I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“European Relations With Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis,” Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Thomas S. Szayna and F. Stephen Larrabee, RAND Corporation, April 2017: The authors, political scientists at the RAND Corporation, write that throughout Europe perceptions of the threat posed by Russia depends largely on “geographical proximity to Russia.” The countries that share a border with Russia tend to perceive a larger threat, whereas those to the West see greater threats elsewhere, such as in the flood of migrants to Europe and the global threat of terrorism. European officials generally agree that “relations with Russia have changed irremediably.” They do not expect these tensions to ease soon; however, implementation of Minsk II would go a long way toward relaxing European sanctions on Russia. The authors urge the U.S. Defense Department to take seriously the concerns of Russia’s neighbors, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Sweden. These concerns include the possible political subversion of a Baltic State, Russia’s capability to keep reinforcements from the Baltics, the role of Kaliningrad, improved communication within NATO and the prevention of nuclear escalation. If Moscow does not ramp up fighting in Ukraine, “most European governments will be sympathetic to some relaxation of sanctions.” Increased conflict, however, would further the European debate on responding to Russia.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Why America Must Stop Russia From Violating the INF Treaty,” Steven Pifer, The National Interest, 04.23.17: The author, director of the Brookings Institution’s Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, writes that rather than withdraw from the INF Treaty per its provisions, Moscow “chose to cheat.” He argues that having the U.S. “simply withdraw from the treaty” would put the blame for the treaty’s failure on the U.S., as little has been done to publicize Russia’s violation. The end of the treaty would also free to Russia to deploy intermediate-range missiles “without restriction,” and possibly supplement them with new intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In order to push the Kremlin “back into compliance,” the U.S. will need leverage. This leverage could take various forms: expensive U.S. intermediate-range missiles stationed in Europe or perhaps conventionally armed weapons allowed by the treaty stationed in and around Europe. The U.S. needs to “multilateralize” the problem by making Russia’s neighbors, including Finland, Sweden and China, aware of the treaty violation “and stress that they are potential targets of the new Russian missile.” “Admittedly, it is a long shot, but it is worth a try.”

“Russia Violated Our Nuclear Arms Treaty. Here's How We Respond,” Alexander Vershbow and Frank Rose, The Hill, 04.21.17: The authors, fellows at the Atlantic Council, write that the U.S. has several options for responding to Russia’s violation of the INF treaty. These options are allowed by the INF and New START treaties and would allow the U.S. to retain “the political high ground.” The authors recommend moving forward with modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems and improving conventional strike capabilities. They also recommend reminding “Russia that NATO remains a nuclear alliance with the capabilities and the political resolve” to respond in kind to Russia’s “illegal cruise missile.” They urge the U.S. and NATO to also deploy “limited defenses against cruise missiles.” The authors caution against responding with a U.S.-made cruise missile and stress the importance of existing arms control agreements.

 Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“What Does Russia Want? What Does America Need?” The National Interest, 04.19.17: At an event held by the Center for the National Interest, four prominent Russia experts answered the questions: What does Russia want? What does America need?

• Angela Stent, a former National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia and a former member of the State Department’s prestigious Policy Planning staff, responded that “Russia would like the United States to treat it as if it were the Soviet Union.” Russia sees its security perimeter as “the outer borders of the former Soviet space,” making Russia’s involvement in Ukraine a response to what it perceived as a Western threat. While U.S. President Donald Trump has assuaged Russian fears about “U.S. interests in regime change in Moscow,” presidential rhetoric following the chemical attack in Syria make it appear unlikely that Russia will be able to receive the recognition it desires under the Trump administration.
• Steven Pifer, director of the Brookings Institution’s Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, said that Russia is interested in challenging the post-Cold War security order that has not proven advantageous to Moscow. In Europe, Russia wants influence and a say in defining a new European security order. “Russia does not want a reemergence of the Soviet Union … but they want neighbors that defer to Moscow’s interests and are open to Russian business.” Managing difference is key for U.S. Russia policy. Military miscalculation, not escalation, worries Pifer.
• Paul J. Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, said that Russia would like a rules-based international system that constrains American use of force, along with “strong governments capable of controlling their own territory” around the globe. Saunders also noted that Russia wants a role on the international stage in line with “its self-image as a major power.” The U.S., on the other hand, wants an international order reflective of “its values and interests.” China, not Russia, Saunders argues, is the greatest threat to this system.
• Michael Kofman, a research scientist at CNA Corporation, said that Russia can use its military for purposes of coercive diplomacy with its neighbors. While the technological gap with the U.S. is narrowing, the Russian military remains in “‘terrible shape’ when it comes to their power projection capabilities”; however, the image of Russia as a declining power safe to ignore has been banished.

“US Conservatives Keep Faith With Putin Despite Trump Travails,” Courtney Weaver and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 04.20.17: The authors, the U.S. political correspondent and the Moscow correspondent for the Financial Times, write that while U.S. President Donald Trump’s hopes for warmer relations with Russia have cooled, many U.S. conservatives remain optimistic. For these conservatives, Russia is “a natural ally” on social issues such as the promotion of traditional family values and opposition to same-sex marriage. Republican libertarians favor avoiding a confrontation with Moscow, and members of the conservative alt-right white nationalist groups praise Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “nationalistic approach to politics both within Russia and on the international stage.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia Looks Out for Own Interests in Europe’s Elections But Risks Long-Term Blowback,” Yuval Weber, Russia Matters, 04.19.17: The author, a visiting assistant professor at Harvard's Department of Government, writes that Moscow did not “create Euro-skepticism or Marine Le Pen,” but is merely exploiting the West’s existing cracks. As a result, the tactics liberal societies employ for countering Moscow’s efforts must be long-term and “effectively promote the virtues of open societies.” Moscow’s goal for intervening in European elections would be to put pro-Russia candidates in power. This would lessen support for sanctions and take the pressure off Moscow for its actions in Ukraine and Syria. Russian election interference is not new, but rather “fits into a long tradition.” Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported groups outside of the anti-Soviet mainstream, allowing the Soviet Union to use “the openness and political liberalism of Western societies” against their governments. Russia’s support for its favored European candidates has been open. However, if Russia is suspected of playing a role in a pro-Russia candidate’s election, it could backfire, precipitating a descent “into long-term Russophobia,” a process at work in Washington. While the West should “recognize that openness might be a weakness in an information war … it is a source of strength for the societies themselves.”

