NB: There will be no Russia Analytical Report on Monday, Sept. 4, due to the Labor Day holiday in the U.S.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“The Cold War and America’s Delusion of Victory,” Odd Arne Westad, New York Times, 08.28.17: The writer, a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and the author of “The Cold War: A World History” (from which the essay is adapted), discusses the legacy of the Cold War and its impact on the United States, Russia and other nations. For the U.S., the author writes, the “post-Cold War era was not an aberration but a continuity and confirmation of an absolute historical purpose.” But starting in the 2000s, when America’s aim should have been to bring other nations into “the fold of international norms and the rule of law,” it did “what declining superpowers often do: engage in futile, needless wars far from its borders, in which short-term security is mistaken for long-term strategic goals.” Russia, however, was the clear loser in the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union “left Russians feeling déclassé and usurped. One day they had been the elite nation in a superpower union of republics. The next, they had neither purpose nor position.” A multipolar world is now emerging with the U.S. and China the strongest powers. Russia and China “will attempt to nibble away at American interests and dominate their regions. But neither China nor Russia is willing or able to mount a global ideological challenge backed by military power. Rivalries may lead to conflicts, or even local wars, but not of the systemic Cold War kind.” The author concludes that while Cold War ideologies offered immediate solutions to complex problems, what did not change with its end “were the conflicts between the haves and the have-nots in international affairs.”

“The 'New Cold War' Was Never Inevitable,” Michael Lind, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, a contributing editor at the magazine, argues that U.S. policies and attitudes have contributed to a “new cold war” with Russia—as predicted by veteran Russia expert George Kennan in 1998, after the U.S. pushed to “expand NATO into the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, while excluding Russia from NATO membership.” Further actions worsened the rift, the author writes, specifically the attempt to draw Georgia into NATO’s orbit, which “provoked the Russo-Georgian War of 2008,” and the effort to bring Ukraine into NATO and the EU, which “provoked Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and a proxy war in Ukraine that continues today.” Further proof that a new Cold War has emerged between the U.S. and Russia can be found in “the revival of Cold War-style McCarthyite paranoia—this time not among conservatives, but among progressives, many of whom sincerely believe that Vladimir Putin is responsible for the election of Donald Trump.” Still, the author predicts, the latest tensions will subside and “today’s Russian Peril will probably seem as deranged, and as manipulated for partisan domestic purposes, as the Red Scares of the 1920s and the 1950s.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“What to Expect When You’re Expecting Zapad 2017,” Michael Kofman, War on the Rocks, 08.23.17: The author, a senior research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses, seeks to dispel concerns that Moscow intends to use its upcoming Zapad-2017 military exercise as cover for a “diabolical Russian invasion.” Zapad-2017, the author notes, is part of a rotation of annual military drills, named for each of the four regions where they take place: Vostok (East), Tsentr (Center), Kavkaz (Caucasus) and Zapad (West). The notion that Russia intends to leave its forces in Belarus, one of the staging grounds for the drill, is belied by a lack of housing and other supporting facilities for its soldiers. While the 2008 exercise in the Caucasus was indeed used as a cover for a Russian military intervention in Georgia, the author points out that Moscow is unlikely to try anything when “NATO is ready, on alert, and bracing for the worst.” Zapad-2017, the author writes, “is meant to establish Russia’s coercive credibility and, judging by Western consternation, it does a great job of it.” In the end, the exercise offers insight into the Russian mindset. “In a conflict between Russia and NATO, things will probably go badly. Moscow may resort to using nuclear weapons. For all the modernization and transformation of Russian armed forces, in reality the Russian leadership is probably still afraid” of U.S. intentions and capabilities.

