This Week’s Highlights:

• The National Interest’s contributing editor Michael Lind posits that Cold War II has its roots in the American bid for global hegemony. Rather than try and fail to achieve this hegemony, the U.S. should instead aim for a new global “modus vivendi,” in which spheres of influence and demilitarized zones would be legitimate objects of diplomatic negotiation, a means of reducing tensions among great powers, while economically, the Washington Consensus would be replaced by economic pluralism.
• The Western strikes on Syria have more to do with dramaturgy than military strategy, writes Jacob Heilbrunn. Dramatically weakening Assad militarily, argue Ryan Crocker and Michael O’Hanlon, would be fraught with risk, as it would likely reignite an all-out civil war, risk a showdown with Russia and set the stage for massive sectarian bloodletting. The West must accept that Assad’s removal is not imminent, write Crocker and O’Hanlon, and that he would insist on a major hand in choosing his successor through a managed transition. 
• Of all the reasons for the U.S. to put competitive strategy against Russia on the backburner, writes Joshua Rovner, none is more urgent than the danger of a needless confrontation.
• Currently, Central Asia resembles the Middle East on the eve of the Arab Spring, writes Rafael Sattarov.
• Unlike Ukraine, Belarus is highly unlikely to experience revolutionary regime change or a sharply different foreign policy, writes Artyom Shraibman. Even if such changes happened in Minsk, Moscow would likely find it more effective and less risky to respond with economic statecraft than with military force.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“America vs. Russia and China: Welcome to Cold War II,” Michael Lind, The National Interest, May-June 2018: The author, a contributing editor of The National Interest and author of The American Way of Strategy, writes: “The Second Cold War is a rematch … . On the one side are the United States and its East Asian and European allies … . On the other side are Russia and China and their allies and clients. …  In Cold War II, as in Cold War I, the rivals have organized competing military alliances … [and] rival trade blocs complement rival military alliances. … Some claim that Cold War II involves global ideological struggle pitting liberal democracy against a new authoritarianism, symbolized by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping—and Donald Trump. … [Imperial] German elites feared … the growth of Russian wealth and power … [would make] their plans [of European hegemony] impossible. … historians of tomorrow may conclude that a similar anxiety about rising Chinese power has motivated several American administrations to launch hasty and reckless efforts to consolidate a global Pax Americana. … the underlying cause of Cold War II is the American bid for global hegemony that followed Cold War I and Chinese and Russian resistance to it. … if American victory is defined as achieving American global hegemony in the face of their resistance, particularly the resistance of China, the United States is going to be defeated in Cold War II. … The alternative should be a geopolitical version of … a ‘modus vivendi.’ … In the new global modus vivendi, spheres of influence and demilitarized zones would be legitimate objects of diplomatic negotiation, in order to reduce tensions among great powers. … In economic policy … [t]he Washington Consensus will not be replaced by a Beijing Consensus, but by economic pluralism. … where genuine American interests and useful alliances are at stake, the United States should defend them vigorously … . But it is folly to continue to equate America’s national interest with the creation and defense of a global Pax Americana.”

