5 Ideas to Explore

1. "Trump is correct. Ending the war is Ukraine's best hope. This is the only country they have, and it's being devastated,” Stephen Kotkin, visiting scholar with the Applied History Project at Harvard’s Belfer Center argues in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. In the interview, Kotkin—who is also a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute—argues that there is a need to grasp three truths in the "big picture" of the war in Ukraine. First, Putin has "made an enormous strategic blunder” by unleashing this war. Second, Ukraine is "an asset, not a liability” for the West. Third, as stated above, Donald Trump is "correct" to seek an end to the war, although the president "lacks follow-through and patience,” according to the renowned historian.
2. In “How to Think About Trump and Ukraine,” Peggy Noonan presents reflections from seasoned non-MAGA foreign policy experts on Trump’s recent Ukraine diplomacy, who urge critics to not “dismiss the current initiative as mere showbiz or posturing.” “Give Donald Trump credit, he lit a fire under the diplomatic dimension,” Noonan quotes the experts as telling her. The experts told Noonan that Trump’s nonlinear style keeps the process unpredictable, making “tentative hopefulness” the most sensible stance. Trump recognizes that Vladimir Putin is a difficult counterpart and that progress will be slow, while Russia is expected to exploit the next two months of fighting before winter, she writes. Meanwhile, the core questions remain unresolved: what will real security guarantees for Ukraine entail, and how to ensure peace that brings stability rather than mere pause, she writes. “It is hard to imagine the effort succeeding. But why begrudge Trump for trying? Take a chance, try something, you never know,” she urges.
3. Has Putin been stringing Trump along on Ukraine? No, is the answer Vice President JD Vance gave Meet the Press on Aug. 24, arguing that, in fact, it was Moscow that has made “significant concessions” for the first time in years, including dropping demands to “install a puppet regime in Kyiv,”¹ accepting that “Ukraine will have territorial integrity after the war” and acknowledging “that there is going to be some security guarantee to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.”
4. "What is a 'security guarantee'?" Michael O'Hanlon of Brookings asks in the Aug. 22 issue of The Wall Street Journal. The author provides no explicit definition of what constitutes a security guarantee, but he does offer lessons on what has worked and what has not, including assurances offered during WWI, WWII and the Vietnam War. In his commentary, O'Hanlon rightly points out that even the strongest on-paper security guarantee, NATO's Article V, needed to be supplemented by troops on the ground to reassure allies. But he does not engage with the awkward position this puts Ukraine's partners in: If they seek to deter Russia, they must risk war with it by stationing personnel in Ukraine, an immensely unpopular prospect in both the U.S. and Europe. This leaves Ukraine seeking something as close to an "automatic" security guarantee as it can get without triggering the ire of foreign publics—a balancing act it may not be able to pull off.
5. “On a map” [Russia’s] gains [in Ukraine] hardly seem noticeable, measured in hundreds of yards, not hundreds of miles,” Kim Baker and Michael Schwirtz claim in their Aug. 20 article in The New York Times, entitled “What Russia Is Doing to Grab Ukrainian Land While It Still Can.” The duo reports that “Ukrainian forces have largely pushed the Russians back from their recent gains and stabilized the front line after moving in reinforcements.” “Moscow is currently trying to take the last 2,500 square miles of the Donbas that Ukraine still controls... This area has little strategic significance but definite opportunity,” they argue. Multiple main claims in this article are false and misleading. Specifically, the claim that the advance of Russian forces is “measured in hundreds of yards, not hundreds of miles” is contrary to all reports from RM’s weekly report card, which uses data from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). As the RM report cards demonstrate, in every month since January 2025 (with the exception of March 2025), Russian troops have captured more than 100 square miles of Ukrainian territory. As maps in Aug. 23’s WSJ show, in the Donetsk region, which has been the central battleground, Russia has expanded its control from 60.2% in August 2024 to 76.5% today. One should also keep in mind that Russia has recently made gains where it counts most: Ukraine’s critical logistical defense hub of Pokrovsk (which is key to control of Donbass). There, Russian forces have nearly encircled and cut off Ukraine’s defenders, and, although the Russians have been pushed back from incursions into the city itself, they continue to try to tighten the noose. Finally, the Times’ authors claim that “Ukrainian forces have largely pushed the Russians back from their recent gains and stabilized the front line” is contrary to multiple reports from the most credible sources, such as the Institute for the Study of War, which show Russia advancing in Ukraine every week this year. 

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Sept. 2, instead of Monday, Sept. 1, because of the U.S. Labor Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• “Expecting on the Front Lines: Motherhood in Ukraine’s Military,” Cassandra Vinograd and Oleksandr Chubko, The New York Times, 08.25.25.
• "He Was a Star in Russia’s Media World. Now He’s a Corporal in Ukraine’s Army," M. Gessen, The New York Times, 08.25.25.
• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:²

"Why Putin Thinks Russia Has the Upper Hand," Anatoly Kurmanaev, Oleg Matsnev, Josh Holder and Paul Sonne, The New York Times, 08.20.25. 

• “This is now a war of attrition favoring Russia, which has mobilized more men and arms than Ukraine and its Western backers.”
• “Mr. Putin figures that he can manage the wartime pressures longer than Ukraine and can secure a peace deal that would ensure his legacy. He has repeatedly demanded four regions that Moscow has claimed to have annexed and sought a deal that blocks Ukraine from NATO and limits the size of its military.”
• “Russia's early military disasters in 2022 decimated the ranks of career servicemen at the core of the invasion, and the Ukrainians exploited the weakness. A September counteroffensive that year broke through Russian lines, nearly thwarting the invasion. Mr. Putin took drastic steps to avoid defeat. He announced Russia's first mobilization since World War II, officially drafting 300,000 men. He ramped up presidential pardons and payments to enlisted convicts, bringing an estimated 100,000 men from Russian jails to the front. These measures stabilized the battlefield but at a political cost.”
• “Today, Russia recruits about 1,000 soldiers a day. The figure has stayed broadly stable since 2023, and it is about twice as high as Ukraine's. Russia's recruitment strategy has depended on the country's economic resilience. Even under the most comprehensive sanctions in modern history, Russia continues replenishing its war chest from exports of oil, natural gas, coal and gold.”
• “Many of Russia's best soldiers were killed early in the war. About 230,000 Russian soldiers have died since the invasion, according to estimates based on obituaries collected by the independent Russian news outlet Mediazona and BBC News Russian. Their replacements are older, with less military experience. The median age of a Russian soldier killed in Ukraine in the first months of the war was 28. It rose to 38 by August of this year, according to Mediazona.”
• “Ukraine has received about $70 billion worth of military equipment from its own allies in Europe and the United States, but the West hasn't mobilized its industrial base as Russia has.”
• “Yelabuga's scientists have reengineered the Iranian [drone] models to improve them. The Russian version, the Geran-2, flies higher and carries more explosives. It is Russia's main weapon in its bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. Russia has tripled production of the Geran-2 since 2023 and makes about 80 a day, according to The Royal United Services Institute, a London-based research organization with ties to the country's defense ministry, known as RUSI.”
• “Russia has used its increased supply of drones to drastically escalate its bombing campaign, launching an average of 200 drones every night in July and once topping more than 700. Early in the war, Russia's biggest attacks included 40 drones, according to RUSI.”
• “By late 2023, the Russian Army had regained its footing but continued to underperform. Endemic corruption and irregular supplies hobbled offensives and bred discontent....In May 2024, Mr. Putin decided to act. He fired the old friend who was his longest-serving minister, Sergei K. Shoigu, from his post atop the defense ministry. Russian prosecutors began jailing Mr. Shoigu's associates on corruption charges. Mr. Putin chose an unusual replacement: a stone-faced economist without military expertise named Andrei Belousov.”
• “In this summer's offensive, Russia is experimenting with sending small groups of camouflaged soldiers deep inside enemy lines, where they hide in abandoned buildings or ravines, before mounting coordinated attacks. This played out recently in the battle for the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk.”
• “Early in the war, Russia had sent armored columns to the town, with disastrous results, as videos show. Late last year, its forces changed tack, gradually occupying the fields on Vuhledar's flanks over several months. The move allowed Russia's drone operators to get around the town and target Ukrainian supplies. When Russia then launched a general assault, Vuhledar fell in about a day. The defenders withdrew to avoid being trapped.”

“What Russia Is Doing to Grab Ukrainian Land While It Still Can,” Kim Baker and Michael Schwirtz, The New York Times, 08.20.25. 

• “On a map, the gains hardly seem noticeable, measured in hundreds of yards, not hundreds of miles. But as President Trump presses Ukraine and Russia to make a deal to end their war, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia is pushing to capture as much land as possible along a frontline that stretches about 750 miles, almost the distance from Chicago to New York.”
• “Ukrainian forces have largely pushed the Russians back from their recent gains and stabilized the front line after moving in reinforcements, according to interviews and battlefield maps.”
• “‘Given that political negotiations and deals are starting to emerge, Putin is trying to use the short amount of time left to grab as much territory as he can,’ said Col. Dmytro Palisa, commander of Ukraine’s 33rd Mechanized Brigade.”
• “Moscow is currently trying to take the last 2,500 square miles of the Donbas that Ukraine still controls.”
• “This area has little strategic significance but definite opportunity. By Aug. 11, a Monday, the Russians had pushed about 8.5 miles north in two long incursions that resembled rabbit ears, east of Dobropillia, the map showed.” Multiple main claims in this article are false and misleading. Specifically, the claim that the advance of Russian forces is “measured in hundreds of yards, not hundreds of miles” is contrary to all reports from RM’s weekly report card, which uses data from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). As the RM report cards demonstrate, in every month since January 2025 (with the exception of March 2025), Russian troops have captured more than 100 square miles of Ukrainian territory. As maps in Aug. 23’s WSJ show, in the Donetsk region, which has been the central battleground, Russia has expanded its control from 60.2% in August 2024 to 76.5% today. One should also keep in mind that Russia has recently made gains where it counts most: Ukraine’s critical logistical defense hub of Pokrovsk (which is key to control of Donbass). There, Russian forces have nearly encircled and cut off Ukraine’s defenders, and, although the Russians have been pushed back from incursions into the city itself, they continue to try to tighten the noose. Finally, the Times’ authors claim that “Ukrainian forces have largely pushed the Russians back from their recent gains and stabilized the front line” is contrary to multiple reports from the most credible sources, such as the Institute for the Study of War, which show Russia advancing in Ukraine every week this year. 

"Drones Drive Battlefield Motorcycle Tactical Shift," Darragh McGovern, RUSI, 08.21.25. 

• “The widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), especially first-person view (FPV) drones, has reshaped battlefield tactics,” Darragh McGovern writes.
• “This has led both Russian and Ukrainian forces to adapt, increasingly turning to motorcycles and All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) for their mobility, speed and expendability,” according to the author.
• “What is emerging is a new light cavalry paradigm—faster, quieter, more modular and adapted to high-tempo, electronically contested environments,” the author argues.
• “Unlike heavily armored vehicles, which carry large numbers of troops and are high-value targets for drones, motorcycles offer a dispersed, fast-moving alternative,” McGovern explains.
• “Russian assault motorcycles are being outfitted with iron cages to defend against drone strikes and, in some cases, with portable electronic warfare (EW) equipment designed to jam incoming UAVs,” the author writes.
• “While motorcycles are effective for fast, agile troop movements, ATVs offer distinct advantages in payload capacity, stability, and off-road capability—filling a critical niche in the current conflict,” according to the author.
• “Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are experimenting with and institutionalizing these innovations, suggesting that the future of ground warfare may belong not just to armored formations or infantry alone, but to hybrid, networked forces capable of maneuvering intelligently under constant aerial threat,” the author argues.

"Inside Russia’s Shadow Military Sustaining the War," Mariya Y. Omelicheva, War on the Rocks, 08.22.25. 

• “Russia is leaning ever harder on irregular forces to sustain its war on Ukraine,” Mariya Y. Omelicheva writes.
• “These formations are institutionalized under state control and deployed at scale, making up as much as 40 percent of the Russian-commanded troops now arrayed against Ukraine,” the author explains.
• “This shadow force gives Moscow a flexible instrument for attritional warfare and covert mobilization…while they expand Moscow’s manpower without triggering domestic political backlash, they erode the professionalism of regular forces,” according to the author.
• “Estimates suggest that irregular formations account for between one-third and one-half of Russia’s deployed ground forces in Ukraine, a staggering proportion by any modern standard,” Omelicheva argues.
• “Russia’s irregular formations are no longer stop-gaps — they are a central pillar of Moscow’s warfighting machine,” the author writes.
• “Outsourcing warfighting to irregular formations enables Moscow to wage a prolonged war of attrition while insulating itself from domestic backlash,” according to the author.
• “Even if the war in Ukraine ended tomorrow, these structures would likely persist. Irregular formations are now embedded in Russia’s sprawling system of military and security services,” Omelicheva explains.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How the West Can Halt Putin's Battlefield Momentum," Jillian Kay Melchior, The Wall Street Journal, 08.19.25.
• "The details of a difficult Ukraine deal come into view," Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 08.19.25.
• "From Alaska to the White House to the Battlefields of Ukraine," Michael Kofman, Dara Massicot, and Ryan Evans, War on the Rocks, 08.2025. Podcast.
• "How Much of Ukraine Does Russia Control?" John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 08.18.25. 

Military aid to Ukraine: 

"What Is a 'Security Guarantee'?" Michael O'Hanlon, The Wall Street Journal, 08.22.25.

