This Week’s Highlights:

• If a working Korean peace deal is the only good thing Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un do in their lifetimes, it may well be enough to redeem them and to supplant all the nasty stuff they’ve said and done, much like how Mikhail Gorbachev is commended for ending Germany’s division, despite bearing the blame for many different things, according to veteran Russia watcher Leonid Bershidsky.
• Former U.S. foreign service officer Raymond Smith argues that Russia sees the difficulties of getting the U.S. to negotiate substantively on issues important to Russia as rooted in a U.S. refusal to accept a relationship of equality. Smith believes this U.S. pattern emerged during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods and that U.S. has failed to adjust it to current realties. The best way to avoid the destabilizing effects of Russia turning to alternative alliances with countries like Syria and Iran, he writes, is not to further isolate Russia, but to open negotiations on issues that concern both countries.
• Given allegations in Mueller documents, the August 2016 meeting between Paul Manafort and Konstantin Kilimnik may represent the closest known link between a senior Trump campaign official and someone with alleged ties to Russian intelligence, columnist David Ignatius notes.
• The Kremlin's “asymmetrical response” to the latest U.S. sanctions on Russian oligarchs has targeted the Russian people at large, Russia liberal opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza writes, noting a bitter joke on Russian social media: “In retaliation for new designations under the U.S. Magnitsky Act, the Russian government has decided to bomb the city of Voronezh.” Meanwhile, Bershidsky argues that the U.S. foray into sanctions that really bite showed that hitting companies integrated into global markets can have too many unintended victims—not what you’d call a success.
• Emerging markets strategist Timothy Ash criticizes Ukraine’s post-revolutionary government for the stalled pace of reform efforts and the restoration of the old oligarchic elite order. 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“What to Do If the Talks With North Korea Succeed,” Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, The Washington Post, 04.23.18: The authors, former U.S. senators, write: “A successful negotiation requires that all those involved benefit from the outcome. It means all sides must give as well as get. … there are vital lessons to be learned by looking back to the early 1990s following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1991, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, we wrote legislation to provide technical and financial assistance for the inventory, destruction and disposal of nuclear and chemical weapons and their delivery vehicles in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. This became law as the Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991—also known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. … The United States and Russia learned to cooperate on threat reduction by working together in implementing the program from 1991 to 2012. … if we are going to rebuild cooperation between Washington and Moscow, North Korea is a good place to start. We believe this concept should be a critical component of any effort to verifiably and irreversibly dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons and related programs, as well as prevent future proliferation of weapons, material or know-how. Such cooperation can also be used to engage thousands of North Korean scientists and engineers … in peaceful scientific and technical work. This would also diminish the risk of proliferation of their deadly knowledge to other states or terrorists. In the context of a more stable Korean Peninsula, we can look broadly to CTR as a model. A broad-based plan for cooperative activities in North Korea would provide incentives for the Kim regime to comply with the difficult commitments and strict verification and monitoring that will necessarily be part of a serious denuclearization agreement.”

