4 Ideas to Explore

1. The delivery of U.S. aid is unlikely to dramatically alter Ukraine’s situation on the frontline, Ukrainian officials, soldiers and military analysts told FT after the U.S. House of Representatives approved a $60 billion military aid package for Kyiv on April 20. The package “does not contain a silver bullet,” according to one senior Ukrainian official, so it “will help to slow down the Russian advance, but not stop it.” The aid will “buy us ... about one year,” according to an estimate by Ukraine’s Frontelligence Insight analytical group cited in FT. Should the Senate pass the aid bill on April 23, the U.S. provisions will be in transit to Ukraine by the end of the week, but it will not begin to affect the situation on the frontline for several weeks, during which the frontline situation is likely to continue to deteriorate for Ukraine, according to ISW.
2. Eye-opening intelligence briefings, the counsel of House committee chairs, the realization that the GOP would never unite on Ukraine, his faith and even his son’s acceptance to a military academy are among the multiple factors that shaped House’s GOP Speaker Mike Johnson’s decision to put the $60 billion military aid package for Kyiv to a vote in spite of the risk of being ousted by his GOP colleagues, according to WP and NYT. Johnson—who in pre-speaker times had voted against funding for Ukraine—himself attributed his turnabout in part to the briefings he had received from CIA director William Burns and others¹ on the status of the war in Ukraine and the global consequences of inaction, according to WP,  NYT and CNN. At one of the most impactful briefings earlier this year, Burns sought to impress upon Johnson how rapidly Ukraine was running out of ammunition, according to NYT. The briefings left a lasting impression, convincing Johnson that the fate of Western democracy was on his shoulders, according to CNN. “I really do believe the intel and the briefings that we got,” Johnson said. “I think Vladimir Putin would continue to march through Europe if he were allowed. I’d rather send bullets to Ukraine than American boys,” he was quoted by Bloomberg as saying. While neither Johnson nor Burns disclosed the contents of their conversations, it is known that Burns has publicly warned that Russia may engage in hybrid warfare against NATO. In an April 18 speech, Burns warned that “there is a very real risk that the Ukrainians could lose on the battlefield by the end of 2024” if the U.S. doesn’t resume military aid to Ukraine soon. Once Ukraine is defeated, “I don’t think Putin’s ambitions would stop [on Ukraine]. He is also able to use what he calls ‘hybrid warfare,’ a combination of conventional military threats and efforts to undermine countries, either in NATO or on his borders,” Burns said, singling out Moldova as one country vulnerable to such a combination. RM has recently published a compilation of forecasts by European and NATO officials on when Russia may attack NATO after and if it defeats Ukraine. We found no such forecasts by Burns, however. Putin has denied such designs, and some Western and other experts have expressed doubt that he would make a move against a member of the alliance.
3. What would it take for Ukraine to win, and what would a Russian victory look like?  Ukraine could succeed in liberating half or more of its occupied territory if Western aid keeps flowing, the Ukrainian army’s personnel ranks are replenished and the effort to breach Russian defenses focuses on a “small section of the front line,” according to a commentary by Brookings’ Michael O’Hanlon in WP. To turn the tide of the war, the West must also ramp up defense production and “go after Russian oil,” according to CSIS’ Max Bergmann. Should Ukraine fail to turn the tide, however, even a partial Russian victory “would create a rump Ukrainian state with a broken economy, while Russia could grow stronger with greater natural resources, industrial strength and agricultural wealth,” Seth Jones of CSIS warns. It would also stoke the appetites of Russia’s “allies in China and Iran, and eviscerate U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization credibility and deterrence,” he writes in WSJ.
4. Stephen Kotkin argues there are five possible scenarios for a fragile Russia’s evolution: (a) France; (b) Retrenchment; (c) Chinese vassal; (d) North Korea; (e) Chaos. Of these scenarios, Russia’s retrenchment represents the best chance for peace, Kotkin writes in FA. To create conditions for this retrenchment scenario to materialize, “Western policymakers and civil society organizations should welcome and reward those Russians who want to deconflate Putin and Russia but not necessarily embrace Jeffersonian ideals,” according to Kotkin, a senior fellow at Stanford University. “It would be a mistake to wait for and reward only a pro-Western Russian government,” he warns.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“With Nuclear Deal Dead, Containing Iran Grows More Fraught,” David E. Sanger, NYT, 04.15.24.

• “When Iran agreed to a [JCPOA] deal in 2015 that would require it to surrender 97 percent of the uranium it could use to make nuclear bombs, Russia and China worked alongside the United States and Europe to get the pact done.”
• “A lot has changed in the subsequent nine years. China and Russia are now more aligned with Iran's 'Axis of Resistance' to an American-led order, along with the likes of North Korea.”
• “The disappearance of that unified front is one of the many factors that make this moment seem 'particularly dangerous,' said Vali Nasr, an Iranian-born professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 'maybe the most dangerous in decades.'”
• “Now the fear of a general escalation has a new, lurking nuclear dimension. The Iranians have not, from all available evidence, been racing for a bomb; their progress in uranium enrichment has been steady and deliberate. But as part of the pressure campaign on the West, they have largely blinded inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world's nuclear watchdog.”
• “Nuclear experts say one of their biggest concerns today is that Iran has every incentive to proceed with its nuclear program, both to taunt the West and to build what it always calls its ''deterrent'' against Israel, the undeclared nuclear weapons state in the region.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Two years of war have impoverished many Ukrainians,” The Economist, 04.21.24. 

• “In 2023 Ukraine’s GDP was 72% of what it was in 2021. Millions have either lost their jobs, or had their pay cut by struggling employers. ... The war has tipped many into poverty, especially those who were hard-pressed before, and above all those whose homes and livelihoods have been lost. A World Bank survey last November found that 9% of Ukrainians had run out of food at some point in the previous 30 days. In March, according to the Centre for Economic Strategy, a think-tank in Kyiv, 23% were in a state of food insecurity. Some 14% were unemployed.”
• “Although many do get aid, their mainstay has been social security. Until March 1st some 2.5m IDPs received a monthly payment (of $77 for those with children or disabilities and $51 for others), which could be topped up with other help. Anyone deemed capable of working is now ineligible to receive this IDP payment, and the number of recipients is expected to drop to about 1.5m.”
• “For 2024 Ukraine needs $37.3bn of external financing and there is likely to be a shortfall. That will mean cuts in social spending, and perhaps an increase in energy prices, which have not kept pace with inflation.”
• “Grinding Ukrainians down on the front and impoverishing them behind it, so that they lose the will to fight on, is clearly part of Vladimir Putin’s plan.”

“There Is a Part of Modern Life That Is So Essential Armies Should Never Attack It Again,” Peter Fairley, NYT, 04.15.24.

• “In late March, after two years of withering attacks on Ukraine, Russia knocked out half of Ukraine's power supply.”
• “Even though the world's dependence on electricity for all of this and more is growing, power grids are still legitimate military targets, according to both international law and our own military rule book. But there are small, promising signs that could be changing. Early last month, before Russia's most damaging assaults, the International Criminal Court in The Hague concluded that the country's pummeling of Ukraine's power system had already crossed the line and issued arrest warrants for a pair of senior Russian commanders, Adm. Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov and Lt. Gen. Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash, whose units are accused of launching the missiles. (Russia has denied committing war crimes.)”
• “It was the world's first prosecution of combatants for attacks on a power grid and an important first step toward recognizing electricity's growing centrality to modern life. But the global community must now draw bright lines for combatants in future conflicts -- and strengthen the hand of future prosecutors -- by codifying specific protections for power grids. The international community already attempts to do that for select infrastructure, including hospitals, dams and nuclear power plants, via the Geneva Conventions. It's time to add power grids to that privileged roster.”

