This Week’s Highlights

• The most consequential impact of COVID-19 is the intensification of Sino-American rivalry and the emergence of new global bipolarity, writes Carnegie’s Dmitri Trenin. It is this looming global bipolarity that presents the main challenge to Russian foreign policy in the medium and long term. Becoming part of a Pax Sinica, China’s sphere of influence, is absolutely unacceptable to Russia, Trenin writes, while a military alliance between Russia and China would be justified in only one, entirely hypothetical case: a U.S. military attack against both countries.
• Under the terms of New START, it can be extended for up to five years, to 2026. This step can be taken easily—in the United States, it would not require sending the treaty back to the Senate for another ratification process, write Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Antonov and former top U.S. diplomat Rose Gottemoeller. Russian President Vladimir Putin has indicated that the Russian side is ready to extend New START without any preconditions. There is nothing stopping U.S. President Donald Trump from immediately announcing the same, according to Antonov and Gottemoeller who took part in the U.S.-Russian negotiations on this treaty.
• Russia has long been interested in pulling the United States into coordinating the global oil market. Although the United States does not need to join OPEC+ and its pledges to mandate production cuts, having regular exchanges about global energy trends could create a niche for constructive discussions between Russian and U.S. officials on other issues, such as Venezuela, argues Harvard’s Meghan O’Sullivan.
• For most of the post-Soviet period, energy officials in Russia have resisted OPEC entreaties to participate in production cuts to help prop up oil prices, arguing that doing so was impossible because of the country’s cold climate, writes Andrew Kramer for the New York Times. Oil analysts have called the cold weather claim one of the global oil industry’s biggest geopolitical bluffs, one which Russian officials carried off with a straight face for decades. Kramer writes that the hurried Russian shutdown now shows that Siberian and far northern wells, it turns out, turn off about as easily as any others.
• Sustainable peace in Ukraine will require a dialogue on European security and Russian relations with the West. EU members, Russia and their neighbors ought to start addressing broader European security issues, including through regional arms control discussions, to lower tensions and alleviate all sides’ security fears, according to a new report by the International Crisis Group. These talks will send a signal to Russia that its threat perceptions are taken seriously and that discussions with European states offer a promising way forward.
• Having learned from its failures during the Cold War, Moscow is no longer building a military force that mirrors those of its rivals. Instead, Russia is investing in areas where it enjoys, or could enjoy, a comparative advantage, writes Jeffrey Mankoff of CSIS. Some of these areas are familiar to students of the Cold War, such as a navy that emphasizes attacks on a foe’s critical infrastructure. Others, like the growing incorporation of drones, are new, Mankoff writes.
• There is a three-part deal between Vladimir Putin and the elites, according to remarks by CFR senior fellow Thomas Graham. “First is that Putin is going to protect the elites, the oligarchs, from external enemies … Second, he’s going to protect the elites against mass socioeconomic discontent that would spill … out into the streets … And then, finally, that he is going to protect the elites from themselves; that is, that he is capable of managing the competition among the elites in a way that keeps everybody in the game in a satisfactory fashion. And if those three conditions—or Putin can’t meet those three conditions, then the elites begin to look for an alternative.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War:

“Prague Assassination Claims Alarming but Fortunately Likely Fantasy,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 05.01.20: The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:

• “The report was as startling as it was alarming. According to the Czech news magazine Respekt, a Russian foreign service officer had flown into Prague with a suitcase of ricin poison and the mission to assassinate the city’s mayor, Ždenec Hrib, as well as two other men: Ondrej Kolar and Pavel Novotny.”
• “For all that, the story is hard to take at face value. It is based on a single anonymous report and has not had any official corroboration. Local [Czech] experts … have cast doubt on it. Moscow, predictably, also denied the account, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling it a ‘hoax.’”
• “There are also practical issues with the story as it stands. … Ricin was used to murder Bulgarian dissident Georgy Markov in London in 1978 and CIA double agent Boris Korczak in Virginia in 1981. However, the Russians do not seem to have used it since, and while extremely deadly, it is also relatively easy to identify in the body.”
• “Also, both Russia and the Czech Republic had closed their borders by this time. … Considering that no one person could carry out the assassination of three separate officials, this would also require the services of numerous other Russian intelligence officers. Given that they would be operating in a city under stringent lockdown, under the gaze of humans and cameras alike, the chances that all or most would be identified is high.”
• “Most importantly, this would be wholly out of keeping with Russian practice, and a massive escalation.”

“A Menace More Durable Than a Virus,” George F. Will, The Washington Post, 05.01.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Zdenek Hrib, the mayor of Prague, confirmed that he was given police protection after a Czech magazine reported that three weeks ago a Russian arrived in the Czech Republic carrying ricin and was driven to the Russian Embassy in a diplomatic vehicle. Czech law enforcement has not confirmed a plot.”
• “As this column noted in January, last year China canceled its invitation to four Czech musical ensembles because Tibet's flag flies over Prague's city hall to express opposition to China's attempts to extinguish Tibet's national identity. Hrib, a doctor, has condemned ‘the forced extraction of organs from members of the Muslim Uighur minority and other prisoners of the [Beijing] regime.’”
• “If Russia is threatening Hrib, this might be ‘comradely assistance’ for China. Russia, however, has its own resentments.”