• “The Alaska summit and subsequent talks in Washington have reignited discussions about security guarantees for Ukraine. What should these entail? History provides useful lessons on what works and what doesn’t.”
  • “World War I was an object lesson in the dangers of offering security guarantees lightly.”
  • “After World War II, the West got more serious about security and alliances. After the Iron Curtain descended on eastern Europe, and the Soviets initiated the Berlin blockade in 1948, Western powers in 1949 formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization..... It wasn’t until the U.S. permanently stationed troops in West Germany, which joined the alliance in 1955, that Europeans began feeling secure.”
  • “When the U.S. issued security guarantees to South Vietnam through the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, it didn’t send combat forces until the fighting was well under way. At that point the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were already committed, and a security guarantee was too late to deter war.”
• “In 1994, the U.S., Britain and Russia promised Ukraine that they would ensure its security if it relinquished nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union and sent them to Russia. That was a weak ‘guarantee’ lacking any treaty codification, discussion of enforcement methods or promise to come materially to Ukraine’s defense in a moment of peril. This history shows how the U.S. and allies can support Ukraine.”
  • “First and most important, we must help Ukraine remain capable of defending itself.”
  • “But a western backstop would also help. History suggests that the physical presence of foreign military forces on Ukrainian soil is crucial to deterrence.”
  • “The U.S. could contribute to the deterrence effort by stationing rapid-reaction forces and air power in nearby Poland.”
  • “In addition, America could sign security assistance contracts with the Ukrainian government that would permanently station several hundred U.S. contractors in Ukraine to help provide air and missile defense for major cities.” 

"What Would Security Guarantees in Ukraine Look Like?" Benjamin Jensen, CSIS, 08.20.25. 

• “The smallest the force could be is around 6,000 military and civilian personnel…The more realistic number…could be over 100,000 and comparable to the size of the full active forces of countries such as Greece or Spain,” the author explains.
• “A true security guarantee must be larger than a small ceasefire monitoring mission. The goal is not to match Russia tank-for-tank, but to create a formidable deterrent that raises the cost of any future invasion to an unacceptable level,” Jensen argues.
• “To deny Moscow air superiority…the air force will have to be much larger than existing NATO air policing missions. This force would need to be at least 40 aircraft strong and could grow to as large as 160 aircraft,” according to the commentary.
• “The Black Sea remains a critical theater…securing Ukraine’s access to maritime commerce is a vital economic interest…this can be achieved with a combination of land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, naval drones, and a smaller flotilla of agile patrol craft,” Jensen writes.
• “A durable peace will require capabilities that transcend the traditional land, sea, and air environments. There will need to be robust space and cyber capabilities aligned with any security guarantee,” the author explains.
• “This is not a short-term mission; it is a generational commitment…The security guarantee itself must be indefinite. It represents a fundamental shift in Ukraine's strategic posture by integrating it into the Western security architecture,” Jensen concludes.

"How to Defend Ukraine’s Skies During Peace Negotiations," Benjamin Jensen, Mark Montgomery and Jose M. Macias III, CSIS, 08.20.25. 

• “Air superiority remains a decisive factor in modern warfare. As Ukraine continues to defend itself against Russian aggression, policymakers and military planners are grappling with a fundamental question: How many aircraft are required to secure Ukrainian airspace sufficiently to deter Russian provocations?” the authors write.
• “Based on analyzing historic NATO operations…we estimate that it will take 40–160 aircraft to protect the skies of Ukraine during a ceasefire and peace process,” according to the commentary.
• “Historical precedent shows Russia is unlikely to honor an agreement without a formidable foe in their way, thus creating a need to secure the peace with military power, including a mix of foreign observers and missions like ‘no fly zones’ and ‘aerial policing,’” the authors explain.
• “NATO’s Air Policing mission…has operated in various regions from Iceland to the Baltics since 1961, offering a model of collective air defense in which nations with advanced airpower capabilities protect those without such capabilities,” Jensen, Montgomery and Macias write.
• “Maintaining a 24-hour combat air patrol requires a minimum of two aircraft per airborne fighter, significantly reducing the number of available aircraft for offensive operations,” according to the authors.
• “Assuming successful integration with Ukrainian air defense and leveraging external intelligence and support assets, Ukraine would need a minimum of 24 aircraft operating out of three airbases in country,” the commentary argues.
• “For a more expansive area defense, this number would grow to almost 160 aircraft operating in three sectors along Ukraine’s border with Russia and Belarus,” the authors conclude.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Europe lacks plan if Trump pulls Ukraine support," Pierre Briancon, Reuters, 08.18.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"How Europe Can Pressure Putin—Without Trump," Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 08.18.25. 

• “Now that Trump appears to have sworn off additional economic sanctions to push Russia into a cease-fire, Europe may have to go it alone,” Keith Johnson writes.
• “Trump appeared to revert to his default position of blaming Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for getting invaded by its larger avaricious neighbor,” Johnson writes.
• “Europe has plenty of cards to play in this conflict even if the Trump administration has opted for appeasement,” Johnson writes.
• “The United States and Europe have all the cards. They are just not willing to play them, and that is nowhere more evident than in the realm of economic warfare,” Tom Keatinge said, as quoted by Johnson.
• “From the start, the G-7 allies have talked a tough game but have never gone all in on sanctions. We have, at every step of the way, fallen short of what we would need,” Keatinge said, as quoted by Johnson.
• “Europe may have to go it alone, in much the same way it has been contemplating going it alone in terms of providing Ukraine with what security assistance it can in the absence of fresh Trump administration deliveries of arms or military aid to Kyiv,” Johnson writes.
• “The Europeans have had plenty of time to figure out how to take action, and there is plenty Europe could do by itself if it chose to drop the hammer,” Keatinge said, as quoted by Keith Johnson.
• “[One]long-standing option for Europe would be to seize the approximately $220 billion in Russian Central Bank reserves already frozen three years ago by Europe and the United States,” Johnson writes.

"An update on the efficacy of sanctions against Russia," Robin Brooks and Ben Harris, Brookings, 08.21.25.

• “U.S. sanctions continue to be substantially more effective than EU and U.K. sanctions, which reinforces just how important it is for the U.S. to join recent EU and U.K. efforts,” Robin Brooks and Ben Harris write.
• “Since June, the EU and the U.K. have aggressively sanctioned Russian-controlled ships,” the authors explain.
• “The last sanctions imposed by the U.S. were on January 10, when the Treasury Department sanctioned 182 Russian-controlled ships in the final days of the Biden administration,” according to the article.
• “U.S.-based sanctions appear to be more effective at depressing shadow fleet activity than EU and U.K. ones, possibly due to greater fear of secondary sanctions,” Brooks and Harris argue.
• “The EU has now sanctioned 444 ships and the U.K. has sanctioned 423 vessels, while the U.S. remains at 216,” the authors note.
• “U.S. sanctions are associated with sharply lower shadow fleet activity than EU or U.K. sanctions…across the board, U.S. sanctions are associated with an 80% drop in activity, while unsanctioned ships see a rise of similar magnitude,” the authors write.
• “Full coordination will help reduce Russian oil revenue and hopefully bring Putin to the negotiating table in good faith,” Brooks and Harris conclude.

“Why Haven't Sanctions on Russia Stopped the War?" Aaron Krolik, The New York Times, 08.25.25. 

• “Since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the United States has put more than 6,000 individuals and companies with ties to the Russian war effort on the official sanctions list,” Aaron Krolik writes.
• “Russia has managed to conduct hundreds of billions of dollars in cross-border trade. One reason could be that the financial institutions necessary to facilitate that trade are not being found and punished,” the author explains.
• “Few big penalties have been issued since 2019…Fearing enormous fines, global banks invested billions in compliance departments, which cut off suspicious transaction activity and severed ties with entire countries deemed too risky,” Krolik notes.
• “Cut off from much of the Western world, Russia has forged deeper ties with India and China, large economies that provide an economic lifeline,” according to the article.
• “Chinese banks are nearly ‘unsanctionable,’ according to Martin Chorzempa…Sanctioning a large Chinese financial institution could lead to global financial instability,” the author writes.
• “In 2024, roughly 72 percent of India’s imports of Russian crude arrived via 425 shadow tankers in the first eight months,” Krolik writes.
• “Europe lacks the financial leverage to enforce sanctions globally. They don't really have a lot of mechanisms to make sure the sanctions are followed,” Maria Snegovaya said, as quoted in the article.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Donald Trump’s Tariffs Can Cripple Russia—If Done Right," Max Meizlish and Angela Howard, The National Interest, 08.19.25.
• "Could foreign investors flock back to Russia?" Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 08.22.25. Clues from Russian Views.

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Declarations: How to Think About Trump and Ukraine," Peggy Noonan, The Wall Street Journal, 08.23.25. 

• “What follows is a combination of the best thoughts and observations, on background, of two non-MAGA foreign-policy professionals of significant achievement.”
  • “Don't dismiss the current initiative as mere showbiz or posturing. The war in Ukraine has caused devastation, disruption, probably a million casualties. Give Donald Trump credit, he lit a fire under the diplomatic dimension.”
  • “People don't know what to think because the story changes every day. You can't follow the balls and strikes every minute, you can't follow every pitch. The story's moving all over the place because it's not linear because Mr. Trump is not linear.”
  • “An appropriate attitude is tentative hopefulness. Mr. Trump appears to know Mr. Putin isn't someone easy to bring to agreements. Mr. Trump tries to charm him, but Mr. Putin's behavior has led him to understand progress will take time.”
  • “Mr. Putin is in no hurry. The next two months are still fighting season. In November comes the mud. Russia will use this time to inflict more damage, demoralize more Ukrainians, maybe gain ground.”
  • “The meeting this week of the major leaders of Europe, President Volodymyr Zelensky and Mr. Trump was a historic ten-strike, more than is probably appreciated. Mr. Putin didn't want to see that meeting, that unity.”
  • “Mr. Trump's foreign-policy team is coming into its own.”
  • “The devil is in the details, and some details are essentials. What exactly do the Europeans, and Americans, mean by "security guarantees" for Ukraine? What will Mr. Zelensky accept, and Mr. Putin? The definition of success can't become peace at any price; it has to be a peace that establishes a certain order and stability so it can settle in. What if Mr. Putin endlessly plays things along?”
• “It is hard to imagine the effort succeeding. But why begrudge Trump for trying? Take a chance, try something, you never know.”
• “There will be plenty of time to laugh at Mr. Trump in coming months and years. Madeline Albright once observed that when Americans talk foreign policy, everything always comes down either Munich or Vietnam. If this is Munich we'll know it soon enough, but we don't know it now. Hope for the best.”

"Russia and Ukraine Are as Far Apart as Ever," Ivo H. Daalder, Foreign Policy, 08.19.25. 

• “The fundamental reality confronting Trump is that Russia and Ukraine are pursuing irreconcilable objectives,” according to the author.
• “Wars, bloody though they often are, are anything but irrational. They reflect real political conflict and an assessment by one or more of the parties that fighting is a better way to achieve their objectives than diplomacy or negotiations,” Daalder argues.
• “For Trump and his chief peace envoy, Steve Witkoff, the conflict is about territory—and the prospect of territorial swaps suggests the possibility of ending the war,” the author writes.
• “Ukraine cannot and will not give up any territory that Russia doesn’t even hold,” according to the author.
• “So we’re left with ‘Article 5 protection’ or ‘NATO-like’ guarantees. On Monday, Zelensky and his European colleagues sought to suss out Trump on what this would mean concretely,” the author writes.
• “Any Russian commitments not to attack Ukraine or European countries…aren’t worth the paper that they’re written on,” the author believes.
• “A time for negotiating will come, but only if and when both parties believe their interests are better served by talking than by continuing to fight. Until then, the most important effort must be to support Ukraine and increase the pressure on Russia,” Daalder argues.

"The Weekend Interview with Stephen Kotkin: With Putin, 'Ultimately, Trump Holds the Cards,'" Tunku Varadarajan, The Wall Street Journal, 08.23.25. 