“Neighbors fear ‘Trojan Horse’ as Russia readies war games,” Neil Buckley, Financial Times, 08.27.17: The author, the paper’s Eastern Europe editor, writes that it is unlikely that Russia’s Zapad-2017 war games are meant to serve as cover for an attack, despite the concerns of Moscow’s Eastern European neighbors and some NATO leaders. The author notes that Ukraine’s national security council has “not excluded” the possibility that Russia could use Zapad-2017 to create “strike forces for the invasion of Ukraine.” In addition, the commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe has warned the exercise could be a “Trojan horse” for Russia to bring and keep soldiers and weapons in Belarus. Russia has dismissed such fears. Pointing to analysts’ assessments, the author notes that, unlike the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 days after military exercises in its Caucasus district, “there has been no sign of Moscow laying the political and propaganda groundwork for military action this time.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Zero-deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Pavel Podvig and Javier Serrat, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2017: The authors, researchers with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, offer a detailed proposal aimed at controlling “non-strategic” or “tactical” nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia. Noting that there is currently “no mechanism to reduce or eliminate arsenals of these weapons or to exclude the catastrophic scenarios of inadvertent use,” the authors propose a scheme whereby neither country’s non-strategic nuclear weapons would be “operationally deployed on a day-to-day basis.” Under the “zero-deployed arrangement,” nuclear warheads associated with non-strategic delivery systems would be transferred to a small number of storage facilities. “Once warheads are removed from bases near units that operate nuclear-capable delivery systems, it should be possible to develop verification procedures that would confirm the absence of deployed warheads at those bases.” Such a plan, the authors note, would have the benefit of not requiring the two sides to negotiate “the complex issues involved in crafting an arms control regime.” Rather, it would involve a gradual approach to implementation and would be “both politically feasible and rewarding, demonstrating the parties’ commitment to greater stability and security, and showing concrete progress towards addressing the risks posed by these weapons.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“How Bashar al-Assad Won the War in Syria,” Daniel R. DePetris, The National Interest, 08.24.17: The author, a fellow at Defense Priorities, argues that, whether the U.S likes it or not, ousting the Assad regime from Syria is a “dead letter.” Because of the “UN Security Council’s internal division, Iran’s organization and training of pro-Assad militias and Russia’s bombing campaign,” the author writes, “the Assad family clan will be in charge for some time to come.” DePetris concludes that the Trump administration must figure out a policy that addresses these realities. “Whatever that policy turns out to be, Syria will be a fractured, broken, chaotic and violent country for a long time to come.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

“The Trouble With Nord Stream 2. How the Pipeline Would Benefit Russia at the EU’s Expense,” Petr Polak, Foreign Affairs, 08.24.17: The author, an associate professor of finance at the University of Brunei Darussalam, writes that the European Union can take several steps to reduce its reliance on Russian natural gas amid tensions raised by the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. While the pipeline expansion has brought Berlin and Moscow closer together, the author notes, it’s also “left some Central and Eastern European states, including Poland and Slovakia, more vulnerable to Russian arm-twisting.” And while “the project would alleviate gas shortages in some of those countries, the added capacity would weaken the position of Ukraine—through which a number of large pipelines now pass.” However, the author writes, the EU can reduce its dependence on Russian gas and better meet its own energy-efficiency targets by: increasing its “use of renewable and unconventional energy”; expanding its “program to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals”; and constructing “more pipelines between EU member states.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Washington and Moscow Must Embrace Détente—Despite Trump,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The National Interest, September-October 2017: The author, who is the editor and publisher of The Nation magazine, argues that the United States and Russia “urgently need a working relationship” in order to reduce the threat posed by war, nuclear weapons and terrorism. A first priority for the U.S., the author writes, should be “reengaging Russia in efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials.” The author suggests that an “agreement guaranteeing Georgia[’s] and Ukraine’s independence, committing them to remain nonaligned, outside of NATO and free to join both the EU and the Russian economic bloc, would greatly reduce tensions.” Regarding alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, the author suggests an independent commission be authorized “to look at what is known, and report publicly.”  Progress on the U.S.-Russia relationship might have to come in spite of President Donald Trump, who, the author writes, has demonstrated “that he has neither the temperament nor the capacity to sustain a coherent, balanced policy initiative.” In light of this, the author concedes, “it is hard to see how we get there from here.”