“America Needs a Coalition to Win a Space War,” Aaron Bateman, War on the Rocks, 04.29.20: The author, a Ph.D. candidate in the history of science and technology at Johns Hopkins University, writes:

• “Russia and China both recognize that American high-precision warfighting is dependent on space systems. According to the U.S. director of national intelligence, both Russia and China are developing capabilities to destroy U.S. satellites in all orbital regimes—at all altitudes. But, unlike in the past, the United States is not on its own. It has allies and partners to turn to.”
• “Russia’s recent anti-satellite weapon test and tailing of a U.S. satellite, and previous U.S. State Department statements about Moscow’s destabilizing behavior highlight the lack of established norms for military space operations. For example, how close is too close for a satellite? Clearly, establishing a code of conduct in space is something that the United States cannot do on its own. It should be a joint effort with spacefaring allies around the globe. Additionally, it is imperative that America and its allies publicly confront Russia, in particular, about its dangerous behavior in space.”
• “It is vital for Washington to work with its allies to establish what specific space behaviors will be considered unacceptable and to communicate—and enforce—such standards with aggressive spacefaring nations like Russia and China.”
• “The United States and its allies should work collectively to prevent the testing of weapons in space.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Pandemic:

Russia’s response to the pandemic in “Update on Russia: Policy, Power and Public Health,” Conference Call With Thomas Graham, Stephen Sestanovich, Celeste Wallander and Susan Glasser, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 04.28.20:

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow with CFR:

• “This big year for Putin has turned into one of real—a real challenge for him. He has been subjected to significant criticism because of the way he’s handled the crisis. … [W]hen the crisis becomes a major issue in Russia, Putin delegates responsibility of this, first to Mishustin, who can’t handle it, and then to the Mayor of Moscow Sobyanin, who’s been really the voice of dealing with this crisis.”
• “Now, what this means for Putin over the longer term depends very much on how this crisis evolves. … If the economy—if the oil prices begin to go up in the fall, if the pandemic has been dealt with effectively by the fall, then Putin may be okay. But if this continues longer, if we get a resurgence of this in the fall or next year, then I think there’s serious implications for Putin. Not so much for the population as it is … with the elites, who will see him as less than a satisfactory leader.”
• “If Putin can make a credible claim that when the worst is behind Russia that he has done a better job than the United States and Western Europe, then I think the impact on his standing is going to be minimal. If he can’t make that, then I think you have significant consequences and you will see the growing socioeconomic discontent. … [I]f the elites begin to lose confidence in Putin’s leadership, then we’re going to see a dramatically different situation and a situation where Putin most likely would not be able to succeed himself in 2024.”
• “The successes that he [Putin] was touting back in 2014-2015 in Ukraine and Syria don’t look as successful today … [W]e’re still in Ukraine. We haven’t solved that problem. … Maybe, you know, the oil price is much more of a problem for our economy than sanctions, but sanctions still … are a problem. And we’ve alienated the West.”

Stephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at CFR:

• “[T]his is a crisis in global energy markets that had been building for some time. You had oversupply … the three big producers, Russia and Saudi Arabia and the United States, were all going at full tilt and the United States had actually become the principal producer. … [T]he word in Moscow is that this was all … a scheme concocted by and pushed on Putin by Igor Sechin, who’s the head of Rosneft, … who has thought that this was a way of knocking out American shale oil.”
• “[T]hey face this crisis in … not in a situation of strength and the question is really just how deep the impact will be, how long lasting. I think there’s a possibility, given these constraints, that Russia will turn out to be one of the hardest hit by the global recession and the crisis in energy markets … you only know when the tide goes out who’s swimming naked. And I think his implication is it may be Russia and Putin that have been swimming naked.”
• “If you look at what Putin talks about, he hardly mentions foreign policy. If you look at his state of the union from January, very little foreign policy. If you look at what he emphasizes as the key themes that he thinks the voters want to hear about it, it’s all pocketbook issues. He understands. … The clear message he’s sending and the way he talks about this is he knows people care about their, you know, wellbeing, health care, education, food on the table.”

Celeste Wallander, president and chief executive officer of the U.S.-Russia Foundation: 

• “I tend to be skeptical that the Kremlin would intervene out of a need to be popular. That doesn’t mean that it wouldn’t—that the crisis would prevent the Kremlin from being willing to intervene if it perceived a significant loss somewhere in, you know, the Eurasian periphery, or somewhere that was important to either business oil markets or, you know, certainly relations. But simply being drive by the problems at home, that’s not one of the scenarios that really keeps me up at night.”

“Russia: Pandemic Tests Putin’s Grip on Power,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 05.04.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “In the space of two months COVID-19 has laid waste to both his [Putin’s] political agenda and the economic model that underpins his regime … The virus has infected almost 135,000 Russians and killed close to 1,300, making the country the world’s seventh most affected … It has also sparked a two-pronged economic shock that is expected to shrink Russia’s gross domestic product by as much as 6 percent this year.”
• “Profits from oil and gas sales provide around 50 percent of Russia’s consolidated budget revenue—about $130 billion. Since oil prices plunged … a $165 billion war chest built up to protect the economy is being drained by as much as $300 million a day, according to government data. … The impact on the population is expected to be severe.”
• “Mr. Putin faces a multi-faceted crisis that has shaken his authority and the informal social contract that underpins his rule: to provide security and economic stability to voters in exchange for restrictions on their political freedoms. Despite attempts to distance himself from the crisis by delegating difficult decisions to his regional governors, Mr. Putin’s approval rating has fallen to a six-year low. … A sharp rise in public anger could certainly hamper Mr. Putin’s bid to rewrite the constitution and grant himself the ability to run for two more six-year terms as president after 2024 … A VTsIOM poll … on April 17—midway through the lockdown—and with case numbers rising rapidly, showed support had dipped to 50 percent.”
• “‘As the number of cases imported from Russia [to China] grows, so is Chinese anger. Not only is Moscow hiding—or unable to detect—real numbers of infections, it can’t control movement of sick people and the spread of COVID-19,’ Alexander Gabuyev of Carnegie Moscow Center says. ‘This is likely to boost long-held feelings of Chinese superiority towards Russia and anti-Russian sentiments. In Russia, it’s likely that the virus will reinforce deep-seated Sinophobia.’”