• "Nobody can do more damage to Putin than President Trump," Stephen Kotkin says. "Putin is actually afraid of Trump. Trump is the only one who could hurt Putin in a big way."
• “Speaking by Zoom from his Hoover office, he's keen to establish that we need to grasp three truths in the ‘big picture’ of the war in Ukraine,” the author writes.
  • “The first is a ‘paradox that people don't usually put together’: Although much-smaller Ukraine may be ‘losing a war of attrition,’ Mr. Putin ‘made an enormous strategic blunder and is damaging Russia severely for the long term.’ He has lost his country's old sphere of influence.”
  • “Second, Ukraine is ‘an asset, not a liability -- but we don't seem to be able to appreciate how it's an asset, and why.’ He means that ‘Ukraine has an army’ -- a serious one, unlike, say, Germany. ... He adds that military aid to Ukraine is ‘actually going to the American defense industry.’”
  • “Third, Mr. Trump is ‘correct’ to seek an end to the war: ‘I applaud his forced imposition of a negotiation process.’ But the president ‘lacks follow-through and patience. He lacks consistency.’”
• “Mr. Kotkin says with the laugh of an unsentimental realist. ‘Crimea is going back to Ukraine the day after Texas goes back to Mexico.’”
• “So how could Ukraine win the peace? Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is out of the question, if only because the U.S. opposes it. The alternative is ‘joining the West through accession to the European Union,’ Mr. Kotkin says. ‘They'll need massive domestic reforms to be able to join. But it's a great process for bringing countries into constitutional rule-of-law, open-society, and market-economy institutions.’”
• “The other marker of a Ukrainian win is ‘some type of security, which some people call 'security guarantees', but which looks more like the 'steel porcupine' approach.’”
• “Mr. Putin is at an advantage, Mr. Kotkin says, because he doesn't need ‘the maximalist win’ -- a restoration of the Soviet empire or even the Soviet Union. ‘He wins by wrecking Ukraine, which is hurt by the continuation of the war.’ He gains merely by keeping the war going... Thus Mr. Kotkin concludes ‘Trump is correct. Ending the war is Ukraine's best hope. This is the only country they have, and it's being devastated.’”
• “The flaw in Mr. Trump's approach ‘is that he didn't put the same pressure on the other party,’ [Putin] Mr. Kotkin says.”
• “Most important, the West needs ‘very severe political pressure on Putin's regime, and that comes in the form of alternatives to his rule.’”
• “There are other things Mr. Trump could do. These include a removal of Russia's Gazprombank from the Swift international banking system, to which it still has tenuous access, greenlighting the confiscation of $300 billion worth of Russian deposits in European banks, getting India to ‘buckle’ and stop buying of Russian oil, and, most audacious, ‘cutting a deal with Xi Jinping behind Putin's back to reduce China's support for Russia in a bargain between the U.S. and China. It's thinkable.’”
• “Of all the threats Mr. Putin faces, Mr. Kotkin says again, ‘none is bigger than President Trump. Putin may smirk. He may walk down that red carpet in a strut. He may joke for the camera with President Trump. But ultimately, Trump holds the cards. And if the president uses those cards, he could unsettle Putin's smirk, his self-confidence, and his maximalist demands. Will this happen? I don't know. But it's there for the taking.’”

"Is Trump’s Push for Peace in Ukraine a Fantasy?" Eric Ciaramella and Andrew S. Weiss, Carnegie Politika, 08.21.25. 

• Eric Ciaramella:
  • “It’s extraordinary that within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, seven European leaders dropped everything to join with Zelensky and press a unified cause to Trump and the White House,” Ciaramella said.
  • “The focus, thanks to European and Ukrainian diplomacy, shifted from territory and land swaps to the much more important question of Ukraine’s long-term security and relationship with the West,” the author explains.
  • “There is a lot of vague talk about 'Article 5-like' guarantees for Ukraine, but the reality is most proposals lack the substance of actual NATO security commitments,” Ciaramella argues.
  • “Congress must be involved in any serious U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine—without it, such guarantees risk being only words on paper,” the author states.
  • “Diplomacy is good and necessary, but so far Trump’s approach lacks the policy detail and coherence needed for lasting results,” Ciaramella concludes.
• Andrew S. Weiss:
• “Trump’s drive to put Ukraine on the back burner and relaunch U.S.-Russia ties keeps running into the reality that ending this war isn’t possible without throwing Ukraine under the bus,” Weiss writes.
• “Russia’s offers at Anchorage, described as big concessions, are illusory—there’s no genuine Russian opening on security guarantees or territory,” the author argues.
• “Putin’s irreducible minimum appears to be domination of Ukraine, not just a border adjustment; the war will continue as long as that’s his objective,” Weiss explains.
• “Ukraine is not on its knees or desperate. Even with a poor outlook, they’d rather fight on than give Putin what he wants on Russia’s terms,” according to the author.
• “Moscow’s real strategy is testing the West’s unity and hoping for U.S. disengagement, which could allow Russia to achieve its aims over time,” Andrew S. Weiss concludes.

“Meet the Press – August 24, 2025 Vice President JD Vance,” NBC News, 08.24.25.

• [When asked Are the Russians stringing President Trump along?] “No, not at all. I think the Russians have made significant concessions to President Trump for the first time in three and a half years of this conflict. They've actually been willing to be flexible on some of their core demands....we're going to continue to make progress. But, ultimately, whether the killing stops, that determination is going to belong to whether the Russians and Ukrainians can actually find some middle ground here.”
• “What they [Russians] have conceded is the recognition that Ukraine will have territorial integrity after the war. They've recognized that they're not going to be able to install a puppet regime in Kyiv. That was, of course, a major demand at the beginning. And importantly, they've acknowledged that there is going to be some security guarantee to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.”
• “The Russians have done a lot of things that we don't like. A lot of civilians have died. We've condemned that stuff from the get go. And frankly, President Trump has done more to apply pressure and to apply economic leverage to the Russians, certainly than Joe Biden did.”
• “No, sanctions aren't off the table. ... The president has applied aggressive economic leverage. For example, the secondary tariffs on India, to try to make it harder for the Russians to get rich from their oil economy.”
• [When asked: is the only thing that President Trump is asking Russia to give up is not to invade all of Ukraine?] “No, that's not it at all. It's providing the Ukrainians the kind of security guarantees that ensures that country is not going to be invaded again. You know, this is why I think we've made a lot of progress, Kristen. Even though we're not yet there, why we've made a lot of progress is fundamentally the disagreement here is over security guarantees versus where you draw the battle lines in Ukraine. So whether we solve those issues, we've actually identified the two critical issues, one to Ukrainians, one to the Russians. And I think that is where the fruit, if we ultimately solve this thing, that's where the fruit of an agreement will come.”
• “Ukrainians are going to ultimately make the determination about where you draw the territorial lines in their own country. ... If Ukrainians are willing to say something on territory that brings the conflict to the close, we're not going to stop them.”
• “We not talking about security guarantees until after the war has come to a close. And, of course, the Russians are going to be a part of the conversation about bringing that war to a close. So, of course, they're going to have some stake in this. They're going to talk about this. That doesn't mean that they're going to have troops in Ukrainian territory.”
• “The president's been very clear. There are not going to be [American] boots on the ground in Ukraine, but we are going to continue to play an active role in trying to ensure that the Ukrainians have the security guarantees and the confidence they need to stop the war on their end.”

"Trump must not reward Putin for his aggression in Ukraine," Mike Pompeo, Financial Times, 08.22.25. 

• “Putin has indicated that he wants Zelenskyy to surrender the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk provinces as a condition for ending the war. This would be a strategic catastrophe for Ukraine and a political non-starter for its government...Handing control of Ukraine’s industrial heartland and key defensive belt to Russia — which thousands of Ukrainians have fought and died to defend — would stymie the country’s reconstruction and set the stage for Russia to complete its conquest.” The author warns that "Handing control of Ukraine’s industrial heartland [Donetsk and Luhansk provinces]... would stymie the country’s reconstruction and set the stage for Russia to complete its conquest." According to USG's estimates, Russia already controls 75%+ of Donetsk region and 99% of Luhansk region, so control of Donbas is already more or less “handed” over.
• “Rewarding Putin’s aggression with territorial gains would signal to every dictator worldwide that violence pays. Russia’s neighbors in the Baltics and other former Soviet states such as Moldova would then have serious cause to fear that they could be next on Putin’s list.”
• “[T]here is a red line: Ukraine should never be compelled to recognize Russia’s claims to territories Moscow has seized and occupied illegally.”
• “Any peace deal that does not include robust security guarantees for Ukraine is not worth the paper it’s printed on.”
• “Putin must be convinced that any future aggression will trigger an overwhelming response. ...appeasement only whets their appetite; to paraphrase Winston Churchill, it’s akin to feeding a crocodile, hoping you’ll be eaten last.”

"Russia–Ukraine: peace looks more remote than ever," Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 08.21.25. 

• “Russia has not scaled back its ambitions and America will not pressure it to do so. Territorial issues and security guarantees are currently second-order issues. The war remains intractable,” Nigel Gould-Davies writes.
• “Trump has definitively abandoned his repeated demands on Russia for an immediate ceasefire. He has also ruled out further sanctions. These amount to further concessions to Russia,” according to the author.
• “Putin’s position, unlike Trump’s, remains firm and consistent. He has not moderated his position in any significant way,” Nigel Gould-Davies explains.
• “Putin insists on a settlement that goes far beyond questions of territory to address the ‘root causes’ of the war. This would lead to the subordination of Ukrainian statehood and identity, and advance his long-term goal of reshaping European security on terms dictated by Russia,” the author argues.
• “Questions of territory… are at this stage largely irrelevant. They will matter when conditions for a genuine peace process emerge. But they are currently a distraction that risks obscuring the deeper intractability of the war,” the author writes.
• “Any ‘security guarantees’… are thus also at this stage a second-order question…since Trump has consistently bent his position towards Russia, neither Ukraine nor Europe can have any great confidence that commitments made now would be honored when tested,” Gould-Davies contends.
• “Peace is further away than ever,” the author concludes.

"The President’s Path to Peace in Ukraine," Michael Froman, Council on Foreign Relations, 08.22.25. 

• “The stakes for brokering an enduring peace in the Russia-Ukraine War are high. Above all, a sovereign, secure and prosperous Ukraine,” Michael Froman writes.
• “If anything, last week’s summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Trump revealed the difficulties of forging a lasting peace in the largest land war in Europe since World War II,” the author argues.
• “Alaska laid bare just how little progress has been made. For starters, there was no ceasefire. To the contrary, Russia appears determined to keep on bombing and taking offensive action against Ukraine while an overall peace agreement gets worked out,” according to the author.
• “The Russian side still seeks its maximalist objectives, including the complete and permanent annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, in addition to Crimea,” Froman explains.
• “Trump has two primary paths to alter the course of the war. Each has its tradeoffs,” the author writes.
• “One path forward is to significantly reduce U.S. support for Ukraine. A dramatic reduction in support could force Kyiv to eventually negotiate on Russian terms, as the war of attrition gradually erodes the country’s capacity to fight,” according to Froman.
• “A peace forged on Russian terms is unlikely to win Trump a Nobel Peace Prize: One doesn’t get the prize for capitulation,” the author concludes.

"Beyond the Alaska summit," Angela Stent, Brookings, 08.21.25. 

• “Trump has pursued two tracks in negotiating with Russia: resetting relations with Russia for business deals, and seeking to end the war,” Angela Stent writes.
• “The Alaska summit ended early…with no announcements on business deals. In Alaska, it appeared that the two tracks of Trump’s diplomacy were linked, and because there was no agreement on ending the war, the U.S. side declined to discuss economic incentives,” according to Stent.
• “Trump emerged from the meeting saying that he had changed his mind about the necessity for a ceasefire to precede a peace agreement. He now said that they should go straight to a peace deal,” the author explains.
• “Putin insisted that Ukraine recognize the incorporation of the Donbas, which Russia does not fully control, into Russia,” Stent writes.
• “It is clear that Putin wants to continue fighting because he believes Russia can win the war, and he is using the vague promise of more talks to delay any real negotiations while Russia continues to bomb cities throughout Ukraine,” the author argues.
• “The White House meeting ended with a European commitment to provide some boots on the ground to enforce a peace settlement, an assertion that the United States would be involved in security guarantees, and that an ‘Article 5-type’ guarantee would be given to Ukraine to deter a future Russian invasion,” Stent explains.
• “There is no indication that Putin has any interest in ending a war that he believes he is winning. He will only negotiate seriously when he believes that Russia cannot prevail,” Stent concludes. 

"What It Would Actually Take to End the War in Ukraine," Joshua Yaffa, The New Yorker, 08.22.25. 

• “Territory, an issue that Trump and his special envoy, Steven Witkoff, have returned to time and again, is actually not the primary concern for either side,” Joshua Yaffa writes.
• “For Putin, lopping off Ukrainian territory … is a way to achieve his ultimate goal: a loyal and neutered Ukraine that does not threaten Russia and is free of undue Western influence,” the author explains.
• “Putin’s position appears to be that Ukraine should withdraw from the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in the country’s east, that it still controls,” Yaffa writes.
• “Putin wants the entirety of the Donbas, as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions together are known, for two reasons—neither of which relates to the intrinsic qualities or benefits of the land, per se. The first reason essentially pertains to image and propaganda… The second reason is that Russian forces will be in constant striking distance of other Ukrainian population centers,” the author explains.
• “Zelensky faces the same pressures, but in reverse… losing the entirety of [Donbas] would be a big blow to morale … after Donbas, there is basically just open steppe without any natural defensive lines,” Balazs Jarabik said, as quoted by Yaffa.
• “Ukraine could, for example, withdraw its troops from particular areas without making any formal territorial concessions, creating an unrecognized but indefinite line of separation, like the one that followed the Korean armistice, in 1953, or the division of Berlin, during the Cold War,” the author writes.
• “Putin would like Trump to force its conditions on Ukraine… But Trump appears to be saying that, on matters of Ukraine’s future borders, laws, and constitution, Putin and Zelensky will have to come to some arrangement between themselves,” Yaffa concludes.

"Putin is back in the driver’s seat on Ukraine: Moscow is seeking victory, not compromise, through diplomacy — and Trump is playing along," Alexander Gabuev, Financial Times, 08.19.25. 