“America needs Europe's help with sanctions. It may not get it,” Bryan R. Early and Keith Preble, The Washington Post, 08.24.17: The authors, a professor and graduate student at SUNY-Albany, argue that the recently passed Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is likely to reignite sanctions-related tensions between the U.S. and Europe. Such frictions often arose between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, when “the E.U. shared U.S. concerns about Iran’s nuclear weapons program and Cuba’s human rights policies, but preferred diplomatic solutions that would not disrupt trade.” During the Obama administration, however, the U.S. and E.U. managed to cooperate very closely on sanctions. Today, European companies are pursuing business opportunities in Iran since the E.U. lifted many of its sanctions in early 2016. CAATSA makes the E.U. unhappy, the authors write, because it did not include an effort at trans-Atlantic consensus building, but simply empowered the American executive branch to punish “foreign firms that undercut the United States' unilateral sanctions against Russia.” As a result, “U.S. policymakers cannot hope to obtain robust cooperation from the E.U. in sanctioning Iran and Russia at any point in the near future.”

“Washington Just Punished Russia—and Helped Putin. The Trump administration just made it harder for Russians to enter the United States ... and gave the Kremlin an easy win,” Mark Galeotti, Foreign Policy, 08.24.17: The author, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague, argues that America’s recent decision to reduce the number of nonimmigrant visas for Russian nationals was “the wrong move, representative of the sort of self-defeating myopia that has defined America’s Russia policy since the start of Cold War 2.0.” By his logic, “the Kremlin … benefits when travel to America is difficult for Russians” and “the United States gains through more open contact.” Galeotti cites tourism-industry data that “those hardest-hit by the new visa limits will … [be] the independent travelers eager to see the United States for themselves and to study and work there.” These Russians, the author believes, are precisely the people who “can most effectively neuter the Kremlin’s propaganda about the big, bad USA” and “it is an own goal of scandalous proportions for America to turn them away.”

“America's neo-Nazis don't look to Germany for inspiration. They look to Russia,” Casey Michel, The Washington Post, 08.22.17: The author, a New York-based journalist, describes the praise that several prominent American white supremacists have heaped on Russia and the platforms that Russia has, in turn, given to such figures. He points out that David Duke, whose books have been sold in Russia’s parliament, believes that “Moscow remains the ‘key to white survival,’” while “Matthew Heimbach, who has said he would like to see the United States fracture on ethnic lines,” considers Vladimir Putin “the ‘leader of the free world.’” Richard Spencer—whom the author identifies as “a founding member of the alt-right's rogues' gallery” and the husband of “the translator of Alexander Dugin, Russia's illiberal polemicist extraordinaire”—sees Russia “as the ‘most powerful white power in the world.’” Michel also points out Russia’s role in amplifying white-supremacist messages. As examples he mentions that “Spencer and his wife [have] been welcomed as geopolitical analysts on Kremlin-funded [media] outposts such as RT and Sputnik” and that in 2015 “St. Petersburg hosted one of the most outspoken gatherings of far-right ideologues Europe has seen in years,” with speakers including “a pair of Americans—Jared Taylor and Sam Dickson—[who] railed against Washington's turn toward civil rights and racial equality.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Looking out Five Years: Ideological, Geopolitical, and Economic Drivers of Russian Foreign Policy,” Dimitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.22.17: The author, who is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, assesses current trends in Putin’s Russia and the economic and foreign policy challenges the country may face over the next five years. In embracing patriotism and a historic vision of Russia as distinct from Europe, Putin has made his continued presidency a “God-given mission.” But, the author notes, economic realities have put Russia “at a crossroads with a three-way choice: reform the economy and dismantle the existing politico-economic setup; go for a wholesale economic mobilization dominated by the state; or keep the system intact and face the prospect of continued decline and possibly an upheaval in the end.” Such choices may be delayed for a few years, but “can hardly be postponed beyond 2025 or 2030.” Russia faces other medium- and long-term challenges, including the rise of Islamist radicalism on its southern borders and a declining population. Reform, however, “would be exceedingly difficult under conditions of confrontation with the United States, which are unlikely to ease considerably in the next five years.” One economic path forward might come from stronger economic ties with China, Asia and the Middle East, which “can partly compensate for the losses in trade with the West and diversify … economic relations.”