“The Coronavirus Gave Europe's Leaders a Popularity Boost. Putin Hasn't Fared As Well,” Vladimir Ruvinsky and Pavel Aptekar, The Moscow Times/Vedomosti, 05.01.20: The authors, writers for Vedomosti, write:  

• “Just 28.3 percent of Russians surveyed by a poll in March named Putin when asked to name a politician whom they trust, the lowest percentage since the pollster began asking the question in January 2006.”
• “Putin’s confidence ratings not only failed to climb as they did for European leaders, but they actually began a gradual decline.”
• “A core electorate that surveys put at 30 percent-40 percent of the population—although the actual number is probably lower—is prepared to let Putin rule for life. Beyond that however, Russians are growing increasingly tired of their National Leader.”

“Russia’s Health Care System, Demographics Present Unique Advantages, Disadvantages in Fighting COVID-19,”Alexandra Vacroux, Russia Matters, 04.30.20: The author, executive director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, writes:

• “[Advantages:] Russia has been testing aggressively—over 3.49 million tests had been run as of April 30, which represents about 2.4 percent of the population. This is roughly equal to testing rates in Ukraine, lower than those of the Baltics and significantly higher than the rest of the post-Soviet space, Poland and Hungary.”
• “In addition, Russia’s longstanding experience with tuberculosis … may give it an edge in setting up systems to test, treat and contain the spread of the virus. … Another advantage that Russia enjoys according to some of its Western peers in fighting the disease, which disproportionally kills older people, is the younger age of its population.”
• “[Disadvantages:] As in other countries, COVID-19 started in the largest cities, and then began to seep out to rural areas where the populations are older, as are the medical facilities. … [A]s Judy Twigg has noted, the chronic diseases that disproportionately afflict many Russians (and especially men) … are those that are associated with coronavirus victims who require more intensive care.”
• “Russia faces two more major problems in its fight with the coronavirus. First, seven years of ‘optimizing’ the health care system have significantly reduced not only inefficiencies, but also the capacity of the system to deal with the current crisis. Second, these resources are not evenly distributed across the country.”
• “Only 41 percent of Russian medical facilities have access to the internet and 10 percent of Russian medical facilities need significant upgrades: half of these have no hot water, and a third lack indoor toilets.”

“How Is the Russian Military Responding to COVID-19?” Mathieu Boulegue, War on the Rocks, 05.04.20: The author, a research fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, writes:

• “The Kremlin opted for a highly-centralized, top-down approach to the COVID-19 response in the armed forces. The first move was to create an ad hoc, dedicated operational-level headquarters on March 12 under the leadership of First Deputy Minister of Defense Ruslan Tsalikov.”
• “The mobilization of specialized engineering troops and medical support units reflects how seriously military planners are taking the coronavirus pandemic. For example, the coronavirus pandemic is a unique opportunity for the nuclear, biological and chemical protection troops to step forward and assume a large part of the ‘preventive’ emergency response within the Russian armed forces. So far, nuclear, biological and chemical protection troops have been mobilized for disinfection operations—from military transport aircrafts and facilities to civilian vehicles.”
• “The Russian defense-industrial complex—a key sector of the national economy—is also bracing for impact. Like in the armed forces, measures are being increasingly introduced in state corporations and their subsidiaries to prevent the spread of the infection. This includes working in shifts, introducing distancing measures on production chains, supplying protective gear, etc.”
• “The Russian armed forces are in a unique position to support civilian emergency and medical infrastructure.”

“The Dangerous New Consensus: Blame China,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 05.03.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, writes:

• “It seems like only yesterday that Russia was responsible for all the world's ills. Over the last decade, we have come to understand Russia as a brutally repressive tyranny whose power-mad dictator works relentlessly to subvert American democracy while his fangs drip with the entrails of peace-loving people he has slaughtered from Ukraine to Syria. Now we can forget that. A new force has supplanted Russia in our national cosmology. Quite suddenly, our relentless search for enemies has led us to a new consensus: whatever bad happens, China did it.”
• “Rather than seek a less confrontational approach to the world after the Soviet Union collapsed, we doubled down on our determination to control events everywhere. Any country that resists becomes our enemy. Bashing Russia was never just about Ukraine or Syria or interference in the 2016 election. It also was punishment for Russia's success in upsetting our ambition to dominate Europe and the Middle East. Today's burst of anti-China passion has the same root.”
• “Plenty about China—like plenty about Russia—deserves harsh criticism. The new hysteria sweeping the United States, however, is not aimed seriously at trying to push China in constructive directions. Nor does it stem only from anger about the virus. Democrats and Republicans alike have an interest in making us believe that the cause of our suffering lies not only outside ourselves, but outside our country.”
• “The narrator of ‘Moby-Dick,’ seeking to understand what malign force is propelling him toward disaster, asks himself, ‘What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it?’ Today we know the answer for ourselves. Our entire political class agrees. The demonic force is no longer nameless or inscrutable or unearthly. It's China. Embracing this reassuring delusion confirms our national innocence and allows us to sleep soundly.”

