “Kyiv’s partners should now ask whether the modest military benefits are worth the escalatory risk,” Biddle writes of deep strike systems.  
4. How can the war in Ukraine end? Is a negotiated settlement possible? What would it take to achieve it? In her review of 25 peace proposals for RM, Colgate University's Masha Hedberg examines the range of options and assesses their viability as blueprints for ending the war, concluding that there is no clear-cut answer to ending the war in Ukraine in a way that is just, expeditious and long-term. “Whether considering total victory or negotiated settlements, each approach offers different trade-offs and possibilities. The ‘peace through strength’ scenarios, while appealing in their clarity, may be impractical given the dynamics on the ground,” Hedberg writes. “On the other hand, proposals for negotiated settlements present creative solutions but often require compromises that will not satisfy all parties involved. But perhaps by focusing on the possibilities rather than just the limitations, the international community may yet discover a path to meaningful progress,” according to Hedberg.
5. “For the first time in Russian history… prominent figures [in Russia]… are openly advocating the preventive use of nuclear weapons to ensure the success of the special military operation in Ukraine,”⁴ Aleksey Arbatov of Russia’s IMEMO writes in reference to “the conflict in and around Ukraine.” Moreover, “for only the fourth time in history, Western nations are collectively opposing Russia and indirectly (so far) participating in the conflict,” according to Arbatov’s article in Polis. Political Studies, republished by RIAC. However, Arbatov sees some silver lining in the current crisis as well. “Even amid violent conflicts between states, arms control has a certain stabilizing effect on the confrontation. It is worth noting that despite the severity of the Ukrainian crisis and the widespread discussion of a possible nuclear escalation in Russia and abroad, U.S. and Russian strategic forces are left out of this discourse,” he writes.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“When a 12-hour shift turned into three weeks at Chernobyl,” Serhii Plokhy, WP, 08.26.24.⁵

• The Russian commanders at the station realized they were sitting on an explosive nuclear barrel. The exhaustion and resentment of the Chernobyl personnel might well lead to an accident that would claim the lives of the occupiers. The Russians were prepared to allow a shift change, but how were they to evacuate those on duty and bring in replacements?
• [Foreman Valentyn] Heiko and the plant managers in Slavutych ultimately decided that new personnel could be brought in only by the Belarusian route, crossing the Dnieper River by boat. The alternative route, through Kyiv, was more dangerous. The Russians gave their approval. They would take the old shift as far as the Dnieper and pick up the new one, but plant management would have to take care of the travel arrangements to and from Slavutych.
• Valerii Seida, the plant’s director, had to select the members of the new shift —­ people ready to risk their freedom, and perhaps their lives, by going into Russian captivity. The trip might become a one-way ticket. Surprisingly, there was no lack of volunteers.
• Preparations for the rotation began in mid-March, with Heiko calling Shelestii and asking him to prepare lists of his staff to be rotated. No one trusted the Russians, and there was concern that they might bring in the new shift while keeping the old shift at the station or moving them somewhere else, still holding everyone hostage. Another problem was how to keep the station working during the shift change itself.
• It was decided that the staff would rotate in two stages: The women and nonessential personnel would go first, and operators essential for the functioning of the station’s equipment would leave after the first group of the new shift arrived. … On March 20, more than three weeks into the shift, Heiko ordered his staff to be ready for departure by 8 a.m.

“Kursk Nuclear Power Plant: The Newest Target for Russian Disinformation,” Darya Dolzikova, RUSI, 08.30.24.

• The recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast has raised concerns over the potential risks to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), with Russia endeavouring to paint a picture of the KNPP as being in imminent danger from Ukrainian military attack. Yet, Moscow’s accusations that Ukraine is planning to target the KNPP have had no grounding in evidence. Instead, the Russian narrative appears to be yet another effort by Moscow to leverage nuclear safety and fears of a nuclear accident for political operational gain in its war against Ukraine. As it stands, there is little operational or strategic incentive for Ukraine to threaten the safety of the facility.
• There are good reasons to take Kyiv at its word that it has no plans to target the KNPP. 
  • The KNPP is outside the range of the unguided artillery systems that Ukraine is known to be using in Kursk Oblast, whereas guided artillery is unlikely to strike the facility unless the plant is explicitly targeted or Russian forces interfere with a Ukrainian munition’s guidance in a way that affects its trajectory. As such, the probability of an accidental Ukrainian artillery strike on the plant is very low. 
  • The KNPP holds little energy-generating potential for Ukraine, and an attack would not meaningfully threaten Russian energy production. 
  • Suggestions that Ukraine may want to capture the KNPP to use it as a trading chip in any future negotiations with Moscow – potentially in exchange for the ZNPP – are also unconvincing. ... it is unclear that Ukraine can or is intending to use its incursion into Kursk as a way of generating leverage to use in future negotiations. 
  • Finally, outright occupation of the plant would leave Ukraine having to manage a highly vulnerable piece of infrastructure in challenging wartime conditions. 

"IAEA Director Rafael Grossi’s General Statement on Kursk Nuclear Power Plant,” IAEA, 08.26.24. 

• Since new developments and increased levels of military activity in the vicinity of the KNPP, I have been closely following developments on the ground, especially with respect to the plant. It is important that when the Agency is called upon to fulfil its mandate to ensure that nuclear is used in a peaceful manner, we are present.  
• It is also important that when the international community needs an independent assessment of the safety and security of a nuclear facility, we will be there. The only way in which the IAEA can validate the information is when we have an opportunity to independently assess what is happening.
• I reiterate that the safety and security of nuclear facilities must, under no circumstances, be endangered. This is an evolving situation, and it is vital when I arrive at the plant tomorrow that I see first-hand the situation and discuss modalities for further activities as may be needed to evaluate the nuclear safety and security conditions of the KNPP.
• It is imperative that the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety during an armed conflict and the five concrete principles – established to protect the Zaporizhzhia NPP but applicable to any nuclear power plant – be respected.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“The Increasingly Front-Line Role of Ukrainian Women. How war has—and hasn’t—transformed the country’s gender dynamics,” Abbie Cheeseman, FP, 09.02.24. 

• Before the war, only 48 percent of women over age 15 took part in the workforce — one of the lowest rates in Europe. War has made collecting data on the gender composition of the workforce impossible, but today, 50,000 women serve in the Ukrainian army, compared to 30,000 before the war.
  • The catalyst came in 2017, years before the current war began. As conflict escalated with Russia in Crimea, the Ukrainian government overturned a Soviet-era law that had previously banned women from 450 occupations.
• But obstacles still remain; for example, women are not allowed jobs the government deems too physically demanding. These barriers continue to be chipped away—most recently, women have been cleared to work in underground mines, something they were prevented from doing before.
• In Ukraine, the idea is to make demining an enterprise with “very little expat footprint,” and said Jon Cunliffe, the Ukraine country director of Mines Advisory Group (MAG), said that will only be possible by recruiting more women. “We should not be here in 10 years. Not like in Iraq or South Sudan, where we have been for 30 years, or Vietnam, or Laos,” Cunliffe said. “It’s common sense that we bring in as many women as we can to do that. In five to 10 years, a lot of these women are going to end up being technical field managers, the jobs that are currently being done by old former British military guys, and it will change the face of demining worldwide because they can take those skills across the world.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Want More Refugees? Keep Blocking Ukraine’s Missile Use," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 08.28.24.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Volodymyr Zelenskyy faces backlash over Russia’s breach of eastern defenses: Strategically important Pokrovsk resistance has been weakened by demands of Kursk incursion, say critics,” Christopher Miller, FT, 08.30.24.⁶

• President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has come under a barrage of criticism from soldiers, lawmakers and military analysts over the rapid advances made by the Russian army in eastern Ukraine since Kyiv launched its bold incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.
• Abreach in the frontline in the strategically important Donetsk region this week has triggered a backlash against the leadership in Kyiv, with critics arguing Ukraine’s positions were weakened by the redeployment of thousands of battle-hardened Ukrainian troops to the Kursk operation.
• Russian forces are closing in on the strategically important city of Pokrovsk taking several nearby towns this week and forcing undermanned Ukrainian units to retreat from prepared defensive positions. Pokrovsk is one of two key rail and road junctions in the Donetsk region and its loss would threaten the entire region’s logistics for Ukraine’s military, according to Frontelligence Insight, a Ukrainian analytical group. Satellite imagery analyzed by open-source investigators at the Finland-based Black Bird Group shows Russian forces now just 8km from Pokrovsk. In response, local authorities have ordered the evacuation of residents in the area. Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst at the Kyiv-based Information Resistance group, called the situation on the eastern edge of Pokrovsk “a complete defensive failure”.
• During a press conference in Kyiv on Tuesday, Zelenskyy described the situation on the frontline near Pokrovsk as “extremely difficult” but claimed that the Russian advance in the area had slowed following Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk. In fact, Russian forces have advanced more rapidly in Donetsk since August 6 compared with the previous months, according to several military analysts, including Deep State, a Ukrainian group with close ties to Ukraine’s defense ministry that monitors frontline movements. “There is complete chaos,” said Deep State’s Roman Pohorilyi pointing to the fall of key towns such as Novohrodivka and the looming threat to Pokrovsk.
• In the past three weeks, Moscow’s forces have quickly captured more than two-dozen towns and villages with minimal resistance, including the long-held stronghold of Niu-York. Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, attributed the Russian gains to a shortage of experienced Ukrainian infantry and the diversion of resources to the Kursk offensive.
• If Pokrovsk were to fall, it could pave the way for Russian forces to push towards Dnipro, Ukraine’s fourth-largest city, extending their control further.

“Even as it humiliates Russia, Ukraine’s line is crumbling in the Donbas. The shock raid inside Kursk has not distracted the Kremlin from advancing,” The Economist, 08.29.24. 

• The fog of war and cloak of Ukrainian operational secrecy mean details are still scarce. But satellite images showing Russian fortifications offer the most obvious confirmation of stabilization. 
• Ukrainian military-intelligence sources say they are untroubled by the likely culmination of the Kursk offensive. The operation has already achieved important objectives, says “Detective”, an officer involved in the action. Kursk was a “proof of concept”, he says, demonstrating Ukraine’s continued ability to circumvent Russia’s numerical advantage. 
• But the Kursk operation has failed to achieve its big aim of distracting Russian forces from their push towards Pokrovsk, a vital logistical hub for Ukrainian troops. Russia has moved some troops from the Kherson region in the south, and from the Chasiv Yar and Siversk lines in the east. But as Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Olesksandr Syrsky, admitted on August 27th, Russia has only intensified its focus on the crossroads town. Moreover, Ukrainian defenses appear to be crumbling, with Russia making rapid gains along the main railway from the east. 
• Russia’s swift progress has highlighted weaknesses in Ukraine’s own fortifications. In some instances, advancing Russian troops have turned Ukraine’s concrete trenches into their own. More often than not, there have simply not been enough Ukrainian obstacles or men to hold the lines. The Russians are much better resourced in this regard, with ten dedicated engineering regiments against Ukraine’s one regiment and two brigades. 
• Ukraine’s troubles in the Donbas region pose questions about what it is doing with its reserves, which Russian commentators claim are not insubstantial
•  The danger is that as the situation deteriorates around Pokrovsk, Ukraine will be compelled to use whatever it has to halt the slide. 

“Ukraine's gamble in Russia has yet to slow Moscow's eastern assault,” Anastacia Galouchka, Serhii Korolchuk and Alex Horton, WP, 08.31.24. 