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“What will it take for Ukraine to win?” Michael O'Hanlon, WP, 04.19.24.

• “Given restored U.S. support and ongoing help from Europe, Ukraine might be able to turn the tide.”
• “Thanks to recent changes in the Ukrainian conscription law allowing the government to draft men ages 25 and 26, some 400,000 more men are now eligible. But that likely won’t be enough to find 200,000 more, so there will also need to be efforts to increase enlistments from other age categories. This means Ukraine will have to improve incentives — not an easy challenge, but also not insurmountable.”
• “Consider first what Ukraine would need to do in a future counteroffensive. It would have to try to push straight through Russian positions. After all, it cannot maneuver around and behind them, because that would mean trying to attack through Russian territory. Apart from the harrowing logistics over such huge distances, this would run a real risk of nuclear escalation.”
• “If Ukrainian troops punched through Russian lines, they could then work to widen the breakthrough corridor and penetrate farther. Eventually, they would look for an opportunity to encircle and cut off all the Russian forces holding Ukrainian land to the west of the breakthrough corridor — up to a quarter million Russian troops.”
• “A more promising approach would focus on one place, in an effort to create an opening perhaps 10 to 20 miles wide. ..With another $60 billion in U.S. aid, a boost in recruiting and an impressive military push through a small section of the front line, Ukraine might have a chance, late this year or early next, to liberate half or more of its occupied territory. The odds are tough, but not hopeless. The country deserves a second chance at such a counteroffensive — to defend the global order, to stop Russia’s aggression and, not least, to free its own citizens now living under Russian rule and regain its Black Sea coast.”

“What Would Russian Victory in Ukraine Look Like?” Seth G. Jones, WSJ, 04.19.24. 

• “The most obvious way Vladimir Putin’s army might prevail is by breaking through Ukrainian lines, collapsing its military, and seizing Kyiv.”
• “A key component of that effort would be to pummel Ukrainian defenses with artillery, attack drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, and glide bombs. This is already happening.”
• “To capitalize on its ground gains, the Russian military would seek to break Ukrainians’ morale by relentlessly punishing their cities.”
• “After weakening Ukrainian defenses and morale, Russian ground forces would punch through fatigued military lines with armor and dismounted infantry, supported by missiles, attack drones and air power.”
• “The military balance favors Russia. Its forces have a significant advantage in manpower and a 7-to-1 advantage in firepower, according to Ukrainian assessments.”
• “In the event that Russian forces can’t take Kyiv, they could nevertheless conquer more territory in the east and south. The Russian army could capture the remainder of Luhansk oblast and push west to take territory in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts. In the south, the Russian army could advance in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, retaking the city of Kherson among others.”
• “A partial Russian victory would create a rump Ukrainian state with a broken economy, while Russia could grow stronger with greater natural resources, industrial strength, and agricultural wealth.”
• “A Russian victory would send shock waves across the globe, stoke the appetites of its allies in China and Iran, and eviscerate U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization credibility and deterrence.”
• “A Russian victory isn’t inevitable. The Russian military hasn’t won a conventional war since World War II, and its forces suffer from systemic corruption, massive casualties, and an inability to conduct joint operations between air, ground and naval forces.”
• “But the clock is ticking. Without a clear U.S. strategy and a sustained supply of Western weapons, intelligence and training, Mr. Putin could prevail. A dangerous world would suddenly become a lot more so.”

“After the Supplemental, Ukraine’s Path Forward,” Max Bergmann, CSIS, 04.18.24. 

• “The supplemental funding will give Ukraine a huge boost. But to turn the tide of the war, Ukraine and its partners will also need to take a number of steps:”
  • “First, Ukraine needs to use 2024 to rebuild its force for the long war.”
  • “Second, European nations need to ramp up production now.”
  • “Third, the United States and Europe should go after Russian oil.”
• “Ukraine should use 2024 to hold the line, exhaust and attrit Russian forces, and rebuild and replenish its own forces and civilian defense capabilities.”
• “Additionally, Ukraine will need to focus on strengthening its civilian defenses.”
• “Next year could then present an opportunity for Ukraine to go back on the offensive. ...whether Ukraine could succeed militarily and push the Russian army out is unknown. But the key is to use the offensives in 2025 to make Russia want to come to the negotiating table.”
• “Ultimately, getting the Kremlin to want to end the war requires turning Russian society against the war.”
• “For those more optimistic about Ukraine’s chances to dislodge the Russian forces, using 2024 to exhaust and attrit Russian troops, while Ukraine is preparing, training, and equipping itself for a 2025 counteroffensive, could lead to a breakthrough. For those skeptical of Ukraine’s ability to displace entrenched Russian forces, the only way to get to a negotiated settlement that does not deprive Ukraine of its European future is if Russia is put on the back foot and wants the war to end. For that to happen, Ukraine must be militarily strong. The passage of the supplemental will put Ukraine on the path to eventually end the war on its own terms.”

“A difficult period awaits us, but Ukraine will not lose" Kyrylo Budanov interview with the BBC, BBC, 04.19.24.² Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• “There is no reason to believe in Ukraine's strategic defeat. Yes, if we say that everything will go badly - well, it is quite clear that the result will also be bad. However, if there will be changes for the better - and there are still reasons to believe that this will happen.”
• “The Russians had a real success at Avdiivka. It must be recognized. This is a fact. They were able to do it. Everything else - well, it's too early to talk about it.”
• “In our opinion, a rather difficult situation awaits us in the near future. But it is not catastrophic, this must also be understood. Armageddon will not happen, as many are now beginning to say. But there will be problems from mid-May. ... I am also talking about the front. This is a comprehensive approach, because the Russians will use a comprehensive approach. They conduct a complex operation. We will not talk about it with you for a long time, but it will be a difficult period. Mid-May, early June.”
• “The coming period, in our opinion, will be difficult. But difficult and catastrophic are different things. We have been through difficult times several times, and we will pass this one, believe me. Nothing extraordinary will happen.”

“This defiant Ukrainian general has no smile — and surprising remarks on Trump,” David Ignatius, WP, 04.17.24. 

