This Week’s Highlights:

• The New START Treaty is likely to be the last arms control treaty between Russia and the United States for a long time to come, and a Track 2 conversation should be launched to ponder new approaches to arms control, new definitions of strategic stability, challenges to strategic stability, missile defense and the role of other nuclear powers, writes Eugene Rumer, director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia program.

• Today’s confrontational rhetoric and policies toward Russia often ignore reality and U.S. policymakers must try to reengage with Russia on North Korea and nuclear arms control, among other things, according to Emma Ashford, research fellow at the Cato Institute. 

• For a resolution to the Ukraine conflict, Ukraine needs its own Moon Jae In,  who would be willing to implement the political part of the long-suffering Minsk agreement and reclaim the bits of Ukrainian territory held by Russian proxies, according to Bloomberg columnist Leonid Bershidsky.

• Designating Russia as a sponsor of terrorism, as advocated by U.S. Sen. Cory Gardner, would have little practical effect, according to CIA veteran Paul R. Pillar. 

• The Kremlin isn’t worried about the effects of the U.S. sanctions on Rusal and other companies because it has never understood the meaning of shareholder value, especially for supposedly private companies, according to Andrey Movchan, senior fellow and director of the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

• Russia’s political and economic system simply isn’t oriented toward development, even in theory, argues Andrei Kolesnikov, chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. Its foundations are laid on the idea of collecting rents from a small elite group that acts as a bridge between those in power and the country’s assets.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Why a Trump-Kim Deal Has a Good Shot. Bridging the gap with enemy countries requires a key US ally to be on board,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.23.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “Once ideological motivations are discarded, three conditions made the Kim-Trump talks possible: South Korean President Moon Jae-In's desire to pursue closer ties with the North; Kim's ability to assert victory (after all, the U.S. wouldn't have come to the negotiating table if not for his successful missile tests); and Trump's ability to claim victory as well (he can say he forced Kim to negotiate by threatening ‘fire and fury’ and then boosting economic sanctions). What, then, if a similar combination … could set the U.S. and Russia on a path toward a deal that would end the current iteration of the Cold War? … Putin would be able to sell this as his win … . Trump, too, would be able to tout a win … . And yet, the timing isn't right. One thing missing is a Ukrainian Moon Jae In … [who would be] willing to implement the political part of the long-suffering Minsk agreement and reclaim the bits of Ukrainian territory held by Russian proxies ... . Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is severely constrained … . Ukrainians won't elect anyone even remotely dovish on Russia in the immediate future: The two countries' conflict is too fresh, unlike the Korean War. … In a way, Putin is in a worse situation than Kim … . The Russian ruler is a hostage to his relative success in Ukraine; he must hold on to keep looking like a winner. Similarly, he cannot give up on backing Assad in Syria. … If the Kim paradigm works, however, why not a new deal with Iran, this time focusing on curbing Iran's regional ambitions? … Then Russia's Syria meddling would become a non-issue and no separate talks about it with Putin wouldn't be necessary. … The U.S. … isn't held back from approaching rogue regimes by its values, but it can be held back by alliances: No deal with adversaries is possible unless regional allies are interested in it and comfortable with the outcome.”