• More than three weeks into the plan by Ukraine's military chief to turn the tide of the war by sending troops into Russia, much looks as if it's proceeding as intended — except that Russians are still advancing inside Ukraine. Russia's offensive continues even with hundreds of its soldiers in Ukrainian prisons and hundreds of square miles of its sovereign territory under Ukrainian control.
• If the bold plan by Kyiv's Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky fails, Ukraine could lose many well-trained soldiers and much of the foreign equipment it has deployed to Kursk, as well as land in its own east, where Russian troops — who far outnumber Ukraine's — persist in their grinding assault on the key transit hub of Pokrovsk.
• Analysts say it is not at all clear what the end game is — or if Syrsky's gamble will pay off.
  • Nico Lange, a former German defense official who is now a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, said of Putin:... "He's basically telling the Ukrainians: 'You can stay, you can leave — do what you want. For now I will be busy with other things,'" he said. If Ukraine's goal was to exchange land for land, Lange added, "it's clearly not working and Putin is calling it."

“Ukraine ‘arm-wrestles’ Russia in final effort to break forces before winter,” Michael Clarke, The Times of London. 08.31.24. 

• As winter approaches, both sides are furiously arm-wrestling for advantage before November, when the cold and wet will slow down military movement and lower the tempo of any offensive ground operations until spring next year.
• All along the northern front the Ukrainians are goading the Russians to make a proper fight of it and bring major units into the fray — and, therefore, away from the battles for control of Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar in the south. But the Russians are bringing forces from anywhere rather than do that.....The Russians have withdrawn some elements of their 11th airborne brigade, the 30th motor rifle brigade and some of the 2nd tank army from the Donbas to fight in Kursk. But this is not a decisive shift of forces and Russian commanders seem to have been galvanized by Ukraine’s audacity to make an all-out effort for Pokrovsk — a strategic target due to its road and rail links.
• Russian tactics in Pokrovsk are to use dismounted infantry, going forward in small squads of eight to ten men moving into every nook and cranny on the approaches to the city. They have kept it up day and night for some weeks.
• Moscow seems ready to sacrifice an unlimited number of troops for Pokrovsk. As in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Russian forces seem intent on flattening the city so as to take possession of the rubble.
• The minor strategic prize for Moscow in this battle will be to take over the transport hub of Pokrovsk and the high ground at Chasiv Yar, then use them as jumping-off points for a bigger offensive north and west to seize the rest of the Donbas and threaten the Dnipropetrovsk region in the spring next year.

“The Murky Meaning of Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive. A short-term success doesn’t necessarily have any long-term effects.” Stephen Walt, FP, 08.28.24.  

• To be sure, the offensive has already brought Kyiv some obvious benefits. 
  • It has given Ukrainian morale a much-needed boost and helped counter concerns that Kyiv was trapped in a war of attrition against a larger adversary that it could neither defeat nor outlast. 
  • It put the war back on the front pages and strengthened voices calling for increased Western support.
  •  It exposed serious flaws in Russian intelligence and readiness and may have embarrassed Russian President Vladimir Putin, although there’s no sign that the incursion has reduced his resolve or slowed Russian advances in the Donbas.
• It’s heartening to see Ukraine enjoy some battlefield successes, but this operation is unlikely to affect the outcome of the war.
  • Ukraine has now seized about 400 square miles of Russian territory and forced roughly 200,000 Russians to evacuate these areas. These figures amount to 0.0064 percent of Russia’s total land area and 0.138 percent of its population. By contrast, Russia now controls roughly 20 percent of Ukraine, and the war has reportedly forced nearly 35 percent of Ukraine’s population to flee their homes. Even if Kyiv can hang on to the territory it has recently seized, it won’t provide much of a bargaining chip.
• It follows that Ukraine’s fate will be determined primarily by what happens in Ukraine, and not by the Kursk operation. The key factors will be each side’s willingness and ability to keep sacrificing on the battlefield, the level of support Ukraine receives from others, and whether a deal can eventually be struck that leaves the unoccupied parts of Ukraine intact and secure. 
• The Kursk offensive raises at least two other issues.
  • The first and most obvious lesson is a reminder of Russia’s limited reach and underwhelming military performance. 
  • Second, several commentators—including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—have suggested that Kyiv’s successful incursion into Russia shows that existing red lines and other restrictions on Ukrainian operations should be discarded and that the West should let Ukraine take the fight to Russia however it wishes. … But the claim that there is no risk of escalation no matter what Ukraine does should be firmly rejected. 
• Pushing for a negotiated solution to the Russia-Ukraine war is one of those instances in which self-interest and morality are aligned. 

“Deputy Director of CIA David Cohen’s Remarks at Intelligence and National Security Summit,” C-Span, 08.28.24. 

• As folks know the Ukrainians earlier this month staged an invasion into the Kursk region in southwestern Russia. They have, at sort of the height, it’s moved back a little bit, had taken about 300 square miles of Russian territory, a number of villages. I think the Ukrainians have been clear that they do not intend to annex Russian territory, uh, in contrast to what Putin has claimed for his intentions in Ukraine.
• But, that being said they are remaining in Russia, they are building defenses and as best we can tell from our conversations they seem to be intent on retaining some of that territory for some period of time. I think we can be certain that Putin will mount a counteroffensive to try to reclaim that territory. But that has not yet begun and when it does begin, I think our expectation is that that will be a difficult fight for the Russians. 
• But what are the implications of this? I think one way to think about this is that Putin has believed, you know throughout this war, that time is on his side. That he will grind down the Ukrainians. That he will slowly by slowly take more and more Ukrainian territory, once the front line was established in the east there. And that the support from the West will begin to wane. And that, his, essentially his negotiating position will continue to strengthen. I think this pierces that. I think we have now a pretty good example of the Ukrainians being able to mount a quite successful offensive into Russia. They showed a lot of strength, skill, resilience in being able to do this. And now Putin’s gonna have to face not only the fact that there’s a front line now within Russian territory that he’s gonna have to deal with. He has to deal with the reverberations back in his own society that they have lost a piece of Russian territory. And I think that has the potential to change the dynamic a little bit going forward. 

“Ukraine’s Kursk 'Incursion': A Turning Point in the War?”, Steven Pifer, NI, 08.31.24.

• With the Russian focus on Donbas, the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk caught the Russian army flat-footed. ... The audacious thrust into Russian territory yields immediate pluses for Ukraine.
  • Militarily, Ukraine’s offensive has forced the Russians to transfer troops from the fight inside Ukraine to the defense of the Kursk region. 
  • Politically, the incursion has provided a morale boost for Ukrainian soldiers and the general public. 
  • The incursion unnerved the Kremlin, which has sought to downplay the attack while cautioning that it may take time to prepare a counteroffensive. 
• The larger question is whether the Ukrainian incursion will have a strategic impact on the war. ... While some believe the incursion could be a turning point, that will depend on what additional forces Ukraine’s already-stretched army can commit to the Kursk operation. Other analysts worry that it may prove a mistake, that the Russians will evict Ukrainian forces from Kursk, and that those forces, which could provide a reserve for defensive operations at home, are at risk. Perhaps, but we do not know how the fighting will play out, and Kyiv retains the option of withdrawal. Ukraine’s military commanders presumably weighed the risks and potential costs as well as the potential gains before launching the incursion. In any event, however, this plays out in the longer term, Ukraine and its friends in the West can enjoy some positive news from the battlefield.

“Ukraine’s Gamble. The Risks and Rewards of the Offensive Into Russia’s Kursk Region,” Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, FA, 09.02.24. 

• Ukraine’s Kursk incursion has raised flagging morale among its troops and restored its initiative along a patch of the front. The attack has also deeply embarrassed Moscow, demonstrating how unprepared Russia was for an offensive operation along the border. Three months after launching its own incursion into Kharkiv, Russia’s leadership undoubtedly believed that the war was steadily going its way and that time was on its side. Kursk will force Moscow to consider that Ukraine retains options, and that the outcome of this war is still unsettled.
• Since 2023, Washington has been out of ideas for how to successfully end the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. Kyiv, meanwhile, has been focused on stabilizing the frontline, but equally worried about the prevailing gloomy narrative and the sense that Ukraine is losing the war. The Kursk operation helps address the latter at the risk of doing damage to the former. Whether or not Kursk succeeds, at least it is not an attempt to refight the failed 2023 offensive, a set-piece battle in which Ukraine held no decisive advantages. 
• Beyond the Kursk offensive and the situation at the front, Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is increasingly the bigger problem. Ukraine faces an uncertain winter. It needs generators and air defense to close gaps in its coverage. More important, Ukraine needs a way to compel Russia to stop these strikes, if not in 2024, then certainly in 2025. In this light, Ukraine’s desire to lift the remaining restrictions on the use of Western long-range strike systems is understandable. The Kursk offensive has prompted that conversation, but it needs to do much more. Holding Kursk as a bargaining chip, expanding strikes, and putting economic pressure on Russia could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s hand, assuming Ukraine can also hold the line, exhaust Russia’s offensive potential, and withstand Russia’s strike campaign this winter. However it ends, the Kursk offensive needs to provide the impetus for Ukraine and its partners to get on the same page—and shake off the current drift.

“The False Promise of Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Into Russia. Hitting Faraway Targets Will Not Tip the Balance of the War,” Stephen Biddle, FA, 08.28.24. 

• There are several ways in which greater Ukrainian deep strike capability might, in principle, change the course of the war. 
  • Kyiv would be able to hit distant logistical and command targets, Russian air or naval bases, ground force assembly areas, arms factories or supporting infrastructure, the civilian energy industry, or centers of Russian political control, such as the Kremlin. Striking or threatening to strike such targets would reduce the efficiency of Russia’s offensives, weaken its defensive capability, make military action less sustainable in the long term, and increase the costs of the war for Putin and the Russian leadership class.
• Yet there is reason to question how significant any of these effects may be. 
  • For starters, deep strike systems are expensive. Cheap drones cannot fly hundreds of miles to reach distant targets. This capability instead demands larger, more sophisticated, and more costly weapons.
  • If expensive systems produced disproportionate results, their cost might be worth it. But to hit distant targets requires precision guidance—a technology vulnerable to countermeasures. 
  • Deep strikes would have a … short window in which they could make a real difference. Ukraine would need to deploy its new capabilities on a large scale and all at once, integrating them with ground maneuver to break through Russian lines. 
  • Ground-force synchronization is not the only way deep strikes could reshape the war. Rather than aiming at Russian military forces directly, Ukraine could use these capabilities to target war-supporting Russian industries….Yet the historical record of such targeting is not encouraging. 
  • Some analysts consider the most beneficial outcome of strategic bombing to be its ability to divert an enemy’s military effort away from land warfare and into air defense, or its ability to destroy an enemy’s weapons production, thereby weakening its fielded forces. But to do either on a sufficiently large scale is a massive undertaking. 
• Of course, conducting more extensive deep strikes would help Ukraine. Damaging factories or infrastructure inside Russia might help boost Ukrainian morale, for example, as a small U.S. bombing raid against Tokyo in 1942 did for American morale in World War II. But now, as then, the capability will not transform the military situation on the ground. With that in mind, Kyiv’s partners should now ask whether the modest military benefits are worth the escalatory risk. The answer will turn on assessments of the likelihood of expanding the conflict and on the risk tolerance of Western governments and publics. The latter is ultimately a value judgment; military analysis alone cannot dictate where to draw the line. What it can do is forecast the battlefield consequences of policy decisions. If the West lifts its restraints on Ukrainian deep strike capability, the consequences are unlikely to include a decisive change in the trajectory of the war.

