This Week’s Highlights

• It is difficult to imagine the Russian army high command allowing subordinate units to use fully autonomous weapons in scenarios in which mistakes that could result in escalation or other dangerous outcomes, according to a new RAND report. However, this would not stop Russia from using other forms of AI, particularly in the gray zone, where operations are smaller and there is less ethical, operational and strategic risk. Despite some successes, Russia’s long-term AI prospects will be limited by structural, demographic and cultural factors, according to the report.
• Military drivers of potential Russia-NATO conflict include military activities or exercises in strategically sensitive locations; enhanced readiness; massing of forces; violations (or perceived violations) of airspace or maritime borders; proximity of forces or capabilities; long-range strike deployments; and threats to vulnerable lines of communication, according to the authors of a new RAND report. Innovative conventional arms control measures could address these drivers, increasing warning and decision-making time, complicating surprise attacks and lowering overall tensions.
• The sanctions against Russia have impacted Russia’s economy adversely, but they have not led Russia to moderate its actions, writes Prof. Angela Stent. Congressionally-imposed sanctions are a blunt punitive instrument carrying few incentives to induce Russia to rethink its policies. Stent argues that they should be re-examined in terms of their effectiveness as a tool for affecting Russian behavior, and that the COVID-19 pandemic may represent an opportunity for the United States to re-engage Russia by cooperating in battling the disease. But, Stent writes, developing a more productive relationship with Russia will remain a major challenge for the United States.
• The hopes of some U.S. and European officials to hasten a new Sino-Russian split amid the coronavirus crisis are bound to be disappointed, writes Carnegie’s Alexander Gabuev. If anything, relations will deepen in the wake of the pandemic. Firstly, the possibility that China will mount an economic recovery more quickly than Europe or the United States is perhaps the only bright spot for commodity exporters in Russia and Central Asia, and secondly, there is huge appetite among insecure leaders across Eurasia to emulate China’s model of societal control and surveillance, according to Gabuev.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains that the pandemic situation is “totally under control,” write Henry Foy and Max Seddon of the Financial Times, but the reality of Russia’s economic predicament is rapidly becoming clear as coronavirus cases continue to tick up. The IMF has forecast that Russia’s economy could contract by 5.5 percent this year as domestic lockdowns are extended and global demand for its raw materials exports collapse, Foy and Seddon write. In addition, in the next few months, the coronavirus dislocation may bring incomes down as much as an average of 18 percent, and up to eight million Russians could lose their jobs, writes Leon Aron of the American Enterprise Institute. Putin is likely to save himself and his regime, Aron argues, yet anger will linger and likely resurface in 2024 when the Russians will have to participate in an election charade to lend him legitimacy. 
• Expect major political turbulence in Ukraine ahead, coupled with a nasty economic downturn, writes Melinda Haring, deputy director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. As a result of the coronavirus, more than one million jobs have been lost, and the IMF expects Ukraine’s economy to contract by 7.7 percent this year. In the end, appointing Misha Saakashvili as the deputy prime minister for reform is bound to fail and will destabilize a weak government that only took office on March 4, Haring writes.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Russia and North Korea Are Fighting—Over Fish: Moscow’s broader ambitions for the Far East are stopping it from cracking down on North Korean poachers in Russian waters,” Emily Ferris and Hamish MacDonald, Foreign Policy, 04.22.20: The authors, a research fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI and an associate fellow at RUSI, write:

• “Throughout 2019, a series of spats between Russian authorities and North Korean vessels occurred over illegal fishing in the Sea of Japan/East Sea. … The Primorye Fisheries Association, a union that represents fishermen in Russia’s Far East, where most of the country’s fishing stocks are caught, has appealed to the Russian government to respond more strongly to the poaching of Russian stocks. But this has amounted to little, as Moscow is reluctant to damage relations with Pyongyang and risk any political instability in its Far East border region that could impact negatively on the foreign investment it hopes to attract there.”
• “However, Russia may be forced into a response sooner rather than later. Against these increasing incursions from North Korean fishermen, and should Russia prove unable to revive its fishing industry—on which many isolated communities depend—it may be obliged to respond more firmly, if only to send a message to its Far Eastern community that Moscow is listening.”
• “Russia has not yet decided how to approach North Korea on this issue and is too focused on domestic issues to address it head on. Russia appears to have calculated that maintaining regional stability and avoiding a confrontation with North Korea over the illegal fishing issue are more important than attempting to boost its own fishing industry. As one of the traditional industries of the Far East declines, Russia will have to hope that other investments in the region pay off.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“There's No Such Thing as Good Liberal Hegemony,” Stephen Walt, Foreign Policy, 04.21.20: The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “I want to explore … whether the U.S. attempt to create a liberal world order during the brief ‘unipolar moment’ was doomed from the start. … That the first attempt was a costly failure should be beyond dispute. Instead of advancing, democracy has been in retreat around the world for more than a decade.”
• “Hyperglobalization under U.S. auspices produced a grave financial crisis in 2008, politically painful job displacement in a number of sectors and helped trigger a wide-ranging populist backlash. … NATO enlargement helped poison relations with Russia, and policies such as dual containment in the Persian Gulf inspired anti-U.S. terrorism.”
• “If former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November—and, to be clear, I hope he does—the apostles of U.S. primacy and its ‘indispensable’ global role will be back in the saddle, and we are likely to see at least a partial attempt to turn the clock back to the halcyon days when the United States was actively trying to create a global liberal order.”
• “The United States could still have pushed for a more open, free and essentially liberal world order, but in a more gradual and sophisticated way … Liberal hegemony lite might have worked slightly better than what the United States actually did, but it wouldn’t have achieved the ultimate goal of a single rules-based global liberal order.” 

“Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence. Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World,” Forrest E. Morgan, Benjamin Boudreaux, Andrew J. Lohn, Mark Ashby, Christian Curriden, Kelly Klima and Derek Grossman, RAND Corporation, April 2020: The authors of the report write:

• “A steady increase in the integration of AI in military systems is likely … The development of military AI presents a range of risks that need to be addressed … The United States faces significant international competition in military AI … The potential proliferation of military AI to other state and nonstate actors is another area of concern. … Both China and Russia are pursuing militarized AI technologies.”
• “Russia is devoting considerable energy to leveling the playing field with the United States in military AI. … There is a strong emphasis on robotics, but Russia is actively pursuing other areas such as defensive systems, decision-making and planning tools, EW, cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns and others. … Despite some successes, Russia’s long-term prospects will be limited by structural, demographic and cultural factors.”
• “It is difficult to imagine the Russian Army high command allowing subordinate units to use fully autonomous weapons, or even semiautonomous weapons, in scenarios in which mistakes that could result in escalation or other dangerous outcomes. However, this would not stop Russia from using other forms of AI, particularly in the gray zone, where operations are smaller and there is less ethical, operational, and strategic risk.”
• “The U.S. should … Organize, train, and equip forces to prevail in a world in which military systems empowered by AI are prominent in all domains. Understand how to address the ethical concerns expressed by technologists, the private sector, and the American public. Seek greater technical cooperation and policy alignment with allies and partners regarding the development and employment of military AI. Explore confidence-building and risk-reduction measures with China, Russia, and other states attempting to develop military AI.”

“Nuclear Modernization Is Essential Business. Don’t Let Coronavirus Shut it Down,” Patty-Jane Geller, The National Interest, 04.26.20: The author, a policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, writes:

• “Since the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Pentagon has had to realign priorities to adjust to a slow-down in defense spending. That challenge may be exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.”
• “Our nuclear deterrence is deteriorating from old age, even as Russia and China modernize and expand their nuclear forces. Every single element of the U.S. nuclear deterrent has passed its projected life span.”
• “The Defense Department may need to make changes to its budget due to the pandemic. And, of course, finding ways to reduce the costs of nuclear modernization would be a welcome development. But we must not allow opponents of nuclear deterrence to use the pandemic as an excuse to advance their categorical anti-nuclear agenda. Rather, in a time of global uncertainty, there is no more important national security priority than ensuring a strong nuclear deterrent.”

 See also “Arms control” below.

NATO-Russia relations:

“NATO Has a New Weak Link for Russia to Exploit: North Macedonia just became NATO’s newest and weakest member. That makes it a ripe target for interference,” Ivana Stradner and Max Frost, Foreign Policy, 04.22.20: The authors, a fellow and a senior research associate at the American Enterprise Institute, write:

• “On March 27, the Western alliance admitted North Macedonia as its newest—and weakest—member. In so doing, it has given Russian President Vladimir Putin a terrific opportunity to expand his influence, further erode NATO’s unity and test the bloc’s commitment to defend a member of the alliance.”
• “North Macedonia is the definition of a weak link and easy pickings for an adversary. A landlocked country of 2 million inhabitants, it has weak political institutions and only a short history of independence. As of 2018, it spent only 1 percent of its GDP on defense—short of the 2 percent NATO guideline—and had just 8,000 active-duty soldiers. There is simmering communal tension between a Slavic Orthodox majority and a sizable ethnic Albanian, mainly Muslim minority, making it vulnerable to interference. Within NATO, only neighboring Albania has a lower per capita GDP and a higher level of corruption.”
• “Despite NATO’s overall military superiority, it has a weak hand in the Balkans, and Russia continues to outmaneuver it there. NATO must quickly signal that it remains steadfast and, having decided to admit it, that North Macedonia is an integral member of the alliance. If NATO fails in its support of new members like North Macedonia, the chances have just risen that it will be met with Russian aggression—hybrid or conventional—that may just mean the end of NATO as a credible alliance.”

Impact of pandemic:

“The Pandemic Could Tighten China’s Grip on Eurasia: Despite border closures, Russia and others may be pushed even closer to Beijing,” Alexander Gabuev, Foreign Policy, 04.23.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “In October 2019, the Russian president admitted that Moscow was helping Beijing to create a missile attack early warning system and characterized Sino-Russian ties as ‘an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.’ … The first phase of the coronavirus outbreak delivered a blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a China-Russia quasi-alliance.”
• “The pandemic is putting a spotlight on the lingering mistrust at both the general public and senior official levels between Moscow and Beijing that has long coexisted with the made-for-TV camaraderie between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The recent closure of the northern Chinese city of Harbin, in the wake of a fresh mini-outbreak imported from across the Russian border, has highlighted similar suspicions among Chinese leaders.”
• “But the hopes of some U.S. and European officials to hasten a new Sino-Russian split are bound to be disappointed. If anything, relations will deepen in the wake of the pandemic. Beijing’s inroads in Russia and across the vast landmass of post-Soviet Eurasia could have global ramifications as the global competition between the United States and China accelerates.”
• “China remains unquestionably the most important external partner for these embattled regimes. Firstly, the possibility that China will mount an economic recovery more quickly than Europe or the United States is perhaps the only bright spot for commodity exporters in Russia and Central Asia. … Secondly, there is huge appetite among insecure leaders across Eurasia to emulate China’s model of societal control and surveillance.”

“Economic Woes Undermine Putin’s Pledge Pandemic Is ‘Under Control,’” Henry Foy and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 04.23.20: The authors, Moscow bureau chief and Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, write:

• “Mr. Putin maintains the situation is ‘totally under control,’ but the reality of Russia’s economic predicament is rapidly becoming clear as coronavirus cases continue to tick up. … Though Russia has a $165 billion cushion of savings … the Kremlin has been reluctant to spend it during a collapsing oil market that has turned its most important revenue stream to a trickle.”
• “Public confidence in Mr. Putin’s administration shows signs of waning. … [His] approval ratings fell to 63 percent in March, the lowest since November 2013. … Much of the public criticism has focused on the limited 2 trillion ruble ($26 billion) government support package, which pales in comparison to those rolled out by other European countries. … Officials have said the rescue package, equivalent to 2.8 percent of GDP, could be equivalent to 6.5 percent of GDP when combined with deficit spending. But most of the stimulus has come from tax holidays and loan guarantees. The actual state injection of funds may be as small as 340 billion rubles, or 0.3 percent of GDP.”
• “The IMF has forecast that Russia’s economy could contract by 5.5 percent this year … Russia has been reluctant to tap the $142 billion of liquid assets in its national wealth fund … That will instead be spent on filling the gaping hole in the budget, which is balanced on a $42 per barrel oil price—more than twice the current one. In a sign of how strained the economy has become, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said this week that the nest egg would only last until 2024, four years earlier than estimated just a few weeks ago.”
• “Several experts say the limited direct government spending may be insufficient to alleviate Russians’ pain from the collapse. In a report published by the Liberal Mission foundation, a group of liberal economists called on the Kremlin to tap the national wealth fund for direct payments to citizens as well as subsidies for small businesses to pay rent and salaries.”