• “Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, chief of Ukraine's military intelligence service, the GUR, spoke with me...promising to take the fight into Russia with drones and special operations, confirming reports that he's battling with Wagner mercenaries in Africa and scoffing at a Korea-style negotiated settlement.”
• “With the House of Representatives nearing a final vote on additional military aid to Ukraine, Budanov delivered a clear, emphatic message to the United States: 'You should keep helping us, and you should, at last, deliver the assistance we need. We will have a common victory together.'”
• “Budanov predicted that Russia will launch a big offensive starting in June to try to capture all of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two provinces known as the Donbas region, which Russia has claimed but doesn't control. The Russians will then focus on the November elections in the United States and the aftermath. 'Until the inauguration of your president, they will try to get as much as possible of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk,' perhaps hoping that a reelected President Donald Trump can ratify their gains.”
• “To counter the Russians, Budanov plans more cross-border attacks by the 'Russian volunteers' who operate inside Russia with support from his service, along with more drone attacks.”
• “The goal is to show that President Vladimir Putin cannot 'protect the population from the war getting into Russia,' he explained. ' ...When I asked if Ukrainian attacks inside Russia would continue, Budanov offered a rare trace of a smile. 'I hope so,' he said.”
• “I asked him about rumors that some of his GUR operatives are fighting in Africa against mercenaries of the Wagner militia. 'We conduct such operations aimed at reducing Russian military potential, anywhere where it's possible,' he said. 'Why should Africa be an exception?'”
• “For all his panache, Budanov has a clear-eyed assessment of Putin and Russia. 'He became a victim of his own propaganda,' Budanov said. 'They overheated their society … saying that they're the most mighty and all-powerful in the world, and he started believing that himself. But it turned out their military is not as powerful as they thought.' Putin made a 'strategic mistake' in launching the war, he said. 'But Russians recover fast, and that's a fact that you should keep in mind. They have proved that dozens of times. We should not underestimate this characteristic.'”
• “'This war will be ongoing while this regime remains in place in Russia,' he said. 'Under the next regime, it might change or not, but there will be a window of opportunity.' When I asked about a 'Korea solution' through negotiations, he bristled and asked if I wanted Ukraine to become North Korea.”
• “Near the end of our conversation, I asked Budanov if he was worried that if Trump were elected, he might try to impose a settlement. ...'I have a huge respect for the personality of Trump,' Budanov said. He noted that the former president had attended a military academy, and he lauded his tenacity. 'There have been nine instances in his life when he went to the top, fell to the very bottom of life, and went back again.' But as for any Trump peace plan, he said: 'Even a person like him won't be able to resolve this issue in one day.'”

“Ukraine’s Big Vulnerabilities: Ammunition, Soldiers and Air Defense,” Marc Santora, NYT, 04.16.24.

• “Ukraine’s top military commander has issued a bleak assessment of the army’s positions on the eastern front, saying they have 'worsened significantly in recent days.'”
  • “Russian forces were pushing hard to exploit their growing advantage in manpower and ammunition to break through Ukrainian lines, the commander, Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky.”
• “Even before the disappearance of American assistance…there was a consensus among Ukrainian commanders and military analysts that the third year of war was going to be extremely difficult.”
• “The three most critical challenges for Ukraine have been evident for months: a lack of ammunition, a shortage of well-trained troops and dwindling air defenses.”
  • “America had provided Ukraine with the bulk of its artillery munitions…and Russia is poised to soon be able to fire 10 shells for every Ukrainian shell.”
  • “The longer range and greater destructive power of rocket systems and big guns like Howitzers…make them essential tools. When the enemy has an advantage of five to one in terms of shells…they can attack. When it reaches 10 to one, they can succeed.”
• “Syrsky said Russia was trying to seize the moment to achieve an operational breakthrough along several major lines of attack.”
• “Ukrainian commanders are hopeful that several initiatives by European allies to secure hundreds of thousands of artillery shells will soon start to alleviate their urgent need.”
  • “The president of the Czech Republic, Petr Pavel, told reporters…that his country had now identified one million rounds of 155-caliber artillery shells.”
• “The widespread use of drones…means that an armored vehicle is usually targeted and destroyed within 30 minutes when deployed to the zero line at the front. So it falls primarily to the infantry soldiers to hold their positions.”
  • “Syrsky said that the quality of training was a 'serious problem.' But no amount of training can protect against the powerful thousand-pound glide bombs.”
• “Degraded Ukrainian air defenses…allowed Russia to have more success in targeting critical infrastructure.”

“What Happened to ‘Stalemate’ in Ukraine?” Stephen Sestanovich, CFR, 04.19.24.

• “While the word stalemate provided a handy summary of the war as Ukraine’s counteroffensive petered out in the second half of 2023—with both sides unable to make more than small gains—the term has now become obsolete. In 2024, the most important questions the two sides face are about a possible break in the stalemate. Russia and Ukraine could soon be looking at a transformed conflict—one in which both have real reasons for hope as well as fear.”
• “Uncertainty about U.S. aid is not the only factor making it harder to hold fast against a new Russian offensive. Ukraine has been scrambling since late last fall to strengthen its own defensive fortifications, with unclear results, and the country’s domestic politics have further complicated the matter.”
• “Russia’s newly amped-up military strategy heightens the danger still more. Last winter saw fewer attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure than many observers expected, but Moscow has once again increased strikes against power plants and urban targets.”
  • “Taken together, these trends paint a grim picture for Ukraine. Yet, Russia, too, has to reckon with the chances of an enhanced Ukrainian campaign... An increase in aid is also likely to have an indirect impact on Ukrainian manpower levels by boosting the confidence of new recruits, limiting draft evasion, and reviving the national standing of the country’s political and military leaders.”
• “This range of outcomes—from major Russian gains at one extreme to much more robust Ukrainian strategy at the other—makes clear how fleeting the seeming stalemate of the war was. Even the modified term “dynamic stalemate” does not fully capture the very different results the coming year could bring. By the time the third anniversary of Putin’s invasion approaches, in February 2025, there is a very real chance that one side will have won and the other lost. Western policymakers need to reckon with—and act on—these possible outcomes.”

“Do Tanks Have a Place in 21st-Century Warfare?” Lara Jakes, 04.20.24. 

• “The drone combat in Ukraine that is transforming modern warfare has begun taking a deadly toll on one of the most powerful symbols of American military might — the tank — and threatening to rewrite how it will be used in future conflicts. Over the last two months, Russian forces have taken out five of the 31 American-made M1 Abrams tanks that the Pentagon sent to Ukraine last fall, a senior U.S. official said. At least another three have been moderately damaged since the tanks were sent to front lines early this year, said Col. Markus Reisner, an Austrian military trainer who closely follows how weapons are being used — and lost — in the war in Ukraine.”
• “That is a sliver of the 796 of Ukraine’s main battle tanks that have been destroyed, captured or abandoned since the war began in February 2022, according to Oryx, a military analysis site that counts losses based on visual evidence. A vast majority of those are Soviet-era, Russian or Ukrainian-made tanks; only about 140 of those taken out in battle were given to Ukraine by NATO states. And Russia has so far lost more than 2,900 tanks, the Oryx data show, although Ukraine claims that the number exceeds 7,000. German Leopard tanks have also been targeted in Ukraine, with at least 30 having been destroyed, Oryx says.”
• “Despite their power, tanks are not impenetrable, and they are most vulnerable where their heavy plated armor is the thinnest: on the top, the rear engine block and the space between the hull and the turret.”
• “The drones that are now being used against tanks in Ukraine are even more accurate. Known as first-person view drones, or FPVs, they are equipped with a camera that streams real-time images back to their controller, who can direct them to hit tanks in their most vulnerable spots.”
• “Depending on their size and technological sophistication, the drones can cost as little as $500 — a paltry investment for taking out a $10 million Abrams tank.”
• “Markus Reisner, an Austrian military trainer who closely follows how weapons are being used — and lost — in the war in Ukraine - said military engineers had sought new ways to destroy tanks for as long as they have been used on the battlefield and that the FPVs did not render the Abrams and other advanced tanks like the German Leopards obsolete in Ukraine. “If you want to seize terrain, you need a tank,” Colonel Reisner said of the single most lethal weapon in ground warfare.”