“Are Ukraine’s F-16s another case of too little, too late?”, Keir Giles, Chatham House, 09.02.24.

• Western-supplied F-16 combat aircraft have now been in Ukrainian service for several weeks. In 2022 and 2023, some had high hopes that provision of F-16s would be a game changer for Ukrainian warfighting capabilities. Yet their final introduction has been something of a ‘soft launch’, without the expectations of a sudden and dramatic impact that accompanied other high-profile new weapons deliveries to Ukraine.  In fact, as WSJ observes, by the time Ukraine had possession of the F-16s, many of Ukraine’s best pilots were already dead. One of the Ukrainian pilots may have been shot in a friendly fire incident, according to Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Verkhovna Rada Mariana Bezugla. The F-16 of Ukrainian pilot Oleksiy “Moonfish” Mes—who was shot down on Aug. 26—was probably downed by a Patriot missile system due to lack of coordination, Ukraine’s UNN media outlet quoted Bezugla as saying. This information has not yet been officially confirmed by Ukraine’s General Staff or Ministry of Defense.
• After intense speculation as to their possible uses, early reporting suggests that Ukraine’s F-16s are primarily being employed in an air and missile defense role. 
• Given limitations on how other weapons systems provided to Ukraine can be used, with strict bans on any use that would impact Russia too severely, it is likely that similar constraints will have been placed on the F-16s.
• Russia is reported to be constructing new airfields close enough to Ukraine to be within the range of US-supplied missiles, if only they were permitted to be used. That suggests that Moscow has confidence in the reliability of US-mandated safe zones for the foreseeable future. 
• Ukraine has drawn up detailed targeting lists for sharing with the United States, indicating what could be struck if restrictions were lifted. That will have been a calculated gamble... But that gamble is an essential part of the ongoing conversation, probing the limits of US support. That task becomes ever more urgent as November’s presidential election draws closer, and with it the possibility of a Trump presidency that could bring an abrupt end to all US aid.
• Ukraine cannot make good the time that has been lost to the hesitancy and timorousness of some of its principal backers. Its vital task now is instead to make the most of the time there is left: to gain the maximum possible benefit from the current military situation on the front line, and the political situation in Washington, before one or the other changes dramatically for the worse. 

“Russia’s Youngest Conscripts Unexpectedly See Combat Against Ukraine’s Invasion,” Neil MacFarquhar and Milana Mazaeva, NYT, 08.31.24. 

• For more than two decades it has been standard practice in Russia: New conscripts doing mandatory military service have not been deployed on the front lines. It is codified in law and embraced by all parents hoping to keep their sons from the carnage of war. But Ukraine’s lightning incursion into the southwestern Russia region of Kursk has upended that compact.
• When Ukrainian troops poured into Russia on Aug. 6, Moscow was caught unawares. Suddenly, the war had come to the conscripts, who were manning lightly guarded positions near the border. Hundreds of conscripts were captured, while scores are missing and potentially dead.
• Military deployment has been a sensitive issue for President Vladimir V. Putin. Moscow’s decision to thrust young, untrained soldiers onto the battlefields of Afghanistan and Chechnya helped to cement domestic opposition that compelled the Kremlin to end those conflicts.  So during the chaotic early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when it was discovered that several hundred newly drafted soldiers were in units that crossed the border, the president ordered military commanders to send them home.  When Ukraine crossed into Kursk, however, the Russian military did not withdraw the conscripts, and indeed some newly minted soldiers from distant regions reported to their families that they were being dispatched to Kursk as reinforcements, according to online posts from parents and independent Russian news reports.
• In general, Russians show far less concern for the fate of former convicts or contract soldiers who are paid around $2,000 a month to fight in Ukraine versus conscripts, who have no choice but to serve and earn about $25 per month, said military analysts.  About 300,000 young men are called up annually, half in the spring and half in the fall. In addition, the draconian jail sentences meted out to critics of the Ukraine conflict have largely neutered parent groups.
• The most common reaction [for employment of conscripts in combat]  was that the Russian state has provided insufficient training, weapons, food or clothing to new soldiers, and hence they should not be shoved into combat. One mother of a conscript mocked the idea that conscripts had been trained: “What can they do against professionals and hired killers? Nothing.”

“After Wagner: Non-State Groups Fighting in Ukraine,” Anna Kruglova, RUSI, 08.29.24.

• With the Wagner Group ceasing to exist last year after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, it may seem that the threat from non-state actors on the battlefield in Ukraine has disappeared. However, while the most well-known group might have stopped its activities, Ukraine continues to attract various paramilitary groups, most of which hold far-right views.
  • One of the most notorious groups that is known for its involvement in Ukraine is Rusich, which has been actively involved in the conflict in Ukraine since 2014 and holds extreme right-wing, neo-Nazi beliefs. … It must be noted, however, that Rusich does not seem to be particularly popular among the Russian far right.
  • Another far-right group is the Russian Imperial Movement (or specifically its military wing, the Imperial Legion) and its smaller affiliates, which consider themselves ‘nationalists’. They believe that Ukraine as a state should not exist and it is simply part of Russia; hence, they see their participation in the war as contributing to the unification of Russian territories, with the final goal of creating new Russian Empire with a monarch ruling it. 
  • In the last year, the so-called Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) has also gained a certain amount of fame as a Russian group fighting on Ukraine’s side. This group was founded in August 2022 by Denis Kapustin (now Nikitin), a Russian national from Germany. It is believed that Kapustin holds neo-Nazi views, and he has even been labelled as a ‘key figure in European extreme far-right circles’ and ‘one of the most dangerous neo-Nazis in the region’.
  • In addition to these, there are also two more groups supporting Ukraine – ‘Freedom of Russia Legion’ and ‘Sibir Batalion’ – however, there is not enough credible information to make firm conclusions about their ideological orientations.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “How the Hundred Years’ War Explains Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia,” Lucian Staiano-Daniels, FP, 09.01.24. 
• “The Kursk Incursion Might Be Ukraine’s 'Gettysburg' Offensive,’” Anthony J. Constantini, NI, 08.30.24. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“More Americans want the US to stay the course in Ukraine as long as it takes,” Brookings, Shibley Telhami, 08.26.24.⁷

• A strong majority of Americans across the political spectrum sympathize more with Ukraine than Russia in the ongoing war: 62% of respondents express more sympathy with Ukraine than Russia, including 58% of Republicans and 76% of Democrats.
• The percentage of respondents who said they want the United States to stay the course in supporting Ukraine grew from our October 2023 poll, reaching the highest level in our tracking since the spring of 2023 … 48% of all respondents said that the United States should support Ukraine as long as the conflict lasts, including 37% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats. All these numbers are new highs in our four polls since March-April 2023.
• In the latest poll, there was a marked drop in the assessment that Ukraine is winning and Russia is losing. Overall, 30% of respondents said Russia is failing in the latest poll, compared to 37% in October; and 21% said Ukraine is succeeding, compared to 26% in October. A plurality of about one-third said each side was neither winning nor losing.
• American public attitudes on the level of funding for Ukraine remain highly partisan, with more Republicans saying the level is “too much” (52%) and more Democrats saying it’s about “the right level” (39%). 
• The percentage of respondents saying that U.S. support for Ukraine is at the right level has dropped from 28% last October to 24% in July-August, with Republican support dropping from 18% to 15% and Democratic support dropping from 41% to 39%.
• We found strong bipartisan support for American urging of Ukraine to engage in diplomacy with Russia, though Republican support is more intense. Overall, 77% of respondents were supportive of diplomacy.

“Dispatch from Kyiv: How Ukraine’s incursion into Russia has changed the war,” John E. Herbst, Atlantic Council, 08.30.24.

• This week, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center took sixteen of its congressional fellows, Senate and House staff members from both parties, on a whirlwind trip to Warsaw and Kyiv. … Without a doubt, our chief impression was the energy and renewed confidence Ukraine’s bold strike into Russia has provided the country’s leadership and people. 
• Putin now might have reason to give up occupied Ukrainian territory as part of a ceasefire agreement. They are encouraged by the disarray in Moscow as the Kremlin downplays the significance of losing control over Russian territory; as Russians fleeing from areas Ukraine has taken fulminate about an uncaring and incompetent government; and as public television commentators, usually careful to toe the Kremlin line, criticize the government for lying about the situation. 
• While celebrating their gains inside of Russia, our contacts did not deny that the battle for Pokrovsk remained difficult. But they also believe that the “Russian operation,” as they described it, should finally bury the notion held by senior officials in Washington and Berlin that strong Western support for Ukraine might provoke Putin to use nuclear weapons. 
  • With ample justification, our contacts pointed out the numerous ostensible Kremlin red lines that have been crossed—Ukrainian strikes into Crimea, Sweden and Finland joining NATO—without Putin going nuclear. And now Ukrainian forces are in control of a chunk of Russian territory and the Kremlin is downplaying its significance.
• A growing chorus of voices in Europe are joining Ukraine’s call for the United States, Germany, and other NATO members to permit the use of their weapons against military and strategic targets in Russia and to arm Ukraine to win this war. This is certainly the smart move for the White House and the German Chancellery to make. 
  • US President Joe Biden should also use his last months in office to reach out to Republican leaders in Congress to pass one last aid bill for Ukraine during his administration.

“American restrictions on hitting Russia are hurting Ukraine,” The Economist, 09.03.24. 

• The reason given in the past for forbidding Ukraine from using American weapons against targets in Russia was that this could trigger an escalatory response from the Kremlin that would end up doing more harm to Ukraine and might even result in Russia resorting to nuclear weapons. However, that justification has become increasingly strained.
• The claim that there are not enough worthwhile targets is equally questionable. The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington think-tank, argues that “Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theatre, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort.” The institute assesses that some 250 military “objects” are within range of ATACMS, of which only 17 are airfields from which  aircraft may have departed. 
• Ben Barry, a land-warfare specialist also at the IISS, warns that although Ukraine is already waging a “deep battle” against a variety of targets in Russia, it may struggle to scale up production of its long-range systems. Yet by showing what they can do, says Mr. Barry, the Ukrainians make an even stronger case for being allowed to use ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP against such targets. For now, as the Lithuanian foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, put it following last week’s onslaught against cities in Ukraine: “Russian planes are better protected by Western guarantees than are Ukrainian civilians.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “The grim toll of American hesitation in Ukraine,” Anna Husarska, WP, 09.03.24.
• “Key questions regarding Germany’s Ukraine policy remain unanswered,” Susan Stewart, SWP, 08.27.24. 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“G7 leaders are tying themselves in knots over Ukraine loan,” Martin Sandbu, FT, 09.01.24. 

• The amount of financial resources Kyiv can count on to ensure the country’s survival hinges on a strangely contorted discussion between western allies. It concerns how to financially engineer a $50bn advance on money relating to Russian central bank reserves that western jurisdictions have blocked Moscow’s access to.  ... The idea is for a syndicate of Ukraine’s friends to take up a loan, then channel it through a trustee institution such as the World Bank. Kyiv’s resulting debt-service costs would be covered by the extraordinary profits that Euroclear, the Belgian securities custodian, is making on nearly €200bn of cash balances it is prohibited from paying out to Russia’s central bank.
• The EU only renews its sanctions for six months at a time, so that profit stream could cease as soon as a single member state vetoes renewal. ‘
• In a nutshell, the problem is that western leaders have tried to get something for nothing: new funding for Kyiv, but with no new taxpayer commitments, no financial risk and no seizure of the assets even of a criminal state. These political contradictions cannot be solved, at most they can be camouflaged, by technocratic solutions.
• Only a political choice to set a new legal precedent would cut through this Gordian knot: a transparent decision to jointly confiscate Russia’s assets outright for Ukraine’s benefit. It may still come to that as political contradictions become unsustainable. But the longer it takes, the more is lost in waiting. In the meantime, making good on the Puglia promise would be welcome — but no one should imagine that will close the issue for more than a few months.