“Competitive Strategies Against Russia Are Seductive, Dangerous and Unnecessary," Joshua Rovner, War on the Rocks, 04.16.18: The author, associate professor in the School of International Service at American University, writes that competitive strategies are “efforts to coax adversaries into self-defeating policies. … Whether by design or by accident, some aspects of the Trump administration’s approach to Russia look like a competitive strategy … U.S. economic advantages give it the opportunity to control the initiative in any arms race and steer Russia towards unsustainable military spending … [but] there are several reasons to resist the temptation. First, the logic of competitive strategies requires reliable assessments of the adversary … but U.S. officials may not understand the substance of Russian military doctrine. … Second, Putin is perfectly capable of making strategic blunders all on his own. … Third, a competitive strategies approach reinforces Putin’s domestic narrative. … Finally, the goal … is vague. … Competitive strategies are deliberately risky because by definition, they work by inspiring fear in adversaries. Done with care, this can allow one side to dictate the scope and pace of competition, without inadvertently provoking conflict. But the same fear can also lead to irrational decisions. … Russia seems vulnerable to competitive strategies because of its oversensitivity and proclivity for overreaction, but these are precisely the reasons why such an approach is ill-advised. Of all the reasons to put competitive strategy on the backburner, none is more urgent than the danger of a needless confrontation.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“New START Controversies,” Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 04.15.18: The author, an independent analyst based in Geneva, a senior research fellow at the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, writes: “In February 2018, … Russia … issued a statement that asserted that the United States reached the [New START treaty] limit in part by converting a certain number of Trident II SLBM launchers and В-52Н heavy bombers” in such a way that Russia cannot confirm that they “have been rendered incapable of employing SLBMs or nuclear armaments for heavy bombers … [and that] some reductions were done by arbitrar[ily] renaming silo training launches into ‘training silos,’ a category not specified by the Treaty. … It is indeed the case that the United States converted some of its Trident II launchers this way … . The problem that Russia has with that procedure is that it is reversible.” The U.S. argues that “New START does not explicitly require the conversion to be irreversible, and that … Russia can … use its inspection provisions” to ascertain compliance. “Unlike the Trident claim, … [renaming silo training launches into ‘training silos’] seem less serious. At the center of the issue are four ‘training silos’ at the three operational ICBM bases … . New START requires counting ‘silo training launchers,’ which are defined as ‘full-scale silo launcher of ICBMs specified for training purposes.’ In [the] U.S. view … ‘silos’ are not ‘full-scale’ launchers in that … they cannot possibly launch a missile. … [I]n the ‘old’ START these silos were reported as ‘silo training launchers,’ so the United States should probably demonstrate why it no longer considers these silos as launchers.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“What Does Trump Believe Is America's Mission in Syria?” Jacob Heilbrunn, The National Interest, 04.16.18: The author, editor of The National Interest, writes: “The western airstrikes on Syria were carefully circumscribed, avoided Russian assets and troops and did little, if anything, to disturb Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. … This did not stop the hawks who support Trump from trying to place their own interpretation of events on the strikes against Syria. … Neither North Korea nor Iran is likely to be overly impressed by the western intervention. Assad remains defiant. The limited nature of the strikes suggests that the president—and above all Defense Secretary James Mattis—harbors little appetite for serious hostilities that might escalate into a wider war. … Trump declared ‘mission accomplished,’ but he never really defined what the mission was supposed to be beyond punishing Assad. … According to Trump, ‘What kind of a nation wants to be associated with the mass murder of innocent men, women and children? The nations of the world can be judged by the friends they keep. No nation can succeed in the long run by promoting rogue states, brutal tyrants and murderous dictators.’ The sentiment is understandable. But it could also be directed at the United States itself. … The truth is that Russia’s and Iran’s promotion, to use Trump’s term, of Assad has worked. Their influence in Syria is at its apogee, much to the distress of Israel. The western strikes have more to do with dramaturgy than military strategy.”

“The US Doesn't Even Care About Syria—But We Keep the War Going,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 04.12.18: The author, a senior fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, writes: “Much of Syria's water, much of its oil and much of its best agricultural land lie in regions controlled by U.S.-backed rebel factions. … We could encourage our Kurdish allies and other rebel groups to negotiate a peace accord with Assad … . That would lay the foundation for a stable Syria—which is why we are unlikely do it. … According to the logic behind American strategy in the Middle East … one of our principal goals should be to prevent peace or prosperity from breaking out in countries whose governments are unfriendly to us. That outcome in Syria would have results we consider intolerable. … it would signal final victory for the Assad government … [and] it would allow Russia … to maintain its influence in Syria. … Trump has declared repeatedly in recent weeks that he wants to pull American troops out of Syria … . That same instinct led him to declare that he would pull troops out of Afghanistan—until his generals persuaded him to send more instead. The security imperatives that keep us in Syria are fantasies of fevered military minds. We should stop trying to turn Syria into an American protectorate, and look for ways to withdraw our troops rather than justifications to keep them there forever.”