“Why Russia Is Openly Violating Sanctions Against North Korea,” Samuel Ramani, The Washington Post, 04.23.18: The author, a PhD candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford, writes: “Why is Russia ignoring the international agreement to isolate Kim Jong Un until he reverses his country's nuclear program? Some prominent scholars … argue that it's because Moscow wants to preserve its historical alliance with North Korea. … My research suggests that violating the sanctions is part of Russia's broader goal of challenging U.S.-led sanctions regimes, for two reasons. First, the two powers have very different perspectives on what constitutes an effective sanctions policy. … Second, Russian President Vladimir Putin wants the political benefits of resisting U.S.-led sanctions policies toward North Korea. …  Putin's consistent defiance of international sanctions against North Korea rallies anti-Western nationalists around his regime, while also carrying out Russia's vision of moderate sanctions that are more likely to nudge Kim Jong Un in the right direction. The West can expect the Russian government to continue to prevent the complete isolation of North Korea for the foreseeable future.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“A Farewell to Arms . . . Control,” Eugene Rumer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 04.17.18: The author, director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes that “the end of the political and ideological standoff between the United States and Russia resulted in a much more benign relationship, thereby diminishing fears of nuclear confrontation and the need for arms control … . In addition to the loss of a critical tool to regulate the strategic nuclear balance between Washington and Moscow, it [the end of arms control] could lead to a return to a situation … [in which] each side [is] pursuing its own programs with little regard to considerations of strategic stability. … [T]he end of U.S.-Russian arms control could [also] impact the nuclear relationship between the United States and China, as well as between Russia and China. … The toxic political climate that surrounds bilateral ties in both Washington and Moscow shows no sign of abating. … Thus New START, negotiated in 2010 and ratified in 2011, is likely to be the last arms control treaty between Russia and the United States for a long time to come. … Arms control is in trouble … there appear to be few, if any, solutions to this challenge, at least in the near term. … A robust diplomatic and media campaign in Europe, as well as in Asia, designed to highlight Russian INF violations and to mobilize U.S. allies and partners to pressure Russia, along with a restatement of U.S. commitment to the INF Treaty, appears to be the best course of action to get Russia to return to compliance. … Moscow and Washington could agree to at least begin some exploratory conversations about sketching out a new framework for managing their strategic competition. … This dialogue too is best undertaken at first as a track two conversation, considering the level of mistrust and animosity between the two governments.” 

Counter-terrorism:

“Is Russia Sponsoring Terrorism?” Cory Gardner, New York Times, 04.19.18: The author, a U.S. senator, writes: “The State Department should consider adding the country [Russia] to its list of state sponsors of terrorism, alongside its close allies Iran and Syria. … Russia has invaded its neighbors … it supports the murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad and our enemies in Afghanistan and it is engaged in active information warfare against Western democracies … . This is why I plan to introduce legislation that would require the State Department to determine within 90 days whether the Russian Federation meets the criteria to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. If the answer is yes, Russia would face restrictions on American foreign assistance, a ban on American defense exports and sales, limits on American sales of certain items that have both civilian and military uses and other financial and other restrictions. … It is clear that the blame for today’s distrust and tensions between Moscow and Washington lies entirely with the Kremlin and its atrocious behavior. We must take every diplomatic step necessary to protect our allies and our democracy, and to deter a revanchist Russia that is intent on rewriting history and threatening our way of life.”

“The Terrorism Label,” Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, 04.22.18: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, writes: “A recent op-ed from Sen. Cory Gardner … calls for officially designating Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. … Such a designation would have little practical effect. … As a matter of policy … one should ask of any group or state to which that label has been affixed, ‘How do we want that group or state to change its conduct, and how would we expect it to change before treating it as a legitimate actor (or removing sanctions on it)?’ If the answer is that there is nothing it could do to be treated normally … then a further question is how such a policy is justifiable given that it kills any incentive for the group or state in question to change at all. … A further problem … is that it [the terrorism label] ignores other forms of political violence that … can be at least as damaging as terrorism.  States’ use of overt military force does not meet most official or academic definitions of terrorism but has caused more suffering of innocent civilians than has true terrorism. … Sen. Gardner’s proposal brings to mind efforts during the Reagan administration … to pin on Moscow the blame for every bit of mayhem across the globe. … Today Russia presents an array of challenges … on which Western governments must formulate policy. Slapping the terrorist label on this array neither clarifies the challenges nor helps governments to arrive at effective policies.”