“Strains on the Sovcomflot oil tanker fleet,” Robin Brooks and Ben Harris, Brookings, 08.29.24. 

• Two months ago, we wrote about Russia’s Sovcomflot fleet of tankers, arguing the U.S. can sanction more of these ships with little risk of an oil price spike. Here we update our analysis and flag two developments in the Sovcomflot fleet.
• First, a Sovcomflot ship sanctioned by the U.S. in December started running again in July, transporting Russian oil from the Baltic port of Primorsk to the Chinese port of Zhoushan.
• Second, July saw an unprecedented shuffle in usage of tankers in the Sovcomflot fleet, with activity shifting to ships that—leading up to July—hadn’t been used very actively.
• We interpret these developments as indications of strain on the Sovcomflot fleet due to Western sanctions and the EU ban on Russian seaborne oil.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Comparing Pathways to Peace in Ukraine,” Masha Hedberg, RM, 08.30.24.

• Deep into the third year of a devastating war, early optimism that Ukraine could push Russian troops off its territory seems a distant memory, as does Russia’s early ambition to fully subjugate its obstreperous neighbor. Despite an influx of Western weapons and money, Ukraine has been largely forced into a defensive crouch, protecting as much territory as it can while grappling with shortages of manpower and munitions. On the other side, Russia has funneled ruble equivalents of billions of dollars into the war effort, but for months significant battlefield advances have remained elusive. Instead, Russia’s progress has been slow and grinding, epitomizing an attrition war in which neither side can achieve a decisive breakthrough, but both can still inflict heavy casualties on each other.
• To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to systematically categorize and compare the many constructive—though often conflicting—[peace] plans put out by governments, think tanks and independent scholars.
• The options currently on the table involve trade-offs between justice and pragmatism, as well as the urgency of halting immediate violence against the goal of achieving a lasting resolution. Proposals that could offer a quicker end to the conflict often come at the cost of significant concessions from Ukraine. Conversely, proposals that could bring about a more morally satisfying resolution require additional resources, which Ukraine lacks and the West may be unwilling to provide. Moreover, it is unclear who will have the final say. While policymakers speak of Ukraine’s right to decide, this regional conflict with global implications involves multiple parties. As a result, plans that could potentially end the fighting may not be endorsed by all involved stakeholders.
• [A]n incremental approach may offer the most workable path forward. As several proposals suggest, such a strategy would first address the more manageable aspects of the conflict, such as establishing a ceasefire, facilitating the exchange of prisoners and deciding on a neutral monitor to enforce the truce. More complex and contentious matters, such as Ukraine’s neutrality, the future of its borders and reparations, would then be deferred for later negotiations.
• [T]here is no clear-cut answer to ending the war in Ukraine in a way that is just, expeditious and long-term. Whether considering total victory or negotiated settlements, each approach offers different trade-offs and possibilities. The “peace through strength” scenarios, while appealing in their clarity, may be impractical given the dynamics on the ground. On the other hand, proposals for negotiated settlements present creative solutions but often require compromises that will not satisfy all parties involved. But perhaps by focusing on the possibilities rather than just the limitations, the international community may yet discover a path to meaningful progress.

“How the Russian Establishment Really Sees the War Ending,” Anatol Lieven, FP, 08.27.24. Clues from Russian Views

• I recently had the opportunity to speak, on the basis of confidentiality, to a wide range of members of the Russian establishment … Only a small minority believed that Russia should fight for complete victory in Ukraine, including the annexation of large new areas of Ukrainian territory or the creation of a client regime in Kyiv. A large majority wanted an early cease-fire roughly along the existing battle lines. There is high confidence that the Ukrainian military will never be able to break through and reconquer significant amounts of Ukraine’s lost territories.
• A key reason for my contacts’ desires for compromise was that they believed that Russia should not, and probably could not, attempt to capture major Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv by force of arms. … [T]he idea of going beyond Ukraine to launch a future attack on NATO was [also] dismissed by everyone with derision. 
• On the other hand, every single person with whom I spoke stated that there could be no withdrawal from territory held by Russia in the four Ukrainian regions that Moscow claims to have annexed. 
• Among my contacts, there were no differences on the subject of Ukrainian neutrality, which everyone declared essential. 
• Most said that if in negotiations the West agreed with key Russian demands, Russia would scale down others. Thus on the Russian demand for the “denazification” of Ukraine, a few said that Russia should still aim for a “friendly” government in Kyiv. 
• On one important point, opinion was unanimous: that there is no chance whatsoever of any international formal and legal recognition of the Russian annexations of Ukrainian territory, and that Russia would not press for this. ….The hope is therefore …. the issue of these territories’ status will be deferred for endless future negotiation.
• [Putin has] offered an immediate cease-fire if Ukraine withdrew its forces from the remainder of the Ukrainian provinces claimed by Russia and promised not to seek admission to NATO. On the face of it, this is ridiculous. …However, Putin did not say that Russia will then occupy these territories. 
• Nobody I spoke to in Moscow claimed to know for sure what Putin is thinking. However, the consensus was that while he made terrible mistakes at the start of the war, he is a pragmatist capable of taking military advice and recognizing military reality. 
• But while Putin might accept what he would regard as a compromise now, everyone with whom I spoke in Moscow said that Russian demands will be determined by what happens on the battlefield. 

“Talking of What Matters open lesson. During his trip to Kyzyl, the President [Vladimir Putin] visited Secondary School No. 20 named after Heroes of the Fatherland and held a Talking of What Matters open lesson,” Kremlin.ru, 09.02.24.^ Clues from Russian Views

• We are defending not only the people living in Donbas, but also our common future, the future of Russia because we cannot allow hostile structures that harbor aggressive plans toward our country and constantly try to destabilize the Russian Federation to be created right next to us.
• Regarding peaceful negotiations, I have always said that we want to resolve all disputed issues by peaceful means. You are young people, still students, but you read and know everything. Everything started, the hot phase began, when our adversary discarded all agreements related to the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Donbas. They declared that they would not comply with the so-called Minsk agreements, where we had agreed on how to build relations with Ukraine and within Ukraine with those who maintained ties with our country, Russia. No, they threw out all these agreements and began preparations for military operations, which they had already conducted multiple times on the territory of Donbas. What did we start doing? We started defending people, our people, who live in that territory. Nevertheless, we have always advocated for a peaceful resolution.
• What is happening there now? The current authorities are not even legitimate according to their own internal laws. They were supposed to hold presidential elections but refused, citing martial law. And this does not correspond to the Basic Law, the Constitution of Ukraine. What has this led to? If the hostilities stop, the Ukrainian authorities will have to lift martial law. And after the lifting of martial law, they would have to immediately hold presidential elections. And the current authorities are clearly not ready for this because they have little chance of being re-elected. Therefore, they are not interested in stopping the hostilities; that is why they provoked this incident in the Kursk region, and before that, they attempted the same provocation in the Belgorod region, where your friend lives. I think this is primarily related to that.
• The calculation [behind the Kursk incursion] was to stop our offensive actions in key areas – in Donbas. The result is known. Yes, of course, it primarily concerns our people; people are going through severe trials, especially in the Kursk region. But the main objective that the enemy set for themselves – to stop our offensive in Donbas – they did not achieve. Moreover, it is no longer a matter of advancing by 200 or 300 meters. We have not seen such a pace of advance in Donbas for a long time. The Russian Armed Forces are now taking control of territories not by 200-300 meters but by square kilometers. Therefore, I am confident that this provocation will also fail. It seems to me that after this, there will be a desire to genuinely move toward peace negotiations and resolve these issues peacefully. We have never refused to do so. But, of course, we need to deal with these bandits who infiltrated the territory of the Russian Federation, specifically the Kursk region, with their attempts to destabilize the situation in the border areas as a whole.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Putin Will Never Give Up in Ukraine. The West Can’t Change His Calculus—It Can Only Wait Him Out,” Peter Schroeder, FA, 09.03.24. 

• Two and a half years after Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States’ strategy for ending the war remains the same: impose enough costs on Russia that its president, Vladimir Putin, will decide that he has no choice but to halt the conflict. In an effort to change his cost-benefit calculus, Washington has tried to find the sweet spot between supporting Ukraine and punishing Russia on the one hand, and reducing the risks of escalation on the other. As rational as this approach may appear, it rests on a faulty assumption: that Putin’s mind can be changed.
• The evidence suggests that on Ukraine, Putin simply is not persuadable; he is all in. For him, preventing Ukraine from becoming a bastion that the West can use to threaten Russia is a strategic necessity. He has taken personal responsibility for achieving that outcome and likely judges it as worth nearly any cost. Trying to coerce him into giving up is a fruitless exercise that just wastes lives and resources.
• There is only one viable option for ending the war in Ukraine on terms acceptable to the West and Kyiv: waiting Putin out. Under this approach, the United States would hold the line in Ukraine and maintain sanctions against Russia while minimizing the level of fighting and amount of resources expended until Putin dies or otherwise leaves office. Only then will there be a chance for a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• When Putin does leave.... Washington needs to be ready with a plan—one that not only resolves the war between Ukraine and Russia but also creates a positive framework for European security that eases military tensions, reduces the risk of conflict, and offers a vision that new Russian leaders in Moscow can buy into. That will require bold leadership, assertive diplomacy, and a willingness to compromise—in Moscow, Kyiv, Brussels, and Washington.
• Since the invasion, the United States’ strategy toward the war in Ukraine has been characterized by wishful thinking. If only Washington can impose enough costs on Putin, it can convince him to halt the war in Ukraine. If only it can send enough weapons to Ukraine, Kyiv can push Russian forces out. After two and a half years, it should be clear that neither outcome is in the offing. The best approach is to play for time—holding the line in Ukraine, minimizing the costs for the United States, and preparing for the day Putin eventually leaves. This is an admittedly unsatisfying and politically unpalatable approach. But it is the only realistic option.

“History Shows: Giving Land to Russia Won’t Bring Peace,” Kristi Raik, FP, 08.31.24.

• History suggests that Russians only withdraw from occupied territories for one of two reasons: Either they are driven out by force or their own cost-benefit calculus compels them to leave. In the latter case, the only major territorial withdrawals in Russian history have happened when regime collapse has radically changed this cost-benefit calculus. If Washington fails to recognize this long-established pattern and continues to severely constrain Kyiv’s defense in hopes for some future reset in relations with Moscow, the next wave of Russian aggression is all but ensured.
• Full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity will likely require another collapse of the Russian empire. It may be years ahead, but Russia’s historical trajectory suggests that it will happen at some point, as the country has shown itself to be incapable of correcting course through evolution rather than revolution. A Western “reset” with the current regime will not be possible without sacrificing Ukraine’s independence and the core principles of the European security order, including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Whether losing Ukraine will be the final death toll for the Russian empire, only time will tell. And even then, Russia’s neighbors will always have to be prepared for its violent imperialism to rebound.

“What Joe Biden got right. He managed the decline of American power much better than his recent predecessors,” Janan Ganesh, FT, 08.27.24.