“What it means when the mercenaries appear,” Elliot Ackerman, WP, 04.15.23.

• “The war in Ukraine began as a mercenary war. When Russia invaded Crimea in February 2014, the invading soldiers wore no Russian military insignia, causing many to refer to them as "little green men." The explicit appearance of Russian soldiers would have cost Russian President Vladimir Putin more politically than he was willing to accept. In the eyes of the international community, as well as in the eyes of his citizens, there was value in deniability. Putin needed to launder his activities in Ukraine. Mercenary armies are very good at such laundering.”
• “To lead this mercenary venture, Putin made an unlikely choice: Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a coarse former restaurateur known as "Putin's Chef." Backed by cadres of battle-tested field commanders, Prigozhin helped found the Wagner Group in 2014 and presided over its rapid expansion. Between 2014 and 2021, Wagner mercenaries delivered many thousands of Russian boots on the ground in places where no Russian boots should have been: Libya, Ukraine, Sudan, Mali, Venezuela, the Central African Republic and directly against American troops in Syria in February 2018. All this while the Kremlin denied Wagner's involvement and, in some cases, its existence.”
• “The Wagner Group was an effective military force that Putin could deploy anywhere in the world without political embarrassment. When Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Wagner Group contributed about 1,000 soldiers to the invasion, but it never assumed the lead. That job would fall to the regular Russian military, which hadn't taken on an operation of this scope in more than a generation.”
• “Like the Romans and the British, Putin would learn the dangers of vesting military power in private hands. Prigozhin began feuding with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and other senior commanders, characterizing them as incompetents. For his army of mercenaries, Prigozhin became a charismatic populist leader, airing their grievances against Russia's military establishment. Prigozhin gave Russia a sorely needed military victory in the battle of Bakhmut, and no achievement vests a leader with political power more quickly than battlefield success. This is one of the great dangers of placing military power in the hands of private military leaders. This was a lesson Putin learned early on the morning of June 24, 2023, when Prigozhin marched his Wagner Group soldiers off the battlefield and back into Russia.”
• “Sometimes the only thing more dangerous than a state's monopoly of force is the lack of such a monopoly. We should be extremely cautious of wars fought with this indirect approach, designed mainly to insulate a domestic constituency from the costs of war.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “What will a sharp increase in Western support give to the Ukrainian Armed Forces?” Nikolai Mitrokhin, Republic.ru, 04.22.24. (in Russian)

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Ukraine faces race against time to deploy US funding,” Christopher Miller and Max Seddon, FT, 04.22.24.

• “American weapons and munitions will start flowing into Ukraine within the coming days if the bill is approved by the US Senate this week, as is widely expected.”
• “Western and Ukrainian officials said some of the material assistance, including arms and ammunition, was already packaged in depots in Poland and elsewhere in Europe and ready to be transported.”
• “But the delivery of the US aid is unlikely to dramatically alter Kyiv’s situation on the frontline, according to Ukrainian officials, soldiers and military analysts.”
• “The influx of arms, particularly much-needed artillery shells and munitions for air defense systems 'will help to slow down the Russian advance, but not stop it,' one senior Ukrainian official told the FT on condition of anonymity to speak frankly about the battlefield situation.”
• “Such a large aid package may be the last this year. Moreover, there is a fairly high probability that all subsequent aid packages for Ukraine will be much smaller in size,” said a former Ukrainian officer who operates the analytical group Frontelligence Insight.  'The aid provided by the US buys us and the European Union time, about one year,' the group’s assessment said.”
• “'Successful combined operations with fighters and anti-air might significantly cancel out Russia’s mass glide-bombing campaign. If Ukraine doesn’t use the key systems en masse, there won’t be a significant influence on the front lines,' said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the [Moscow-based]  Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.”
• “The US assistance package, which is certain to provide artillery shells, the senior Ukrainian official said, 'does not contain a silver bullet.'”
• “'I think manpower may be the key to how the war unfolds in 2025,' said Rob Lee. Russia is at present able to mobilize about 30,000 soldiers each month, according to US and Ukrainian estimates, or enough to at least cover its massive battlefield loss.”

“Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2024,” ISW, 04.20.24.

• “The US House of Representatives passed a supplemental appropriations bill on April 20 providing for roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine. The bill must now be passed by the Senate and signed by the president before aid can begin to flow. These requirements and the logistics of transporting US materiel to the frontline in Ukraine will likely mean that new US assistance will not begin to affect the situation on the front line for several weeks.³ The frontline situation will therefore likely continue to deteriorate in that time, particularly if Russian forces increase their attacks to take advantage of the limited window before the arrival of new US aid. Ukrainian forces may suffer additional setbacks in the coming weeks while waiting for US security assistance that will allow Ukraine to stabilize the front, but they will likely be able to blunt the current Russian offensive assuming the resumed US assistance arrives promptly.”
• “US media reported that US officials stated that the US Department of Defense (DoD) has been assembling the first tranche of resumed US security assistance for Ukraine ahead of the vote in the US House of Representatives but noted that the Biden administration has yet to make a final decision on how large the first tranche of aid will be or what it will include. US officials reportedly stated that the United States will be able to “almost immediately” send certain munitions to Ukraine from US storage facilities in Europe, particularly critically needed 155mm artillery shells and air defense missiles.”
• “The threat of an operationally significant Russian advance in the coming weeks remains, although the Ukrainian command may have more latitude to take short-term risks with dwindling supplies to prevent such an advance once it knows that more materiel will be arriving soon. Russian forces will likely intensify ongoing offensive operations and missile and drone strikes in the coming weeks in order to exploit the closing window of Ukrainian materiel constraints. ....Russian forces may hope that continued and possibly intensified missile and drone strikes will be able to collapse the Ukrainian energy grid and force Ukraine to contend with a humanitarian crisis alongside its ongoing defensive operations.”
• “Ukraine will likely be in a significantly improved operational position by June 2024 regardless of delays in the arrival of US security assistance to the frontline, and the Russian military command will likely consider significant changes to the large-scale offensive operation that it is expected to launch in June, although it may still proceed as planned. Ukrainian forces will likely leverage sufficient US security assistance to blunt Russian offensive operations in June 2024.”
• “The likely resumption of US security assistance to Ukraine is a critical turning point in the war in Ukraine, but the Kremlin, the West, and Ukraine still have additional decisions to make that will determine the character and outcome of the fighting.”
  • “The Kremlin still retains the ability to further mobilize its economy and population to support its campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity and may determine to pursue domestically unpopular decisions should it deem them necessary.”
  • “Ukraine still faces persisting force generation, sustainment, and defense industrial challenges that will heavily affect the capabilities that it can bring to bear.”
  • “The United States and its Western allies must provide Ukraine with regular and consistent aid and deliver new critical systems to Ukrainian forces in a timely and effective manner for Western security assistance to have operationally significant effects.”

“Finally, America’s Congress does right by Ukraine,” The Economist, 04.20.24.