“The Coronavirus Could Imperil Putin's Presidency,” Leon Aron, Wall Street Journal, 04.24.20: The author, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “COVID-19 has exacerbated tensions and exposed political and economic inadequacies, testing the strength and legitimacy of institutions as well as confidence in national leadership. In this regard, the pandemic could hardly have come at a worse time for the Kremlin. … Russia entered the crisis in a weakened state. Its longest stagnation in modern history … has eroded incomes. In the third quarter of 2019 … almost 18 million Russians, or 12 percent, were below the subsistence minimum … Most of the impoverished were working.”
• “Adding to the malaise is the disastrous oil-price war Russia entered in early March with the Saudis. … In 2009, after the financial crisis, Russia's gross domestic product shrank by almost 8 percent—the largest contraction among Group of 20 economies—and the country is likely to bear the brunt of the coming global recession too.”
• “There is little doubt … that this is going to be the toughest challenge President Vladimir Putin has faced in his 20 years in power. … After telling provincial governors to do the best they can, and ceding to them neither power nor resources to accomplish much, Mr. Putin left Moscow.”
• “The tools that have served Mr. Putin so well in previous crises—television propaganda, bribes to opinion leaders and politicians, selective repression and, most of all, the people's trust in his luck—are not likely to be as effective this time. … [O]nly 35 percent of Russians trust Mr. Putin the most out of their national leaders, according to a survey the Levada Center conducted in January.”
• “Mr. Putin is likely to save himself and his regime. Yet anger will linger and likely resurface in 2024 when the Russians will have to participate in an election charade to lend him legitimacy. COVID-19 may not destroy Mr. Putin's presidency, but it has placed a time bomb under it.”

“Russia’s Economic Woes Will Clip Vladimir Putin’s Wings,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 04.27.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Mr. Putin conceded on [April 24] that Russia now faces a bigger economic crisis than the 2009 global recession. Prices for the country’s chief export, mainstay of its economy and budget, have collapsed just as COVID-19 has forced the country into shutdown. The IMF forecasts Russian gross domestic product could contract by 5.5 percent this year. Economists from Moscow’s liberal Gaidar Institute estimate a 7-12 percent decline—leading to a budget deficit even higher than the 6 percent Russia’s central bank is assuming. The $150 billion of oil revenues Russia has funneled into a rainy-day National Wealth Fund can cover some of the budget shortfall, but could end up being spent much more quickly than expected.”
• “The government’s pandemic support package, meanwhile, so far amounts to less than 3 percent of GDP, a fraction of those in most developed economies. It is skewed toward large companies … and much comes from tax holidays and loan guarantees, not direct aid. Alexei Kudrin, the ex-finance minister, has forecast 8 million Russians could lose jobs. Since two-thirds of citizens have no savings, real suffering could result.”
• “The oligarchs and securocrats who look to him as their guarantor will be watching for signs his authority is waning. Even if he is unlikely to want to make peace in Ukraine … his domestic troubles may ensure Mr. Putin will not be launching any further expansionist ventures for the foreseeable future.”

“Putin’s Not-So-Excellent Spring,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution/ Stanford CISAC, 04.23.20: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “At the beginning of 2020, the spring looked auspicious for President Putin, who planned to cement constitutional changes allowing him to stay in power with a referendum and large celebration of the 75th anniversary of the end of WWII.”
• “Alas for Putin, reality intruded. The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March. … Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation. This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.”

“The Belarus Government Is Largely Ignoring the Pandemic. Here's Why,” Tatsiana Kulakevich, The Washington Post, 04.21.20: The author, a visiting assistant professor at the University of South Florida School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, writes:

• “President Alexander Lukashenko is a COVID-19 holdout. Despite nearly 5,000 confirmed cases and over 40 coronavirus deaths, Belarus remains the only country in Europe denying the coronavirus danger.”
• “Why does the government hold fast to this denial of the coronavirus threat? And what does this tell us about how autocracies respond to global threats generally? Belarus has limited economic resources and presidential elections are coming up on Aug. 30—these two factors may help explain the government's no-quarantine position. But the country's unique economic and geopolitical situation also helps explain why autocrats around the world have a wide range of pandemic responses.”
• “Belarus has been coasting on other countries’ efforts. The Belarusian government has been benefiting from other countries' response to the virus, as well as the response of its own people. Thus far, the government has made only limited efforts and financial contributions to contain the pandemic.”
• “By officially denying the COVID-19 danger while benefiting from other countries' response to the coronavirus—and with Belarusians promoting social distancing despite Lukashenko's denials—the Belarusian government has been limiting attention to its inability to deliver economic relief to those in need on the eve of the presidential election.”
• “If the pandemic threat resolves before the presidential election, then the government will be able to credit itself with the successful fight against the coronavirus. And if the pandemic continues longer, this approach could well backfire, triggering popular unrest in the country and jeopardizing relations with the West.”