“Do Pandemics Promote Peace?  Why Sickness Slows the March to War,” Barry R. Posen, Foreign Affairs, 04.23.20

“Video Surveillance and COVID-19 in Eurasia,” Erica Marat, PONARS Eurasia, May 2020: The author, an associate professor at the National Defense University, writes:

• “To enforce quarantine measures, some Eurasian cities are relying on smart surveillance technologies initially installed a few years ago to capture criminal and disorderly behavior. Moscow, Nur-Sultan and Kyiv have been leaders in retooling existing electronic surveillance infrastructure, including facial recognition cameras, to monitor violations of government restrictions on movement amid the COVID-19 pandemic.”
• “The recent measures taken by these cities have shown that in the name of the public good, cutting edge technologies can be quickly adapted to new functions by municipal and national authorities. Without a broader debate about implications for privacy and civil liberties, such rapid shifts are likely to benefit political incumbents and expand their control over urban populations. The issue of digital surveillance as a way of controlling the spread of COVID-19 is discussed worldwide, including in the United States and Europe, but in Eurasia, surveillance is augmented top-down by national and municipal authorities without public oversight.”
• “Moscow, Kyiv and Nur-Sultan are right in taking harsh measures to prevent the spread of the novel virus. But even amid the pandemic, discussions of civil liberties must not be overshadowed by the urge to protect public health. In the long term, smart cameras can be seamlessly retooled for other political or social purposes, all in the name of the public good. Technologies provide a sense of control by the authorities, but in reality, they may be enforcing order only selectively in areas with the highest availability of smart cameras. Instead of relying on surveillance technologies to successfully maintain social distancing, municipal authorities can solicit ideas from the public on the best ways to serve communities facing the greatest risk of exposure to the virus or assisting the needs of healthcare workers and other essential workers.”

“Russia and Digital Surveillance in the Wake of COVID-19,” J. Paul Goode, PONARS Eurasia, May 2020: The author, a senior lecturer in Russian politics at the University of Bath, writes:

• “Russia’s response to the current pandemic highlights its aspirations to become a world leader in facial recognition and artificial intelligence (AI). The adoption of self-isolation and digital pass regimes provides opportunities to showcase the country’s growing network of ‘safe city’ programs with video surveillance for crowd and traffic control, which in some cities includes facial and vehicle recognition capabilities. However, the practical effect has been to highlight its limitations while facilitating the rapid expansion of data collection on Russian citizens.”
• “In the longer term, Russia has the potential to leverage its existing SORM-based surveillance networks in Eurasia to create a datasphere that rivals China’s. In theory, its existing capabilities also provide it with the means to slow China’s advance in the region—for instance, by creating incentives for cooperation through the Eurasian Economic Union, by using information warfare to inflame nationalist sentiment in target countries, or by instrumentally mobilizing international norms and ethics to slow the adoption of competitors’ digital surveillance technology. Such tactics could help Russia to ‘run out the clock’ while levelling up to the competition. The operative question, then, is whether Russia has time to spare, as one of the most important lessons of the pandemic for the Kremlin is that the clock is already ticking.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“Keeping Peace in the Nuclear Age. Why Washington and Moscow Must Extend the New START Treaty,” Anatoly Antonov and Rose Gottemoeller, Foreign Affairs, 04.29.20

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“How Trump Can End the War in Syria. Putin and Erdogan Are Finally Ready to Negotiate,” Ayman Abdel Nour, Foreign Affairs, 04.26.20

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“The Russians Manipulated Our Elections. We Helped,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 04.24.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “When Russian intelligence officers plotted their campaign to destabilize American politics in 2016, they had nearly a century of experience in covert manipulation to draw upon. The Internet had given the Russians new tools for this mischief. But their secret weapon was us—an open, divided, angry America. That’s the lesson of Thomas Rid’s superb new book, ‘Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare.’”
• “The manipulators were opportunists: They poked at the holes and fissures in our political life and helped turn our simmering rage into a boil. But we did most of the work for them, as we amplified Moscow’s leaks and lies in the aftermath of its 2016 covert action and agitated ourselves into a state of near-hysteria. Russia set loose a virus, but we journalists and citizens, ever more obsessed with Russian ‘meddling,’ were the mules who carried it.”
• “As foreign intelligence agencies seek to shape America’s political reality, citizens may become so hardened and skeptical that they stop trusting anyone, concluding that it’s all just ‘fake news.’ That’s the real affinity between American demagogues and Moscow. They both traffic so much in disinformation that an exhausted, disoriented public doesn’t know what to believe.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Oil's Collapse Is a Geopolitical Reset in Disguise: From Russia to Mexico, U.S. foreign policy makers face new risks and opportunities,” Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Bloomberg, 04.29.20: The author, director of the Geopolitics of Energy Project at Harvard Kennedy School, writes:

• “The world is on the cusp of a geopolitical reset. The global pandemic could well undermine international institutions, reinforce nationalism and spur de-globalization. But far-sighted leadership could also rekindle cooperation.”
• “We now face a disruption of such proportions that it, too, will reorder some power relationships. … For dozens of oil producers, the plunge in oil prices is devastating. No major oil producer can balance its budget at prices below $40 … Those with (comparatively) more diversified economies—such as the United Arab Emirates, Mexico and Russia—are obviously better off.”
• “Despite Trump’s insistence that the United States needs and wants a better relationship with Russia, this dysfunctional dyad so far has been impervious to recalibration. Moscow and Washington are unlikely to come to any meaningful détente, … yet a small opening exists to professionalize a segment of bilateral U.S.-Russia ties.”
• “Russia has long been interested in pulling the United States into coordinating the global oil market. Although the United States does not need to join OPEC+ and its pledges to mandate production cuts, having regular exchanges about global energy trends could create a niche for constructive discussions between Russian and U.S. officials.”
• “Foreign policy makers and leading thinkers do need to consider how the global order will change in response to the coronavirus. As John Ikenberry pointed out elsewhere, history suggests that initial moves toward isolation could be followed by global efforts to re-create needed institutions. But a U.S. failure to address the more immediate challenges stemming from the COVID-19 oil market collapse will not bode well for any larger effort to remake the world order.”