• “After months of bitter wrangling, the House of Representatives passed a bill to appropriate $61bn to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia.”
• “That it took so long to do the right thing by Ukraine was disgraceful.”
• “As soon as the bill becomes law, it should quickly make a difference on the battlefield. The Pentagon has pre-prepared arms consignments and is poised to deliver them. The first shells could start arriving in a couple of weeks, if not sooner. Confident of their arrival, Ukrainian forces on the ground need no longer conserve ammunition as zealously as before. The chances of a catastrophic Russian breakthrough this year have significantly receded.”
• “Many problems remain, however, both practical and political.”
  • “The practical ones will be felt first. Some of the larger kit that Ukraine needs, such as anti-missile and anti-aircraft batteries, will take longer to build and ship.”
  • “The political picture in America is, if anything, more complicated.  ... [Trump] appears to have balked at letting Ukraine lose, perhaps for fear that the resulting geopolitical mess would land on his desk if he regains the presidency... It would help if more Republicans—and more Democrats—could articulate more clearly why helping Ukraine is in America’s self-interest.”
    • “If Mr. Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, he will keep going.”
    • “If America abandons Ukraine, when the cost is a modest fraction of the Pentagon’s budget and no American blood is being spilled, America’s enemies and friends alike will conclude that Uncle Sam is a fickle protector.”
    • “China would be more likely to invade Taiwan.”
    • “Allies such as South Korea and Saudi Arabia would be more likely to seek nuclear weapons, setting off destabilizing regional arms races.”
• “With American and European support, Ukraine should be able to hold the line. ... Mr. Putin is gambling that, sooner or later, the West’s political divisions will hobble its support for his victim. That calamity was averted this weekend. But come November, no one can be sure.”

“Having exhausted the other options, the House did the right thing on Ukraine,” Max Boot, WP, 04.20.24. 

• “Even more concerning than the growing size of the Russian forces is their increased competence. We should not imagine that the Russian army of today is the same one that couldn't keep its tanks and trucks fueled during the initial invasion. As Cavoli noted, 'The Russian military in the past year has shown an accelerating ability to learn and adapt to battlefield challenges both tactically and technologically.'”
• “Ukraine has been short not only of ammunition but also of soldiers: Its roughly 200,000 troops at the front face an estimated 470,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine. ... Yet fewer Ukrainians have been willing to enlist than in the heady early days of the war.”
• “The House bill calls on the administration to send long-range ATACMS, missiles that could do serious damage to the Crimean bases that support Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Biden should have sent those weapons systems long ago, and it is imperative that they be dispatched now, along with the longer-range Taurus cruise missiles that Germany has so far refused to send.”
• “The United States and its allies also need to dig deep — and take some short-term risks with their own defense requirements if necessary — to send more of the Patriot batteries that the Ukrainians are desperately requesting to protect against Russian airstrikes.”
• “The good news is that all is far from lost.”
• “The newly authorized U.S. aid package should come just in time — and not a second too soon — to avert a Ukrainian collapse this year. It will provide both a materiel and a morale boost, signaling to Ukrainians they are not being abandoned. But more needs to be done, both by Ukraine and its Western supporters, to wrest the battlefield advantage from Russia and to convince its dictator that he cannot win his cruel war of conquest. Indeed, more U.S. aid will be necessary in the future. Let us hope that next time Congress will move without first forcing Ukraine to the brink of disaster.”

“The evolution of Mike Johnson on Ukraine,” Leigh Ann Caldwell and Marianna Sotomayor, WP, 04.21.24. 

• “When the House passed a $40 billion emergency funding bill for Ukraine in May 2022, support for Ukraine was largely still a bipartisan issue. But a little-known conservative congressman from Louisiana was one of the 57 Republicans to oppose it. Now, just six months after his unlikely elevation to speaker of the House, Mike Johnson (R-La.) has pushed through a $60 billion effort to bolster Ukraine’s arsenal, along with funding for Israel and the Indo-Pacific.”
• “The move marks a major victory and dramatic turnabout for the speaker.”
• “It is also a major rebuke to former president Donald Trump, who publicly backed Johnson at a recent Mar-a-Lago event but has long criticized Ukraine while repeatedly sympathizing with Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
• “The speaker’s torturous path to embracing Ukraine aid is the result of many factors: high-level intelligence briefings as a House leader, his faith, the counsel of three committee chairs, and a realization that the GOP would never unite on Ukraine.”
• “The day after he was elected speaker in October, he met with Biden and the three House national security panel chairs — Reps. Michael R. Turner (R-Ohio), Michael McCaul (R-Tex.) and Mike D. Rogers (R-Ala.) — who brought him to the White House for a worldwide threats briefing heavy on Ukraine. Former CIA director and ex-secretary of state Mike Pompeo became an informal adviser.”
• “The new speaker heard from evangelical Christians in the United States and Ukraine about the persecution of Ukrainian Christians by Russia. Over the next months, the other congressional leaders twice brought him to meet with Biden at the White House, where he got an earful about the importance of this moment in history from the president, McConnell and Schumer⁴. It was eye-opening. One Republican House member recalls: “I’ll never forget Johnson one time said, ‘I’ve gone from representing my district only to representing the entire [House] and the country.’ For someone to go from where he was to where he is now as quickly as he did … is remarkable.'”
• “Johnson was given polling from the American Action Network, the policy arm of the Republican-affiliated super PAC, that found a large majority of voters in battleground districts favor aid to Ukraine and that favoring Ukraine aid was not a principal deciding factor for Republican primary voters.”
• “This month, Johnson started to turn his attention to Ukraine behind the scenes. ... Johnson also received a private, classified and sobering briefing from CIA Director William J. Burns about the status of the war in Ukraine and its implications.”
• “'I really do believe the intel and in the briefings that we’ve gotten,' Johnson said last week. 'I believe [Chinese President] Xi [Jinping] and Vladimir Putin and Iran really are an axis of evil. I think they’re in coordination.'”

“How Mike Johnson Got to ‘Yes’ on Aid to Ukraine,” Catie Edmondson, NYT, 04.21.24.