“The Pandemic Could Bring a Global Ceasefire,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 04.27.20: The author, chief foreign affairs commentator for the news outlet, writes:

• “Could anything good come out of the coronavirus pandemic? … [O]ne ray of light may be emerging from an unlikely venue—the U.N. Last month, António Guterres, the secretary-general, issued a call for a ‘global ceasefire’—to try to prevent the world’s warzones being further ravaged by COVID-19.”
• “Perhaps surprisingly, the call has had some effect on the ground—even in raging conflicts such as Yemen and Syria. Later this week, the push for a global ceasefire may gain momentum, if the U.N. Security Council approves a resolution backing the idea.”
• “Efforts to negotiate a resolution on a global ceasefire have been frustrated for weeks by sniping between the U.S. and China. … Both Russia and the U.S. were worried that signing up to a global ceasefire would stop them fighting their enemies in the Middle East and have insisted on a ‘terrorism’ carve-out in the resolution. Still, energetic diplomacy, from France in particular, looks likely to push the resolution over the line.”
• “The next step in the revival of the U.N. as a forum could be a virtual summit of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., China, Russia, France and the U.K.). Once again this is a French initiative. … The handling of the pandemic—closely followed by economic revival and international trade—are the most difficult and divisive issues facing the Security Council. Supporting a drive to end some smoldering wars in Africa and the Middle East might seem an uncontroversial feel-good project by comparison.”

“Chernobyl Broke the Soviet Spirit. The Coronavirus Won't Break Ours,” Alexander Nazaryan, The Washington Post, 04.26.20: The author, Yahoo News national correspondent in Washington, D.C., writes:

• “Chernobyl broke the Soviet spirit, which had been annealed by the defeat of Hitler in 1945. Four decades later, the battle for Berlin was less immediate than the battle for edible groceries. Once triumphant, we were now helpless.”
• “The comparison between Moscow in 1986 and Washington in 2020 is undeniably compelling. ‘The coronavirus is Trump's Chernobyl,’ went the headline of a Washington Post op-ed. … Perhaps the coronavirus really will prove to be President Trump's Chernobyl. But it will not be ours.”
• “Chernobyl made Soviet citizens realize that their leaders were liars and the country's institutions were broken. It would be difficult for the coronavirus to achieve the same effect in the United States, if only because so many Americans already hold that view of Washington. Short of knocking out Netflix, it's hard to see how the coronavirus could deepen our collective cynicism.”
• “The coronavirus is shattering sacred nostrums about getting and spending only for yourself and your own. It has taken us many long decades—and then a brutally quick three months—to remember that we need each other, that compassion is not weakness, that strength in numbers is not about how many people attend a political rally.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Arms control:

“A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe. Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century,” Samuel Charap, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot and Giacomo Persi Paoli, RAND Corporation, April 2020: The authors of the report write:

• “Although it once served as a cornerstone of European security, the current regional CAC [conventional arms control] regime is outdated and largely irrelevant to today's challenges. … Military drivers of potential Russia-NATO conflict include military activities or exercises in strategically sensitive locations; enhanced readiness; massing of forces; violations (or perceived violations) of airspace or maritime borders; proximity of forces or capabilities; long-range strike deployments; and threats to vulnerable lines of communication.”
• “[Scenarios of conflict include]: Scenario One: Escalation in the Land Domain … Scenario Two: Escalation in the Air Domain … Scenario 3a: Red Asymmetry … Scenario 3b: Blue Asymmetry … Scenario 3c: Increased Militarization of the Black Sea … Scenario Four: War in Northern Europe.”
• “Innovative CAC measures could address [military drivers of potential Russia-NATO conflict], thus increasing warning and decision-making time, complicating surprise attacks and lowering overall tensions.”
• “A CAC agreement that incorporates such measures would reduce the risk of conflict through misunderstanding and miscalculation. … Any future CAC negotiation would invoke several policy considerations, including the relationship of a potential new agreement to the existing regime.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“Democracies Can’t Blame Putin for Their Disinformation Problem: The focus on foreign subversion ignores the damage being done at home,” Seva Gunitsky, Foreign Policy, 04.21.20: The author, an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto, writes:

• “With a looming election and an ongoing pandemic, concerns about Russian disinformation are never far from U.S. policymakers’ minds. …Yet as research has increasingly shown, homegrown disinformation is making democracy sicker than any foreign efforts can. The U.S. media landscape has seen a proliferation of fake local news, homegrown conspiracy theories and a steady stream of questionable information and selectively edited videos from President Donald Trump and top government officials.”
• “The presidential reelection campaign, in concert with a number of private efforts, is poised to spend over a billion dollars on what the Atlantic called the ‘most extensive disinformation campaign in U.S. history.’ This isn’t just a problem of the contemporary United States. There are immense incentives for disinformation built into democratic institutions themselves.” 
• “Russia will undoubtedly continue its attempts to influence U.S. politics using these methods (hence why it’s better to see Russian interference as a process and not an event). But trolling, strategic distraction and disinformation is not something primarily done to the United States by external actors. Instead, it stems primarily from domestic actors inside the country and benefits from the free discourse crucial to a functioning democracy. (If anything, it’s the United States that has increasingly served as a model of disinformation for other leaders.)”
• “Regardless of Russian or Chinese efforts, the same institutional advantages that allow democracy to function also make disinformation pervasive and inevitable. An emphasis on foreign trolls, while politically convenient, creates an unhelpful distinction that obscures the root of the problem.”
• “Russian disinformation is not an imaginary threat. But focusing on Russian teens posting on Facebook even as Trump, large media companies and international organizations pour out a steady stream of false and misleading information is the equivalent of treating a cancer patient for a cold. The problem is more intractable than ‘Putin did it,’ and the sooner policymakers accept this, the sooner they can start thinking about actual solutions.”