• “Putin convinced Donald Trump that it’s better not to seek a ceasefire, but a comprehensive deal to end the conflict in Ukraine — and that diplomacy should proceed in parallel with the fighting,” Alexander Gabuev writes.
• “Now Putin is back in the driver’s seat and his game plan is to drag on the negotiations while wearing down Ukraine on the battlefield,” according to the author.
• “Continuing the war remains Putin’s only source of leverage to secure a desirable outcome, and he is unlikely to surrender this tool even under pressure,” the author argues.
• “Putin is convinced that China and India, the two lifelines of the Russian war economy, will not throw his country under the bus,” the author believes.
• “The Kremlin is convinced that the battlefield dynamics are shifting in its favor — and that Ukraine’s losses in this war of attrition may soon be accelerated,” Gabuev writes.
• “The concessions he is demanding from Ukraine — first and foremost the surrender of fortified parts of Donbas under Ukrainian control — are unacceptable to Zelenskyy for military, moral and political reasons,” the author argues.
• “The grim reality is that the talks will be accompanied by ongoing fighting that may continue for months or years,” according to the author.

 "Trump Has No Idea How to Do Diplomacy," Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 08.19.25. 

• “U.S. President Donald Trump is a terrible negotiator, a true master of the ‘art of the giveaway,’” Stephen M. Walt argues.
• “All Trump really craves is attention, coupled with dramatic visuals that suggest he is in charge. The substance of any deal he might make is secondary if not irrelevant,” according to the author.
• “Is there anything Trump got for the United States, its allies, or Ukraine when he met with Putin in Alaska? Did Putin give anything up?” the author writes.
• “Nothing has been more damaging to the Western position on this issue than its foreign-policy elite’s head-in-the-sand refusal to acknowledge that open-ended NATO enlargement…was a strategic blunder,” Walt argues.
• “The uncomfortable reality is that Moscow has been willing to put its economy on a war footing and sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives to achieve its goals, and Ukraine’s Western supporters have not and will not,” the author believes.
• “Article 5 is not an airtight security pledge and certainly not a tripwire that automatically triggers the dispatch of allied troops to help a member state that has been attacked,” according to the author.
• “If you’re looking for someone to conduct serious and well-prepared negotiations, however, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is not the address I’d pick,” the author writes.

"Ukraine Will Not Be a Pawn: Any Deal to End the War Must Respect the Country’s Independence," Dmytro Kuleba, Foreign Affairs, 08.22.25.  Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin is pretending he wants peace. U.S. President Donald Trump is riding along with him, pretending (or perhaps truly thinking) that Putin is sincere. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is pretending he believes Trump, as are leaders in Europe,” Dmytro Kuleba writes.
• “Trump…used the Alaska meeting to free himself from domestic pressure to impose harsh sanctions on Russian oil or to take other forceful measures,” according to the author.
• “Trump has repeatedly expressed admiration for powerful dictatorships and endorsed the idea that, in international relations, strong countries should do as they like,” Kuleba argues.
• “But no matter how many times Putin and Trump speak, and no matter what they do, Ukrainians are strong enough to avoid having their future dictated to them,” the author writes.
• “The best [partners] can do is not deprive Ukraine of what it is already getting,” according to Kuleba.
• “Bringing the war to a full conclusion requires far more time and concessions than does arranging a cease-fire. More time, however, is exactly what Putin is after,” the author argues.
• “Diplomats can profess that they are making progress. Yet no statement, summit, or social media post can substitute for actually understanding Ukraine’s demands—and creating a strategy that meets them,” Kuleba writes.

"The Ukraine Peace Process Is Moving Quite Fast," Anatol Lieven, The Nation, 08.20.25.

• “The Ukraine peace process is now moving as fast as can reasonably be expected,” Anatol Lieven writes.
• “Major obstacles remain. Of these, the greatest from Ukraine’s point of view is probably the continued Russian demand for Ukrainian military withdrawal from the approximately 30 percent of Donetsk region that Ukraine still holds,” the author explains.
• “Trump has raised the idea of a swap of this territory for the small areas that Russia holds in Kharkiv and Sumy provinces (which Russia does not claim as its territory). This would…mean Ukraine exchanging around 3,000 square miles of territory for 150 square miles, which hardly looks like an equitable deal,” according to the author.
• “An obvious deal could involve Russia dropping its territorial demand…in return for the West giving up the idea of a European reassurance force for Ukraine, backed by US airpower. This idea is, in any case, foolish,” Lieven argues.
• “European insistence on this force also reveals either the deep hypocrisy or the utter confusion of European thinking,” the author writes.
• “There are also other areas in which the West could offer concessions to Russia in return for dropping the territorial demand; areas, moreover, which would do no harm to Ukraine. One would obviously be the suspension of all Western sanctions against Russia, though with a ‘snap back’ clause stating that they would automatically resume if Russia launched new aggression,” according to the author.
• “Such a deal should be proposed first to the Russians. If they rejected it, then full US arms supplies (and sanctions) should continue, most likely condemning the Russian army to years more of very slow and costly advance through ruined lands,” Lieven argues.

"Can Trump Seal the Ukraine Deal?" Karl Rove, The Wall Street Journal, 08.21.25. 

• “One thing has remained constant: Vladimir Putin's demands -- the surrender of territory he hasn't conquered, the end of an independent Ukraine and, in its place, a puppet state from which he can threaten Europe,” Karl Rove writes.
• “If Mr. Trump brokered a successful deal, the talk of his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize would spread beyond Turning Point USA gatherings,” the author argues.
• “The second possible outcome: If Russia and Ukraine can't come to an agreement, the conflict would rage on over battlefields filled with dead soldiers from both countries as Moscow keeps pounding civilian targets from the sky,” according to the author.
• “A failure to come to an agreement would hurt Mr. Trump's reputation as a strong leader and a great deal-maker,” Rove explains.
• “The defeat of Ukraine by Russia would be similarly disastrous for Mr. Trump. He came to office promising a quick and easy end to the conflict -- 'in 24 hours,' he said. This raised unnecessarily high expectations,” the author writes.
• “His erratic approach since -- buttering up Mr. Putin, strong-arming Ukraine to sign an economic deal with the U.S., supplying needed weapons to Kyiv before slow-playing them, the Oval Office debacle with Mr. Zelensky in February, and his friendlier embrace now of the Ukrainian leader -- may all have been examples of Mr. Trump's famous deal-making moves. Or not,” Rove argues.
• “Mr. Trump can bring about a reasonably successful conclusion to this catastrophic war by doing what Mr. Putin fears most: rejecting the Russian dictator's flattery and demands and insisting he make a fair, enforceable deal with Mr. Zelensky,” the author believes.

"Ukraine talks expose Trump’s dreadful attention to detail: Zelenskyy and allies contain White House’s tilt towards Moscow for now," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 08.19.25. 

• “In Anchorage, the US president rolled over and aligned himself with Russia’s stance on ending the war,” according to the editorial board.
• “Many in Europe feared Trump would railroad Zelenskyy into a bad deal or punish him for rejecting one,” the editorial board writes.
• “In Trump’s peacemaking show, optics matter more than substance. The vague prospect of another meeting is enough to keep it moving forward,” the editorial board argues.
• “Trump has sided with Moscow over the need for a comprehensive settlement rather than a ceasefire and has dropped any hint of sanctions,” the editorial board believes.
• “He seems to think that Ukraine could end the war ‘immediately’ if it gave up the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk, which would be politically and militarily suicidal for Zelenskyy,” according to the editorial board.
• “The Ukrainians rightly demand robust and meaningful commitments from allies to come to its aid,” the editorial board writes.
• “Trump has a propensity to ignore the difficult details of any negotiation. He flip flops and then lands on the broad contours of a deal, with little regard to what it means in practice,” the editorial board argues.

"Why Steve Witkoff Is Trump’s Master of Disaster," Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, 08.19.25.

• “All these things happened just before the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska on Aug. 15. Then, the U.S. media was full of feverish reports on Trump’s supposed vexation with Putin and alleged shift toward Ukraine. Since the U.S.-Russia mutual admiration event last week, all that has vanished down the memory hole, melted away like the snows of yesteryear,” the author writes.
• “In Alaska, Trump invited Putin, an indicted war criminal, into his limo for a private chat, drowned him in public flattery and praise, and blathered about the glittering future of U.S.-Russian relations,” Caryl argues.
• “None of the more positive notes emerging from those meetings change the fact that, as a result of Trump’s summit with Putin, the United States is evidently pressuring Ukraine to cede territory to the aggressor that invaded without provocation three and a half years ago,” according to the author.
• “It was Witkoff’s many visits to Moscow—most recently on Aug. 6—that set in motion the events that have brought us to this point,” the author writes.
• “Witkoff has repeated its false claims that Russian speakers in Ukraine’s eastern provinces have endured discrimination at the hands of the Ukrainian government,” Caryl argues.
• “Witkoff also has a strikingly high opinion of Putin, the man who was perhaps best known, at least until he began bombing maternity hospitals, for poisoning his critics,” the author believes.
• “The meeting in Alaska once again revealed the depths of Trump’s predilection for Russia—a predilection so successfully cultivated by Witkoff,” according to the author.

"Ukraine Diplomacy Reveals How Un-American Trump Is," Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, 08.19.25. 

• “The whole thing leaves me deeply uncomfortable,” Thomas L. Friedman writes.
• “When our allies have to devote this much energy just to keep the peace with our president, before they even begin to figure out how to make peace with Vladimir Putin…how is this ever going to work?” the author argues.
• “Trump is unlike any American president in the past 80 years. He feels no gut solidarity with the trans-Atlantic alliance and its shared commitment to democracy, free markets, human rights and the rule of law,” according to the author.
• “The fundamental bond of trust that underlay the 80-year success of the trans-Atlantic economy, that served the U.S. so favorably for decades, is now ruptured,” the author writes.
• “Trump doesn’t feel any gut need to bring Ukraine into the West or understand that Putin’s invasion was just his latest march to break up the West as revenge for its breaking up the Soviet Union,” Friedman argues.
• “Putin is not and never has been looking for ‘peace’ with Ukraine. He is, as I have written before, looking for a piece of Ukraine — in fact the whole piece if he can get it,” the author believes.
• “The more [Trump] builds his peace strategy — not on expertise but on his hugely inflated self-regard and his un-American anti-Westernism — the more this will become his war,” according to the author.

"Donald Trump’s Ukraine peace juggernaut careers onwards: Lack of clarity over US security guarantees shows primacy of form over substance," Ben Hall, Financial Times, 08.19.25. 

• “Trump’s peace juggernaut is careering forward. But few people can tell where it is heading,” according to the author.
• “Much of the substance that will underpin a deal to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine remains unclear and possibly unresolvable,” the author writes.
• “Ukraine and its European allies had two objectives for today’s meeting: to pin down what exactly the US is prepared to do to help guarantee Ukrainian security… and to stop the idea of Ukraine ceding land still under its control to Russia becoming a prerequisite,” Hall argues.
• “Russia has already gone a long way to establishing its land claims as a sine qua non before any of the other issues have been negotiated,” the author believes.
• “It is the very opposite of an equitable swap: in this case it would mean Kyiv giving up swaths of Ukrainian land it controls for slivers of Ukrainian land seized by Russia or in exchange for Moscow not seizing more of its territory,” the author writes.
• “The land concession is a Russian trap that Trump and Witkoff walked into,” according to the author.
• “Russia has somehow persuaded Trump that its maximalist territorial demands, impossible for Ukraine to accept, are the only basis for a deal. Ukraine and the Europeans need to do the same with security guarantees,” Hall argues.

"Repairing the damage done in Alaska?" Steven Pifer, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 08.19.25.  

• “President Donald Trump traveled to Alaska on August 15 intending to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire. He returned home with no ceasefire but an ‘understanding’ containing poison pills guaranteed to make it unacceptable to Ukraine,” Steven Pifer writes.
• “That ‘understanding’ reportedly would require that Kyiv withdraw its military from Donbas and cede that region to Russia as the entry price to begin negotiating a general settlement,” the author explains.
• “It was foolish to think such an arrangement would hold any appeal for Zelensky. Even were he inclined to agree, he would not be able to sell it at home,” according to Pifer.
• “First, the badly-flawed Alaska ‘understanding’ seems to have fallen by the wayside, at least for the time being. It does not appear that Trump pressed Zelensky or the others to accept it,” the author writes.
• “Trump told Zelensky and the other European leaders that the United States would help with security guarantees for Ukraine if a settlement were reached. While he ruled out US ground forces, he later suggested that US air power could be involved,” Pifer notes.
• “Getting Putin and Zelensky together will not prove easy—the Russian leader has sought to delegitimize his Ukrainian counterpart—but is essential,” according to the author.
• “Those who want to see a just and durable settlement have good grounds to feel better after August 18 than they did three days earlier,” Pifer concludes.

"The Pernicious Spectacle of Trump’s Russia-Ukraine Diplomacy: How Demands for Quick Resolution Hinder a Real End to the War," Michael Kimmage, Foreign Affairs, 08.19.25. 

• “In trying to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, which Donald Trump once promised he could do ‘within 24 hours,’ the U.S. president is presenting himself as a kind of emperor,” Michael Kimmage writes.
• “But the Trump administration has no plan for ending the war. The president vacillates from one position to another, discarding policies like gloves—a cease-fire one day and a comprehensive settlement the next, with threats of disengagement along the way,” Kimmage writes.
• “The United States struggles to find leverage over Russia, not least because it has preemptively rejected any form of escalation, such as additional sanctions or more military aid to Kyiv,” Kimmage writes.
• “Yet the U.S. president insists on being the peacemaker, and an international public is asked to admire his nonexistent plan. On and on the procession goes,” Kimmage writes.
• “A rudderless American diplomacy is nonetheless helpful to the Kremlin,” Kimmage writes.
• “Trump, who typically blames Ukraine for having been invaded, configures Putin’s Russia as eager for peace, even though Moscow has spent the summer relentlessly attacking civilian targets in Ukraine and pushing to conquer more territory,” Kimmage writes.
• “Zelensky and his European counterparts are not naive about Trump. They know that his furious diplomatic efforts are hollow, as is his commitment to European security overall,” Kimmage writes.
• “The final cost to Trump’s diplomatic charade will be measured in the currency of American power,” Kimmage writes.