“A Nobel Prize for Trump and Kim Is No Joke,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.27.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “Coral, one of the top British bookmakers, has Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un as favorites … to win the Nobel Peace Prize this year. … If their talks go as well as Friday’s summit between Kim and his South Korean counterpart Moon Jae-in, and peace is restored to the Korean peninsula, they’ll both deserve it. There’s a lesson in this … The nastiest, most distasteful people, even ruthless dictators and mass murderers, can and should be celebrated for specific actions that make the world a safer place. In some cases, these actions will—and should—form their principal legacy. … One could argue that nothing that has happened since the millennium could match a potential Korean peace deal. … If a working Korean peace deal is the only good thing they do in their lifetimes, it may well be enough to redeem them and to supplant all the nasty stuff they’ve said and done. In a similar way, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader who is blamed for many different things in Russia and its ex-Soviet neighbor states won his Nobel Peace Prize for, well, choosing peace over war—and ending Germany’s division in the process. … Peace is fragile. It’s also the ultimate achievement for a leader. Those who attain it are heroes, whatever else they are.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“Yes, It Is a New Cold War. What Is To Be Done?” Raymond Smith, War on the Rocks, 04.25.18: The author, a former U.S. foreign service officer, writes that unlike in the 1980s, today “Russia and the United States are not locked in a worldwide struggle for ideological and military dominance. But there are other obstacles. … The U.S. agenda of problems that would have to be dealt … either does not address issues of concern to Russia or, when it does, requires Russia to unilaterally change its behavior if relations are to improve. … For the U.S.-Russia relationship to improve, Russia needs to change its behavior on Ukraine, electoral interference, INF treaty violations and Syria. There are, however, also issues on the Russian side of the ledger: NATO expansion, U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and U.S. interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Russia has had great difficulty in engaging the United States substantively on these issues. It sees the problem as rooted in a U.S. refusal to accept a relationship of equality. I see it as a pattern of negotiating behavior that the United States became accustomed to during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods, a pattern that has not been adjusted to current realties. … The best way to avoid the destabilizing effects of such efforts [Russia turning to alternative alliances with countries like Syria and Iran] is not to further isolate Russia, but to open negotiations on issues that concern both countries. … The issues that divide the United States and Russia today are not as fundamental as the ideological and military rivalries that divided the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. On the other hand, the political obstacles in the United States and the level of distrust in Russia are higher today. Reagan’s reputation as a staunch anti-communist gave him negotiating credibility … Putin, for his part, lacks Gorbachev’s optimism about forging a new relationship with the West.”

“Time to Terminate Escalate to De-Escalate—It’s Escalation Control,” Jay Ross, War on the Rocks, 04.24.18: The author, an associate at an information technology consulting company, writes: “‘Escalate to de-escalate’ is catchy … Unfortunately, it is also wrong—but not for the reasons experts usually focus on. … Russia’s approach to conflict is better described as ‘escalation control,’ a concept that was a part of the American strategy lexicon until the end of the Cold War. … ‘Escalate to de-escalate’ tends to focus solely on Russia’s thresholds for nuclear weapons use, rather than taking a holistic approach to conflict. De-escalatory strikes are essentially an action to deter further aggression—that is, to control escalation—but such actions do not need to take place in the nuclear realm. … A more dangerous problem is that policymakers (and policy wonks) tend to misinterpret the phrase as meaning Russia has lowered its nuclear threshold. … Foresight and clarity about Russia’s approach to controlling escalation can give the United States hard choices early rather than impossible choices later—and that starts with finding the right language to describe and understand Russia’s strategy.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia Risks a Wider Mideast War,” Dennis Ross, The Wall Street Journal, 04.28.18: The author, a counselor at the Washington Institute, writes: “The prospects of a wider war pitting Israel against Iran, Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Syria and Lebanon are increasing—thanks to Russia. It is the Russians who ‘outed’ Israel's April 9 attack against the Iranian T-4 base in central Syria. … Why would the Russians out the Israelis? Two reasons: First, the Russians are co-located at the base … it was close to Russian forces. Vladimir Putin decided to signal to the Israelis that this was unacceptable. Second, the Israeli attack took place after Bashar Assad's use of chemical weapons in Douma, and Mr. Putin wanted it known this was not an American strike. … The [U.S.] president's stated determination to get out of Syria … no doubt also emboldens both Russia and Iran—and tells the Israelis they are on their own. … Even if the current possible clash can be managed, Iran and Israel are on a collision course. … American deterrence is needed now. Mr. Putin needs to understand that the U.S. will not sit by and wait for Iran's expansion in Syria to trigger a wider war with Israel. He can act to contain the expansion of the Iranian and Shiite militia presence, or America, using its air power, will do so. Mr. Trump clearly sees no interest in Syria. But he also has no interest in a wider regional war that could suck America in and harm the global economy.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“We Know an Awful Lot About Manafort and Russia. Trump Can't Make It Disappear,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 04.24.18: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes that in “The machinations of August [2016] illustrate why [Paul] Manafort is a central figure in special counsel Robert S. Mueller III's investigation. And they show why the probe has deep roots—in evidence already made public, cases filed and plea deals won—that will persist even if Trump moves to fire Mueller. … On April 11, he [Manafort] sent an email to Konstantin Kilimnik, who managed his office in Kiev, to ask whether the ‘OVD operation’ knew about ‘media coverage’ of Manafort's growing role in the campaign … Kilimnik matches the ‘Person A’ described in a series of documents by Mueller … Mueller's March 27 sentencing memo in a separate case included this startling allegation: FBI agents ‘assess that Person A has ties to a Russian intelligence service and had such ties in 2016.’ … And who was the ‘OVD’ whom Manafort was so eager to impress? … Oleg V. Deripaska, a billionaire Russian oligarch and Kremlin insider. … In a July 7 email to Kilimnik, Manafort offered: ‘If he needs private briefings we can accommodate,’ … A Deripaska spokeswoman has denied that the Russian tycoon received any offer of a briefing from Manafort. … On Aug. 2, he [Manafort] met with Kilimnik … who had just arrived in New York with a message from a seeming Russian friend about the ‘future of his country,’… Given Mueller's allegation about Person A, this meeting may represent the closest known link between a senior Trump campaign official and someone with alleged ties to Russian intelligence. … A lawyer named Alex van der Zwaan, who pleaded guilty in February to lying to the FBI about his dealings with Gates, … is another link in Mueller's chain of evidence. … The Manafort case illustrates how hard it will be for Trump to dispel the allegations that swirl around the Mueller investigation. The president might want to rid himself of the special counsel, but he can't make the evidence that has already been gathered disappear.”