“The Russia Hoax Was Never a Hoax. An Encouraging Bipartisan Report Confirms It,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 04.22.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “The Senate Intelligence Committee has released a bipartisan report with a stark bottom line: What President Trump calls the "Russia hoax" isn't a hoax at all.”
• “The committee members conclude that the intelligence community produced a ‘coherent and well-constructed . . . basis for the case of unprecedented Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election’ despite a tight time frame.”
• “The Senate Intelligence Committee deserves accolades for its clear-eyed examination of a subject that shouldn't be political but has become polarizing thanks to the president's provocations. Yet lawmakers wouldn't have had a report to analyze at all if it weren't for an intelligence community willing to dig up inconvenient truths.”
• “The most recent Russia report is a reminder of the need to protect our elections against a repeat performance, whether by disrupting online influence campaigns, securing critical infrastructure or requiring paper trails and risk-limiting audits at the ballot box. But it's also a reminder of the need to protect the intelligence community from co-option by a leader hostile to any truths that threaten his power.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russia’s OPEC Volte-Face,” Marcel Salikhov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.21.20: The author, president of the Institute for Energy and Finance think tank, writes:

• “[Under the deal with OPEC] Russia must reduce its crude output from 10.3 million barrels per day in March to 8.5 million in May and June (a 17.5 percent decrease), and then keep production at 8.9 million barrels per day until the end of the year. In doing so, it will account for 18 percent of OPEC+’s total contribution to the reduction: the same share it took on in previous output reduction agreements with OPEC. Saudi Arabia must also reduce its output to 8.5 million barrels per day, so it can hardly be said that the terms are in any way unfair to Russia.”
• “Russia’s production capacity is not, however, prepared for such a large and sudden decrease. Output there has not fallen by more than 10 percent since 1994. Oil companies will have to carry out an enormous amount of work at their deposits and change their entire treatment systems. They could have spent March in preparation. Instead, they will have to do all the work as a matter of emergency in April.”
• “The main risk is that after being temporarily shut down, the oil wells may not be able to return to their previous operating capacity, or will require a major overhaul to do so. … Generals are often accused of preparing to fight the last war, but some of them, it appears, don’t even do that.”

“All Dried Up? How Oil Wars Have Brought an End to Russia's Fossil-Fueled Golden Age,” Stratfor Worldview, Stratfor Worldview/The National Interest, 04.25.20: The geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm writes:

• “In the mid-2000s, West Siberian conventional fields revitalized the Russian economy, producing vast sums of low-cost oil at a time of rapidly rising global demand. But 15 years on, many of these fields have since plateaued or begun to decline. New fields have the potential to largely offset this decline, but developing these areas come with higher upfront costs and will also eventually progress to a stage of declining production sometime in the 2030s.”
• “To maintain supply, Russian oil producers will thus be forced to explore new avenues of ‘unconventional’ production in the years ahead, generally situated in the following two categories: Hard-to-recover reserves in the Caspian, Black and White sea regions, as well as deep drilling in the Arctic. … Shale reserves are perhaps more prevalent in Russia than anywhere in the world, with key areas being the Bazhenov and Domanik formations.”
• “Russia's current energy sector is also ill-equipped to soften the blow of rising costs due to the following key factors: Russia's inefficient and poorly integrated refinery network has led to higher demand from key markets for bulk crude in lieu of more profitable finished products … A lack of globally respected financial institutions has robbed Russia of the economic alpha gained from national marketplaces, exacerbating its reliance on Brent pricing and dollar-denominated oil. … International sanctions have prevented the sale of advanced oil extraction equipment … limiting Russia's ability to take full advantage of offshore reserves or shale deposits. … The lack of competition in Russia's oligopoly oil market has edged out small-scale innovation: Large producers have already licensed nearly all (95.7 percent) of the country's proven reserves, and 88 percent of its estimated reserves.”
• “Russia's oil future at an impasse. President Vladimir Putin is likely aware of the costs necessary to shed Russia's oil reliance, but the surgery might be worse than the illness. … The clock for Russian oil may already be ticking. What Moscow does to arrest these compounding issues remains to be seen.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Don’t Bet on Reset: US-Russian Relations in the Wake of the Coronavirus,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russia Matters, 04.22.20: The author, the Captain Jerome E. Levy chair at the U.S. Naval War College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), writes:

• “Putin hopes that by offering himself as a partner to the Trump administration during a new crisis—the coronavirus pandemic—he can achieve this long-elusive breakthrough with his fourth American president.”
• “Indeed, given the unprecedented amount of contact between Trump and Putin over the past two weeks, with multiple phone calls and discussions of a wide-ranging bilateral agenda, analysts in both the United States and Moscow are speculating as to whether both leaders are laying the groundwork for yet another reset of U.S.-Russian relations.”
• “Yet, to be blunt, talk is cheap. Multiple phone calls between Putin’s dacha and the Oval Office have had no impact on a series of aircraft encounters in the Mediterranean, where U.S. and Russian military commands have apparently not gotten the memo that a new reset is in the works. So, the real test is what exactly Trump and Putin are prepared to do.”
• “Putin is always willing to talk and propose, and he is not unmindful about the perception his close contact with Trump has created—as well as the consternation it engenders with America’s European partners. But having seen this rodeo more than once, he is also giving up nothing of substance. Stripped to its bare essence, Trump’s request of Putin is that during this crisis, Russia accept the status quo as it stands and not take advantage of America’s need to focus inward to combat the coronavirus.”
• “Putin has no interest in taking a pause—whether in Syria, Ukraine or in trying to foment problems within the Euro-Atlantic community—simply because Trump needs to devote more attention to domestic issues. Instead, Putin has learned another important lesson: take advantage of when America is distracted in order to create new facts on the ground.”

“Why Are US-Russia Relations So Challenging?” Angela Stent, Brookings Institution, 04.27.20: The author, a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, writes:

• “The United States’ relationship with Russia is today the worst that it has been since 1985. … The most immediate issue [in U.S.-Russian relations] is the fate of the New START Treaty on strategic offensive weapons, set to expire on Feb. 5, 2021. ... If this is not extended, then by 2021 there will be nothing limiting the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, with serious implications both for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for a costly future arms race.”
• “Resolving the conflict in Ukraine will remain very difficult. Although the United States is not included in the ‘Normandy Format’—Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine—that seeks to end the war, it still has an important role to play in negotiations for peace and in supporting Ukraine. It needs to resume a more active role. … Russia’s increasingly close relationship with China represents an ongoing challenge for the United States. … [I]t should not pursue policies that drive the two countries closer together, such as the trade war with China and rafts of sanctions against Russia.”
• “The sanctions against Russia have impacted Russia’s economy adversely, but they have not led Russia either to moderate its actions in Ukraine or to diminish its cyber interference inside the United States. … Congressionally-imposed sanctions are a blunt punitive instrument carrying few incentives to induce Russia to rethink its policies. They should be re-examined in terms of their effectiveness as a tool for affecting Russian behavior.”
• “The COVID-19 pandemic may represent an opportunity for the United States to re-engage Russia by cooperating in battling the disease. But developing a more productive relationship with Russia will remain a major challenge for the United States. … Russia seeks to create a ‘post-West’ world in which the United States is one of several great power players and can no longer dominate the international scene. It seeks U.S. recognition for its right to a sphere of influence. So far, no U.S. administration since the Soviet collapse has been willing to accept this premise.”