Conflict in Syria:

“Trump's Realist Syria Strategy,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 04.17.18: The author, a professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College, writes: “The president is a realist who believes that international relations are both highly competitive and zero-sum. If Iran and Russia threaten the balance of power in the Middle East, it is necessary to work with any country in the region that will counter them, irrespective of its human-rights record. … Yet the rationale for the missile strikes was not realist but humanitarian and legalistic … . Mr. Trump sounds inconsistent at least in part because his choices are so unappealing. Iran's Russia-assisted march toward regional dominance leaves the U.S. caught between two courses. … Standing back while Russia and Iran run the table in the Middle East would be bad policy and bad politics—but so, too, would rushing into another Iraq-style military and political effort to stabilize Syria. The goal is to avoid bailing out without getting sucked in. … Mr. Trump may be unintentionally arriving at a form of offshore balancing. Rather than seek to impose an order of its own design on the turbulent region, Washington would simply ensure that no other power or group of powers succeeds in dominating the Middle East.”

“Trump’s Syria Strategy Makes Perfect Sense. There's only one way to accomplish all of America's goals in Syria: cooperating with Russia,” Aaron Stein, Foreign Policy, 04.16.18: The author, a senior resident fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, writes: “America’s strategic goals can cohere with Trump’s guidelines but only if policymakers cease complaining about them and begin to take seriously the solution the commander in chief has proposed all along—uncomfortable cooperation with Russia. … To address the longer-term chemical weapons issue, together with the president’s desire to withdraw, will take more than sanctions and tough talk on cable news. Achieving lasting counterproliferation requires working with international agencies to eliminate chemical precursors, associated infrastructure and monitor chemical facilities. … Raising the costs on Moscow for the actions of its client, whether through sanctions or missile strikes, is a sound approach … . Washington should be explicit that it would like Russia to convince its client to eliminate its chemical weapons. If it succeeds, the United States should be willing to forgo sanctions meant to punish Russia for the actions of the Syrian regime. If Russia proves unable to manage its client, the United States could increase the severity of sanctions on Moscow for its support of a regime flagrantly violating the CWC and signal that any future regime use will, again, invite a missile barrage that Russian air defenses have proved impotent against.”

“Trump's Syria Strategy Actually Makes Sense,” Kori Schake, The Atlantic, 04.16.18: The author, deputy director-general at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, writes: “He [Trump] does have a strategy for Syria and the broader Middle East. His strategy is to limit American involvement, to push responsibility for outcomes in the region back onto states in the region and to let power determine outcomes. He has no particular affinity for states in the region, and professes to be a devoted friend to each without committing to enduring obligations to any. … He is indifferent to government type, and just as likely to be a benefactor to authoritarians as to democrats. It is an approach international relations theorists call ‘realism,’ of the variant called ‘offshore balancing,’ as he seeks to withdraw U.S. forces from the region. … Obama was self-deterred, whereas Trump—or at least his administration—runs limited risks. Obama generated false hope among reformers and victims; Trump generates no hope. But he does have a strategy, and it does carefully assess and manage risk to achieve its aims.”