"Guaranteeing Insecurity: The Flaws in Ukraine’s Security Talks," Matthew Savill, RUSI, 08.20.25. 

• “Frenetic diplomacy over the past week has set up potential talks between Presidents Zelenskyy and Putin. But so far this is a triumph of diplomatic process rather than concrete progress,” Matthew Savill argues.
• “The issue of the day is what form any ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine will take, and what the means of enforcement will be,” according to the author.
• “Trump was clear that Europe was the ‘first line of defence’ for Ukraine, a stance consistent with his desire to shift more of the responsibility on to European countries for security in their own ‘backyard’,” the author writes.
• “Europe is trying to play a weak hand well…getting into the conversation with the US, and convincing Trump that Europe can shoulder more of the burden can at least be regarded as a limited success,” Savill argues.
• “‘Article 5-lite’ is a mirage,” the author believes. “The follow-up conversations…strongly suggest that they do not know what form the security guarantees will take and are still working on them.”
• “That all means that the momentum of the war on the ground lies with Russia, even if it comes at a fearsome cost in lives and materiel,” according to the author.
• “The success of the past week has been that the Ukrainians and Europeans have avoided being forced into accepting Putin’s terms, or the trap of being seen as responsible for stymying talks,” Savill writes.

"Putin Calls Zelensky the West's Illegitimate Puppet. Can He Talk Peace With Him?" Matthew Luxmoore and Thomas Grove, The Wall Street Journal, 08.19.25. 

• “If Russian President Vladimir Putin agrees to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, as urged by President Trump, he will come face-to-face with a man he has spent 3½ years excoriating as an illegitimate leader and puppet,” the authors write.
• “Trump's call for a meeting puts Putin in a bind. If he declines, he risks angering the U.S. president…But sitting down with Zelensky could damage him politically with the Russian elite and the broader public,” Luxmoore and Grove argue.
• “Agreement from Putin to meet Zelensky won't likely come quickly—or easily…He has dismissed the Ukrainian leader repeatedly as a servant of the West, and has insisted that various complex issues be solved before the two leaders sit down,” according to the authors.
• “Putin sees the war as part of a broader Russian push to relitigate grievances…the very makeup of Europe's security architecture,” the authors write.
• “In Putin's eyes, Zelensky is not a player. The fact Ukrainians are fighting at all is because of Western support,” Tatiana Stanovaya said, as quoted by the authors.
• “A meeting could indicate that he's really willing to negotiate the end of this war, and I don't think he's ready,” Samuel Charap observed, as quoted in the article.
• “Putin is likely to pour cold water on the idea of a meeting without actually refusing one outright—a strategy he has previously deployed in response to calls for a cease-fire,” the authors argue.

"7 Lingering Questions After the Trump Ukraine Summit," Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 08.19.25. 

1. “After a flurry of diplomacy, what was actually agreed to?"
2. "What security guarantees is Trump actually offering Ukraine?"
3. "What good are these security guarantees when Ukraine watched the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2015 Minsk accords be shredded by all signatories?"
4. "Will there be a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky? Or a trilateral meeting including Trump?"
5. "Would Ukraine be able to countenance surrendering Crimea? What about the Donbas?"
6. "What would a U.S.-brokered agreement that legitimized the forcible redrawing of national borders do to the international system?"
7. "What would any peace deal do about reparations and war reconstruction?"

 "Trump Relies on Personal Diplomacy With Putin. The Result Is a Strategic Muddle," David E. Sanger, The New York Times, 08.25.25. 

• “President Trump, for a problem as contentious as the Russian war in Ukraine, argues only a leader-to-leader meeting can solve it, saying, ‘Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together,’” David E. Sanger writes.
• “After the Anchorage meeting, outward signs are that any real progress has ground to a stop; neither a Putin-Zelensky nor a three-way meeting has been scheduled,” the author noted.
• “Trump insisted to European leaders that Putin agreed to allow a peacekeeping force in Ukraine, but by midweek Russia described a different plan in which it would participate in security guarantees for a country it invaded,” Sanger explains.
• “‘We haven’t even discussed the specifics’ of security guarantees, Trump said Monday, highlighting the strategic incoherence of the negotiations,” according to the article.
• “Trump abandoned his initial demand for a cease-fire before a peace agreement, a reversal that ‘rather than moving the ball forward, scores an own goal,’ Ivo Daalder said,” as quoted by Sanger.
• “Trump alternates between mediating as a neutral figure and promising to help secure Ukraine from future attack, creating great uncertainty about the American role,” the author writes.
• “Trumps’s personal-diplomacy-first approach means muddled strategy—from abandoning unified Western positions to sending mixed signals about American commitment and responsibility for Ukraine’s fate,” Sanger concludes.

"Trump wants a Nobel prize. Europe can exploit that to help Ukraine," The Economist, 08.21.25. 

• “The prospect of joining Teddy Roosevelt, Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King as a Nobel laureate…has sent Mr. Trump into ‘peacemaker-in-chief’ mode,” The Economist writes.
• “Trump has boasted of spreading harmony faster than the world’s baddies can spark strife…he has claimed credit for ending six (or sometimes seven) wars in as many months,” the article notes.
• “Yet to secure the gong Mr. Trump knows he will have to tackle the thorniest war of all: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The president campaigned on a promise that peace could be brokered in just 24 hours,” The Economist explains.
• “Europeans hope a newly invested Mr. Trump will come to realize that Russia is in fact the obstacle to a realistic deal—and thus to Mr. Trump’s white-tailed trip to Oslo,” according to the article.
• “There are downsides to Mr. Trump’s Nobel lust. His get-peace-quick schemes might come at the expense of the tiresome legwork needed to stop the fighting for good,” The Economist argues.
• “Above all [Zelensky] needs security guarantees America would have to at least support, but the offer of which remains infuriatingly vague,” the article stated.
• “If Europe can find a way to channel Mr. Trump’s prize-winning delusions to its advantage, a little Nobel tomfoolery may be worth it,” The Economist concludes.

"Tactical Victories in Ukraine Peace Talks Will Only Lead to Strategic Defeat," Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Politika, 08.25.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Putin flatly refuses to understand that it is not the West that does not allow Ukraine to become ‘friendly,’ but that Ukrainian society and elites will never accept the capitulatory conditions that Moscow is trying to impose on them,” Tatiana Stanovaya writes.
• “Even if Putin succeeds in seizing new territory or winning concessions at the negotiating table, these would be only tactical victories,” the author explains.
• “The fundamental problem for Moscow is that any attempt to force Ukraine and its people into the Russian sphere against their will is doomed to strategic failure,” Stanovaya argued.
• “Each time Moscow thinks it has cornered Kyiv, Ukrainian society adjusts and strengthens its resolve to resist, making true submission ever less likely,” according to the article.
• “The West may sometimes waver, but Ukrainian resistance is rooted in real societal consensus, not elite manipulation,” Stanovaya notes.
• “The Kremlin’s misreading of Ukraine risks prolonging the war, deepening Russia’s isolation, and fueling instability at home,” the author writes.
• “Lasting peace is impossible without Moscow accepting reality: that a sovereign Ukraine will determine its own future, regardless of Kremlin pressure,” she writes.
• “[M]o matter what Putin forces Kyiv to sign, he won’t get a “friendly” Ukraine. Tactically, the parties may win, but strategically there can be no winners,” Stanovaya concludes.

"Trump’s Ukraine summit was a European damage control operation. It succeeded – for now," Orysia Lutsevych, Chatham House, 08.20.25.

• “The presence of leaders from the UK, Germany, France and Italy was a notable display of European solidarity with Ukraine, intended to prevent another calamitous outcome and preserve Transatlantic unity,” the author writes.
• “Trump needed a diplomatic win. It was clear that nearly nothing had been agreed in Anchorage, with Trump forced to admit afterwards there are ‘a couple of big ones’ (points) that remain unresolved,” Lutsevych argues.
• “One of the only significant outcomes of the Alaska summit was a gain for Russia: Trump’s backtracking on the need for an unconditional ceasefire before launching a genuine, high-level diplomatic track towards a final peace deal,” according to the author.
• “Putin is pushing a comprehensive peace agreement in order to draw out negotiations with demands to address the ‘root causes’ of the conflict, while continuing the war against Ukraine,” the author writes.
• “Both German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron urged President Trump to put pressure on Putin to establish a ceasefire ahead of the next meeting. But this appeal seems to be falling on deaf ears,” the author argues.
• “One positive piece of news from the Washington summit is the US signaling its readiness to participate in providing Ukraine’s security,” according to the author.
• “What Ukraine needs now is a mechanism that provides defense in case Russia decides to mount another attack following the end of hostilities. Since Russia is a nuclear state, Ukraine’s security protection must include other nuclear powers,” the author believes.

“Meet the Press – August 24, 2025 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,” NBC News, 08.24.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “President Putin has regard for President Trump, respecting President Trump concentration on the interests, national interests of the United States, national interests and well being and historic heritage of the American people. And I don't have any doubt that President Trump respects the same attitude of President Putin to protecting national interests of Russia, to protecting basic interests of the Russian citizens, including the right to be a nation which has very rich history, various traditions and which has the duty, if you wish, to support those who share the values of the Russian language, Russian world if you wish.”
• “Ukraine has the right to exist, provided it must let people go. The people whom they call terrorists, who they call species and who during a referenda – several referenda in Novorossiya, in Donbas, in Crimea decided that they belong to the Russian culture and the government which came to power as a result of the coup was determined as a priority to exterminate everything Russian.”
• “Russia started special military operation to defend the people who Zelenskyy and his predecessor did not consider as humans. They called them beings, species. You should look. You should really, I understand that you need something to sell today, but if you are raising and touching up on some serious things, my suggestion is to take a look at the history of Ukrainian development after the coup in 2014.”
• “We want peace in Ukraine. He wants, President Trump wants, peace in Ukraine. The reaction to Anchorage meeting, the gathering in Washington of these European representatives and what they were doing after Washington indicates that they don't want peace.”

“Former Trump adviser: Ukraine talks are all about ‘managing Trump,’” [video] Scott McIntosh, Idaho Statesman, 08.23.25.[3]

• Fiona Hill, a member of Harvard’s Board of Overseers: “The solution would seem to start from an ability to freeze the lines of conflict. This is what all the Europeans are talking about—trying to freeze the point of conflict because no one even knows what they're talking about. President Trump doesn't want to talk about ceasefire anymore; he wants to talk about stopping the killing. Absolutely everybody wants to stop the killing… So I think we're all in agreement there, and the Europeans are certainly in agreement with President Trump. The problem is that President Trump always wants to take credit for everything, but at this point it should be very clear that Europeans, and President Zelensky as well, are willing to give him the credit if he wants to take it for making peace. But they want to see a genuine peace, not just something that's always on Putin's terms, and that's been the real risk coming out of the last summit.”
• Hill: “President Trump promised there would be a ceasefire; there's no ceasefire, and now we have President Putin meddling in American politics by talking about mail-in voting, according to Trump himself, and it has nothing to do with anything related to Ukraine. We now have Putin basically persuading the president there's no need for a ceasefire because that gives strategic advantage to one side over the other. The lack of a ceasefire gives strategic advantage to Russia, not Ukraine.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “World Leaders Debrief Trump’s Meetings With Zelensky and Putin,” Rishi Iyengar, Foreign Policy, 08.19.25.
• "Peace Talks in Ukraine All Lead to the Donbas," Kim Barker and Constant Méheut, The New York Times, 08.24.25.
• "Mutual Security Must Undergird Peace in Ukraine," George Beebe, Compact, 08.2025.
• "The way forward for Ukraine after the Putin summit," Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings, 08.18.25.
• "Why the Donbas Matters to Putin So Much," John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 08.21.25.
• "Lots of Ukraine diplomacy, little actual progress," Max Boot, The Washington Post, 08.19.25.
• "The Alaska Summit as Theatre: Moscow’s View Beyond Ukraine," Emily Ferris, RUSI, 08.19.25.
• "The Real Meaning of the Zelensky Summit Was Not as It Appeared," M. Gessen, The New York Times, 08.19.25.
• "What Zelensky, Putin and Trump want out of peace talks," Avery Lotz, Axios, 08.18.25.
• "The Alaska Summit Yields No Breakthrough, But None Was in the Cards," Sergei Shelin, Russia.Post, 08.20.25.
• "Grading Trump’s Ukraine Diplomacy," Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy, 08.18.25.  Podcast.
• "Ukraine Got a Reprieve in Washington — Not an Escape," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 08.19.25.
• "This Ukraine Summitry Is All Reality TV, Zero Substance," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 08.20.25.
• "Trump Says Ceasefires Don’t Matter. Oh Yes They Do," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 08.21.25.
• "Back Ukraine Diplomacy With Deterrence," Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 08.22.25.
• "The ‘Big Tactical Error’ in the Russia-Ukraine Negotiations," Nahal Toosi, Politico, 08.21.25.
• "Trump’s Nobel Delusions," Nina L. Khrushcheva, Project Syndicate, 08.22.25.
• "Understanding Russia’s Endgame," Carl Bildt, Project Syndicate 08.19.25.
• "After the Alaska Summit: Ukraine Not Closer to Peace," Stefan Meister, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 08.20.25.
• "The Alaska Summit and Donald Trump’s Russia Ties," Paul R .Pillar, The National Interest, 08.20.25.
• "False start or breakthrough?" Vladislav Inozemtsev, The Moscow Times, 08.20.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
• "Trojan Horse. Putin's Version," Boris Bondarev, The Moscow Times, 08.18.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"How Decades of Folly Led to War in Ukraine," Michael A. Reynolds, Compact, 08.15.25. 