• In 1945, the US had a nuclear monopoly. As late as 1960, it had 40 per cent of world output. It won’t have either again. And so the brief for all US presidents now is to manage decline. Joe Biden did this honorable work better than several of his predecessors.
• George W Bush had a grandiose and ultimately ruinous idea of what US power could achieve in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
• Barack Obama retrenched, too much. 
• And Donald Trump? Whatever the Republican affiliation, he is more Obama than Bush. Whatever the jingoism, he is a declinist. 
• Of recent presidents, Biden has struck much the finest balance. There has been no Bushian adventure, but that’s the easy part. The trick is to not overcorrect: to not allow the narrative of US decline to render a still-great power timid.
• Consider Biden’s assertiveness in Europe. He knew in late 2021 that Russia was going to attack Ukraine, and let the world know too. He then armed the victim well enough to frustrate the invader for two and a half years and counting. (Though he could have done more.) NATO, which was casting around for a raison d’être when Biden took office, has new members, and existing ones that are tooling up. The alliance, a force-multiplier for the US, has been renewed for at least a generation.
• Nor did this European focus come at the cost of Asia, where the AUKUS pact, which might soon encompass Japan, entrenched US influence. 
• He [Biden] seemed to understand the most important thing about imperial decline: it takes ages. A great power can drag out its time in the sun for decades and even centuries after challengers start eating away at its underlying economic supremacy. ... Between the peak of something and its ultimate demise, a vast amount can be achieved. Perhaps it took a man who become president at 78 to see the point.

“The End of the Zeitenwende,” Benjamin Tallis, DGAP, August 2024. 

• Germany’s Zeitenwende has failed. That is the sweeping, yet inescapable, conclusion after a two-year evaluation by the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Action Group Zeitenwende (AGZ). 
• The analyses of AGZ members have shown that the Scholz government has failed to deliver meaningful change that could durably address the serious problems laid bare by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On support to Ukraine, defending democracy and freedom against authoritarian threats, playing a greater role in strengthening the EU and NATO and arming Germany to defend itself, the changes made have been dangerously inadequate. 
• The failed Zeitenwende puts Germans’ security, prosperity and freedom at risk and has diminished Berlin’s influence with key allies and partners in Europe. 
• The good news is that, like the politicians and experts involved in AGZ, many Germans know they need real change. 
• Any theory of victory should include: removing the over-cautious restrictions imposed on how and where Ukraine can use certain weapons; seizing frozen Russian state assets to help sustain Ukraine financially and fund its victory as well as recovery, including through development of its defense industrial capacity; providing more weapons and munitions (including fighter jets and long-range strike weapons, such as Taurus) from stocks or purchased, quickly, from any available sources. Germany’s contribution to Ukraine’s victory should be commensurate with its economic weight and the responsibility it should shoulder for European security.
• AGZ members were clear that a genuine German re-armament is both essential and must be made complementary rather than put in competition with arming Ukraine to win, as both are essential for the country’s security, which underpins its future prosperity and freedom. 
• Presenting a clear vision for a future Germany and the kind of world it wants to help shape, and then setting the strategy and committing the resources to achieve it, would create a genuine, democratic alternative to both the inadequate status quo and to the dangerous vision proposed by anti-democratic parties. It is incumbent on politicians and experts, such as those involved in the AGZ, to properly debate, in public, what that vision should be and to propose credible ways to achieve it. The task now at hand is no less than reinventing Germany’s collective identity and reinvigorating its societal purpose to ensure Germans’ future security, prosperity and freedom and their country’s place in the democratic world.

“The Ukrainian Crisis in the Cycles of Russia-West Relations,” Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 08.28.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• Russia's rivalry with the United States will outlast the Ukrainian crisis. This is a structural, long-term rivalry that we will witness at least in the first half of the 21st century. However, a quick resolution of the crisis in Ukraine should not be expected, as the government in Kyiv does not act in the interest of the state but offers itself as a tool of the West's strategy against our country. 
• Russia's conflict with the West is cyclical. We have observed it at various points in history and in different dimensions. Many British and French generals, as well as some political figures, in private conversations and publications, refer to the current crisis as a reincarnation of the [19^th century] Crimean War. 
• [Like the U.S.] [t]he countries of Western Europe also have no significant incentive to seek reconciliation with Russia. Firstly, they still hope that victory can be postponed but is achievable. Secondly, they are using this opportunity to consolidate Europe on anti-Russian grounds. The confrontation with Russia, the attempt to defeat it, and the punishment for its claims to autonomous, independent interests from the West echo the events of 150 years ago. However, our cycles of relations include both periods of wars, conflicts, and crises, as well as periods of peaceful coexistence

“This European region could be the next Ukraine,” Dmitri Trenin, RIAC/RT, 08.28.24.⁸ Clues from Russian Views. (RT is a Russian government-funded outlet.) 

• The “Ukraine crisis” is not actually an accurate name for what is happening now in relations between Russia and the West. This confrontation is global. It touches virtually every functional area – from finance to pharmaceuticals to sport – and spans many geographical regions.  In Europe, which has become the epicenter of this confrontation, the highest level of tension outside Ukraine is now in the Baltic region. The question often asked in Russia (and in the West) is: Will this become the next theater of war? 
• The current situation in the northwest is forcing Moscow to strengthen its strategy of military deterrence against the enemy. ... Nuclear weapons have already been deployed on Belarusian territory.⁹ Exercises involving Moscow’s non-strategic nuclear forces have taken place. Official warnings have been issued that, under certain conditions, military facilities in the territory of NATO countries will become legitimate targets. A modernization of Russia’s nuclear doctrine has been announced. Atomic deterrence is becoming a more active tool of Russian strategy.
• We can only hope that Washington realizes that a naval blockade of Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg would be a casus belli – an excuse to declare war.
• Hopes are hopes, but it is clear that Russia has already exhausted its reserve of verbal warnings. The hostile actions of our adversaries do not call for condemnation, but for an appropriate response. We are now talking about airfields in NATO countries, including Poland, where the F-16s handed over to Kiev may well be based; possible attempts by Estonia and Finland to disrupt shipping in the Gulf of Finland; the prospect of Lithuania cutting the railway link between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia on various pretexts; and significant threats to our ally Belarus. A tough response at an early stage in the development of each of these possible schemes has a better chance of preventing a dangerous escalation.
• For the foreseeable future, the Baltic region – that once-promising bridge on the road to a “Greater Europe” – is likely to be the most militarized and Russia-hostile part of the neighborhood. How stable the situation will be depends, of course, on the goals of the Ukraine operation being achieved.

“‘My first thought was that I was going to be led out to be executed,’” Vladimir Kara-Murza, WP, 08.29.24. 

• The exchange [of prisoners] in Ankara was historic in many ways. The largest East-West prisoner swap since the Cold War, it was only the fifth in history that freed not just Western hostages but also political prisoners from Soviet or Russian captivity. It is one thing to speak about freedom and human rights — many Western leaders say the words. It’s quite another to actually do something to protect them. Few things should be more important for a democracy than human life; and with this exchange, the U.S. and German governments have saved 16 lives from the hell of Putin’s Gulag. Whatever else President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will be remembered for years from now, they will be remembered for this.
• The exchange on Aug. 1 has shown that the free world cares and that, contrary to stereotype, there is still room for decency and values in international politics. We must not let this become an exception — and we must not rest until the others who are unjustly imprisoned by Putin’s dictatorship are home and reunited with their families, too.

“Speech and Answers to Questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergei Lavrov, at a Meeting with Students and Faculty of MGIMO,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 09.02.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• Globalization, which the West actively promoted for many years, was accepted as a method of conducting affairs in relations between states in the areas of economics, technology and finance. This model of globalization is now falling apart. The principles on which it was based, according to the beliefs of our Western colleagues—fair competition, the inviolability of property, the presumption of innocence and market forces—were all discarded by the West in an instant to punish, in this case, the Russian Federation.
• And now I see attempts by the West, particularly noticeable in the first couple of years after the start of the special military operation, to "Ukrainize" the agenda at G-20 summits. The Westerners are trying to make their goal of condemning Russia the central focus of the G-20’s work, which should be concerned not with geopolitics but with global finance and the economy.
• Almost 95% of our trade with China is conducted in rubles and yuan. I see no need for a barter system, although there is nothing wrong with it. If it is convenient and allows us to avoid dependence on bank transfers, which the United States and its allies are trying to suppress in every way, then why not? These are different cultures and civilizations. Everyone understands that. Why should this somehow affect trade and investment cooperation? Our relations with China are at the highest level in their entire history. Both Russia and China clearly see the threats hidden in maintaining elements of globalization that were invented by the West and adopted by everyone else. The Western countries have now turned them into a weapon.

“The Situation in the Middle East Reflects the Overall Global Situation: Nobody Wanted to Fight... Is Armageddon Cancelled?” Andrei Kortunov, NG, 09.01.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• One could assume that the current situation in the Middle Eastern region reflects the overall state of global politics. After Feb. 24, 2022, many experts expressed grim certainty that "the world is entering a new era of great wars and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably trigger a chain reaction of major armed conflicts across the planet." Predictions included an inevitable military clash between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, armed confrontation between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula, numerous new conflicts in various parts of Africa, and more.
• Fortunately, none of the above has happened so far. ... The international system, though shaken, has largely held together. For now, it has held.
• Of course, it is still too early to be complacent. Tensions could flare up at any moment and almost anywhere: there are plenty of flashpoints around the world, and the level of trust and even simple communication between the great powers has dropped to almost zero. In today's international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, including the most apocalyptic. And this oppressive uncertainty is fully present now in the Middle East as well. However, there is still hope that the ongoing transition to a new world order will proceed in less destructive and less costly formats for humanity than many professional pessimists have envisioned over the past few years.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “How Great Power Competition Undermines Global Stability,” Andrew Hyde, NI, 09.01.24. 
• “Why Whataboutism Works. In International Politics, It Pays to Point Fingers,” Wilfred M. Chow and Dov H. Levin, FA, 08.27.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Talking of What Matters open lesson. During his trip to Kyzyl, the President [Vladimir Putin] visited Secondary School No 20 named after Heroes of the Fatherland and held a Talking of What Matters open lesson,” Kremlin.ru, 09.02.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

In the past Russian officials have denied reports that Russia and China are to become formal allies. This may be Putin’s overture to Xi to consider a formal alliance.

• We are now seeing growing interest in the Chinese language. Why? Because there are many contacts. Business is developing accordingly, and many partnerships are emerging between Russia and China. They are appearing naturally. Our trade turnover with China exceeds $200 billion, already reaching 230 according to various estimates. And the volume is increasing. And what does this mean? It doesn't just mean that goods are being transported from one country to another or that our joint scientific teams are being formed and so on. It means that when people interact with each other to solve specific tasks that life sets before them, the need arises to learn each other's language. And in China, by the way, interest in the Russian language is growing, and here in Russia – in the Chinese language. The younger members of my family speak Chinese, they speak fluently.
• The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation are allies in every sense of the word. First of all, of course, we unite our efforts in the field of economics, culture, humanitarian ties, and the language is in demand. And as China's economy grows ... I remind you that today, in terms of purchasing power parity, meaning the size of the economy, China's economy is the number one economy in the world, with India in second place. Russia has reached fourth place. And most importantly, China's economy is growing faster than other economies in the world. So this gap between the Chinese economy and others, including the U.S. economy, will continue to widen, at least in the near future, in the near historical perspective. This is an obvious fact.
• Yes, in terms of per capita, it is considered a good, correct indicator as well. In this sense, the United States is far ahead. China has 1.5 billion people, while the U.S. has just over 300 million. Per capita, the U.S. is ahead, but the volume of the Chinese economy is already significantly higher. And the gap continues to grow. Therefore, the significance of the Chinese language will undoubtedly increase. As we say today, this is a medical fact; there's no escaping it.
• We must do everything to maintain its [the Russian language's] level and status both within the country and with our closest friends, neighbors, our allies, primarily, of course, in the space of the former Soviet Union, but also with our main partners and allies, including such a large and promising country in its development as the People's Republic of China.