“In Syria, Moscow Is Defending a Narrative, Not a Country. Moscow does not want a war—but it does want Russians to stick to a war mentality,” Maxim Trudolyubov, The Russia File/The Moscow Times, 04.19.18: The author, editor of the Kennan Institute’s The Russia File, writes: “Moscow has long been stoking domestic alarm over an imminent new war cycle in Syria. … Russia’s Gen. Valery Gerasimov described a menu of possible provocations and Russia’s plans for retaliation … . Last week there was a lot of talk in Russia of a new ‘Cuban crisis’ … . In response to Russian bravado, President Donald Trump tweeted about America’s ‘nice, new and ‘smart’!’ missiles. But behind the smokescreen of the American president’s flamboyance and Moscow’s World-War-III innuendo, both sides have shown cool-headed restraint. The United States and Russia quickly moved to de-escalate as soon as the operation was over. … But for the Kremlin, it is bad television. Moscow wanted an engrossing new story about an evil aggressor deterred by a righteous Russia. … The Kremlin prefers a military narrative for Syria because it puts Russia and the U.S. on an equal footing. … It [the Kremlin] relishes the story of a ‘Great Game’ rivalry.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“How Reflexive Hostility to Russia Harms US Interests. Washington Needs a More Realistic Approach,” Emma Ashford, Foreign Affairs, 04.20.18: The author, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, writes: “Today’s confrontational rhetoric and policies toward Russia often ignore reality ... . A more accurate assessment of Russia today would certainly acknowledge that the country has engaged in belligerent behavior … . It would also recognize Russia’s continued aggression toward its neighbors … and its profoundly undemocratic political system. Yet … it would affirm that there is an underlying rationale for many of these actions. Some, such as the seizure of Crimea, reflect security concerns … . At the most basic level, Washington has a clear interest in preventing Russia from dominating Europe, a possibility that is today so far-fetched as to be laughable. At the same time, the United States also has an interest in avoiding pointless conflict with Russia over states that are simply not that important to U.S. national security, including Syria and Ukraine. … First on Washington’s to-do list should be to establish redlines with Russia. … Violations of these more definite redlines should be met with responses that are not just clear but also flexible and creative. … Second, Washington needs to understand that many of Russia’s actions against Western countries in recent years would not have been possible without the existence of vulnerabilities within the West … . U.S. policymakers must try to reengage with Russia … . North Korea is a key issue for both states … . More important, however, is a return to arms control negotiations … . Ultimately, the key barrier to improving U.S.-Russian relations is political: in the current U.S. domestic climate, the incentives to emphasize hostility are heightened. Today’s focus on hostility is fundamentally counterproductive. … [And] likely only to make the situation worse in the long run.”

“Sanctions and Retaliation: Where Russia-US Relations Are Headed,” Andrey Movchan. Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.19.18: The author, a senior fellow and director of the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “Russian oligarchs … might formally own a business empire on Russian territory, but in reality, they are only junior managers working at the pleasure of the Kremlin. When these businessmen get stabbed in the back by the United States due to Kremlin policies, they don’t have much of a choice. … [They] declare the sanctions a reflection of their loyalty to the Kremlin, signal absolute loyalty, threaten default and ask for more financial support. The Kremlin, which views oligarchs as stewards looking after its property, will certainly fulfill such requests. … This is why Deripaska and Vekselberg’s reactions were so predictable. … The Kremlin isn’t worried about the effects of the sanctions. It has never understood the meaning of shareholder value … . So Rusal’s market plunge hasn’t caused much concern … . Strangely enough, as often happens in realpolitik, all sides are happy. The White House can report to voters that it is taking adequate measures against the dysfunctional Russian regime, while at the same time … protecting American aluminum production. In addition, … a time bomb has been placed under the Russian economy by banning exports to it of sensitive technologies … . Over the next ten to fifteen years, this boycott will lead to a loss of competitiveness in the few areas of Russian production that are still on par with the rest of the world. … The Kremlin can be satisfied with the result of its policy. The active greenmail of the global community and the latter’s clumsy reaction have been able to buoy the ratings of the ruling regime. At the same time, tough macropolitics prevent the economy from falling apart. The slow recession doesn’t worry anyone, and nor do the losses of oligarchs."

“Why America Just Got Serious About Sanctioning Russia,” Sergey Aleksashenko, The National Interest, 04.21.18: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes: “It is likely that the administration has become more serious about perceiving Russia’s actions as a serious threat to U.S. national interests. … Unlike the sanctions introduced in 2014, the latest decisions have had a much more serious and systemic impact on the Russian economy. Public flogging of Rusal and its principal shareholder has destroyed a significant portion of shareholders’ value and put its production facilities on the edge of freezing. For owners of other major Russian assets, the threat of sanctions has become much more serious, which gives grounds for a growth in quiet rejection of Putin. … For Putin, the shutdown of the largest factories will demonstrate that the pressure of sanctions, and their economic and social effect within Russia, might be much more serious than he had thought. … [However,] the United States has not been able to gain EU support for new individual sanctions … [which] could ease pressure on Russia. … [T]hese eight weeks have undoubtedly highlighted the foundation on which America’s Russia policy will be built. At the same time, all that happened made it very difficult to find the framework of any deal that President Trump wants to sign with Vladimir Putin. Before, the Kremlin could have won an easing of sanctions in exchange for the return of the Donbas to Kiev; now Ukraine is just one—and not the most important—piece in the new puzzle.”