• “The war in Ukraine is the outcome of decades of Western miscalculation about Russia and its place in the post–Cold War order,” Reynolds writes.
• “NATO expansion, coupled with U.S. dismissals of Russian security concerns, fueled mounting resentment and paranoia within the Russian leadership,” the author argues.
• “The 2014 Maidan revolution and the annexation of Crimea marked a decisive turn, locking Moscow and the West into a contest that only escalated,” Reynolds explains.
• “By ignoring Russia’s historic interests in the Black Sea and Ukraine, Western policymakers underestimated the depth of the crisis that would erupt if those interests were threatened,” according to the author.
• “Successive U.S. administrations failed to develop a sustainable European security architecture that included Russia as a stakeholder,” Reynolds writes.
• “Diplomatic opportunities to avert war were repeatedly squandered—through sanctions, rhetoric, and military aid that antagonized Russia without resolving the core dispute,” the author argues.
• “A hard lesson of this war is that ignoring the grievances and interests of major powers invites disaster,” Reynolds concludes

 "It's the Old World's turn to rescue the New," George F. Will, The Washington Post, 08.19.25. 

• “Donald Trump crumpled quicker than even Vladimir Putin probably anticipated. The former KGB agent currently indicted for war crimes felt no need to negotiate with the man-child,” George F. Will argues.
• “Putin wants to win the war, Trump wants to end it, and as George Orwell said, the quickest way to end a war is to lose it,” the author writes.
• “For a nation, more dangerous than an enemy’s hatred is his contempt, which makes him reckless and implacable,” the author believes.
• “Alaska was not just another drop in our overflowing bucket of mortifications. It was proof that for the next 41 months, no interlocutor can believe a word the U.S. president says,” according to the author.
• “He [Putin] articulates his seriousness while his U.S. adversary advertises his lack thereof,” Will writes.
• “The Brezhnev Doctrine has been tweaked,” according to the author.
• “Now it is the Old World’s turn to rescue the United States. It needs to be liberated from the chimera that it has no substantial stake in the outcome of high-intensity, state-on-state violence inflicted by a nuclear power obedient to a man who has actual beliefs: crackpot, but real, and menacing,” Will argues.

"Mikhail Komin on why the Arctic is Putin’s next front," Mikhail Komin, The Economist, 08.14.25. 

• “Operation Spiderweb... stood out not just for the heavy damage it inflicted with cheap drones, or the morale it boosted, but for striking at a core belief of Vladimir Putin’s regime: the invulnerability of Russia’s nuclear forces,” the author writes.
• “The Kremlin appeared to shift its emphasis away from exposed bombers and towards submarines. That same month, the Northern Fleet received the Knyaz’ Pozharsky, a new ballistic-missile submarine, further cementing the role of Arctic-based subs as the backbone of Russia’s second-strike capability,” according to the author.
• “Russia’s Arctic strategy has long been shaped by two deep-seated insecurities. One is the fear of losing military dominance as melting ice erodes the country’s natural defenses and NATO’s presence expands… The other is economic,” the author believes.
• “This trajectory poses three serious risks for all Arctic countries in the coming decade—but particularly for Europe, which remains reliant on American military support in the region, a commitment that now appears less assured,” Komin argues.
• “Should Russia become convinced that war with NATO is inevitable, it is likely to strike first in the Arctic,” according to the author.
• “On his watch, these campaigns are likely to intensify across northern Europe, aiming to test NATO’s red lines and to expose perceived vulnerabilities in Western societies,” the author writes.
• “To keep Donald Trump engaged—and thus constrained in his willingness to put pressure on the Kremlin—Mr. Putin will need a new, bold idea capable of capturing his imagination. The Arctic may be the perfect vehicle,” Mikhail Komin argues.

"Putin’s desire to destroy Western unity rages on," The Economist, 08.19.25. 

• “Mr. Putin’s peace initiatives and military actions are aligned to the same goal: more power,” The Economist argues.
• “Mr. Trump, despite earlier promises, has not imposed sanctions and no longer demands a ceasefire as a precondition for peace talks,” the author writes.
• “As far as Moscow is concerned, the meeting produced little more than general talk of security guarantees—and these will only apply if Mr. Putin agrees to peace,” according to the author.
• “Recent polls have shown that 70% of Russians think that their country has been successful on the battlefield. At the same time 60% now favor peace talks,” the author believes.
• “The Russian economy is heading into recession; in the first seven months of this year its budget deficit has overshot the target for the whole of 2025,” The Economist writes.
• “For Mr. Putin endless negotiations are simply another part of his war plans. They keep Mr. Trump on his side and help him in his broader objective of sowing dissent within the West and inside Ukraine,” according to the author.
• “Even if the active phase of the war were to come to a halt, that struggle to destroy Western unity will continue,” The Economist argues.

"Baltic Training Grounds and NATO Forward Presence," Lukas Milevski, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 08.19.25. 

• “A recent claim that ‘Lithuania is running out of space for its military’...makes sense in light of the possible Russian military threat against the Baltic states and Europe as a whole,” Lukas Milevski writes.
• “Such requirements may constitute substantial challenges to geographically small countries such as the Baltic states, and not merely for their national militaries, but also for those of their allies,” the author argues.
• “Implementing universal conscription or wanting allies to deploy forces more or less permanently to Baltic territory represents an influx of soldiers requiring training and, therefore, local training grounds,” according to the author.
• “Lithuania’s only brigade-scale training ground…is the German 45th Panzer Brigade’s permanent garrison as of 2025, but it also remains a work in progress,” the author writes.
• “Latvia…is developing a new training ground near Aizkraukle and Jēkabpils…once complete, it will be the largest training ground in the Baltic states,” Milevski explains.
• “Estonia does not have a single training ground capable of hosting a full brigade exercise,” according to the author.
• “It is self-evidently sensible in today’s security environment to increase the scale of Western forces based in the Baltic states, further developing a credible force posture which would deter Russia from invading,” the author argues.

"By Land or by Sea: Continental Power, Maritime Power, and the Fight for a New World Order," S. C. M. Paine, Foreign Affairs, 08.19.25. 

• “Modern conflicts over the international system flow from a long-standing…disagreement over the sources of power and prosperity…producing two antithetical global outlooks: one continental and the other maritime,” S. C. M. Paine writes.
• “In the continental world, the currency of power is land…continental hegemons such as China and Russia believe the international system should be divided among them into huge spheres of influence,” the author explains.
• “States with an oceanic moat have relative security from invasion. They can thus focus on compounding wealth rather than on fighting neighbors…they advance domestic prosperity through international commerce and industry,” Paine argues.
• “Today’s competition is just the latest iteration of the continental-​maritime conflict…The United States’ strategy has reflected its position as a maritime power…China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, meanwhile, want to undermine the rules-based order,” according to the article.
• “After the Napoleonic Wars, the Industrial Revolution introduced compounded economic growth…tilting the playing field in favor of maritime powers,” Paine writes.
• “Putin has made it clear he intends to expand Russia’s borders…His initial objective is control over Ukraine, the hors d’oeuvre before the main course,” the author explains.
• “The strategy that won the previous Cold War remains equally serviceable today. It begins with a recognition that this struggle—like the last—will be protracted. The victors…managed the conflict for several generations,” Paine concludes.

The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations Against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure," Charlie Edwards and Nate Seidenstein, IISS, 08.19.25.

• “Russia is waging an unconventional war on Europe. Through its campaign of sabotage, vandalism, espionage and covert action, Russia’s aim has been to destabilize European governments, undermine public support for Ukraine by imposing social and economic costs on Europe, and weaken the collective ability of NATO and the European Union to respond to Russian aggression,” the authors write.
• “This unconventional war began to escalate in 2022 in parallel to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Edwards and Seidenstein explain.
• “European capitals have struggled to respond to Russian sabotage operations and have found it challenging to agree a unified response, coordinate action, develop effective deterrence measures and impose sufficient costs on the Kremlin,” according to the executive summary.
• “IISS has created the most comprehensive open-source database of suspected and confirmed Russian sabotage operations targeting Europe,” the authors notes.
• “Russia’s sabotage operations are decentralized and, despite European security and intelligence officials raising the alarm, are largely unaffected by NATO, EU and member state responses to date,” the report finds.
• “Russia has exploited gaps in legal systems through its ‘gig economy’ approach, enabling it to avoid attribution and responsibility,” Edwards and Seidenstein write.
• “Europe’s critical infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to sabotage because it is in such a poor state following decades of deferred maintenance and a lack of investment from national governments and the private sector,” the authors write.

"The Grand Chessmaster," Thomas E. Donilon, Foreign Affairs, 08.19.25. 

• “Zbigniew Brzezinski was perhaps the preeminent strategic thinker of the Cold War era—a chessmaster of geopolitics who understood the links between European stability, Asian balance, and American power,” Thomas E. Donilon writes.
• “Brzezinski’s focus on the Eurasian chessboard reflected his belief that control of this vast landmass determined the fate of global power,” the author argues.
• “He saw the maintenance of a viable, independent Ukraine as critical to the balance of power in Eurasia,” Donilon explains.
• “For Brzezinski, the restoration of America’s alliances and global leadership required a clear-eyed assessment of rivals and an unrelenting focus on strategic priorities,” according to the author.
• “He warned that accommodating Moscow’s ambitions could destabilize all of Eurasia and eventually threaten U.S. interests,” Donilon writes.
• “Brzezinski’s legacy is a reminder that success in grand strategy demands moral clarity, creative statecraft, and constant engagement, not complacency,” the author concludes.
• “As the world faces new threats, his insistence on discipline and vision remains instructive for today’s leaders,” Donilon observes.

"Trump’s ambiguity is the worst of all worlds," Janan Ganesh, Financial Times, 08.20.25. 

• “Donald Trump has given Vladimir Putin the immense prestige of a one-to-one meeting. But he has also raised tariffs on India for doing business with the same man,” Janan Ganesh writes.
• “To all these cases of ambiguity, there is a natural reaction. ‘It could be worse.’ I wonder,” the author argues.
• “If Trump were clear and consistent that he is abandoning Ukraine, as well as Europe and Nato, the continent would have no choice but to become militarily self-sufficient as soon as possible. It might fail, of course, but there could be little doubt what should be done,” according to the author.
• “The worst of all worlds is one in which Trump blows hot and cold, and we are living in it,” Ganesh explains.
• “It is America’s partial commitment, the prospect of some security assurances but not decisive ones, that could be perversely more unsettling,” the author writes.
• “I don’t suggest that Trump sends mixed signals to stunt Europe: to stop it committing to the grand project of becoming sovereign. He just likes having people grovel to him,” according to the author.
• “Too little is said about an America that does just enough to give Europe false hope of salvaging the post-1945 order,” Ganesh argues.

"Europe’s ‘Peace Through Strength’ Hypocrisy," Anchal Vohra, Foreign Policy, 08.22.25. 

• “Europe’s vision for ending the war in Ukraine might fairly be summed up as ‘peace through strength.’ The question now is whether that’s anything more than a mere vision,” Anchal Vohra writes.
• “The Trump administration’s acceleration of the timeline for a peace deal with Russia means that it’s crunch time for Europe: Is it ready to personally provide the strength to secure the necessary peace?” the author explains.
• “Europeans don’t want to die for Ukraine,” Gérard Araud said, as quoted by Vohra.
• “Since the onset of the war, Europe’s policy has been far too reticent, far too scared of how the Russian president might respond, and far too selfish even as Ukrainians form the first line of defense for the whole continent,” Vohra argues.
• “European leaders have often been accused of engaging half-heartedly…refusing to provide critical weapons such as Taurus missiles, doing little to discourage third-party circumvention of sanctions,” the author writes.
• “The idea to send troops isn’t well thought through. I don’t think the German parliament would agree to it…Germany has repeatedly cited a shortage of soldiers and said it is already struggling to meet its existing NATO commitments,” André Härtel said, as quoted by Vohra.
• “Europeans may consider a bad deal—one that ends the fighting in Ukraine but emboldens Russia to attack other Eastern European states—to be worse than an end to the war. But it’s increasingly clear that they have few ideas on how to achieve a good deal before Trump loses patience,” Vohra concludes.

“Updated Endgame Scenarios: Is this the beginning of the end—or just the end of the beginning?” JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics, August 2025.