“After the Syria Strike, a Strategy,” Ryan Crocker and Michael O'Hanlon, The Wall Street Journal, 04.16.18: The authors, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, write: “The crisis in Syria—the chemical weapons attack by President Bashar al-Assad's forces, followed by the limited U.S.-U.K.-France military response—creates an opportunity to develop the broader Syria strategy the West now lacks. The first element of such a strategy is to help local allies in Syria hold their ground. … The second element … is to take advantage of the threat of further U.S. military operations. … The goal of such threats is deterrence. Actually carrying them out would entail major dangers to the West. Weakening Mr. Assad militarily to that degree would likely reignite an all-out civil war, risk a showdown with Russia and set the stage for massive sectarian bloodletting. … The third element … is a more realistic political vision for the country—one that no longer seeks Mr. Assad's immediate removal. … The West must accept that Mr. Assad would insist on a major hand in choosing his successor through a managed transition. … Fourth, in order to secure Turkey's cooperation, the Kurdish question needs a better answer … . America and its international partners have a major advantage: money. Most of the $100 billion or so in financing that Syria will ultimately need to rebuild can only be delivered by the U.S. and its allies.”

“The Real Next War in Syria: Iran vs. Israel,” Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, 04.15.18: The author, a veteran columnist, writes: “The U.S., British and French attack on Syria to punish its regime for its vile use of chemical weapons—and Russia's vow to respond—is actually just the second-most dangerous confrontation unfolding in that country. Even more dangerous is that Israel and Iran … seem to be heading for a High Noon shootout in Syria over Iran's attempts to turn Syria into a forward air base against Israel, something Israel is vowing to never let happen. … In the past few weeks—for the first time ever—Israel and Iran have begun quietly trading blows directly, not through proxies, in Syria. And this quiet phase may be about to end. Israel and Iran are now a hair-trigger away from going to the next level—and if that happens, the U.S. and Russia may find it difficult to stay out. … Israeli military officials believe Russian President Vladimir Putin and [senior Iranian military officer Qassem] Suleimani are no longer natural allies. Putin wants and needs a stable Syria where his puppet Bashar Assad can be in control and Russia can maintain a forward naval and air presence and look like a superpower again … .  Iran's President Rouhani probably also prefers a stable Syria … that is not a drain on the Iranian budget. But Suleimani and the Quds Force seem to aspire to greater dominance of the Arab world and putting more pressure on Israel. Unless Suleimani backs down, you are about to see in Syria an unstoppable force—Iran's Quds Force—meet an immovable object: Israel.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Why the US Targeted This Russian Oligarch: The billionaire Oleg Deripaska is no Putin crony, but he helps flood the US with imported aluminum,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.10.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “Deripaska … has kept his head down and enjoyed a decent relationship with the Kremlin, as have most other Yeltsin-era billionaires. … But he was never a Putin crony, a participant in his hockey games, a judo sparring partner, a fellow KGB veteran. … I can see only one reason why Deripaska has been singled out now … . Russia was the No. 2 supplier of aluminum to the U.S. market after Canada. In this case … we mean Rusal, the country's dominant aluminum producer. … By sanctioning Deripaska and his companies, the U.S. took a huge chunk of imports off the market much more effectively than it could have done with the tariff. U.S. consumers, of course, will pay for this as domestic producers and other exporters raise prices, and the tariffs will be all the less useful. As for Deripaska, he will get help from the Russian government again.”

“Sanctions Are a Game Changer for Russian Assets. Rating Agencies Should Rethink Country’s Investment Grade,” Timothy Ash, Financial Times, 04.10.18: The author, senior sovereign strategist at an asset management firm, writes that “the U.S. Treasury’s actions on April 6, sanctioning seven Russian oligarchs and a range of government officials … are a major game changer in terms of how one should view Russian credit and market risks. I think this is important for two reasons. First, … the Treasury made it clear that almost no Russian oligarch can now escape the clutches of U.S. sanctions. … Second, sanctioning securities and assets that have already been issued was highly significant. … It is no longer a question of the ability and willingness of the [debt] issuer to pay but whether the U.S. Treasury will permit the issuer to pay. I cannot see Russia retaining its IG rating—which has big implications for the country’s credit market, local bond market and the ruble.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia: War and Punishment,” John Raine, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 04.13.18: The author, senior adviser for geopolitical due diligence at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, writes: “Two features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule are notable. First, he has been consistent in his rejection of the current international order as appropriate to Russia. … Second, Putin has made central to his repertoire domestically and overseas the use of … ‘condign power.’ He has repeatedly shown himself willing to punish those who betray him. … The only person who can speak for Russia is Putin. Unlike those of Trump and Russian officials, his comments always deserve to be taken both seriously and literally. Talking past him or not to him at all sets the conditions for a Cold War combination of standoffs and proxy conflicts for which … he is better equipped than the West. How that dialogue is initiated and conducted is the greater diplomatic challenge that lies beyond the current crisis.”

"Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe," Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William Marcellino, Andriy Bega and Zev Winkelman, RAND Corporation, April 2018: This study by RAND Corporation experts in various fields looks at “Russian-language content on social media and the broader propaganda threat posed to the region of former Soviet states that include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Moldova and Belarus.” Key findings of the report include: “Russia's goals in its near abroad differ from those for farther-flung states …  Specific communities spread and discuss propaganda … Broader challenges affect counterpropaganda efforts in the region.” The authors’ recommendations include: “Highlight and ‘block’ Russian propaganda … . Build the resilience of at-risk populations. … Expand and improve local and original content to displace the Russian media narrative.  … Better tell the U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) story. … Track Russian media and develop analytic methods. Identify fake-news stories and their sources, understand Russian narrative themes and content and understand the broader Russian strategy that underlies tactical propaganda messaging.”

China:

• No significant commentary.

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.12.18: The author, a journalist and political commentator for Tut.by, writes: “It is possible that this current phase in Belarusian history—characterized by an alliance with Russia and coinciding with parallel state institutions aimed at asserting Belarusian sovereignty—will one day be seen as one of the few realistic options for preserving the independence of a young country with a weak national identity, a Soviet-style economy and a Soviet-era mentality among the bulk of its population and elites. … Belarusian society remains largely pro-Russian, with a stable, sizable pro-European minority. … they will not sacrifice their sovereignty and share the costs of Russian foreign policy. … The political system is likely consolidated enough to allow him [Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko] to grow old in his post, though if he were to pass away unexpectedly, a chaotic power struggle could ensue in the absence of a chosen successor. … Unlike Ukraine, Belarus is highly unlikely to experience revolutionary regime change or a sharply different foreign policy. Even if such changes happened in Minsk, Moscow would likely find it more effective and less risky to respond with economic statecraft than with military force.”

“A Needless Rivalry? Russia and the EU in Central Asia,” Rafael Sattarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.11.18: The author, an expert on Central Asia with the Bilig Brains analytical project, writes: “The EU’s strategy toward Central Asia … focuses primarily on security and stability. … The goals of the EU and Russia are not in direct competition in Central Asia. Yet the Kremlin fundamentally distrusts EU attempts to build civil society and democratic institutions in the region. … Currently, Central Asia resembles the Middle East on the eve of the Arab Spring. The depletion of water resources and other ecological problems have caused a disorderly mass migration from impoverished rural regions to cities, which are completely unprepared to receive the migrants. In the Middle East, this led to a deep social and economic crisis across the region. The EU and Russia share an interest in preventing this kind of destabilization. Each side has its own advantages and areas of influence in the region. The challenge is for them to overcome their rivalry and find ways of developing joint initiatives in education, infrastructure, and technological assistance in the name of a common strategic goal.”

“A Hint of Spring in Uzbekistan,” Editorial Board, New York Times, 04.13.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes: “[T]he first, tentative steps by his [former Uzbek president Islam Karimov’s] successor to curb the secret police are raising high hopes of an Uzbek Spring in the making. … President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s efforts bear watching and deserve support. … Most notable have been his steps to curb the huge powers and reach of the feared security apparatus. Mr. Mirziyoyev fired its long-serving chief and his deputy and signed a law that made protecting human rights one of the security service’s missions. He has released some political prisoners, including journalists; he has removed about 18,000 people from the security services’ notorious ‘black list’ … ; he has curbed the use of forced labor in cotton fields; he has loosened controls on news media a bit; he has worked to mend fences with Uzbekistan’s neighbors. … [I]t is critical that the United States and the European Union link whatever engagement they have with Uzbekistan, whether investment or development programs, to continued improvements in human rights. That is critical not only insure that Mr. Mirziyoyev stays the course, but also as an example to Uzbekistan’s neighbors, and to any leader who sees benefits in authoritarian and illiberal rule.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.