“How to Stop Vladimir Putin's Mafia. The real enemy is a group of about 100 beneficiaries of the regime and several thousand accomplices,” Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Wall Street Journal, 04.22.18: The author, founder of Open Russia, writes: “The West's real enemy—and the enemy of the Russian people too—is a group of about 100 key beneficiaries of the Putin regime, and several thousand of their accomplices … . Despite having now taken control of the presidency, the group retains every aspect of the criminal ilk from which they came. … Acknowledging the mafia origins of Vladimir Putin's entourage will allow the U.S. and its allies better to understand and resist the group's actions. … The best method of targeting Mr. Putin's circle is to identify its individual members, along with their accomplices and the politicians they have paid off. Then, the U.S. and its allies could act to cut them off from the mechanisms of their influence loot—the people, money and corporations they control in the West.”

“Democracies Should Trust but Verify. Citizens deserve more public facts about intelligence judgments used to justify decisions on war and peace,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.17.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “Western democracies are giving their citizens almost as little useful information on matters of national security as the Russian regime's notorious propaganda machine gives Russian citizens. That is not only insulting to the public, it's also dangerous in a democracy. … the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the British National Cyber Security Center did not provide any evidence that ‘Russian state-sponsored actors’ were involved in … malicious [router] hacking or that they were more dangerous than other router-hacking evildoers. … Sites controlled by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were hit by the U.S., the U.K. and France last week in retaliation against the alleged use of chemical weapons … before experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons experts even got a chance to travel to Douma. … There's also no publicly available proof to support the conclusion that Russian government agents attempted to poison former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Julia … . Few people read long technical texts like the IRA indictment, the Owen report on Litvinenko, the JIM report on chemical weapons in Syria, the McLaren report on Russian doping in sports. … the evidence laid out in such documents is usually enough for informed judgments … . Non-public intelligence can still be legitimate … . But Western governments appear to be leaning toward … implying that the public release of evidence is never necessary before judgments are passed and retaliatory measures launched.”

“Adapting to American Decline,” Christopher A. Preble, New York Times, 04.22.18: The author, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, writes: “There is no question that America's share of global wealth is shrinking. … The proliferation of various technologies … has made it easier for even relatively small and weak countries and nonstate actors to challenge the big and powerful United States. … The Trump administration's National Defense Strategy … speaks of 'an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield' and worrisome 'trends' that 'will challenge our ability to deter aggression.' Its answer? Try harder. … America's insistence upon maintaining primacy at all costs may stimulate greater resistance from the likes of China and Russia. And the risk that the United States gets drawn into wars that it need not fight and cannot win will remain high, no matter how much we spend. We are faced with the prospect, then, of frequent uses of force—like the missile strike against suspected Syrian chemical weapons sites … that even supporters admitted was unlikely, by itself, to accomplish much. … There are, however, alternatives … . America should seek a new arrangement that asks the beneficiaries of today's relatively peaceful and prosperous world order to make a meaningful contribution to maintaining it. The American security umbrella will stay aloft—and American military power will remain formidable—but others will need to do more. … The United States is the most important country in the world and will remain so for many years by virtue of its strong economy and prodigious military capabilities. But admitting that the United States is incapable of effectively adjudicating every territorial dispute or of thwarting every security threat in every part of the world is hardly tantamount to surrender.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