“US-Russia Deconflicting 75 Years Ago: Flares and Friendly Fire at the Elbe,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 04.27.20: The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “This month 75 years ago, U.S. and Soviet forces linked up on the Elbe River in Germany at the end of the European phase of World War II. The anniversary prompted current leaders of the U.S. and Russia to transcend the frosty relations between their countries and issue a rare joint declaration that cited the meeting as ‘an example of how our countries can put aside differences, build trust and cooperate in pursuit of a greater cause.’”
• “What the declaration did not say, however, is that the April 25, 1945 link-up featured some deliberate flouting of military orders that led to friendly fire. On that day, U.S. Army and Red Army servicemen took turns violating orders issued by their commanders to ensure a safe and orderly meeting at the Elbe River, including instructions to fire green (U.S. Army) and red (Red Army) flares and a ban on straying outside zones designated for patrol (U.S. Army), according to an account based on first-hand recollections of that meeting’s participants published in Russia’s Kommersant daily.”
• “Today, U.S. and Russian militaries have much more reliable and advanced means to communicate with each other than flares and field radios, and it is my hope they will continue to use those to prevent an accidental conflict no matter how tense the political dimension of the bilateral relationship becomes (although some of these modern channels were as unreliable as commercial phones, as was the case with Syria operations).”
• “I also hope that U.S. and Russian military servicemen in Syria, in the European theater and elsewhere will stick to deconfliction rules as outlined by their commanders. The U.S. and Russia are no longer allies, to put it mildly, and the might and range of weapons their militaries have acquired since 1945 would make any bending of deconfliction rules fraught with consequences that could prove much more harmful than those that the heroic patrolmen on both sides of the Elbe River could have possibly sparked 75 years ago. Those brave patrolmen’s judgement was understandably impacted by the anticipation of the end of combat and the desire to meet allies on the banks of the Elbe. No such excuses exist today.”

“Here's a Better Foreign Policy for Biden,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post, 04.21.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “A first area for common ground is redefined national security priorities. Trump's National Security Policy statement treats the face-off with China and Russia as the primary threat, and Trump remains—in contrast to the military—in obtuse denial of climate change. Biden and Sanders could sensibly agree that the existential threat posed by climate change poses the greatest threat.”
• “Sanders and fellow progressives would cut the Pentagon budget. Biden and the national security establishment assert that the United States must maintain a significant military advantage over all rivals. By embracing the progressive view, Biden can show he is prepared to meet the most pressing challenges facing the country.”
• “Even before the pandemic, progressives indicted the global trading order for undermining America's workers and contributing to extreme inequality. In addition to a Green New Deal, Biden and Sanders could agree on reordering our trade relations to put worker and environmental protections first and to crack down on corruption and tax avoidance.”
• “Rising tensions with Russia have sidetracked any progress in arms control. The START Treaty, the last remaining limit on the arms race, expires next February. Democrats could unify behind renewing the new START agreement, and also embrace Warren's call for a ‘no first use’ declaration of nuclear weapons.”
• “The hardest reassessment would be over the emerging Cold War with both China and Russia. Trump has continued the Cold War buildup … Mainstream Democrats echo muscular rhetoric about both China and Russia. … But progressives should not ignore the peril of a new Cold War with escalating and costly military tensions. Prioritizing engagement with Russia and China in arms control, and addressing common challenges such as climate change, would be a measure of needed realism—and provide more security.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Three Possible Scenarios for Life After Coronavirus in Russia,” Alexey Eremenko, The Moscow Times, 04.24.20: The author, a senior consultant at Control Risks, writes:

• Scenario 1: “True to its longstanding policy, the government helps big Kremlin-connected businesses and state companies. The public and the private sector get reluctant token support and are left to fend for themselves. New taxes for both are likely as the government struggles to make up for vanished oil revenue. Politically, approval ratings plummet, but President Vladimir Putin remains in power due to the absence of unified opposition and the continued support of people on the state payroll. The pending constitutional vote and the 2021 Duma elections are rammed through by state pressure and vote manipulations, exacerbating the tensions, which will stretch beyond 2021.”
• Scenario 2: “The government implements an economic support package comparable to those in developed countries—6-10% of GDP. Business activity gradually resumes, supporting approval ratings. As oil remains low, more interest is finally given to other industries, prompting sprouts of diversification in an attempt to offset the spending of reserves. Politically, the Kremlin capitalizes on its image as an economic savior, successfully pushing through constitutional reform and winning the Duma vote. Economically, Russia returns to the stagnation and slow growth track it was following before 2020. Focus on non-oil sectors is hopeful for a range of industries. However, crisis support depletes the government’s monetary reserves, tempting it to hike taxes again after the election cycle. This will, in turn, have ramifications for approval ratings, but that factor will come into play after 2021.”
• Scenario 3: “Exasperated by a futile struggle to salvage the economy, Putin defaults to policies familiar from the Soviet era, relying on the siloviki for their implementation.”