“Too Cold for an Oil Cut? Russia’s Move Reveals a Long-Running Bluff,” Andrew Kramer, New York Times, 05.04.20: The author, a reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “For most of the post-Soviet period, energy officials in Russia have resisted OPEC entreaties to participate in production cuts … arguing that doing so was impossible because of the country’s cold climate. … Supposedly, wells drilled in permafrost could not be shut down, lest they froze, requiring them to be drilled all over again when they were reopened.”
• “Oil analysts have called the cold weather claim one of the global oil industry’s biggest geopolitical bluffs, one which Russian officials carried off with a straight face for decades to deflect OPEC demands for help with prices.”
• “That view has been substantiated by the hurried Russian shutdown now. Siberian and far northern wells, it turns out, turn off about as easily as any others. This week, confronted by a gusher of unsaleable oil and no place to put it, Russian energy executives unveiled plans to reduce production by a fifth by shutting down wells, many of them in the Arctic.”
• “‘The level of compliance with the deal will be 100 percent,” Russia’s energy minister, Aleksandr Novak, said in an interview with the Russian news agency Interfax … Moscow committed to cutting about two million barrels per day, about a fifth of its pre-crisis output.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Russia–US: No Reset, Just Guardrails,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.29.20: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Hardly anyone in the Russian leadership expects a fundamental turnaround in Russian-American relations in the foreseeable future. The outlook is bleak: the current confrontation between the two countries is labeled systemic, and U.S. sanctions on Russia are deemed to be eternal. The Moscow-Washington rivalry, as asymmetric as it is, is seen as linked to the power redistribution processes changing the world order, and each country’s position and role within that order.”
• “However, tactical opportunities for even very limited engagement are not to be missed. In a nutshell, what Russia wants from the United States is to resume dialogue based on mutual interests, and without preconditions. Moscow’s U.S. agenda is currently essentially limited to arms control issues.”
• “It is hard to say, however, whether the Trump administration, which is generally more hostile toward Russia than the president himself, is prepared to do that work [extend New START]. … The ceasefire in Ukraine’s Donbas region should remain stable and allow for humanitarian and economic exchanges across the line of contact. This is the most that can be done.”
• “The longer-term consequences of the coronavirus will include the further intensification of U.S.-Chinese rivalry, and the emerging Sino-American bipolarity. Russia’s top priority should be to carefully maintain equilibrium—though not equidistance—between the United States and China.”
• “Another priority would be to reduce concerns in Europe about the threat from Russia itself, and enhance relations with those EU countries that are more open to that. … Finally, Moscow will have to draw a lesson from the spectacular fall in oil prices caused by the pandemic-linked economic recession and Russia’s ill-timed price war with Saudi Arabia. … No new reset is in the offing, and the outlook remains negative, if generally stable. The U.S.-Russian confrontation will continue—with some guardrails around it.”  

“The Judge and Michael Flynn,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 05.02.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Federal Judge Emmet Sullivan is overseeing the prosecution of former National Security Adviser Mike Flynn, who is accused of lying to the FBI. The judge now has a second issue of fact and law to examine—to wit, whether prosecutors withheld crucial information from the Flynn defense.”
• “The Justice Department has recently and belatedly provided to Mr. Flynn's lawyers documents that are potentially exculpatory. … The FBI in early 2017 obtained transcripts of the Flynn-ambassador calls and jumped on the dubious theory that Mr. Flynn's conversations about Russian sanctions violated the Logan Act.”
• “Handwritten notes from former FBI counterintelligence head Bill Priestap suggest the purpose was to trap Mr. Flynn in a lie. … A separate document shows the FBI had already decided there was nothing to allegations of Flynn-Russia collusion. So why keep pursuing him on absurd Logan Act claims? … A newly released email from former FBI lawyer Lisa Page shows that bureau officials debated how to skirt its policy of providing Mr. Flynn a formal warning against lying to agents. Former FBI Director Jim Comey bragged in 2018 that he sent the agents who told Mr. Flynn he needn't consult the White House counsel.”
• “Other documents show the FBI deliberately chose to provide no warning to Mr. Flynn and hid from him that the interview was being conducted in an investigatory context—allowing him to think he was merely chatting with fellow government officials. The FBI, in other words, looks to have set up a situation designed to coax Mr. Flynn into saying something it could later claim was at odds with the transcript.”
• “All of this throws into doubt the Flynn prosecution and plea, and Judge Sullivan has an obligation to examine the prosecutorial record. Prosecutors wield extraordinary power, and Brady abuses are all too common. If judges aren't willing to police misbehavior, Americans can have no faith in our system of justice.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

On Putin’s deal with the elites and the possibility of upheaval in “Update on Russia: Policy, Power, and Public Health,” Conference Call With Thomas Graham, Stephen Sestanovich, Celeste Wallander and Susan Glasser, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 04.28.20:

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow with CFR:

• “Basically, there is a deal between Putin and the elites … I see it as sort of in three parts. First is that Putin is going to protect the elites, the oligarchs, from external enemies, the United States and the West in particular at this point. Second, he’s going to protect the elites against mass socioeconomic discontent that would spill … out into the streets, destabilize the system. And then, finally, that he is going to protect the elites from themselves; … he is capable of managing the competition among the elites in a way that keeps everybody in the game in a satisfactory fashion.”
• “And if … Putin can’t meet those three conditions, then the elites begin to look for an alternative. If you look at the situation now, it’s already difficult. If the pandemic turns out to be worse than anticipated, the oil prices stay low for a long time, a number of things happen.”
• “[T]he Russian economy doesn’t receive the amount of money … that it needs to distribute among the elites to keep everybody happy, so people get forced out who were part of the elite. That hasn’t been the situation over the past several years. The decision-making group narrows. The group of individuals who have access to those resources narrow. And that, I think, amplifies elite discontent.”
• “It would also have socioeconomic consequences. And there’s a question of how long the Russian people will endure sitting at home, being sort of passive, and when they’ll decide to come out in the streets in a more coordinated fashion largely for socioeconomic reasons.”
• “And then, finally, as I’ve already indicated, I don’t think the foreign policy looks like an overwhelming success at this point. And there certainly is an element within the Russian elites that would like to normalize relations with the United States, sees that as necessary for Russia’s long-term survival.”