“Taiwan and the Limits of the Russia-China Friendship,” Eugene Rumer, CEIP, 09.03.24.

• The relationship between Russia and China rests on four pillars: 
  • A common adversary—the United States;
  • Complementary geopolitical priorities—Europe for Russia, Asia-Pacific for China—that reinforce each other in competition with the United States;
  • Authoritarian domestic politics; and
  • Complementary economic strengths—Russia’s natural resources and China’s manufacturing power.
• China benefits from the war in Ukraine, as U.S. resources and attention are diverted from the Asia-Pacific.
• But China has been careful to not become closely associated with the war, to avoid being targeted by U.S. sanctions, and to maintain a façade of impartiality.
• Russia benefits from tensions in the Asia-Pacific because they distract the United States from the European theater.
• But a war between the United States and China over Taiwan would most likely not be in Russia’s interest.
• A war over Taiwan would entail many risks for Russia: 
  • The risk of a global catastrophe triggered by a confrontation between two global superpowers;
  • Risks to Russia’s military and economic assets along its Pacific coast; and
  • The risk of a global economic disruption with adverse consequences for Russia.
• In the event of a war between the United States and China, Russia would probably avoid becoming directly involved and adopt a policy broadly similar to China’s policy with respect to the war in Ukraine. It would probably help China with: 
  • Energy deliveries—a critical factor stressed by Russian and Chinese experts;
  • Military equipment, technology, and know-how based on Russia’s warfighting experience in Ukraine;
  • Early warning and missile defense expertise; and
  • Intelligence-sharing and cyber expertise.
• However, even in the absence of direct involvement in the conflict by Russia, it would be a major risk factor for the United States to consider because of:
• Its proximity to the theater of war, to the United States, and to U.S. treaty allies Japan and the Republic of Korea;
• Its adversarial relations with the United States; and
• The mistrust and lack of transparency between Washington and Moscow.

“Can NATO Ice Out China and Russia in the Arctic?”, Matthew P. Funaiole and Aidan Powers-Riggs, FP, 08.28.24.

• On the sidelines of July’s NATO summit … [t]he leaders of the United States, Canada, and Finland announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact, a trilateral deal on polar icebreaker production. The agreement aims to leverage the technological expertise and production capacity of these three Arctic states to build a modern fleet of icebreaking vessels for NATO countries and their global partners. The ICE Pact is a response to two strategic challenges facing the United States and its allies. 
  • First, the United States’ atrophying shipbuilding industry risks being pushed further into irrelevance by China’s sprawling shipbuilding empire; this could also hamstring Washington’s ability to compete with Beijing’s naval modernization efforts. 
  • Second, rising geopolitical competition in the Arctic has laid bare the need for deeper coordination among NATO allies and their partners to counter the growing alignment between China and Russia in the region.
• “The increased competition and militarization in the Arctic region, especially by Russia and China, is concerning. … We cannot be naïve and ignore the potentially nefarious intentions of some actors in the region. We must remain vigilant and prepare for the unexpected,” Rob Bauer, the chair of NATO’s Military Committee, said last year.
• Russia alone operates a fleet of over 40 state- and nonstate-owned ice-class vessels, including several nuclear-powered icebreakers. China now has four in operation—two were put to service in the last five years—and has plans to build more.
• Looking forward, building collective capabilities to safeguard peace and security in the Arctic must remain one of NATO’s north stars. Maintaining a NATO presence in this remote frontier is key to preserving the alliance’s Arctic influence—and protecting U.S. interests.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Disarmament in History and at Present: Theory vs. Practice,” Aleksey Arbatov, Polis. Political Studies, 5, 24-45/RIAC, 08.28.24. Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• The conflict in and around Ukraine ... has become the epicenter of an extraordinary escalation of international tensions. For only the fourth time in history, Western nations are collectively opposing Russia and indirectly (so far) participating in the conflict, waging war on Russia through large-scale deliveries of arms and military equipment to Kyiv, sending advisers and mercenaries, supporting it with communications and intelligence systems, and through unprecedented economic and political sanctions. The continuation of the Ukrainian conflict, including missile and drone strikes deep inside Russian territory, is fraught with the risk of nuclear escalation, especially since some prominent figures, for the first time in Russian history, are openly advocating the preventive use of nuclear weapons to ensure the success of the special military operation in Ukraine.
• Even amid violent conflicts between states, arms control has a certain stabilizing effect on the confrontation. It is worth noting that despite the severity of the Ukrainian crisis and the widespread discussion of a possible nuclear escalation in Russia and abroad, U.S. and Russian strategic forces are left out of this discourse. The discussion is only about tactical nuclear weapons and limited nuclear strikes. This stands in contrast with the situation during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1983 Euromissile Crisis, when the public attention was focused on the expectation of massive nuclear strikes with strategic weapons and medium-range systems. Over the past 60 years, nuclear arms control has become an integral feature of international relations and global security. A large package of agreements on other weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms has evolved around it. ... There is no doubt that the current situation would be far more dangerous if not for the six preceding decades of generally successful arms control. 
• The world order that has emerged over the past decades is now fundamentally changing, as is the situation within many leading powers. These changes inevitably affect the established system of treaties and the practice of dialogue on various aspects of disarmament, especially since it has many ideological and opportunistic opponents. 
• In restructuring the outgoing world order, as stated in Russia’s latest Foreign Policy Concept, Moscow seeks to eliminate “...vestiges of domination by the US and other unfriendly states in global affairs, create conditions to enable any state to renounce neo-colonial or hegemonic ambitions; improve international mechanisms for ensuring security and development at the global and regional levels.” Russia’s partners in this effort are China, India, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and many other nations of the Global South (however vague this term may be).
• At the same time, according to the Concept, the new world order is expected to pay much attention to “...strengthening and developing international political foundations (arrangements) for maintaining strategic stability, regimes of arms control and non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery ... preventing an arms race and precluding its transfer to new environments, creating conditions for further phased reduction of nuclear potentials ... strengthening nuclear safety and security at the global level and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism.”
• A security strategy of this kind is quite reasonable, since nuclear chaos will ensue without it, with the resumption of full-scale testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater and in space, their acquisition by terrorists and radical regimes, limited or massive use of these arms in conflicts and major wars. Still this strategy in no small measure involves constructive interaction with the U.S., its allies and partners, as well as with China, India and other nations.
• The unbroken combination of these two tracks for reorganizing international relations is a truly monumental goal set before Russia’s foreign policy.

“Nuclear proliferation will dominate the next president's agenda,” Henry Sokolski, WP, 08.30.24. 

• The next president will have to focus [on the nuclear proliferation challenge] and take several minimal steps.
• Some in Congress insist we must sell the Saudis enrichment plants — or else China and Russia will. But if Iran goes nuclear, will blocking Chinese and Russian nuclear sales be our top concern? Unlike Beijing and Moscow, Washington has nuclear agreements with the United Arab Emirates and South Korea, who will ask for whatever we allow the Saudis. Turkey, Poland, Egypt — all Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) members interested in bombs — will be restless. How should we proceed?
• The new administration will also have to lock down U.S. and allied civilian nuclear commerce from bolstering Chinese and Russian bombmaking. ... We ... complain about Vladimir Putin's nuclear threats but still allow U.S. utilities to buy hundreds of millions of dollars of uranium annually from Rosatom, Russia's main nuclear weapons maker. This gives hypocrisy a bad name. The next president must cut the knot: Suspend U.S. nuclear cooperation with China and Russia until they can certify that none of the United States' or Canada's nuclear commerce is helping their weapons efforts. 
• Finally, we will need to toughen our stance on nuclear weapons sharing and the NPT's enforcement. Early in 2026, the treaty undergoes formal review. China and Russia are already cynically steering a self-serving narrative in arguing that the United States hasn't disarmed as the NPT requires, and that it is violating the treaty by sharing nuclear arms with NATO and not precluding redeployments to Japan and South Korea. Never mind that Russia's repositioning of its nuclear weapons to Belarus is driving Polish interest in getting U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. And that China's nuclear buildup is driving similar South Korean and Japanese interest. Or that Beijing and Moscow have refused to negotiate nuclear arms limits as the NPT calls for.
• It's time to call the bluffs of both Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The next president should offer to make NATO, Japan, and South Korea free of U.S. nuclear weapons if Putin moves his nuclear arms east of the Ural Mountains in a verifiable fashion, and if Xi freezes his fast reactor and reprocessing activities.

“Ukraine the Underdog Takes a Risk,” Walter Russell Mead, WSJ, 09.02.24. 

• [With the Kursk incursion] Ukraine has successfully defied one of the great taboos of the atomic age. This is the first time that a nonnuclear country has invaded and occupied the territory of a nuclear power. Deterrence theoreticians have long believed that one of the benefits of having nuclear weapons is that no one would dare invade a nuclear-weapons state. Russia's failure to launch nuclear weapons against invading forces now leaves scholars and policymakers scratching their heads.
• What are the new rules, and where are Mr. Putin's red lines? What would happen if Ukraine doubled the area of Russian territory under its control? What if Ukrainian armies, like Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner forces, broke through Russian lines and headed for Moscow? Will Team Biden and Ukraine's other Western allies try to stop Ukraine from pursuing a course that could lead to nuclear war? Or, believing that Mr. Putin is deterred from using nukes against Ukraine, will the U.S. step up support for Ukraine's land and air attacks on Russian territory?

“Nuclear Weapons Always Stopped Invasions. Then Ukrainian Troops Poured Into Russia. In testing Putin's red lines, Kyiv is sparking a rediscovery of Cold War-era ideas about nuclear escalation,” Daniel Michaels, WSJ, 09.01.24. 

• Ukraine's incursion into Kursk isn't just a brash bid to upend Russia's invasion. It also marks the first time that a declared nuclear power has faced invasion and occupation by another country.
• Ukraine isn't a nuclear power and is outgunned by Russia, yet Kyiv has managed for more than three weeks to control territory now totaling almost 500 square miles. It is a stunning twist. Strategists over the years have frequently envisaged countries from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization grabbing Russian turf in a fight, not a beleaguered underdog doing it.
• Now Western leaders, military thinkers and nuclear theorists are puzzling over what current events mean for prospects of Russian escalation—and for future war gaming. Theoretical risk faces a real-world test, forcing a re-examination of the role nuclear weapons can play in deterrence.
• Ukraine aims to show with its Kursk incursion that another taboo can be broken without dire consequences. Part of the aim is to convince the White House that Ukraine should be allowed to use more lethal and precise U.S. weapons to attack Russia.
• Uncertainty over where Russia's red lines lie is "the fundamental challenge of strategic ambiguity," said Janice Gross Stein, a professor of conflict management at the University of Toronto. 
• Ambiguity and uncertainty are integral to nuclear gamesmanship. "No one really knows the Russian red line—they've never given any precision," said Nikolai Sokov, a former Soviet and Russian arms-control negotiator. "We may find out later that we crossed the red line two months ago," said Sokov, who now briefs Western military leaders on Russian strategic thinking. One wild card Sokov notes is that the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin seem to consider threats to his regime as sovereign threats to Russia. In a sign of how events are affecting deterrence calculations, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on Sunday said that the Kremlin would adjust its nuclear doctrine based on analysis of the war and the West's role.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Russia’s Burevestnik Is No Wonder Weapon,” Decker Eveleth, FP, 09.03.24. 