“If Putin Has Kompromat on Trump, How Might He Use It?” Scott Radnitz, The Washington Post, 04.24.18: The author, an associate professor at the University of Washington, writes: “If Russia is really blackmailing Trump, and he knows it, why does he think he can get away with ever disregarding Russia's interests? … And how do Trump's beliefs about Putin's calculations affect how he deals with Russia? The tools of game theory can help us think through these questions. First scenario … Let's first assume that the material in the file is extremely damaging to Trump … this would appear to give Russia enormous leverage. However … deposing Trump would be a horrible outcome since he would be replaced by Vice President Pence, who would probably take a harder line on Russia. … Second scenario … Let's assume the material is only mildly damaging, … How would Putin regard a politically wounded Trump who still clings to power? Very favorably, if Russia's aim is to sow discord in the United States. … Yet Russia might still hesitate to reveal the comprising information—assuming that damaging Trump would invite closer scrutiny from Congress and the public, and limit his chances to help Russia in the future. … Is Trump's behavior toward Russia more consistent with the existence of mild or severe kompromat? It depends on what his true preferences are. … if his true preferences are pro-Russian, then his vacillation … could be explained by simple indecisiveness. Trump could get away with this because he knows Putin possesses kompromat so severe he would never use it. … Perhaps he [Trump] seeks to avoid nuclear war or believes in the power of diplomacy … Or he might simply admire Putin's style of leadership, or hope to pursue a major real estate deal in Russia after his presidency. … If Putin has called in the Kremlin's game theorists to think through these possibilities, he will see that having kompromat is not enough. It must be wielded carefully. And even then, it is not that easy to blackmail a foreign leader.”

“The House’s Russia Report Has Some Good Ideas—but Bias Drowns Them Out,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 04.28.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes that the House Intelligence Committee's report “contains some useful information and recommendations—which will be drowned out by its slanted attacks on the intelligence community and its other attempts to give President Trump cover. ‘In 2015, Russia began engaging in a covert influence campaign aimed at the U.S. presidential election,’ the report begins. ‘The Russian government … sought to sow discord in American society and undermine our faith in the democratic process.’ Although these sentences suggest that the committee does not live in the president's world of total denial, the committee nevertheless refused to accept that the Kremlin tried to hurt Democrat Hillary Clinton and help Mr. Trump. … In a report on a hostile Russian campaign against the United States, the committee also spends a substantial amount of ink attacking leakers … The report insists that the committee found no evidence of collusion or troubling pre-election ties between Mr. Trump and Russia. Committee Democrats reply that it is easy to not find evidence if you do not look for evidence. … the report contains some good ideas. It recommends tighter communications on cyberthreats between federal and state agencies … The report suggests funding for state and local governments to adopt stronger cybersecurity standards, for the federal agency that sets those standards and for states and localities to conduct cyber risk assessments. And it suggests that electronic voting machines produce a reviewable paper trail. Too bad these suggestions are hidden inside so much folderol.”