“Is Russia Really Arming the Taliban? Why would Moscow reengage in a country where it was humiliated?” Krishnadev Calamur, The Atlantic, 08.25.17: The author, a senior editor at the magazine, tries to parse claims that Russia is arming the Taliban, which have been made by senior U.S. officials, most recently by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. (Russia denies the accusations.) He puts forward two reasons Russia may have for engaging with the Taliban: to “have leverage with the largest non-state actor” in Afghanistan—one “that is also supported by Pakistan”—and to make “common cause over their shared opposition to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and ISIS, both of which operate inside Afghanistan.” While the author points out that Russia would likely be delighted to see the U.S. “fail” in Afghanistan, he also cites experts who say that (a) “many of the weapons seized or documented in Afghanistan are old,” (b) “tracking arms supplies to the militants is nearly impossible” and (c) “of the weapons the Russians are said to have supplied [to] the Taliban … ‘Russian-made weapons of those calibers can be obtained in many places.’” While the U.S. claims have been made without accompanying evidence, one of the experts interviewed by the author points out that the U.S. government tends not to make such claims “‘without some type of evidence, so I wouldn’t discount the possibility.’”

China:

• No significant commentary.

Ukraine:

“Survey on Ukraine: Does Providing Lethal Weapons to Kiev Serve US Vital Interests?,” Russia Matters, 08.22.17: This piece offers the perspective of five experts on Russia and national security on whether the U.S. should provide lethal weapons to Ukraine amid its ongoing standoff with Russia-backed separatists. Among the areas of inquiry: “What U.S. vital interests are at stake in the conflict in eastern Ukraine?”; “What are your top recommendations for U.S. policy toward Ukraine?”; “Would delivering lethal weaponry to Ukraine impact U.S. vital interests and, if so, how?” All but one of the respondents express skepticism about the benefit of providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. However, Kevin Ryan, a retired general and an associate fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, argues that a “strong and unambiguous stand in support of Ukraine's security (alongside a similar stand in the Baltics) is key to restraining Russian adventurism.”

“For the U.S. to Arm Ukraine Could Be a Deadly Mistake,” Michael Kofman, New York Times, 08.25.17: The author, a senior research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses, argues that providing “defensive weapons” to Ukraine—an option favored by U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis—would mean America “is walking into a proxy war with Moscow—one that it is unprepared to win.” One argument against such military support for Kiev is that “Russia’s interests in Ukraine are far greater and its military superiority [there] is well established,” while “the United States’ coercive credibility in the region is close to nonexistent.” The timing of the proposal also seems off: “Ukraine has not seen a Russian offensive, or lost significant territory to Russia, in more than two years.” Recent reports, the author writes, have specifically mentioned Javelin anti-tank guided missiles as part of the proposed aid, but this is “an expensive and impractical choice to give a country with a large military that already has anti-tank guided missiles, and makes its own.” Ukraine’s use of such missiles in its battle against Moscow-backed separatists in the past has “had little discernible deterrent effect on Russia, which was always fighting for strategic leverage rather than territory.” The talk of U.S. military aid to Ukraine does not seem well considered, Kofman argues, as it ignores the “the balance of interests and the capabilities both sides can bring to bear.” He adds that “there is moral hazard for Washington in belligerently proclaiming support for a nation when it has zero intention to fight on that nation’s behalf. … If the Trump administration sees the conflict in Ukraine as part of a new Cold War, it should think harder about how it plans to win it.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

“Why the Russian Navy Is a More Capable Adversary Than It Appears,” Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, The National Interest, 08.22.17: The authors, research scientists at the Center for Naval Analyses, argue that Western analysts underestimate the Russian Navy at their own peril. While the navy still has “plenty of deficits,” the trend lines over the near to medium term are in fact positive. “Russia is building a navy that makes sense for its strategy. It is transitioning to a green-water force by design, while retaining and investing in capabilities that will allow it to deter or threaten stronger maritime powers for decades to come.” The modern Russian Navy, the authors write, “is not designed to compete with the U.S. Navy, but instead to counter it.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.