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“Cyber Prince of Russia. How Pavel Durov’s arrest fueled anti-Western sentiment, aiding Russian propagandists,” Mikhail Zygar, Substack, 09.02.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

• Pavel Durov never criticized Putin, but even the fact that he left Russia was a clear sign that he was against the regime.
• Over the past ten years, Pavel Durov has become a real idol for countless young Russians. A mystical hero who made himself, amassed a colossal fortune, built several tech businesses from scratch, and never bowed to government pressure—an ideal hero for many young Russians. 
• The arrest of Pavel Durov in France is a major moral blow for his followers. Russian propaganda is trying to turn this to its advantage. As usual, it broadcasts the message that everywhere is the same, and the rules in Europe are no different from those in Russia. There is no freedom of speech or fair trial anywhere—so if there’s no difference, why leave Russia? Here, at least, everything is familiar and our own.
• Suddenly, an extraordinary unity has emerged in Russia: Putin’s supporters and his opponents, staunch fascists and closet liberals—nearly everyone believes that Durov is an innocent victim.

“The Durov case is not about free speech,” Editorial Board, FT, 09.01.24.

• The hashtag #FreePavel, launched by Elon Musk, spread quickly after Pavel Durov’s recent arrest in Paris. Many of those who reposted it portray the Telegram founder’s detention as an assault on free speech. In any direct sense, it is not. Durov faces preliminary charges in a French probe of Telegram’s alleged failures to address criminality on its platform, including drug peddling and child sexual abuse material. 
• Free-speech advocates argue that acquiescing to law enforcement requests from democracies would open Telegram up to nefarious requests and threats from autocracies, which often call political opponents terrorists or criminals. But the platform would only enhance its credentials as a haven of free speech if it purged the content that any civilized society abhors. Even the US First Amendment, which gives broad protections to free speech, does not shield content or activities that break the law. 

“Globalization Under Arrest,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 08.27.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• Pavel Durov, a convinced cosmopolitan-libertarian, is a typical representative of the "global society." He has had friction with every state he worked in, starting with his homeland, and continuing as he moved from one place to another. Of course, as a major entrepreneur in a sensitive industry, he was in dialectical interaction with the governments and special services of various countries, requiring maneuvering and compromises. However, the stance of avoiding any national rooting persisted. Having passports for all occasions seemed to expand the room for maneuver and gave confidence. But only as long as this global society lived and thrived, calling itself the liberal world order. But now it is contracting. And this time, possessing French citizenship along with several others promises not to alleviate but to aggravate the situation of the accused.
• "Supranational" entities will increasingly be demanded to "ground" themselves—identify with a specific state. If they don’t want to do so voluntarily, they will be forcibly "grounded," recognized as agents not of the global world but of specific hostile states. This is what’s happening now with Telegram, but it is neither the first nor the last. The struggle to subordinate various entities, and thus in fact to fragment the unified field, will likely become the main content of the next political stage in the world.
• The tightening of control over everything related to data inevitably increases the level of repression in the information sphere, especially since silencing undesirable channels in practice is quite difficult—it’s a two-way street. But if until relatively recently it seemed impossible to dig up the global information highway, making it unusable, now it no longer seems like a fantasy. The most interesting question is how the probable shrinking of informational globality will affect trade and economic interconnectedness, which remains a pillar of global unity. Judging by the dynamics of change, there will be news there soon as well. 

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Pavel Durov and the limits of free speech,” John Thornhill, FT, 08.29.24.
• “Palantir’s Alex Karp Talks About War, AI and America’s Future,” Maureen Dowd, NYT, 08.17.24. 

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Save American lives. Ban travel to countries that take U.S. citizens hostage,” Danielle Pletka, WP, 09.03.24. 

• Tears of relief greeted three Americans and others freed last month from illegal detention in a negotiated exchange with Russia. But paying ransom to ruthless dictators makes for bad long-term policy. The United States needs to take action to break the cycle of hostage-taking for profit that it is caught up in. Fortunately, there is a way.
• Travel bans are deeply unpopular; there is only one in place right now, for North Korea. The United States warns citizens not to travel to Russia, Syria, Iran and other nations, but it does not explicitly forbid travel to them. It is unsustainable to allow the cycle of kidnapping and ransom to go on, however. To solve the issue, the secretary of state should place a travel ban on any country that systematically kidnaps Americans. Would that hinder U.S. journalists from working in those countries? Yes. But that's a price worth paying to end the trade in U.S. hostages.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Harris Could End America’s Era of Hubris Abroad," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 08.31.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin's regime could fall if he loses the support of just a few hundred people,” interview with political scientist and author of "How Tyrants Fall" Marcel Dirsus, The Bell, 09.02.24. 

• For personalist dictatorships like Putin’s regime, the biggest threat typically comes from regime insiders. 
• To me, the more likely scenario is that palace elites or men with guns decide to remove Putin because they believe they could gain more power or wealth by doing so. However, that scenario does not guarantee that Russia will transition to a democracy. It is just as easy to imagine a situation where another dictator assumes power instead.
• The most likely scenario, if Putin were to, say, die tomorrow from a heart attack, is that the regime elites would try to rally around a new figure to continue leading the regime. The nightmare scenario, of course, would be a complete collapse, leading to a freefall where things could escalate to the point of civil war. We've seen similar situations unfold in other countries, like Sudan.
• The biggest risk to Putin right now comes from the men with guns. Even though propaganda can convince a lot of people of many things, if the Ukrainians were to gain the upper hand and push back the Russian military, I can imagine a scenario where those men with guns realize that all the fighting and dying has been for nothing. In that case, there could be a situation where Putin is deposed by his own soldiers or mercenaries. We've already seen episodes of instability. The Wagner march towards Moscow seemed highly unlikely until it actually happened. So, unforeseen events happen all the time, and it's incredibly difficult to predict these things.
• Another scenario that could cause Putin serious trouble is if he were to experience health problems. 
• Truth be told, the influence of ordinary Russians is severely limited. And that's, of course, no coincidence, because the Russian government has spent a lot of time and resources reducing the threat from the street.
• While the war is terrible for many Russians, it benefits some who matter to the regime. War always brings opportunities for corruption. People can make money by evading sanctions, so it doesn't have to be bad for everyone around Putin that he's waging this war
• More than two-thirds of personal dictators end up in prison, exile, or dead after losing power. Now that he has started this war, and his fate is likely tied to either victory or defeat in Ukraine, it's possible to imagine Putin deciding that, rather than lose the war, he would be willing to use nuclear weapons.
• If Putin were to discuss the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it's certainly possible that regime elites would try to depose him. They would understand that their chances of survival would drastically decrease if Russia were to use nuclear weapons. .... The risk of something going catastrophically wrong would drastically increase if Putin were to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. So yes, I can definitely imagine this leading to his downfall.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“How Vladimir Putin hopes to transform Russian trade,” Economist, 08.28.24.

• Over the next decade, the Russian state expects to funnel $70bn into the construction of transport routes to connect the country to trade partners in Asia and the Middle East. Russia’s far east and high north will receive the lion’s share; a smaller sum will go on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a project designed to link Russia and the Indian Ocean via Iran. Officials promise growth in traffic along all non-Western trade routes. 
• Mr. Putin says that, once complete, the INSTC will “significantly diversify global traffic flows” by transforming Iran into an outlet for Russian goods heading for the Middle East, Asia and farther afield. India is the ultimate prize. Unlike China, its demand for coal and oil is projected to remain strong until at least 2030.
• Yet Mr. Putin’s plans face considerable obstacles. For a start, although trade along the new routes is growing, it is still meagre. Ice cover will limit year-round use of the Northern Sea Route until at least mid-century, when scientists expect the first ice-free summer. Just 8m tons of goods were transported along the INSTC by rail in 2022, well below its overall capacity of 14m tons. The route depends on trucks, which limits throughput. 
• Despite surging trade with China, Russia’s eastern railways handled 13% less goods than their stated capacity last year. … Decades of neglect have left ports and railways in eastern Russia in desperate need of repair.
• Even under the best conditions, Russia’s infrastructure track record is poor. In the far east, where long distances and bad weather complicate planning, it is worse. Mismanagement is routine. The transport industry is dominated by only a handful of companies. … Sanctions are also delaying progress on sanctions-defying routes. 
• Even if Russian officials do raise capacity on the new routes, demand for goods is not certain. … Countries not imposing sanctions will be able to drive hard bargains, taking advantage of Russia’s limited alternatives. … Ultimately, China and India will power Russian economic growth only if the price is right—and that is a problem for Mr. Putin.

“The far-right’s disturbing success in eastern Germany,” Editorial Board, FT, 09.02.24.

• The AfD’s rise is  more troubling than those of equivalents in France or Italy, say, because of its radicalism. Some members openly espouse ethno-nationalist and xenophobic views, and sections of it are deemed extremist by Germany’s security services. Björn Höcke, AfD’s leader in Thuringia, was convicted of using banned Nazi slogans. That nearly a third of voters in Thuringia and Saxony voted for it is deeply unsettling. Another 10-15 per cent voted for the populist hard-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), whose anti-immigrant and pro-Russia stances chime with the AfD’s.
• The danger of the far right’s electoral advance is that mainstream parties are pulled on to their ground but fail to dissuade voters from choosing the radical original. This is a particular trap for the Christian Democratic Union, on course to win the next general election. It has shifted to the right under leader Friedrich Merz and is now seeking an unlikely coalition in Thuringia and Saxony with the anti-immigrant BSW. Last week Merz said Germany should be prepared to reimpose land border controls to stop all asylum-seekers.
• Another risk is that mainstream parties dial back support for Ukraine because the pro-Russia AfD and BSW exploited skepticism about the policy among voters in the east. With little or no formal role in government, the extremists could conceivably push Germany towards a policy that would be a disaster for Ukraine — and for the security of Europe.

“Changes Without Shifts: How the Successes of the Far-Right and Far-Left Will Affect German Politics,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Profil/Russia in Global Affairs, 09.02.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Germany is experiencing new turmoil – in two eastern federal states (the former GDR territories), non-mainstream parties have achieved significant success in the elections. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) overwhelmingly won the vote in Thuringia and narrowly trailed behind the CDU in Saxony. The newly formed "Sarah Wagenknecht Bloc" outperformed its predecessor, the Left Party, and took third place in both states. 
• Overall, the elections in Thuringia and Saxony confirm an interesting European trend. The successes of the far-right and far-left (using the accepted terms) do not bring either to power. (A very clear example is France, where Macron, despite all his blunders and being a lame duck, is about to appoint a prime minister of his choice.) However, such election results do not go unnoticed. The political process is increasingly turning into sophisticated political technology manipulations to completely bypass or at least neutralize the non-mainstream parties with growing support.
• The higher the numbers of those who are "not acceptable," the harder it becomes to form coalitions without their participation. This requires the remaining parties to level their ideologies, which renders the election process meaningless. After all, during the campaign, parties emphasize their differences, but after it, they are forced to focus on similarities. This is normal in principle, as it's the essence of any multiparty democracy where the main players number more than two and form alliances based on mutual compromises after elections. But the emergence of the "elephant in the room" – political forces whose influence is clearly increasing but whose participation in governance is considered unacceptable – distorts what was once a natural process.
• The breakthrough of former "outcasts" into the first echelon doesn't mean a reorganization of the echelon, but the normalization of the newcomers. The EU/NATO framework is strong enough to keep the political field within the same parameters. This raises the question of whether we should expect any changes in the course affecting Russian interests. So far, there are no grounds for this.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Putin, cash and guns prompt ‘explosive’ rethink of Swiss neutrality," Laura Kayali and Jacopo Barigazzi, Politico, 08.29.24.