“Is Putin Emulating Azerbaijan in 2008-09? Modifying Term Limits Under Economic Uncertainty,” Farid Guliyev, PONARS Eurasia, April 2020: The author, a postdoctoral fellow at Justus Liebig University, writes:

• “An autocratic ruler who is constitutionally constrained to regain the presidency has three choices: 1) play by the rules and step down, 2) promote a successor he has been grooming and hand the reins of power to him, or 3) bend the constitutional rules requiring term limits and seek another term for him or herself. This was the trilemma facing President Ilham Aliyev as he sought a win in the October 2008 election … Not only did he opt for the arguably unpopular option 3 above (bend the rules), but his administration rushed to call for constitutional changes immediately after the voting took place.”
• “There are some interesting parallels between Putin’s 2024 succession problem and Aliyev’s handling of succession in 2009. As happened in Baku in 2008-09, Putin in Russia is facing a precarious succession problem staring into the face of economic recession. Russia’s elites are … fragmented along similar ideological lines (siloviki vs. technocrats) and the sharing of patronage resources. In the eventuality of a deep economic or succession crisis, elites may split, eroding the pillars of regime stability.”
• “In both Baku and Moscow, circumvention of term limits is seen as a way to deal with a looming succession crisis. More importantly, in initiating their moves, both incumbents were operating under severe economic uncertainty … Both the Azeri and Russian leaders were concerned to act swiftly in order to assure the elites of their resolve to stay in power.”
• “While the removal of term constraints on Putin’s reelection introduces a degree of clarity regarding the president’s desire to remain in power, the unfavorable external environment continues to provide fertile ground for intra-elite tension.”

“The Political Elite Under Putin,” Dmitry Gorenburg, Marshall Center/Dmitry Gorenburg’s blog, 04.22.20: The author, a senior research scientist at CNA, writes:

• “Russia’s political elite has undergone relatively little change under Vladimir Putin’s rule. Only sixty people have been ranked twentieth or higher at least once between 2000 and 2019 in the annual Nezavisimaya Gazeta list of the most politically influential Russians. Eighteen people have appeared on every list during this period. The greatest shift in elite composition occurred between 2007 and 2008, with smaller shifts around the presidential elections of 2004 and 2012.”
• “Most of the political elite originate in the government bureaucracy in Moscow or St. Petersburg or came to their positions of influence through personal ties to Vladimir Putin, either in St. Petersburg or in the security services. Only ten percent came to power through electoral politics; another ten percent are businessmen who made their money independently of any connections to Vladimir Putin.”
• “The elite is fairly evenly divided between individuals who have political influence solely because of their positions in government and individuals who have influence outside of their official role. People in the first group generally drop off the list quickly after leaving government or being demoted, and people in the second group tend to retain influence regardless of their position at any given time and remain influential for extended periods, even after departing government service.”

“Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Turned on the West.Catherine Belton’s riveting account traces an underestimated officer’s rise to the Kremlin,” Peter Frankopan’s review of Catherine Belton’s book, 04.21.20: In this book review, the author, a professor of global history at Oxford University, writes:

• “In Putin’s People, Belton, a former FT Moscow correspondent, leaves no stone unturned in her exposition of how the Russian president and his ‘people’ dominate the largest country on Earth and how they have come to do so.”
• “In the chaos of the years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a tight-knit group of former intelligence officers who had been trained to maintain and control the apparatus of the state looked on with a mixture of anger and envy as a lucky few got obscenely rich extremely fast.”
• “What the cabal of officers lacked was a protector, a co-ordinator and a figurehead who could also give them some of the action while curbing the power and wealth of the new oligarchs, who had forgotten, as one well-placed source puts it, ‘to whom they owed a debt.’ The answer to this, and to the additional challenge of making Russia great again, was the softly spoken, efficient former KGB officer who had the knack of being in the right place at the right time and saying the right thing.”
• “’For a long time, it seemed the west didn’t understand the depth of Russia’s transformation,’ she writes. That transformation centred on being able to control the state from the judiciary to the media, but also on the creation of a new circle around Putin, where the primary quality—and indeed pre-requisite—was absolute loyalty.”
• “That comes at a price. The Putin regime’s ‘original sin,’ as Belton calls it, is that control of the state is so total that outside investment into Russia has dried up because of concerns that assets might be seized, legal authorities weaponised, or worse.”

 “Russia's Independent Media Is Under Attack Again as Apathy Reigns,” Ilya Klishin, The Moscow Times, 04.27.20: The author, former digital director of the New York-based Russian-language RTVI channel, writes:

• “Vedomosti, one of Russia’s leading business newspapers changed ownership recently and brought in a new chief editor, Andrei Shmarov, in late March. Even though the sale of the paper has not been finalized, Shmarov has wasted no time in making significant changes. He banned any reference to surveys by the Levada Center, Russia’s last remaining independent polling agency and cancelled a regular column for what he deemed ‘undesirable’ content. Shmarov also tried to subvert the meaning of the site’s heading and forbade any criticism of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to ‘zero out’ his terms in office and remain in office for life. As a result, the Vedomosti editorial staff is waging war against Shmarov.”
• “The situation, as it currently stands, is terrible: the authorities are strangling Vedomosti slowly as we watch, and not only are we powerless to stop it, but we have lost the inner spark necessary to be properly horrified by what we are witnessing. And that, perhaps, is the greatest loss of all.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Why Populists Want a Multipolar World: Aspiring authoritarians are sick of the liberal order and eager for new patrons in Russia and China,” Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, Foreign Policy, 04.25.20: The authors, the director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute and an associate professor at Georgetown University, write:

• “Despite important regional, cultural, and political differences, many contemporary populists embrace multipolarity. … In essence, they [populists] have come around to the position taken by Russia and China in 1997 against hegemony and in favor of diversity in foreign relations. This remains true even though the president of the United States is himself a right-wing populist.”
• “Populists tend to emphasize the availability of new external partners, usually China or Russia. Most often, they point to Beijing and Moscow as actual, or simply potential, suppliers of international club and private goods that were, during the 1990s and early 2000s, delivered almost exclusively by the United States, the EU, Japan, and Western-dominated multilateral organizations.”
• “Leaders argue that, unlike Western donors, China and other new patrons do not demand intrusive conditions such as economic conditionality or respect for individual rights.  … In response to the outbreaks in Europe, both China and Russia have made a public showing of providing medical supplies, equipment, and trained personnel to Italy and other ravaged European countries. While doing so, they have taken pains to promote the narrative that they have stepped in where the United States and the EU have failed.”
• “Opposing alignment with the United States—which, along with its partners, was then pretty much the only game in town for effective security guarantees and other goods—carried international and domestic costs. … Now conditions have changed. … Leaders, and populists especially, now increasingly see partnership with the United States … and its Western allies as overly constraining.”
• “In the end, for smaller states, multipolar populism may prove self-defeating. It’s one thing to use exit options to reduce external liberalizing pressure, but it’s another when new patrons start calling in favors.”  