• “For weeks after the Senate passed a sprawling aid package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, Speaker Mike Johnson agonized over whether and how the House would take up funding legislation that would almost certainly infuriate the right wing of his party and could cost him his job. He huddled with top national security officials, including William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, in the Oval Office to discuss classified intelligence. He met repeatedly with broad factions of Republicans in both swing and deep red districts, and considered their voters’ attitudes toward funding Ukraine. He thought about his son, who is set to attend the U.S. Naval Academy in the fall. And finally, when his plan to work with Democrats to clear the way for aiding Ukraine met with an outpouring of venom from ultraconservatives already threatening to depose him, Mr. Johnson, an evangelical Christian, knelt and prayed for guidance.”
• “As a rank-and-file hard-liner, Mr. Johnson had largely opposed efforts to fund Kyiv’s war effort. And early in his speakership, he declared he would never allow the matter to come to a vote until his party’s border demands were met. But by the time he made clear he planned to band together with Democrats to muscle through the aid package over the objections of many in his party, Mr. Johnson was speaking a starkly different language 'History judges us for what we do,' he told reporters at the Capitol last week. 'This is a critical time right now. I could make a selfish decision and do something that’s different. But I’m doing here what I believe to be the right thing. I think providing lethal aid to Ukraine right now is critically important.'”
• “Mr. Johnson attributed his turnabout in part to the intelligence briefings he received, a striking assertion from a leader of a party that has embraced former President Donald J. Trump’s deep mistrust of the intelligence community.”
  • “'I really do believe the intel,' Mr. Johnson said. 'I think that Vladimir Putin would continue to march through Europe if he were allowed. I think he might go to the Baltics next. I think he might have a showdown with Poland or one of our NATO allies.'”
  • “Mr. McCaul,⁵ who repeatedly huddled with Mr. Johnson and the chairmen of the other congressional national security committees in a secure room of the Capitol where lawmakers can review classified material, described Mr. Johnson’s journey as 'transformational.' 'All of a sudden, he’s realizing that the world depends on this,' Mr. McCaul said. 'This is not some little political game on the floor.'”
  • “One of the most impactful briefings, according to people familiar with the discussions, came in February in the Oval Office, when congressional leaders met with Mr. Biden to discuss government funding and aid for Ukraine. At that meeting, Mr. Burns and other top national security officials sought to impress upon Mr. Johnson how rapidly Ukraine was running out of ammunition, and how dire the consequences would be if their air defenses were no longer reinforced by American weaponry. Convinced that they would come around to his way of thinking, Mr. Johnson repeatedly urged Republicans who opposed the funding measure to go to the secure space at the Capitol and receive the same intelligence briefings, according to people he spoke to.”
• “Mr. Johnson was also struck by the stories he heard in meetings with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine and others about the magnitude of the misery Russian forces have unleashed across the embattled nation. The speaker also faced mounting political pressure to act.”
• “[In February] Mr. Johnson began — first privately, then loudly — telling allies that he would ensure the U.S. would send funding to Kyiv... In a small meeting with lawmakers, Mr. Johnson 'made it pretty clear that if we didn’t get this done in April, that it could be too late for Ukraine,' Representative Don Bacon, Republican of Nebraska, said.”
• “Mr. Johnson told reporters on Thursday that he believed that if he did not act soon, G.O.P. lawmakers would try to circumvent him by using a procedure called a discharge petition to force a vote on the Senate bill.”

“How Johnson came to embrace Ukraine aid and defy his right flank,” Annie Grayer, Melanie Zanona and Manu Raju, CNN, 04.21.24.

• “The speaker’s embrace of Ukraine aid represents a remarkable evolution for Johnson, who voted against funding for the country as a rank-and-file member. .... He remained resistant to moving on Ukraine funding, letting the Senate-passed foreign aid package sit idle for months – even when Biden and the other three top congressional leaders, including Senate GOP leader Mitch McConnell, pressured him to act in a tense Oval Office meeting in February.... Part of Johnson’s reluctance: Trump, who has been critical of Ukraine aid... So Johnson trekked down to Mar-a-Lago last week for an unrelated news conference, at Johnson’s behest, where Trump expressed support not only for structuring some Ukraine aid as a loan but also for Johnson’s speakership.... The next day, Israel was attacked by Iranian missiles, fueling a new sense of urgency for Congress to act. Johnson knew he could no longer put off a decision.”
• “Almost immediately after securing the speaker’s gavel, sources say he began to hear directly from critical Republican national security voices – including Donald Trump’s former secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, who impressed upon him the urgent need to approve assistance for Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s invasion.”
• “In March, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky lobbied the speaker directly... And more recently, Johnson received a key intelligence briefing from CIA Director Bill Burns, who painted a picture of the dire situation on the battlefield in Ukraine and the global consequences of inaction, according to multiple sources with knowledge of the situation. The briefing left a lasting impression, and Johnson became increasingly convinced the fate of Western democracy was on his shoulders, sources close to him said.”
• “Another factor that sources say weighed heavily on his decision-making: Johnson’s oldest son was recently accepted into the Naval Academy.”

“Ukraine Aid Shows MAGA Hasn’t Cowed Johnson,” Patricia Lopez, Bloomberg, 04.21.24. 

• “House Speaker Mike Johnson endured a titanic struggle to get Ukraine aid through the House, one that demonstrates the benefits of cooperation and the pitfalls of extremism. His ultimate success on Saturday, however, came at a dear price, one paid by Ukrainians in blood and in the countless lives that might have been saved had Johnson taken up the bill when it was passed by the Senate in February.”
• “Instead of catering to MAGA extremists, Johnson declared himself a “Reagan Republican,” rejecting the isolationism that has come to dominate the party’s extremists. It was a refreshing and unexpected turn from Johnson.”
• “'We have a very special responsibility,' Johnson told reporters at an earlier news conference. 'It doesn’t mean we’re the world’s policeman. It does mean we have to stand for freedom.' Such talk is seldom heard these days from the party of Donald Trump. Even rarer is Johnson’s affirmation of the value of gathered intelligence. 'I really do believe the intel and the briefings that we got,' Johnson said. 'I think Vladimir Putin would continue to march through Europe if he were allowed. I’d rather send bullets to Ukraine than American boys,' he said noting that his son will enter the US Naval Academy this fall.”

“CIA Director Burns on Ukraine: ‘We’re running out of time to help them,’” a conversation between David Kramer and William Burns, George Bush Presidential Center, 04.18.24.

• “[William Burns] There’s an enormous amount at stake in terms of how the U.S. House of Representatives and Congress, more broadly… decide to act regarding supplemental assistance for Ukraine.”
  • “Ukrainians are at a tough moment on the battlefield right now. The Ukrainians are not running out of courage and tenacity; they’re running out of ammunition, and we’re running out of time to help them.”
  • “Two days before the fall of Avdiivka, one entire Ukrainian brigade, so more than 2,000 personnel, had a grand total of 15 artillery rounds for the entire brigade, 15 artillery rounds per day.”
• “[WB] There is a very real risk that the Ukrainians could lose on the battlefield by the end of 2024 or at least put [President Vladimir] Putin in a position where he could essentially dictate the terms of a political settlement.”
  • “With supplemental assistance from the U.S. Congress, I think Ukrainians can hold their own on the battlefield in 2024 and continue to do damage with deeper strikes in Crimea, which the Russians are occupying right now, and against the Black Sea Fleet, where the Ukrainians have sunk 16 warships in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet just over the last six months.”
• “[WB] I don’t think Putin’s ambitions would stop [on Ukraine]. He is also able to use what he calls “hybrid warfare,” a combination of conventional military threats and efforts to undermine countries, either in NATO or on his borders. Moldova, for example, faces a really important election today.”
• “[WB] Putin…is someone who’s kind of a combustible combination of grievance and ambition and insecurity all wrapped up together. And so the phenomenon of transnational repression of governments, autocratic governments in particular, reaching out to kill or intimidate oppositionist human rights activists outside their own borders, I think, is growing.”
• “[WB when asked about US warning Russia about the Crocus City Hall attack] The duty to warn obligation for U.S. intelligence services actually goes back to the 1970s.”
  • “We…did provide quite accurate intelligence to the Russian services about what we could see was an impending terrorist attack by ISIS.”

“Moment of Truth on Ukraine and Israel; Both countries urgently need U.S. aid to defend themselves against brazen adversaries that seek their annihilation,” Joe Biden, WSJ, 04.17.24.