Celeste Wallander, president and chief executive officer of the U.S.-Russia Foundation:

• “We should be thinking of is less the overthrow of the system than a substantial moving around of the deck chairs, not just, you know, for—to make it look nicer, but that there could be a redistribution of power where everyone agrees to keep Putin.”

“Putin Has Just Made Two Huge Mistakes—and His Timing Couldn't Be Worse,” Michael Carpenter, The Washington Post, 04.29.20: The author, managing director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement, writes:

• “The Kremlin's first mistake came in early March, when it reacted to falling oil prices by rejecting Saudi entreaties to cut production.”
• “The Kremlin's second big mistake was to allow its propaganda machine to project an aura of invincibility even as the COVID-19 tsunami was spreading across Russia.”
• “What happens next is hard to predict with any certainty, but one thing is clear: The legitimacy of the Putin regime will be tested as never before.”

“Russia's Free Press Takes Another Hit: An independent business paper is fighting a Kremlin power grab,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 04.28.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Last week the editorial staff of Vedomosti revolted against acting editor in chief Andrei Shmarov. An April 23 editorial warned that Mr. Shmarov's decisions put the publication at risk of becoming ‘another dependent and controlled media aiming to fulfill the interests and ambitions of its official and secret owners.’”
• “In March Vedomosti's Russian owner announced he would sell the publication, though apparently the sale still isn't final. Amid the chaos of the COVID-19 outbreak and ownership machinations, Mr. Shmarov, who previously founded a Kremlin-linked magazine, was appointed in violation of Vedomosti protocols.”
• “Staffers say that at their first meeting Mr. Shmarov acknowledged he didn't read the publication nor its code of conduct. But already he has banned critical coverage of Mr. Putin's recent move to remain in power beyond his current term limits. He removed a column critical of Mr. Sechin. He also forbade the paper's editorial staff from using survey data from the Levada Center, Russia's only independent polling outfit.”
• “The editorial staff is struggling to find alternative investors and regain control of the newsroom from Mr. Shmarov. Vedomosti losing its independence would be a serious loss for the Russian people, who suffer as Mr. Putin and his cronies rule Russia without the accountability that Westerners so often take for granted.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Improvisation and Adaptability in the Russian Military,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), edited by Jeffrey Mankoff, April 2020:

Introduction by Jeffrey Mankoff, a senior fellow at the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program:

• “The Russian military … is rapidly updating its tools and techniques in ways that challenge traditional thinking about great power competition. Having learned from its failures during the Cold War, Moscow is no longer building a force that mirrors those of its rivals. Instead, Russia is investing in areas where it enjoys, or could enjoy, a comparative advantage. Some of these areas are familiar to students of the Cold War, such as a navy that emphasizes attacks on a foe’s critical infrastructure. Others, like the growing incorporation of drones … are new. If nothing else, Russia’s military is adaptive. It also comparatively well-funded, with a solid technological base that, even if it struggles at times to produce completely new systems, allows Russia to be largely self-sufficient.”

“A Russian Global Expeditionary Force?” by Stephen Blank, an internationally-known expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union:

• “Russia can exploit significant sociopolitical, ethnic or religious cleavages and conduct this form of warfare anywhere it wants. By trial and error, Russia fashioned a way to project its influence and power abroad and will continue experimenting with these forces and tactics. Russian military writing is integrating new forces and concepts … about contemporary war and strategy. Accumulating tensions in ostensibly peripheral areas like Africa, the Middle East and Latin America have historically helped precipitate crises in more central areas—sometimes even triggering major wars. Without learning political, military or combined means of meeting these challenges, they will not only become local ‘forever wars’ but will grow into larger, longer and more violent conflagrations in Europe and Asia.”

“The Broader Challenge of Russian Electronic Warfare Capabilities,” by Andreas Turunen, a research analyst at Conflict Studies Research Centre:

• “Russian electronic warfare capabilities are a continuously evolving challenge that can only be countered by investment and institutional change. Years of Western emphasis on counter-insurgency and combat operations against non-peer adversaries created an embedded sense of security and superiority in the conduct of operations. … [R]efocusing on countering threats from peer and near-peer rivals … still requires time and sustained effort. For the United States and NATO member states, the moment of action is now in order to sustain deterrence in the European theater. Russia will continue to develop and enhance its electronic warfare capabilities while finding new vulnerabilities and attack vectors utilizing the full spectrum of electromagnetic means across the domains of military interaction. Lack of a meaningful response by Russia’s adversaries carries within it the risk of defeat and hence risks emboldening Russia to even more assertive interventions in Europe.”

“From Leaflets to ‘Likes’: The Digitalization and Rising Prominence of Psychological Operations in Russian Military,” by Joe Cheravitch, a Russian information operations analyst:

• “Just as leaflets were used to attempt to divide enemy coalitions along ethnic, religious and social differences in the past, modern GRU operators apply those techniques to undermine NATO and its partners through social media and cyberattacks. These techniques were most recently demonstrated in the spate of cyberattacks against Georgia in late 2019 … Information confrontation, in this sense, represents digital echoes of techniques forged through some of the worst conflicts in human history. It falls on the shoulders of analysts and experts to bridge the vast differences between Western and Russian approaches to digital conflict … in order to equip decisionmakers with a better understanding of the actors behind these furtive campaigns.”