“Private Military and Security Companies: Views from the UK and Russia on Regulation and Accountability,” Alexander Nikitin and Fletch Williams, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 04.22.20: The authors of the report write:

• “The basic change required of the international community’s approach to PMSCs is the following: to move from perceiving them as ‘business as usual’ exports under commercial regulations towards perceiving them as highly specific exports and services requiring supervision and constant oversight on behalf of national governments, civil society and the international community, led by the UN. Both national governments and the UN must have more concern and responsibility for what PMSCs do, and when, where, and how PMSCs operate worldwide.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Lack of Demand: The Coronavirus Pandemic and China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Felix K. Chang, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 04.27.20: The author, a senior fellow at the FPRI, writes:

• “No doubt, the longer the disease lingers, the longer an economic recovery will take. That could create one more economic casualty: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).”
• “For the BRI to reorient global trade towards China, more infrastructure will have to be built. But for that new infrastructure to be sustainable, there must be enough trade to keep it profitable.”
• “Given the weakening of the global economy from the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing will have to shoulder more financial costs if it wants to the BRI to make significant headway in the near term. Rather than only allowing borrowing countries to defer payments on their BRI loans, it may have to restructure or forgive far more of them. China may also need to find ways to divert more trade to BRI routes and away from traditional routes, like the Malacca Strait. Finally, China could help create demand by dropping its import barriers and encouraging other countries to export goods to it.”
• “Going forward, someone will have to bear the risk and costs of BRI loans. Unless China is willing to accept more of both, Xi’s dream of creating a new global economic order centered on China may have to wait a while longer.”

Ukraine:

“Belarus, Russia and the Crimean Issue: The Alliance Without Recognition,” Sergei Mudrov, Jordan Center, April 2020: The author, an associate professor in the department of social communications at Polotsk State University in Belarus, writes:

• “Belarusian authorities, as well as large Belarusian corporations, generally observe the policy of de jure recognition of Crimea as part of Ukraine. The Ministry of Statistics, which publishes updated information for all Russian regions, does not list Crimea among them. On the website of the Belarusian Railway, all Crimean stations are listed as located in Ukraine. Besides, there is now no direct train connection between Belarus and Crimea, though one had existed before 2014, crossing Ukraine from north to south. … However, it is possible to take a flight from Minsk to Simferopol via Moscow, using a Russian airline like Aeroflot—this option has not been prohibited by Belarusian authorities.”
• “On the level of medium and small business, contacts with Crimea have continued. Belarusian goods have been exported to Crimea, while some Crimean goods, like wine and soda, have been imported into Belarus. Crimea as a tourist destination is openly advertised in Belarus.”
• “At the international level, Belarus has consistently supported Russia on the Crimean issue. In March 2014, Belarus was one of 11 countries that voted against a UN Resolution on Ukraine’s territorial integrity that specifically denounced the unlawfulness of the Crimean referendum. The situation recurred in December 2016, when Belarus, along with 25 other countries, voted against the resolution called ‘The Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine.’ In May 2015, at the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga, Belarus similarly opposed a proposal to sign a final document containing the wording ‘unlawful annexation of Crimea.’ Thus, Minsk has clearly indicated its alliance with Moscow on Crimea, even if it has never officially recognized the Crimean peninsula as a formal part of the Russian Federation.”

“Turning To Saakashvili Will Not Help Ukraine,” Melinda Haring, The National Interest, 04.24.20: The author, deputy director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, writes:

• “It’s crazy time in Kyiv again. President Volodymyr Zelensky is trying to appoint fifty-two-year-old Misha Saakashvili as the deputy prime minister for reform. Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia, is endlessly energetic and fun to watch, but only if disaster movies are your thing.”
• “In 2015-2016, his former classmate President Petro Poroshenko appointed him to be the governor of the Odessa region. Saakashvili promised to clean up the city’s notorious port system, but Gennady Truhanov, the local mayor, turned out to be far stronger and Misha focused his energy far more on staging media circuses rather than systematic reforms.”
• “If Misha failed as a regional governor, why would the president put him in charge of nation-wide reforms? … First, Zelensky’s numbers are slipping and he’s desperate to put points on the board. He promised to make Ukraine rich, end the war in eastern Ukraine, and end graft. So far, he’s zero for three, and he’s been in office for a year. …Misha is a big, attention-grabbing name, and by attaching himself to another celebrity who is popular in the West and talks a good reform game, Zelensky may buy himself some more time to prove his reformist credentials. … Second, appointing Saakashvili is payback. Zelensky’s rival Petro Poroshenko detests him.”
• “Expect major political turbulence ahead, coupled with a nasty economic downturn. As a result of the coronavirus, more than one million jobs have been lost, and the IMF expects Ukraine’s economy to contract by 7.7 percent this year. In the end, appointing Saashashvili is bound to fail and will destabilize a weak government.”

“Zelenskiy's First Year: He Promised Sweeping Changes. How's He Doing?” Christopher Miller, RFE/RL, 04.25.20: The author, a correspondent for RFE/RL, writes:

• “Alyona Hetmanchuk, director of the new Europe Center, a Kyiv think tank, says that ‘the main thing’ is not what Zelenskiy managed to do on the war issue but what he did not do: ‘He did not achieve peace on Russian terms,’ which would be unacceptable for most Ukrainians.”
• “When Zelenskiy was elected, he promised ‘victory over corruption’ … vowed to conduct a sweeping ‘de-oligarchization’ of the country. But a year later, critics say neither has happened—or at least not to the extent promised.”
• “’In general, after his first year in office, Zelenskiy is not emerging as the most effective Ukrainian president,’ Hetmanchuk says. ‘But he is definitely not the disaster that many of his opponents predicted and are trying to portray him as.’”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• See “Impact of pandemic” above.