• “Despite … uncertainties, we are adjusting our probabilities to reflect growing momentum behind a European-led security role—potentially backed by U.S. security guarantees. If the U.S. stays engaged, we assess there’s a greater than 60% chance that this ends in a place where Ukraine could be like South Korea or Israel today – which is the most realistic, best outcome for Ukraine. Trump would get a big win and justifiably stake claim to the coveted Nobel Peace Prize. Here is how things look to us:”
  • “Endgame 1. ‘South Korea’ – European Tripwire Force | Odds: ↑ 30%
    • Ukraine accepts neutrality and partial, if not formally recognized, territorial loss. In return, it receives a European-led security force, long-term funding, and a reconstruction roadmap. The U.S. remains supportive from a distance, offering security guarantees to prevent a return to conflict. …  The Europeans’ momentum in developing a ‘coalition of the willing’ and the U.S. president’s reported consideration of security guarantees causes us to increase the odds of this outcome.
  • Endgame 2. ‘Israel’ – Fortress Ukraine | Odds: ↑ 30%
    • Robust military and economic support, but no foreign boots on the ground. Ukraine survives as a fortified front-line state. Deterrence holds, but war remains on the doorstep. U.S. unpredictability—and possible partial rapprochement with Russia—shifts more pressure on Europe to lead.
  • Endgame 3. ‘Georgia’ – Drift and Dependence | Odds: ↓ 35%
    • Lack of clear security guarantees and foreign troops leads to stagnation. Donor fatigue grows. Russia reasserts soft influence. … Trump’s talk of security guarantees leads us to downgrade this, although this is what Putin is aiming for.
  • Endgame 4. ‘Belarus’ – Capitulation | Odds: ↓ 5%
    • The nightmare scenario. If Western unity collapses, Russia could force Ukraine into a humiliating settlement. … Conceivable if Moscow stalls for time, Washington walks away in frustration, and European support withers, but unlikely.”

"Theater and Neurosis," Fyodor Lukyanov, Profil, 08.19.25. Clues from Russian Views, Machine-translated.

• “Donald Trump’s meeting with European leaders at the White House was a vivid spectacle—something to be viewed through a theatrical lens: each played a part, adopting a role,” Fyodor Lukyanov writes.
• “Europe has no political agency in its relationship with the U.S. All the efforts of the Old World’s top officials are now focused on figuring out how to behave so the American president…doesn’t get angry,” the author argues.
• “Without America, Europe can do little—even when it comes to matters that directly affect its own interests,” Lukyanov believes.
• “Under Trump, the previously latent process became open—even demonstrative. Europe interests him solely as a tool to solve certain problems, above all a financial one to relieve the U.S. burden,” according to the author.
• “Europe has chosen the tactic of unrestrained flattery… Trump willingly accepts flattery, seeing it as a statement of the obvious—his own merits—and does things his own way,” Lukyanov writes.
• “No one outside the Atlantic community wants direct conflict, but nor do they accept blatant blackmail. So Europe is the undisputed champion of adapting itself to the senior partner,” according to the author.

• “The real problem is not that Europe follows in America’s wake, but that it can’t even formulate its own interests. Because of this, whether consciously or instinctively, it tags along behind the U.S.,” Lukyanov concludes.

  "‘Nobel’ by Force: Why the Idea of Awarding Trump a Peace Prize Isn’t So Absurd," Fyodor Lukyanov, Kommersant, 08.24.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• “Trump is the first to openly and assertively demand the Nobel peace prize—while ranks of nominators continue to grow, from Rwanda, Cambodia, and Gabon to Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Fyodor Lukyanov writes.
• “Carter hoped to repair his electoral position with a peace prize; Trump, on the other hand, is driven by endless vanity and a child-like desire to have every trophy that exists,” the author explains.
• “If you take Nobel’s will as a guide, awarding Trump would make little sense with regard to ‘uniting peoples’ or reducing militarism—the Pentagon’s 2026 budget is nearly $1 trillion—but Trump calls himself the absolute champion of conflict resolution,” Lukyanov argues.
• “The White House cites six accomplishments, including preventing nuclear war (India-Pakistan)—though Trump mixes up the countries in his list of triumphs, but that’s a detail,” the article notes.
• “Europe, desperate to placate its capricious patron, may well move behind the scenes to support Trump’s case—even if decision-makers at the Nobel Committee are hard to imagine being swayed,” according to Lukyanov.
• “The idea of giving Trump the prize isn’t as absurd as it seems: The committee rewards efforts that contribute to peace—and in an age of world order ‘dismantling,’ you can at best reduce tension, which is exactly what Trump is sincerely trying to do,” the author writes.
• “Paraphrasing Lenin: awarding Trump the Nobel is essentially right, but formally—absurd. As is the age, so is the prize,” Lukyanov concludes.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "A Strategy Long Overdue: The EU’s New Vision for the Black Sea," Natia Seskuria, RUSI, 08.22.25. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"China Can Help Trump and Putin End the War in Ukraine," Wang Huiyao, Foreign Policy, 08.13.25.

• “True peace will require more than just the involvement of the United States and Russia. It also requires Ukraine, Europe, the United Nations, and China,” Wang Huiyao writes.
• “Behind the public posturing, a different reality is taking shape. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has signaled an openness to a resolution with Russia under the right conditions,” according to the author.
• “China is uniquely positioned to help break the gridlock,” the author argues.
• “A seven-party talks framework avoids forcing one side to capitulate to the other’s narrative. Instead, it works to reframe the problem by seeking out shared interests…that can be de-linked from more contentious zero-sum debates,” the author writes.
• “The first step is a cease-fire. History shows that even partial success here could stop escalation, reintroduce flexibility, and help create a framework within which more lasting arrangements can eventually take shape,” Wang believes.
• “An effective peacekeeping force could be composed of a mixture of nonaligned states and European ones, offering a politically viable middle ground, allaying fears on both sides of the conflict,” according to the author.
• “By hosting seven-party talks, Beijing can help lead the way,” the author argues.

 "Is Ukraine the Future of Asia?" C. Raja Mohan, Foreign Policy, 08.20.25. 

• “U.S. President Donald Trump is pressing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to cede territory in exchange for peace of an uncertain duration, while demanding that European allies fall in line,” the author writes.
• “Trump’s high-handed diplomacy raises troubling questions about whether America will remain a reliable security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific,” C. Raja Mohan argues.
• “Trump’s reversal of former President Joe Biden’s Ukraine policy leaves [Asia-Pacific partners] exposed and highlights the fragility of America’s geostrategic fancies,” according to the author.
• “A peace settlement in Ukraine that rewards Russian annexation will likely encourage Chinese assertiveness,” the author believes.
• “Trump’s diplomacy offers little comfort. India has long argues that Western pressure was pushing Russia into China’s arms. But a U.S.-Russia rapprochement provides no strategic relief for India,” Mohan writes.
• “Trump’s Ukraine strategy underscores the essence of his ‘America First’ worldview. In his second term’s opening months, Asia has already seen the hard edge of this approach in the realm of trade, with alliances and security interests set aside in favor of economic nationalism,” the author argues.
• “For Asia’s allies, the lesson is sobering. They may need to prepare for a future where American commitments are uncertain and transient, and the burden of securing the region rests more heavily on their own shoulders,” according to the author.

"China–Russia Cooperation in the Age of AI," Wang Wen, Valdai Club, 08.22.25. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

•  “China and Russia together can form a complete innovation chain, from basic scientific research to engineering transformation, and build a technological ecosystem and standards system in which non-Western countries predominate,” Wang Wen writes.
• “The rapid growth of China and its technological breakthroughs are disrupting the longstanding Western, especially U.S., monopoly in high technology and opening a new path toward technological independence and sustainable development for the world—particularly for non-Western countries,” the author argues.
• “For Russia, China’s rise is not a source of competitive pressure but unprecedented opportunities for development and a new space for China–Russia cooperation,” according to Wang.
• “The China–Russia community of shared destiny is not just a political slogan but a practical option for science and technology,” the author explains.
• “Global competition in science and technology is evolving from Western dominance to multipolarity, and this is an important historic opportunity for China and Russia,” Wang writes.
• “BRICS and ASEAN are strengthening independent innovation through joint R&D and collaborative standards, building a fairer and more open global science and technology governance system,” according to the author.
• “By deepening cooperation, China and Russia can lead non-Western countries to achieve independent innovation and sustainable development in intelligent technologies,” Wang concludes.

"10th International Conference 'Russia and China: Cooperation in a New Era'. 80th Anniversary of Victory in World War II and the Founding of the United Nations," Russian International Affairs Council, 08.18.25. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The relationship of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China is not subject to foreign policy fluctuations and is built on the unshakable principles of equality, mutual assistance, and support,” the conference summary states.
• “Xi Jinping’s May 2025 visit to Moscow, timed to the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, saw the signing of new agreements to further develop bilateral trade and economic cooperation, including increased support for small and medium-sized businesses,” according to the report.
• “The leading role of Russia and China in forming a fairer multipolar world order was reflected in the Joint Statement on Global Strategic Stability, in which Moscow and Beijing opposed destructive policies in the strategic domain,” the conference summary explains.
• “An updated bilateral agreement on the promotion and mutual protection of investments is expected to increase and facilitate Russian investors’ access to the Chinese market and provide further legal protection for entrepreneurs of both countries,” the report notes.
• “The jubilee 10th RIAC–CASS conference in 2025 (held in Beijing) became a platform for expert discussion of Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow and the upcoming visit of Vladimir Putin to Beijing,” the summary states.
• “The main topics of plenary sessions included preserving historical memory in Russia-China relations, lessons from the Yalta-Potsdam accords for shaping a new world order, Russia and China’s relations with Western countries, and prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict around Ukraine,” the conference summary says.
• “Discussions also covered investment cooperation, its role in Arctic development, prospects for a tougher sanctions regime on Russia and its impact on cooperation with China, as well as educational and cultural exchanges,” the report explains.

"Is Trump a BRICS Secret Agent?" Jim O'Neill, Project Syndicate, 08.19.25.

• “US President Donald Trump is going easy on China and Russia, while pushing away Brazil, India, South Africa, and America’s fellow G7 members,” Jim O'Neill writes.
• “Does he want to give the BRICS+ group of major emerging economies and others an even stronger reason to develop alternatives to the Western-dominated order?” the author asks.
• “Much about life under US President Donald Trump’s second administration is mystifying and strange, not least his treatment of the BRICS+,” according to O'Neill.
• “Judging by his words, Trump seems to want to stop the bloc of major emerging economies from challenging the US-led global-governance system,” the author explains.
• “But judging by his actions, one could be forgiven for thinking that he wants to help it pursue its global ambitions,” O'Neill concludes.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "The End of Russia’s Exclusion from Europe," George Beebe, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 08.21.25. Video.
• "Access Denied? The Sino-American Contest for Military Primacy in Asia," Nicholas D. Anderson and Daryl G. Press, International Security, 08.01.25.
• "What Does China Want?" David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, Zenobia T. Chan, International Security, 08.01.25.
• "Why the Russia-India-China Reboot Won’t Last," Karishma Vaswami, Bloomberg, 08.24.25.

Missile defense:

"New Missile Defense Project in the US: How Trump's 'Dome' Differs from Reagan's Initiative," RIAC/Interfax Interview with Andrei Kokoshin, 08.19.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• "The ambition of the ‘Golden Dome’ project is no less, and possibly even greater, than that of Ronald Reagan’s 1980s SDI (‘Strategic Defense Initiative’) research and development program."
• "Under current conditions, Donald Trump has set the task of intercepting not only cruise missiles, but also hypersonic and orbital strike systems."
• "Reagan, when advancing the SDI program, loudly declared that he wanted to make nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete.’ At that time, however, the U.S. accelerated the development of a number of strategic offensive systems. The United States began deploying nuclear-armed intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Today Trump declares the ‘denuclearization’ of relations between great powers, though without giving any concrete details. At the same time, within Trump’s close circle, plans are being actively discussed for radically expanding strategic nuclear forces compared to the plans that existed in the U.S. before him."
• "All this combined creates serious additional threats to global strategic stability, which was concisely and unequivocally stated in a recent joint declaration by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on global strategic stability."
• "The ‘Golden Dome’ faces an even more ambitious task than the SDI program: intercepting all types of missiles from any state and from any direction."
• "There is no doubt that Russia can do everything necessary to effectively counter a space-based interception echelon."
• "Over the past 10–15 years, Russia has invested significant resources in modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. A very substantial foundation has been created to ensure reliable and convincing nuclear deterrence against any potential aggressor toward Russia over the long term, including in view of that aggressor’s significant capabilities in missile defense."
• "We must continue to improve our strategic nuclear forces and other forces and means, ensuring our ability to respond under any scenario for the development of U.S. missile defense. Particularly important here is the improvement of our missile-attack warning system and space-monitoring system, along with a number of other strike and support capabilities. I know that Russia’s scientific and technological base fully allows us to do this."

Nuclear arms:

"To Get Peace in Ukraine, Trump Should Play the Nuclear Card," Matthew Kroenig, Foreign Policy, 08.18.25.

• “First, Trump should threaten that if there is not an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, then he will have no choice but to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons to Poland and perhaps other front-line states on NATO’s eastern flank,” according to the author.
• “Second, for related reasons, the United States and NATO can announce their intention to deploy new varieties of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Europe,” he writes.
• “Third, Trump should threaten to pull out of the New START agreement and load additional nuclear weapons onto U.S. strategic delivery platforms,” according to the author.

"Meeting with young employees of nuclear industry enterprises," Vladimir Putin, Kremlin.ru, 08.22.25.