“Strategic Deterrence, Critical Infrastructure and the Aspiration-Modernization Gap in the Russian Navy,” by Michael B. Petersen, director of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute:

• “A policy aspiration-modernization gap has opened up for the RFN. Russia is likely to attempt to close this gap in two ways. The first is its continued construction of new global power projection platforms such as modernized Yasen-M and Laika-class nuclear-powered submarines, combined with efforts to field extended-range hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. Modernization of legacy platforms may be limited. In the near term … the RFN will muddle through in a way that allows it to provide sustained deterrence missions against regional, mainland European adversaries. However, it will struggle to develop and upgrade more complex, larger platforms … In the longer term (5-10 years), the RFN will begin achieving a more credible and sustainable long-term conventional and tactical nuclear deterrence presence as newer large platforms and extended-range precision strike systems slowly matriculate into the force. … The RFN has managed to develop in ways that allow it to credibly project power into critically vital areas among its European rivals. At the same time, it is on a long-term trajectory to expand its reach against the United States.”

“Russian Unmanned Vehicle Developments: Syria and Beyond,” by Samuel Bendett, an adviser with the CNA Russia Studies Program and an adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security:

• “The Russian Federation has made major strides over the past decade in becoming one of the most active users and developers of unmanned military systems. Its involvement in Syria has been the single most defining experience for the MOD over the past 20 years. … The United States needs to track the evolution of development ‘robotic complexes’ in Russia and other great powers because active unmanned and autonomous vehicle use by these countries is already redefining how modern combat is waged.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

Russia’s relations with China in “Update on Russia: Policy, Power, and Public Health,” Conference Call With Thomas Graham, Stephen Sestanovich, Celeste Wallander and Susan Glasser, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 04.28.20:

Celeste Wallander, president and chief executive officer of the U.S.-Russia Foundation:

• “Clearly many of the Kremlin’s core interests and concerns about both the global system and the United States’ role, and position, and leadership of that are shared by China. I mean, I think there’s a—there is something of a common interest driving a lot of Russian and Chinese cooperation, whether that is having one another’s back in the U.N. Security Council on issues of intervention and security, whether that is … questioning American leadership in certain multilateral fora … So I think that there is both an exploitation of problems in the U.S.-China relationship, but I think it’s mostly driven by the Putin leadership’s own interest in the kinds of problems and challenges there are in the U.S.-China relationship.”

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow with CFR:

• “If you look at this from the standpoint of Russian national interest over the longer term … Russia really doesn’t benefit over the long term from being too close to China, becoming a natural resource appendage to the Chinese economy. It really needs to find a way to normalize relations with the United States and the West to get the technology and the investment that it needs in order to grow its economy over the long term. Putin, I think, understands that, if not willing to make the concessions or compromises he needs to normalize relations with the West. But I think there’s a growing number of people inside Russia, and within the elites, that realize that the continued alienation of the West is a long-term losing strategy for Russia.”

“How Russia Can Maintain Equilibrium in the Post-Pandemic Bipolar World,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.01.20: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Although the crisis precipitated by the new coronavirus pandemic is still in its very early stages, it is clear that it has vastly accelerated the ongoing processes around the world. The most consequential is the intensification of Sino-American rivalry and the emergence of new global bipolarity. It is this looming global bipolarity that presents the main challenge to Russian foreign policy in the medium and long term. … Some in Moscow may be relieved that Washington now treats China rather than Russia as its main rival. They should not be. The hostility of the U.S. political elite toward Russia is not going anywhere and is not decreasing. Any idea of a reset … is doomed to disappointment.”
• “Moscow should not go out of its way to accommodate all of Beijing’s wishes. When in doubt, it would suffice for the Kremlin simply to look at China’s own practices vis-à-vis the U.S.-Russia confrontation. Beijing did not join Washington in sanctioning Moscow, but it always put its own interests in the United States first when developing economic ties with Russia. … Becoming part of a Pax Sinica, China’s sphere of influence, is absolutely unacceptable to Russia.”
• “Another area where Russia should tread carefully is the Sino-American confrontation. Both Moscow and Beijing share a worldview that rejects U.S. dominance and its promotion of democracy, and both are branded as adversaries by the United States. Yet a military alliance between Russia and China is justified in only one, entirely hypothetical case: a U.S. military attack against both countries.”
• “Russia’s main geopolitical problem for the foreseeable future is not withstanding a confrontation with an adversary, the United States, but maintaining an equilibrium with a partner, China. Moscow must take care to preserve its full sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis Beijing, which is the only solid basis for friendly and productive relations with China.”

“Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Are the Big Losers From This Pandemic,” Philip Stephens, Financial Times, 04.29.20: The author, director of the editorial board and chief political commentator for the news outlet, writes:

• “Mr. Xi is often styled the most powerful Chinese leader since chairman Mao. Instead, the early response to the pandemic spoke to the brittleness of his power. … Beyond Asia, coronavirus has also crystallized a shift that has left Beijing almost friendless in the West. … Predatory investment and trade policies and military operations in the South China Sea have transformed European attitudes. In the words of one senior EU diplomat, the starting point for European policy towards China was, until quite recently, an eagerness to engage. Now it begins with pushing back.”
• “Mr. Xi’s ally Vladimir Putin is a still bigger loser. … The revanchist Russian president had marked out 2020 to solidify his own position and Russia’s great power status. A plan to extend his presidency for another dozen years beyond 2024 would win ringing endorsement in a national plebiscite. Moscow would host a summit of world leaders. Coronavirus has forced the cancellation of both events.”
• “A failed price war with Saudi Arabia has seen a collapse in the oil price to levels far below the $40 a barrel assumed by the Russian government in setting its annual budget. The result, as the Kremlin admits, is an economic crisis worse than that of 2009.”
• “All the while, China’s supposedly equal alliance with Moscow looks more like strategic encirclement. The Belt and Road Initiative has underscored Beijing’s claim on central Asia. Mr. Xi’s long-term ambition to make China the pre-eminent Eurasian power would supplant Russia in Europe. How long, one wonders, will Mr. Putin be content to be so obviously the junior partner in such a relationship of unequals?”