“Reflecting on a Quarter Century of Russia’s Relations With Central Asia,” Arkady Dubnov, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 04.19.18: The author, a Russian political analyst and expert on Central Asia, writes: “The breakdown in Moscow’s relations with the West has resulted in a major geopolitical pivot to Asia and the pursuit of an even closer relationship with China. … [And] also reinforced Russia’s long-standing policy of minimizing … the influence and presence of the West in Central Asia. … The difficult situation the region faces—defined by poverty, lack of economic opportunity, underdevelopment, authoritarian governance and instability arising from ethnic and religious rivalries—is compounded by the threat of instability spilling over from Afghanistan and of the exploitation of grievances by militant organizations. … All indicators are that Russia’s and China’s likely responses will be consistent with the patterns they have established … with China driving economic development and Russia ensuring the political stability and security of the region’s potentially fragile regimes. … Russia has been successful in securing its sphere of influence in Central Asia and expelling Western interests. This accounts for two out of its three principal objectives in the region. Moscow’s partnership with China has served its interests in the region so far, and the point at which their interests may diverge still appears to be rather far in the future. … [S]ecuring the region from external and internal threats of instability is the crucial element that will ultimately determine the success of Russia’s overall policy in Central Asia.”

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia's Telegram Ban Isn't Just an Attack on Privacy. A tech company with Kremlin ties is rising just as a popular messaging app hits a regulatory wall,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.17.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes that the ban on the Telegram messenger app “isn't just an attack on the freedom of communication and expression: It happens to benefit the business of a Kremlin-friendly billionaire. … Earlier this month, Herman Klimenko, Putin's internet adviser, recommended that Telegram users switch to ICQ. That messaging service reached its peak at the turn of the century and was acquired by the Russian company Mail.ru in 2010 … . A month ago … ICQ was the tenth most downloaded social networking app in Russia. It is now in fifth place. Another Mail.ru-owned messenger, TamTam, … stands at 11th place. Regardless of whether Telegram is actually accessible to Russians, Mail.ru is benefiting from the government's move. Mail.ru is controlled by Megafon, a cellular operator … controlled by Alisher Usmanov, one of Russia's richest men and a strong Putin loyalist. Vkontakte, which founder Pavel Durov exited after Usmanov acquired a share, is part of Mail.ru. That's how Putin's Russia operates: It's never clear whether government moves are part of a conscious policy or a business undertaking. Sometimes, it's a little of both. Lost somewhere in the process are the millions of ordinary users.”

“A User Guide to Getting Along in Putin’s Russia,” Maxim Trudolyubov, New York Times, 04.16.18: The author, editor of the Kennan Institute’s The Russia File, writes: “Putin’s fourth term … is off to a tumultuous start. Russia is facing a coordinated, if symbolic, retaliation by the West against Moscow's alleged chemical attack in Britain. American sanctions against Russian oligarchs have wiped out billions of dollars of their wealth and weakened the ruble. Russia's economy is stagnant. And Russians are recovering from the shock of 64 people, including 41 children, dying in a fire at a shopping mall in the year 2018. … Russia's rulers no longer bow to any ideology. But they do follow some basic working rules. First: A disaster, natural or man-made, makes the state vulnerable. … Second: A threat originates only from an external or foreign source. … Third: A civil servant is accountable only to his or her superior, not to the public. … Just as the Kremlin has ad hoc rules, most Russians have some, too. They ’get’ what it takes to prosper in their system: Pretend you are loyal, tell the interviewer you approve of the president, mark the right box and there you go. Freedom!”

“Permanent Stagnation: Putin’s Invisible Fourth-Term Agenda,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.20.18: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “If Putin didn’t resolve to undertake structural reforms in better times, he’s certainly not going to do so now … . The system that has been built simply isn’t oriented toward development, even in theory. Its foundations are laid on the idea of collecting rents from a small elite group that acts as a bridge between those in power and the country’s assets. The only possibility is a certain rationalization of politics within the existing regime, the increasing influence of the state on the economy and the continuing concentration of resources in the hands of a few clans, accompanied by a permanent state of adaptation to the outside world, sanctions and worsening relations with trade partners.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

 Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.