• “Through their talent and titanic willpower, they [Soviet/Russian nuclear scientists] created a robust nuclear shield for our country and were the first in the world to harness peaceful nuclear energy for the benefit of the nation and all humanity.”
• “Ensuring global nuclear parity became a genuine victory for our entire people.”
• “Today, Rosatom is a global leader…demonstrating the indisputable reliability and environmental safety of domestic nuclear technologies.”
• “This forward trajectory is absolutely precise and correct. We must set ambitious goals and strive to take a qualitative leap in developing Russia’s economy and indeed, civilisation as a whole.”
• “Colossal in scale, [these programs] are designed to strengthen the country’s defence capabilities and sovereignty.”
• “[The] community of intelligent people has never been entirely dismantled…to protect humanity from the genie they were about to let out of the bottle, you had to create a balance. And that is precisely what they were doing by assisting our scientists.”
• “Now, our scientists would have invented it [the atomic bomb] anyway, without that support. But those individuals…acted consciously to help.”
• “That community of intelligent people has never been entirely dismantled, and it never will be…Science…has a role to unite people. It has always been this way. I am one hundred per cent certain it always will be, and no one will ever succeed in destroying this scientific community.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How opposing views on nuclear deterrence fracture the non-proliferation regime," Jana Baldus, European Leadership Network, 08.20.25.

Counterterrorism:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Knowing What Not to Know About Islamic State: Terrorism Studies and Public Secrecy," Sarah G. Phillips and Daniel J. Tower, International Security, 08.01.25. 

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

"Putin’s New Cyber Empire: How the Kremlin Is Embedding Russian Technology Around the World," Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, Foreign Affairs, 08.25.25. 

• “Russia’s top cybersecurity companies could help governments gain control of their national information space,” Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan writes.
• “The Kremlin sees Russia’s commercial cybertechnologies as an important part of this broader campaign and another way to further its interests around the world,” the authors explain.
• “Several top Russian cybersecurity firms have links to the Kremlin’s military and security services…Positive Technologies and Kaspersky Lab have both faced U.S. and EU sanctions,” according to the article.
• “Russia has gained a growing technological foothold in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, signing major cyber-cooperation agreements,” Soldatov and Borogan note.
• “Putin has sought to rebuild the tight relationship between intelligence services and the country’s top technology developers, funneling cyber capabilities into geopolitical expansion,” the authors write.
• “The 2024 security meeting in St. Petersburg marked a turning point…with the Kremlin offering the services of seven top Russian cyber-companies to dozens of security agencies around the world,” the article states.
• “Moves by the United States and its allies to sanction Russian cybersecurity companies may only have accelerated the spread of Russian cybertechnology to other parts of the world. That neglect could, in the long run, provide a significant advantage to Putin’s Russia,” Soldatov and Borogan conclude.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "The Age of Robotic Warfare Has Arrived," Ragnar Sass, Project Syndicate, 08.25.25.

Energy exports from CIS:

"India’s oil lobby is funding Putin’s war machine — that has to stop," Peter Navarro, Financial Times, 08.18.25.  

• “Here’s how the India-Russia oil mathematics works. American consumers buy Indian goods. India uses those dollars to buy discounted Russian crude. That Russian crude is refined and resold around the world by Indian profiteers in league with silent Russian partners — while Russia pockets hard currency to fund its war machine in Ukraine,” Peter Navarro writes.
• “As Russia continues to hammer Ukraine, helped by India’s financial support, American (and European) taxpayers are then forced to spend tens of billions more to help Ukraine’s defence,” the author explains.
• “India imposes some of the highest average tariffs in the world, along with a dense web of non-tariff barriers that punish American workers and businesses. As a result, the US runs a massive trade deficit with India,” according to Navarro.
• “Before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russian oil made up less than 1 per cent of India’s crude imports. Since then, daily imports have soared to more than 1.5mn barrels — more than 30 per cent of India’s total,” the author notes.
• “Refining companies have turned India into a massive refining hub for discounted Russian crude… the proceeds flow to India’s politically connected energy titans, and in turn, into Vladimir Putin’s war chest,” Peter Navarro argues.
• “India’s dependence on Russian crude is opportunistic and deeply corrosive of the world’s efforts to isolate Putin’s war economy,” the author writes.
• “A recent executive order issued by the president will impose a 25 per cent national security tariff on Indian goods to address the threat posed by India’s continued importation of Russian oil,” Navarro concludes.

For more on the Russian-Indian relationship see the section on Russia’s external policies below.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

See these links for commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Donald Trump has purged one of the CIA’s most senior Russia analysts," The Economist, 08.21.25.
• "William J. Burns: A Letter to America's Discarded Public Servants," William J. Burns, The Atlantic, 08.20.25.
• "Trump's Firing of Intelligence Experts Raises Policy Worries," Julian E. Barnes and Luke Broadwater, The New York Times, 08.23.25. 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

See these links for commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "A Blow to the Informers, or About the Future of Russia Without Telegram and WhatsApp," Anton Starikov, The Moscow Times, 08.24.25.
• "The myths that made Putin’s war," Timothy Snyder, Financial Times, 08.23.25.
• "Coffin diploma: why does the Russian state need military widows with higher education," Jan Levchenko, The Moscow Times, 08.24.25.
• "Counting the Losses, or Someday Foreign Agents Will Be Paid Enormous Compensation," Valery Panyushkin, The Moscow Times, 08.21.25.
• "In fact, Russia is bankrupt," Henrik Müller, The Moscow Times, 08.25.25. (originally published by Der Spiegel)

Defense and aerospace:

"Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat," Mattias Eken, Kiran Suman-Chauhan, Beatrice Aubert, Paul van Hooft, RAND Corporation, 08.17.25. 

“Key Findings:

Russian strategic culture drives nuclear decision making

• The report finds that Russia's strategic culture — shaped by historical, cultural and ideological factors — profoundly influences its military and nuclear strategies. Central features include a zero-sum worldview, a persistent sense of vulnerability, and narratives about state survival. These characteristics underpin the Russian leadership's reliance on NSNWs as essential tools for securing national security and deterring adversaries, especially in the European theatre.

Scenarios for Russian use of NSNWs are context-dependent

• Through scenario planning and expert interviews, the study demonstrates that Russia is most likely to consider the use of NSNWs in situations where regime survival is at stake, such as in response to major conventional threats, large-scale cyber-attacks, or when conventional options appear insufficient to achieve strategic aims. However, the report notes that Russia would typically undertake significant pre-emptive and signaling steps prior to considering actual nuclear use, reflecting both caution and a preference for escalation control.

Implications and challenges for NATO and Allies

• The analysis highlights significant challenges for NATO and European Allies, particularly the need to better understand Russian strategic culture to inform effective deterrence and crisis management. It recommends strengthening Alliance cohesion, improving communication and signaling strategies, and prioritizing preparedness for a range of potential escalation pathways. The report underscores that ongoing research and dialogue on strategic cultures are crucial for mitigating escalation risks and clarifying divergent conceptions of NSNWs between Russia and the West.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Guns and Oil: Continuity and Change in Russia-India Relations," Tina Dolbaia, Vasabjit Banerjee, and Amanda Southfield, CSIS, 08.22.25.

• “Modi’s diplomatic tightrope reflects India’s careful positioning between the two competing blocs…India’s attitude toward Russia continues to be influenced by historical affinity…and pursuit of strategic autonomy,” the authors write.
• “Despite Modi’s assertions, on the international stage New Delhi has largely maintained a neutral-to-pro-Russian tilt in regard to Russia’s war in Ukraine, usually abstaining from UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Moscow’s actions,” according to the report.
• “There is a growing belief among the Western expert community that Russo-Indian ties are undergoing ‘a managed decline’ shaped by Moscow’s deteriorating international and regional standing and its strengthened relations with Beijing—New Delhi’s rival,” the authors argue.
• “India is the world’s largest importer of arms and Russia’s largest export market for arms,” the report explains, noting a slow but steady diversification in India’s arms relationships.
• “Russian crude has become the mainstay in these processes in the last three years, with Indian refineries profiting from cheaper imports from Russia…The share of crude oil imports from Russia grew sharply from a meager 2 percent in 2021 to a staggering 39 percent by the end of 2023,” according to the authors.
• “The 2025 military crisis with Pakistan has revealed the depth of India’s dependence on Soviet-Russian weapons,” the report observes, while also highlighting growing U.S.-India military and technology cooperation.
• “In the energy domain, New Delhi—even before the tariffs threat from Washington—has understood the importance of gradual diversification away from Moscow’s crude…India has already increased its energy purchases from the United States, with crude oil imports reportedly rising by 51 percent in the first half of 2025,” the authors conclude.

"The Kremlin’s growing influence in Orbán’s Hungary," Edit Zgut-Przybylska, Politico, 08.19.25. 

• “Orbán’s friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin is an embrace between two nationalistic strongmen, who openly condemn Western liberalism and have reshaped their countries’ political systems,” Edit Zgut-Przybylska writes.
• “This deal [with Gazprom] is symptomatic of burgeoning Russian influence in Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Hungary,” according to the author.
• “Orbán hopes to give Hungary an oversized say in global decision-making. And his ‘friendship’ with Putin is feeding the ever-growing clientelism within his government and funding his cronies,” the author argues.
• “News of the Gazprom deal broke shortly after Czech and Polish authorities had exposed Voice of Europe — a Fidesz-aligned news site — for spreading pro-Russian propaganda and paying European politicians,” the author writes.
• “Now, however, Hungary’s considered a ‘safe haven’ for Russian spies, and Moscow has a direct line to Orbán’s government,” according to the author.
• “Hungarian state media has been relentlessly spreading Kremlin misinformation to justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine,” Zgut-Przybylska argues.
• “All in all, the deepening ties between Russia and Hungary can’t be allowed to go unchecked any longer,” the author believes.

Ukraine:

Balazs Jarabik on His Impressions from His Visit to Ukraine, X account, 08.21.25.

• “Leaving Kyiv with a few impressions. Relief after Washington — no repeat of the February disaster — but tension lingers. The war is clearly escalating, and the talks are expected to follow.”
• “Trump, acting as chief moderator, secured concessions from both sides. Moscow accepted security guarantees for Ukraine and toned down territorial claims. Kyiv and Europe agreed to talks on a peace agreement — moving past the “ceasefire first” line.”
• “On the battlefield, escalation continues: more Russian tactical gains, met by less Ukrainian counter-attacks. Major breakthroughs are unlikely — the war has shifted. With skies saturated by drones, large-scale mechanized offensives have become nearly impossible.”
• “The energy war is escalating. Ukraine hits Russian refineries and pumping stations (Unecha, Nikolskoe), disrupting the Druzhba pipeline. Russia strikes Ukraine’s GTS and refineries, targeting supply to Kyiv and especially the Azeri SOCAR’s oil reserves and transport route.”
• “No surprise winterization has become a top priority for the new government (though it needs more attention). At the same time, concern is growing in military and political circles over the state of the army, as mobilization seems clearly off track.”
• “After the battle over anti-corruption agencies, politics has largely frozen as Zelensky concentrates on crucial talks. Yet tensions simmer—both within state institutions and with a growing, frustrated opposition. Regional strains, especially in Odesa, are also mounting.”
• “Speculation about elections is intensifying; rumors that the US is pushing for them. There is no Rada preparation yet, but parties are stretching their muscles. Politics remains in suspension: frustration, anger, internal pressure mount—raising concerns how it might erupt.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Can Belarus Capitalize on Historic Trump-Lukashenko Phone Call?" Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Politika, 08.21.25. 

• “En route to his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, U.S. President Donald Trump called contested Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko. It was the only time in Lukashenko’s thirty-one years in power that he had spoken to a U.S. president by phone,” Artyom Shraibman writes.
• “Trump referred to Lukashenko as ‘highly respected President’ in a social media post after the call, a significant gesture since the West has not recognized Lukashenko as Belarus’s legitimate leader since 2020,” the author notes.
• “Trump also thanked Lukashenko for the recent release of sixteen political prisoners and said he hoped more would soon be at liberty. He even agreed to meet Lukashenko in person, though no date was specified,” Shraibman explains.
• “Long-term efforts by Belarusian civil society have succeeded in making political prisoners a key issue in Minsk’s relations with the West. Sanctions have been linked to it for many years,” according to the article.
• “Trump lawyer-turned-envoy John Coale…said recently the United States had used Lukashenko to convey messages to Putin. And the Trump-Lukashenko call a few hours before Trump’s encounter with Putin in Alaska suggests the Belarusian leader is playing some sort of role,” Shraibman writes.
• “Lukashenko named two goals: the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States, and the lifting of U.S. sanctions against Belarus,” according to the author.
• “Twists and turns in the negotiations over Ukraine could either accelerate the warming of U.S.-Belarus ties—or quickly send them back to their previous parlous state,” Shraibman concludes.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Getting Beyond Blame in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process," Anar Jahangirli, The National Interest, 08.19.25.
• "Trump's Caucasian Route. View from the Spasskaya Tower," Vadim Dubnov, The Moscow Times, 08.18.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

Footnotes

1. This is indirectly supported by the absence of the demand for "de-Nazification" in a recent list of Russian demands reported by Reuters. "De-Nazification" is a phrase Russian diplomats have used when essentially calling for a regime change in Kyiv with the ascent of pro-Russian figures to a pro-Russian government.
2. For maps and charts that, according to WSJ, show why Putin is eager to get his hands on the land, please see the following article: “Russia Covets This Ukraine Province Above All. These Maps and Charts Show Why,” Andrew Barnett and James Marson, The Wall Steet Journal, 08.23.25.
3. Also see “Adult Supervision From Europe Gone, Trump Reverts To Blaming Ukraine For Getting Invaded,” S.V. Date, The Hill, 08.19.25.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Andrii Marienko.