“Russia Sanctions the West—Hurting Its Own Citizens,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 04.25.18: The author, a Russian liberal opposition leader, writes: “For all the sanctions imposed by Western governments, no one has punished the Russian people harder than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Where Western measures are directed against specific individuals and entities close to the regime, the Kremlin's ‘asymmetrical response’ has targeted the Russian people at large. Russian social media came up with a bitter joke: ‘In retaliation for new designations under the U.S. Magnitsky Act, the Russian government has decided to bomb the city of Voronezh.’ …  Last week the Duma began consideration of a bill that proposes a plethora of measures. It includes the legalization of the theft of intellectual property of U.S. persons and entities (in other words, state-sponsored piracy); restrictions on the import of alcoholic beverages from the United States and its allies; and—most consequentially—a ban on the imports of U.S.-made medications. The latter account for some 10 percent of the Russian pharmaceutical market and are used for treatment of such conditions as diabetes, hypertension, epilepsy, leukemia and other forms of cancer, HIV, Hepatitis C and depression, among others. … It is (bitterly) ironic that the anti-Russian measures have come from Russia's own government. While the Kremlin's propaganda machine has been diverting public attention from this basic fact for years, it will be unable to do so indefinitely. After all, you can only fool all the people some of the time.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Rusal Case Is a Failure of US Sanctions. There are ways to hit Putin's shadowy cronies without hurting top Russian firms,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.24.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “The softening of U.S. sanctions against Russian aluminum producer Rusal sends at least two important signals to investors and to official Moscow. One is that the Trump administration has little understanding of the impact of its moves before it makes them. The other is that it doesn't want to impose sanctions that will do a lot of collateral damage outside Russia. … U.S. unwillingness to inflict damage on its ‘partners and allies’ … sends an unmistakable message to Russian companies and the Russian state: spreading operations internationally is an effective way to discourage sanctions. … I remain convinced that Deripaska was chosen because his company deals in aluminum—the target of Trump's import tariffs …  In any case, the U.S. foray into sanctions that really bite clearly hasn't been a success. It showed that hitting companies integrated into global markets can have too many unintended victims. … There is an obvious alternative the U.S. hasn't been serious about implementing. Mikhail Khodorkovsky laid it out in a column: ‘The West’s real enemy … is a group of about 100 key beneficiaries of the Putin regime … many of whom hold posts in the Federal Security Service and the presidential administration’ … These are emphatically not the oligarchs who got rich under Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. They are the real Putin cronies from his time in the KGB and the St. Petersburg mayor's office … Most of the $1 trillion that has fled Russia to the West since the Soviet Union’s collapse isn't owned by the old-school ‘oligarchs.’ It was the corrupt officials and the little-known regime clients who moved it overseas. The West is still doing little to track that wealth and its owners; it's looking under the lamp, not in the shadows where the true criminals and their fortunes are.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

• No significant commentary.

Ukraine:

“Timothy Ash: Who Do Ukraine’s Leaders Think They Are Fooling?” Timothy Ash, Kyiv Post, 04.24.18: The author, a London-based senior emerging markets sovereign strategist, writes: “Ukraine brought a large delegation to the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund this year, headed by the newly confirmed governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, Yakiv Smoliy. The size of the delegation I guess was meant to signal intent and a desire to iron out the various outstanding issues with the now long delayed fourth review of the $17.5 billion IMF lending program through 2019. It is now a whole year since the completion of the last review, less than half the planned IMF monies have been released to date and Ukraine should now be on its 13th review, not its third. It’s fair to say that Ukraine’s Western allies are frustrated. … the sense is that … the pace of reform has … stalled, even stopped, and that the old oligarchic elite order has been restored. What a disappointment after the euphoria of the EuroMaidan Revolution, which drove Kremlin-backed President Viktor Yanukovych into exile in 2014, when there was such hope that this time could be different. … Ukraine is reaching decision point on so many areas, including the anti-corruption court, gas prices, the future of the IMF program, market access, constitutional reform and elections. It is going to be an interesting year for sure.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Armenia: Why Has Vladimir Putin Not Intervened So Far and Will He?” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 04.24.18: The author, director of the Russia Matters project, writes: “The resignation of Armenia’s Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan after more than a week of mass protests in Russia’s backyard begs the question: Why has Moscow not intervened so far? … for Moscow to intervene in one of its Soviet-era satellites at least two conditions need to be present: First, Vladimir Putin has to see an acute threat to Russia’s vital national interests, … second, the chances for defending or advancing its interests through the use of force have to be relatively high. The first condition is absent in Armenia because the dominant, pro-Russian wing of the country’s ruling elite continues to retain power. … For Russia to intervene … [protest leader Nikol] Pashinyan would not only have to oust the current party of power, he would also have to show a determination to move Armenia westward, into the EU and NATO. So far, Pashinyan has showed no such intentions … The second condition for Russia to intervene is that the overall situation … has to be conducive to the use of force. … Russian leaders must be sure they will prevail in a military confrontation or at least ensure a stalemate … That condition is at least partially present in the case of Armenia. … Russia has a large military base in Armenia, so if Moscow were to decide to use force there, it could theoretically do so more quickly than in Ukraine or Georgia. … Any attempt to take control of Armenia, especially in the absence of a credible threat to Russia’s vital interests, would seriously undermine Moscow’s efforts to keep other post-Soviet republics in its various international integration projects … If Armenia remains a Russian ally, as it likely will, then Moldova … could be the next target of Russian intervention … Putin may choose to escalate in Ukraine or Georgia if these two countries manage to somehow convince NATO to grant them MAPs. However, the prospect … is unlikely for either of the two, and for Moldova as well.”

“Armenia's Peaceful Revolution Is a Lesson for Putin. Mass protests have pushed the nation's power-hungry leader to resign without bloodshed or foreign interference,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.23.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “It was almost inconceivable after Russia's violent reaction to Ukraine's 2014 ‘Revolution of Dignity’ that tiny Armenia, a largely Moscow-friendly nation, would attempt a revolution of its own. Yet on Monday, Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan was forced to resign by mass protests that paralyzed the nation. Russia is unlikely to intervene: The protesters have been careful to stress that their motives were strictly domestic. And yet the end of Sargsyan's career should be of interest to another leader who might be tempted to extend his reign past constitutional limits: Russian President Vladimir Putin. … The Armenian constitution only permits two presidential terms, and in 2015, Sargsyan ran a referendum ostensibly shifting the country to a European-style parliamentary republic run by a prime minister … in 2017, Sargsyan's Republican Party won a parliamentary election, and he was elected prime minister last week after his presidential term ran out. … more than 100,000 Armenians flooded the central square of Yerevan, the nation's capital, in the biggest rally of the past 20 years. … Without a single reason to interfere with Armenians' choice, Putin need[s] to think hard about the finale of his own presidential career. According to the Russian constitution, that is scheduled for 2024. He could try switching to the prime minister's office, as he did in 2008 when Dmitri Medvedev took over as placeholder president, and he could push through constitutional changes that would make the prime minister's office the most powerful in the land. But what if Russians are as fed up by his rule in six years as Armenians were with Sargsyan's?”