• “Now is not the time to abandon our friends.”
  • “In this third year of Russia's war, Ukraine continues to defy the odds. Against a much larger military, the Ukrainians regained more than half the territory that Russia occupied after its 2022 invasion. They've struck the Russian navy time and again, winning important victories in the Black Sea. And they've developed innovative weapons, especially drones, to counter Russian forces. Theirs is a fighting force with the will and the skill to win.”
  • “Meanwhile, as we saw this weekend, Israel's military has the technology and training to defend the country against even an attack of unprecedented scope and ferocity.”
    • “But while both countries can capably defend their own sovereignty, they depend on American assistance, including weaponry, to do it. And this is a pivotal moment. Vladimir Putin is ramping up his onslaught with help from his friends. China is providing Russia with microelectronics and other equipment that is critical for defense production. Iran is sending hundreds of drones; North Korea is providing artillery and ballistic missiles. Ukraine, facing ammunition shortfalls, is losing hold of territory it had regained.”
• “Both Ukraine and Israel are under attack by brazen adversaries that seek their annihilation. Mr. Putin wants to subjugate the people of Ukraine and absorb their nation into a new Russian empire. The government of Iran wants to destroy Israel forever—wiping the world's only Jewish state off the map.  America must never accept either outcome—not only because we stand up for our friends, but because our security is on the line, too.”
  • “If Russia triumphs, Mr. Putin's forces will move closer than ever to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. "An attack on one is an attack on all" means that if Mr. Putin invades a NATO ally, we will come to its aid—as our NATO allies did for us after the Sept. 11 attacks. We should surge support to Ukraine now, to stop Mr. Putin from encroaching on our NATO allies and ensure that he doesn't draw U.S. troops into a future war in Europe.”
  • “Likewise, if Iran succeeds in significantly escalating its assault on Israel, the U.S. could be drawn in.”
• “Mr. Putin has tried relentlessly to break the will of the Ukrainian people. He has failed. Now he's trying to break the will of the West. We cannot let him succeed. There are moments in history that call for leadership and courage. This is one of them.”

“Europe—but Not NATO—Should Send Troops to Ukraine. To Halt Russia’s Advance, Kyiv Needs More Boots on the Ground,” Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek and Phillips P. O’Brien, FA, 04.22.24. 

“How to fill Ukraine’s ammunition gap,” Petr Fiala, FT, 04.15.24. 

• “The Czech ammunition initiative has attracted considerable international attention. This is a positive thing. At the moment, European nations buying additional artillery ammunition from other countries is the only way to quickly provide Ukraine with urgently needed rounds.”
• “The [purpose of the] Czech Republic’s ... ammunition initiative ... is to find hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds as quickly as possible on world markets (where they are still available in abundance), to finance their purchase with co-operating western states and to get them to the front without delay.”
• “This initiative also has another, equally important, aim: to give the west more time to adapt. ... especially until Europe can produce enough ammunition on its own. We will not shrug off this responsibility.”

For more relevant analysis, including commentaries published before the April 20 vote on Ukraine aid by the House of Representatives, see:

• “Ukraine’s desperate need for air defences,” Editorial Board, FT, 04.18.24.
• “Here are the U.S. congressional districts benefiting from Ukraine aid,” Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 04.18.24.
• “Will America Let Ukraine Collapse?” Editorial Board, WSJ, 04.17.24.
• “Ukraine cannot fight evil with empty hands,” Oleksandra Matviichuk, FT, 04.18.24.
• “Ukraine urgently needs support to defend democracy,” Jonathan Katz et al, Brookings, 04.19.24.
• “Losing Ukraine Isn't Necessary,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 04.19.24.
• "If Only the West Backed Ukraine as It Did Israel," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 04.17.24.
• "US Aid for Ukraine Is Just a Start. Now for a New Plan," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 04.22.24.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“The price is right. Why Russia’s economy appears to be booming in the face of sanctions,” Meduza, 04.15.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “Russia’s Finance Ministry released its preliminary report on the federal budget indicators for the first quarter of 2024, revealing results that surpassed expectations.”
  • “Government earnings are soaring above [2023] figures.”
• “In the first quarter of 2024, oil and gas earnings surged by nearly 80 percent compared to the same period in 2023, injecting 2.9 trillion rubles ($31 billion) into Russia’s federal budget.”
  • “Oil prices are on the rise… the U.S. has been replenishing its raw material reserves as OPEC countries cut production. The conflict between Israel and Hamas has threatened shipments through the Red Sea… Iran, one of the world’s major oil suppliers, has now entered the conflict.”
  • “Russia has revised its method for calculating the mineral extraction tax (MET). If a barrel of Brent is selling at $100 and a barrel of Urals is selling at $50, the ministry disregards the actual price and levies taxes based on a price of $80 per barrel.”
  • “The Russian government has also seen an increase in revenues from its quarterly profit-based tax (NDM). This allows companies to defer their tax burden until after they’ve become profitable, which…encourages them to invest in developing new reserves.”
• “The ruble’s depreciation could also have impacted the statistics. The ruble weakening to 90 to the dollar automatically led to an increase in budget revenues from oil sold abroad.”
• “Non-oil and gas revenues have risen by 43 percent, bringing in 5.8 trillion rubles ($62 billion) in the first quarter alone.”
• “The ministry also mentions “planned receipts of one-time non-tax revenues.” [In 2024], the ministry has set a significantly higher target [than in 2023, for profit generation through privatization] from the outset: selling 100 billion rubles ($1.07 billion) worth of state-owned assets.”
• “The Russian government has already ramped up its spending. Compared to the first quarter of 2023, budgetary expenses have increased by 20 percent.”
  • “Increasing budget expenditures also heighten risks for the national currency exchange rate. Russia’s Economic Development Ministry officially predicts that the average exchange rate for this year will hover around 90 rubles to the U.S. dollar.”
  • “The situation may worsen if sanctions on Russian oil begin to take effect.”

“What Russia Sanctions Failure Says About the Future. The U.S. risks being caught off-guard if it expects the ’90s to last forever,” Mark Episkopos, American Conservative, 04.16.24. 

• “How did Russia ... manage to defeat an economic blockade imposed by a coalition accounting for over one-third of the global economy? ... It is, in large part, a story of sophisticated Russian sanctions evasion and mitigation measures, including a wide array of parallel import schemes, a vast network of commercial proxies and cut-outs, alternative energy export pathways, and Russia’s success in offsetting Western pressure through deeper commercial ties with China, India, and other major players in the global south.”
• “The ... failure of Russia sanctions offers a glimpse of a future for which U.S. policy, stuck in a staid 1990s mentality even as the world quickly passes it by, is not prepared. Washington must finally wean itself off its worsening sanctions addiction and pursue a more nuanced, pragmatic framework for dealing with the rest of the world while it can still do so on its own terms.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "Tax the Oligarchs. Don't Just Seize Their Yachts," Lionel Laurent, Bloomberg, 04.17.24.
• “Russia’s Shadow Fleet Could Create Strange Allies. Both Greenpeace and NATO are working against off-book oil tankers,” Elisabeth Braw, FP, 04.22.24. 

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“From Beijing to Kyiv,” Henning Hoff, International Politk Quarterly 04.18.24. 