“An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation,” Dmitry Gorenburg, Marshall Center/Russia Strategy Initiative/Dmitry Gorenburg’s Blog, 04.29.20: The author, a senior research scientist at CNA, writes:

• “Since 2014, Russia and China have developed a strategic partnership, primarily due to enhanced military cooperation, including sales of advanced military equipment and an increasingly robust program of bilateral and multi-lateral military exercises. Economic and diplomatic cooperation have also increased, though to a much lesser extent.”
• “Bilateral cooperation is unlikely to advance to the level of a full alliance because of differences in geopolitical interests and asymmetries of power, with Russia remaining reluctant to fully acknowledge China’s geopolitical rise.”
• “Actions by the United States to pressure both Russia and China have the effect of pushing the two countries closer together. To prevent a closer partnership, the United States should focus on creating areas of policy divergence between the two states.”

Ukraine:

“Peace in Ukraine I: A European War,” International Crisis Group, 04.27.20: The authors of the report write:

• “The war in Ukraine is a war in Europe. It is also a war about European security. Russia’s military intervention on its neighbor’s territory was undertaken in large part to guarantee that Ukraine did not align with Western economic and security institutions.”
• “Sustainable peace in Ukraine will require a dialogue on European security and Russian relations with the West. EU members, Russia and their neighbors ought to start addressing broader European security issues, including through regional arms control discussions, to lower tensions and alleviate all sides’ security fears. These talks will neither end the war nor, in all likelihood, result in quick agreements. But they will send a signal to Russia that its threat perceptions are taken seriously and that discussions with European states offer a promising way forward.”
• “To strengthen the case that European-Russian dialogue holds real potential, the EU also should consider making its sanctions policy more flexible. Allowing some incremental sanctions relief for Russia in exchange for progress in eastern Ukraine would be in line with sanctions best practices and counter Moscow’s narrative that they merely reflect a punitive strategy. By contrast, the current rigid, all-or-nothing approach has limited Russian incentives to change behavior.”
• “The war in Ukraine is local, and some of its roots are specific to Ukraine. The road to peace in Ukraine leads through Moscow, as only Moscow can cut off support to fighters in the east, withdraw weapons and ensure that Kyiv regains control of its territory. But the road to Moscow also leads through Europe: Moscow’s decision to annex Crimea and support armed fighters in Donbas was driven as much by its view of European and global security as by its interests in Ukraine itself. The steps outlined in this report will not in themselves end the conflict. But they could create a framework that gives peace in Ukraine a chance.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Russia’s Policy of Passport Proliferation,” Neil Melvin, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 05.01.20: The author, director of international security studies at RUSI, writes:

• “On April 24, President Vladimir Putin signed a law to amend Russia’s citizenship law. The new provisions had been rushed through the Russian parliament, passing both houses in just two weeks. Under the terms of the amendments, described as ‘revolutionary’ for Russia’s approach to citizenship, key groups of foreigners, notably including ethnic Russians and Russian speakers resident in states neighboring Russia, will qualify for a simplified procedure to obtain citizenship. Russia is reported to be aiming to add between five and ten million new citizens as a result of the provisions.”
• “While the revision of the citizenship law is in part motivated by the need to address Russia’s demographic crisis, it also forms part of a shift by the Putin government to put Russian ethno-linguistic identity and nationalism at the core of its regional foreign policy.”
• “The April 2020 amendments to Russian’s citizenship law  mark a significant step in a project of Russian nation-building beyond the borders of the Russian state. These measures appear designed to weaken further the legal significance of the state borders of Russia’s neighbors and to strengthen Russia’s claim to exercise a regional droit de regard, backed by the threat of use of force.”

“Post-Revolution Armenia: New Generation, Old Problems,” Alexander Iskandaryan, PONARS Eurasia, April 2020: The author, director of the Caucasus Institute, Armenia, writes:

• “Almost two years have passed since the Velvet Revolution in Armenia. By now, the elite rotation is almost complete.”
• “Armenia has been concentrating power in the hands of a new ruling class, which retains popularity and political legitimation, but is it now willing to implement systemic change?”
• “As obvious as it sounds, replacing ‘bad guys’ with ‘good guys’ does not guarantee a functional political system. Old systems find ways to replicate themselves despite deep overhauls of personnel. Over two years, Armenia has been concentrating power in the hands of a new ruling class. Replacing universally hated old-style officials with popular young ones, conducting legitimate elections, and trying to abide by the law whether it be in elections or governance, are not sufficient measures for success. Thus far, in all of the five post-Soviet countries that have gone through revolutions, successes in building viable, plural political systems have been modest. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia are still looking for political models that could lead them toward fair and sustainable development.”
• “One of the lessons learned from Armenia’s revolution is that democracy is not just about preventing ballot stuffing. It is about elaborating on a voting culture and having a mature political party system, political competition, and respect for minorities. A revolution, by definition, involves mass expectations of quick results, but lasting change can hardly be accomplished in a couple of years. This may be the largest challenge faced by contemporary Armenia as well as other nations in revolutionary transit. At some point, a revolution needs to stop and persistent issues dealt with despite ‘generational’ change.”