“Russian Restraint in Armenia,” Anna Ohanyan, World Policy, 04.26.18: The author, a professor of political science at Stonehill College, writes: “The popular movement that deposed him [Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sargsysan] ... has been strikingly different from the ‘color revolutions’ … or the Arab Spring protests … Unique among movements in the post-Soviet region or the Middle East, too, the Armenian protests were not geopolitically polarizing. Armenia has balanced, more or less successfully, its relationships with neighboring powers—namely, the European Union and Russia … Russia’s restraint [in response to the protests] was uncharacteristic for the post-Soviet space. … Armenia and Russia already share a tight alliance of economic and political interests. …  Russia’s actions in the region can be explained by its pursuit of these narrow interests … By moving Armenia into the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2014, and giving Russia monopolistic control over sectors of the Armenian economy over the past decade … unintentionally, he [Sargsysan] likely created a geopolitically safe space for Armenia to democratize without the risk of openly confronting Russia’s interests in the country. It remains unclear whether Russian restraint ... is the outcome of specific circumstances, or whether it reflects a new approach by Russia toward its peripheries. … The benefits of such benign hegemony may be larger than Russia’s traditional preference for working with select elites. … Russia’s restraint in the face of recent developments in Armenia may signify the dawn of a new social contract between Russia and the constellation of new nations around it. Or, it may simply be remembered as the exception that proves a long-standing rule.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Kennan Cable No. 32: How Can Russian Civil Society Survive Putin’s Fourth Term?” Sergey Parkhomenko, Wilson Center, 04.27.18: The author, a Russian journalist, publisher and founder of several projects aimed at developing civic activism and promoting liberal values in Russia, writes that “many types of civic communities [in Russia] find that it makes sense to exist without registration at all—to be ‘suspended in the air.’ … Such an organization … does not have an address, office, bank account, letterhead, computers, servers, executives or accountants. Such an organization has nothing that could be blocked, confiscated or arrested. … This approach has an additional crucial disadvantage: it precludes all possible forms of regular fundraising. … Civic communities and activist groups are [also] shifting their attention to the grassroots [levels]. … This micro-level work increasingly serves as an entry point for civic activists … The success of independent civic projects, I would argue, translated to the success of independent democratic candidates at the 2017 municipal election in Moscow—a major breakthrough. … [Additionally,] cash-free forms of participation in civic projects are starting to develop. People … are asked to pitch in through working—that is, personally engaging in the effort by rendering some practical services to the project. … If independent financing makes you a target, then it is better to avoid handling money at all … a supportive donor could [instead] purchase something useful for the organization. … There are other methods organizations use to survive … and they all share a common aspect: a gradual transition from traditional forms of civic and activist groups organized on corporate or institutional principles toward network structures built on distributed operational ties. Such a structure obviously has many entry points … But it is also well-equipped with multiple exit points that provide vectors for disseminating the group’s work. … This horizontal approach is not just the model—it is the real practice of civil society in today’s (and tomorrow’s) Russia.”

“The Tragedy of the Age-Old Kremlin-Vor Alliance,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 04.26.18: The author, a senior research fellow at the Institute of International Affairs Prague, writes: “For generations, there has been an unusually close connection between the underworld and ‘upperworld’ powers. … when the little-known Vladimir Putin was campaigning for the presidency in 1999-2000, he promised law and order, and many believed him. …  given Putin’s crucial role in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office as its ambassador to the city’s underworld … we should not have expected him necessarily to take on the gangsters. Instead, he domesticated them. … Criminals could continue to be criminals; the police would continue to police them. But if at any point the vory [thieves] looked as if they were posing any challenge to the state, then they would be treated as enemies, and life would get very hard. … Occasionally, individuals were deemed to have become too big for their boots or embarrassingly prominent … Then the state would swoop in with deliberate overkill … Until 2014, the relationship between the Kremlin and the kleptocratic Russian elite on one hand, and the gangsters on the other, seemed to be getting more tenuous. … The new age of geopolitical tension may be reversing that trend and bringing Kremlin and crooks closer together again. ... Putin has created what I call a mobilization state. This is not totalitarianism. ... But аt any time they may be asked — and in Godfather style, this is a request that cannot be refused —  for favors in the name of the state. This also applies to the gangsters. … This is not a ‘mafia state’ with its implication that either the gangsters run the government, or that the government controls the underworld. Instead, it is simply the latest example of the corrosive way that successive regimes have tried to use organized crime as a tool of statecraft, not realizing—or perhaps not caring—how much the vory have gained from this pernicious alliance.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.