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Between Russia and the West: Buffer or Flashpoint?” Thomas Graham, Rajan Menon and Jack Snyder, World Policy Journal, Spring 2017: The authors, a managing director at Kissinger Associates, a professor of political science and a professor of international relations, discuss the possibility of Ukraine as a buffer state between the West and Russia. While Ukrainians aspire to be part of the West, success for Ukraine as a buffer state would entail “securing its territorial integrity, developing a capacity for self-determination and promoting sustainable economic growth.” This is complicated by the lack of strong national identity in Ukraine. If Russian troops were to march on Kiev, they would encounter “more hostile areas with smaller ethnic Russian populations,” leading to “bloody urban warfare.” Ukraine’s success as a buffer state depends on not only its geography and domestic politics, but also on “the balance of power and resolve between Russia and the West.” Both of these favor Russia, as Ukraine matters more to the Russia than to the West. The authors note that decentralizing Ukraine and requiring its “abstention from regional alliances” only makes sense if Moscow’s goals do not include destabilizing NATO and the EU. The U.S. could attempt to stabilize the situation in Ukraine as part of a deal to improve U.S.-Russia relations. “A buffer zone arrangement initiated by Kiev” is possible. “Many obstacles stand in the way of this outcome, but the plausible alternatives are worse, for Ukraine and for the West.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Naming the Armenian Genocide for What It Is,” Chris Bohjalian, The Boston Globe, 04.24.17: The author, whose novel “The Sandcastle Girls” centers on the Armenian genocide, writes that Nazis from the commandant of Auschwitz to Adolf Hitler himself “were serious fanboys of the Young Turks.” While the term has taken on different meaning today, in the first decades of the 20^th century, it referred to the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, “the architects of the Armenian genocide.” During World War I, “three out of every four Armenians living under Ottoman rule were killed by their own government,” beginning with the roundup and execution of Constantinople’s Armenian political, intellectual and religious leaders on the night of April 24, 1915. The author writes: “To commemorate this devastating anniversary, the president of the United States will likely find yet another euphemism for the word ‘genocide,’ because heaven forbid America should risk antagonizing Turkey by describing accurately what happened and assigning the blame where it belongs.” While Germany recognized the events as a genocide last year, the U.S. Congress has yet to do so. While the Armenian genocide is not necessarily a precursor of the Holocaust, the author notes that “the Young Nazis were there when the Young Turks were at work.” The author urges the U.S. to “stop mincing words when it comes to the Armenian genocide,” as “the last stage in genocide is denial, and that denial becomes the first stage in the next one.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Generation YouTube: How Millennials Are Shaping Russian Politics,” Serafim Orekhanov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.18.17: The author, an editor with history project “Project1917,” writes that millennials are becoming an increasingly important factor in Russia’s politics. The median age of protestors who came out for the March 26 anti-corruption protests was much lower than that of the 2011-2012 anti-Putin protests. These younger protestors were mobilized largely by a YouTube film produced by opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. The film, about Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s involvement in corruption, got over 15 million views—“more than the daily audience of Channel One.” In response, Russian State Duma Deptuy Vitaly Milonov has introduced a bill prohibiting those under the age of 14 from access to social networks and imposing restrictions on how older teenagers use social media. For the opposition to continue engaging with and mobilizing millennials, they “will have to come up with a new language” to communicate with a group that has become “too important to ignore.”

“Why Protests Keep Putin Up at Night: The Fears of a Strongman,” Stephen Crowley, Foreign Affairs, 04.19.17: The author, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, writes that the Kremlin’s reaction to the March 26 protests—arresting around 1,000 protestors—seems at odds with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “solid grip on power.” However, the Kremlin’s concern is understandable given the following: limits of authoritarianism, “the particular threat” corruption allegations pose to Putin himself and “the challenge of maintaining” the Putin regime’s legitimacy “under a stagnating economy.” This legitimacy, based on a promise of stability after the chaotic 1990s, begins to look suspect as “signs of past discord reappear.” These rumbles of discontent pose a threat to Putin and those around him, as the fall from power and subsequent loss of wealth “may be pretty steep indeed.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia: A Land Power Hungry for the Sea,” Tom Fedyszyn, War on the Rocks, 04.19.17: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that Russia’s navy has made “impressive gains” since the 1990s and shows “a hefty appetite for maritime power.” Even with a “‘permanent flotilla’ in the eastern Mediterranean,” Russia does not appear likely to “content for control of the world’s oceans.” However, the Russian navy does appear to be following “the missions outlined by Peter the Great.” It is mostly keeping close to Russia’s borders, defending the homeland, while its global port visits and exercises are an effort to gain “international domestic respect and recognition.” Russia’s navy has also played a role in arms sales. “Of even greater concern is that Russia’s navy is now conducting military operations some distance from its borders and it can apparently shoot straight.” Also of note is that Russia’s primary national security decision maker, Russian President Vladimir Putin, appears to have a particular affinity for his navy and is a confirmed “risk taker, known to overplay weak hands—and get away with it.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.