Ukraine:

“Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation. Lessons for Future Conflict,” Todd C. Helmus and Khrystyna Holynska, RAND, 09.03.24. 

• Ukraine's key initiatives launched before the war, referred to as shaping operations, helped lay the groundwork for successful Ukrainian counterdisinformation initiatives
  • Its intelligence-driven "prebunk" informed Ukrainian and international audiences about a planned Russian operation to falsify a Ukrainian attack on its forces and thereby provide a casus belli for the Russian invasion.
• In Ukraine's efforts during the war to counter Russian disinformation in the three theaters of its information war — inside Ukraine, inside Russia, and in the international community — it has largely experienced success in countering it domestically within Ukraine
  • To fight Russia's attempts to undermine Ukrainian unity and sap their will to fight, Ukraine has responded with a diverse campaign that enlisted both government and civil society institutions to debunk Russian disinformation, prebunk emerging narratives, build the capacity of key frontline communities, and promote media literacy education among the populace.
• Ukraine has fared the worst in countering Russia's domestically targeted disinformation inside Russia during the war
  • While Ukraine has attempted to undercut Russian support by highlighting the costs of the conflict to both Russian soldiers and Ukrainian citizens, such efforts have largely proved unsuccessful.
• Success in the international arena can best be measured in international support for the war, which has slipped over time, maybe particularly so in the United States
  • Ukrainian narratives hailing from the internationally popular President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as well as a band of online Ukrainian influencers helped to enlist early international support.
  • Cracks in the international coalition have emerged of late.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“A Key Western Ally Is Buckling Under Russian Pressure. As Georgia’s government draws closer to Moscow, national elections mark a flashpoint for the entire region,” Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 08.29.24. 

• In recent months, as Russia regained momentum in Ukraine, the government in Tbilisi has hewed closer and closer to Moscow, moving away from the Caucasus nation’s longstanding pro-Western aspirations.
• Georgia’s unfolding break with the West was catalyzed by this summer’s strict restrictions on foreign funding for nongovernment organizations, media and civil society. Dubbed “the Russian law” by the opposition, the new legislation mirrors similar “foreign agent” curbs enacted by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2012 as he eviscerated political freedoms there. In another borrowing from Putin’s political playbook, the Georgian government now is moving ahead with a law that would ban LGBT “propaganda” such as Pride events, and uphold “traditional values.” In recent months, many antigovernment activists have been assaulted by thugs believed to be connected with the authorities.
• “We are now in the same situation where Russia was in 2012. If the [ruling party] Georgian Dream begins to enforce this Russian law, they will basically get rid of international organizations, of donor organizations, kill the civil society, and then the independent media and the opposition parties, as it has already happened in Russia,” said Zurab Japaridze, founder of the opposition Girchi party who said he had to use his sidearm to fire in the air as he was being attacked near his home earlier this year.
• The geopolitical stakes in Georgia are hard to overstate. The mostly Christian country of 3.7 million provides the only alternative route besides Russia for Central Asian and Azerbaijani trade with the West, be it in oil, gas or other goods. One of only three former Soviet republics—alongside Ukraine and Moldova—with EU candidate status, it has historically been the most consistent outpost for pro-Western feeling in the region, sitting between authoritarian Russia, Turkey and Iran.
• To many Georgians, the crisis in the country reminds of events in Ukraine in the final months of the rule of President Viktor Yanukovych, who triggered mass protests, known as the Maidan revolution, after suddenly aborting an association agreement with the EU and embarking on an alternative trade alliance with Russia in late 2013.
• A sense that Georgia approaches an existential moment is in the air. Tina Khidasheli, chair of the Civic Idea NGO, said the country faces the strong risk of becoming a dictatorship and a satellite of Russia if [Bidzina] Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream wins re-election in October. “We will do everything so it will not happen. Literally everything. Whatever it takes to get this country back,” said Khidasheli, a former minister of defense. “Bidzina [Ivanishvili] is not going to end this country’s history as an independent state. No way.”

“The Power of Stigma: How Georgia’s “Foreign Agent” Law—and Others Like It—Can Damage Democracy,” Maxim Krupskiy, FA, 08.29.24.

• In and of themselves, laws to monitor and prevent harmful foreign influence are not antidemocratic. … The problem arises when states exploit vaguely worded legislation to stigmatize dissent and violate human rights. Foreign-agent laws are especially dangerous in the hands of antidemocratic regimes, which use them to suppress criticism and stifle civil society, primarily NGOs and independent media.
• [T]here is reason to fear that Georgian Dream will implement the legislation in a way that stigmatizes NGOs. More than 10,000 NGOs operate in Georgia. As a developing country, Georgia is strapped for resources, and according to a 2020 Asian Development Bank study, its civil society groups receive over 90 percent of their funding from abroad. But these NGOs play a crucial role in protecting the environment, promoting the rights of women and children, safeguarding freedom of speech, and leading the fight against corruption.
• Georgian Dream has been castigating local NGOs and media outlets for years, and unscrupulous politicians are now liable to wield the new law as a weapon to further suppress public criticism and discourage NGOs from seeking financial support abroad. These dynamics risk compromising the effectiveness of civil society in Georgia, destroying Georgia’s chances for EU accession, strengthening Russia’s sphere of influence—and undermining the will of the people.

“Azerbaijan’s government turns on its critics at home. The war with Armenia has ended in victory, so the regime needs another target,” The Economist, 08.29.24.

• Azerbaijan’s opposition had long hoped that the country would open up after its war with Armenia ended. ... But if anything this has empowered Mr. Aliyev to go after his enemies at home even more vigorously....the repression keeps on getting worse
• Whatever leverage the outside world may once have had for influencing Azerbaijan has disappeared, as the country has become deeply involved in the sharpening conflict between Russia and the West. “[Mr. Aliyev] thinks that he can push red lines further and further because everybody now needs him,” says Altay Goyushov, head of the Baku Research Institute, a think-tank. “They don’t want to spoil relations with him.” Mr. Goyushov himself recently left the country. “I knew that my turn could be coming,” he says.
• Defeating Armenia militarily means Mr. Aliyev needs a new enemy. Few know this better than Mr. Samadov, a doctoral student researching “authoritarianism and the logic of exclusion in Azerbaijan”. In a 2021 essay he described how the state demonizes Armenians and domestic critics in parallel fashion: “The enemy, internal or external, must be eliminated.”

“Russia's Eurasian Alliances Are Unraveling. We Must Use That To Our Advantage,” Vladislav Inozemtsev, MT, 08.30.24. 

• When Moscow was building “Eurasian unions” in the first half of the 2010s, bribing potential members with loans and prospects of participation in a large and unified economic space, the situation looked very different from today.  Back then, Russia, which was considered European, gathered allies around itself that had no access to the seas, positioning itself not only as a powerful economy but even as a “bridge to Europe” — not to mention the qualities of a military protector. Ten years later, any attractive features that Russia had at that time have been lost.
  • First, Moscow is embroiled in a major European war that has recently spilled over into its territory. 
  • Second, there are even more problems economically. ... Labor migration from Central Asia, once a major pillar of post-Soviet integration, is now shifting toward Turkey and the Middle East, a trend that Moscow has absolutely nothing to counter.
• All of these circumstances (not to mention the dramatic increase in China's role in Central Asia and Turkey's role in the Caucasus) are causing hysteria in and around Moscow, as we saw last week. In recent years, Russia has become the most sanctioned country in the world and a global pariah — and such powers cannot be the centers of integration associations. Therefore, the structures that Moscow has created in the post-Soviet space since the early 2000s will simply start to collapse in the very near future. Armenia has already de facto withdrawn from the CSTO and is increasing its cooperation with the EU, the condition for which will sooner or later be withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Union.
• The West should be as attentive as possible to all of these processes. The Kremlin has invested a lot of effort in post-Soviet integration — and the collapse of this initially hopeless project would be just as impactful as the defeat of Russia in Ukraine. The war that began in 2022 was largely made possible because Putin believed his rear was secure and that he only needed Kyiv to rebuild his empire. Considering all of this, undermining the Eurasian project should be the most important task of the free world — a task that can bring maximum benefits at a minimal cost.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Uzbekistan Is Calling America. Will We Pick Up The Phone?” Daniel Runde, NI, 08.28.24. 
• “Trapped Between Three Conflicts, Central Asian Migrants Face Problems We Can No Longer Ignore,” Stevan Weine and Noah Tucker, PONARS, 08.26.24. 

Footnotes

1. The Pokrovsk area hosts one of two key rail and road junctions in this eastern Ukrainian province and its loss would threaten the entire region’s logistics for Ukraine’s military, according to Frontelligence Insight’s analysis reported by FT.
2. A map of combat actions created by Deep State and updated on Sept. 2 showed that Russian forces attacking from the western tip of Novohrodivka in the northwest/west direction, toward Pokrovsk. The distance between the eastern boundaries of Pokrovsk and the northwestern boundary of Novohrodivka is less than 5 miles, if measured straight as the crow flies via Google Maps.
3. The U.S. is close to an agreement to give Ukraine Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, U.S. officials said, according to Reuters. The air-launched JASSM missile could enable Ukraine to hit targets about 186 miles (300 km) inside Russia. There is also a longer-range JASSM missile that can fly more than 500 miles, according to Reuters.
4. For a recent example of how “Atomic deterrence is becoming a more active tool of Russian strategy,” see the summary of Dmitri Trenin’s article “This European region could be the next Ukraine” in the “Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations” section in this digest.
5. This piece is adapted from “Chernobyl Roulette: War in the Nuclear Disaster Zone,” Serhii Plokhy’s forthcoming book documenting the 2022 invasion and occupation of the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear sites in Ukraine.
6. Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group showed in the Sept. 2 version of its combat action map that Russian forces were attacking in the northwest/west direction from the western tip of Novohrodivka toward Pokrovsk. The distance between the eastern boundaries of Pokrovsk and the northwestern boundary of Novohrodivka  is less than 5 miles, if measured straight as the crow flies via Google Maps. 
7. Brookings’ new University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll with SSRS shows robust, even increasing, support for Ukraine. The poll was carried out by SSRS among a sample of 1,510 American adults from their probability-based online panel, in addition to oversamples of 202 Blacks and 200 Hispanics, July 26-Aug. 1, just before the Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. The margin of error is +/- 3.0 %. 
8. This is a continued attempt to instill fear of a nuclear war in the minds of Western strategists and the general public, which D. Trenin was among the first Russian analysts to call for in the wake of the launch of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
9. It should be noted that Russia and Belarus are to sign a treaty on security guarantees and nuclear weapons in December 2024, according to Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov. "We plan to sign an interstate treaty with Russia on security guarantees for the two countries, which will lay down the principle of using nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of protecting both countries that are part of the Union State," Ryzhenkov said. It is yet to be seen whether and how the “the principle of using nuclear weapons” in the e treaty will differ from conditions for use of nuclear weapons outlined in Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. These differences (if any) may, perhaps, help to foresee what revisions of the conditions for such use as outlined in Russian strategic documents, which Ryabkov and other Russian officials say is underway, will end up looking like. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

^ Translated with the help of ChatGPT.

Slider photo by Kremlin.ru shared under a Creative Commons 4.0 license.