• “This week, [Olaf] Scholz set out to convince Xi to lean on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop his country’s murderous war against its neighbor. He said as much on X after his three-hour meeting with Xi. 'China’s word carries weight in Russia. That is why I have asked President Xi to use his influence so that Putin aborts his insane campaign, withdraws his troops, and ends this terrible war.' At least, China should take part in the peace conference Switzerland is hosting in June, another step in a process that started in Jeddah last summer—without Russia and with Chinese on-again, off-again 'participation.'”
• “This time round, however, there was no Xinhua news story that the chancellor could point to. Reportedly, Xi told Scholz that all concerned “should be at the table and none on the menu” when nations convened at the Ukraine peace summit near Lucerne on June 15-16. Since Russia has already rejected any participation, China will in all likelihood stay away, too.  Because in Xi’s analogy, the country that should 'not be on the menu' is clearly Russia. The 'four principles' Xi announced, while as opaque as the Chinese initiative of February 2023, have a clear slant. They include to 'refrain from seeking selfish gains,' 'not to add fuel to the fire,' 'refrain from further exacerbating tensions,' and 'reduce the negative impact on the world economy and refrain from undermining the stability of global industrial and supply chains.' None of those seems to be directed at Russia.”
• “So Scholz came back only with a terribly weak Chinese commitment to stay in touch on the subject in “an intense and positive way”—good enough for the chancellor to pin to his X profile. And Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Scholz for his efforts. Still, one keeps wondering how many “reality checks” German foreign policy requires.”
• “That Xi has no incentive to act as Scholz asked is blatantly clear. What’s more, in recent weeks there were growing signs that Beijing is stepping up its support for Moscow.”

“Trump’s ‘plan’ for Ukraine is even more preposterous than Nixon’s for Vietnam,” Max Boot, WP, 04.15.24.

• “When I read a recent news article by my Post colleagues headlined “Inside Donald Trump’s secret, long-shot plan to end the war in Ukraine,” my thoughts naturally turned to another…another Republican presidential candidate was widely reported to have a “secret plan” to end another war…Richard M. Nixon.”
  • “None of Nixon’s machinations produced what he promised: 'peace with honor.'”
• “If elected again, Trump claims he would end the war in 24 hours, but he has been cagey about how he would pull off this miraculous feat.”
  • “Trump regards himself as the world’s greatest dealmaker despite a long track record, going back at least to 1990 and his first casino bankruptcy, indicating the opposite.”
  • “As president, he was very good at abrogating treaties — including the Paris climate agreement and the Iran nuclear deal — but not very successful at negotiating new ones.”
  • “Of greatest relevance to the conflict in Ukraine was Trump’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate an end to the war in Afghanistan. His 2020 deal with the Taliban was as one-sided as Nixon’s Paris peace accords with the North Vietnamese.”
• “[Trump] seems to have fallen for Russian propaganda…suggesting that the war in Ukraine is a minor border dispute that can be easily resolved by handing over to Moscow the Russian-speaking regions.”
  • “Yet even sacrificing Crimea and Donbas would be extremely unlikely to satisfy [President Vladimir] Putin’s imperial ambitions. Even if Putin promises to respect Ukrainian sovereignty as part of a peace deal, there is no reason to accept his assurances at face value.”
• “Putin might eventually abandon his maximalist objectives if he were convinced that his military forces were headed toward defeat. But Ukraine’s [2023] counteroffensive failed, and Russia is now reportedly readying a major offensive that has the potential to break through Ukrainian lines.”

“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s interview with the radio stations Sputnik, Govorit Moskva, and Komsomolskaya Pravda,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 04.19.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “President of Russia Vladimir Putin is constantly reminding everyone that we always prefer talks to fights and wars. We already had some experience. After the Ukrainians realized that they had overdone it, while shelling Donbass and promoting direct genocide methods against the Russians on their own territory (as they had believed), they suggested launching talks two or three weeks after the special military operation began. We immediately agreed. There were several rounds of talks in Belarus and online. Later, we went to Istanbul where the Ukrainians laid their proposals on the table for the first time. We accepted them after a certain discussion. They included an obligation to abolish legislation discriminating against national minorities (primarily the Russian minority) and to stop supporting movements that glorified Nazism, relied on Nazi ideology and were outlawed by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.”
  • “As for the negotiations – we haven’t mentioned this yet, but I hope I won’t be criticized for it – what guarantees did that Istanbul document include? We were ready to provide extremely serious guarantees, as the Ukrainian delegation wanted. Is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty serious enough? We did not reproduce it verbatim, but agreed upon a formula that was close. What I am saying is, those were very serious security guarantees. However, the document specifically stated that those guarantees did not apply to Crimea or Donbass. This meant that they could not be touched, otherwise no guarantees would work.”
  • “In terms of Ukraine’s demilitarization, the document stated that there would be no military bases in Ukraine. As President Vladimir Putin said during the Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg in the summer of 2023, the Istanbul document outlined the limits of the relevant weapons, personnel, etc. It said that the armed forces of Ukraine would hold no maneuvers or military exercises involving third countries unless all guarantor countries, Russia and China included, agreed. We were ready to sign the treaty.”
  • “It also said that the negotiations on other issues would continue, but only after the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, provision of security guarantees, and abolition of Ukrainian laws of a racist, neo-Nazi, and discriminatory nature.”
  • “Istanbul is past history.  ....unlike the Istanbul story, we will not pause the hostilities for the period of negotiations. The process must go on. In addition, the realities on the ground have changed significantly. These realities must be taken into account. By realities on the ground, I mean not only the current dispositions or the line of contact, but also the amendments made to the Constitution with regard to these four new/old Russian regions, our ancestral regions. Everyone should realize this.”⁶
    • “Talks with Zelenskyy are pointless.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Five Futures of Russia. And How America Can Prepare for Whatever Comes Next,” Stephen Kotkin, FA, May/June 2024. 

"The Second Cold War Is Escalating Faster Than the First," Niall Ferguson, Bloomberg, 04.21.24.

• “We ... are witnessing the formation and consolidation of an Axis.”
• “To the likes of Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, and Levin’s former Fox News colleague Tucker Carlson, the war in Ukraine is just “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing,” as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain infamously said of Czechoslovakia in September 1938.”
• “They appear quite unembarrassed to serve as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “useful idiots,” in direct lineal succession to Hitler’s and Stalin’s apologists in the 1930s. And not only Putin’s. For, as State Department spokesman Matthew Miller pointed out last week, behind the Russian war effort stands the vast economic resources of the People’s Republic of China.”
• “By the same token, one cannot treat Iran’s war against Israel in isolation. Tehran supports Russia’s war against Ukraine, supplying thousands of drones and missiles similar to the ones unleashed against Israel last weekend. Russia, in turn, is likely helping to strengthen Iran’s air defenses. China is not only one of the main buyers of Iran’s oil; Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called Tehran immediately after the attack on Israel to praise rather than condemn his Iranian counterparts. Chinese propaganda has been consistently anti-Israel since Hamas’s murderous attacks of Oct. 7 last year.”
• “The emergence of this new Axis was foreseen by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, as long ago as 1997. In his book The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski wrote: 'Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia and perhaps Iran, an ‘antihegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.'”
• “So what are the biggest differences between Cold War I and Cold War II?”
  • “First, China is a much bigger economic contender than the Soviet Union ever was.”
  • “Second, the West is economically entangled with China, through a vast web of supply chains, in a way we never were with the USSR.”
  • “Third, we are much weaker in terms of manufacturing capacity.”
  • “Fourth, US fiscal policy is on a completely unsustainable path. To run a 7% deficit at a time of full employment is, to put it mildly, not what the macroeconomics textbooks recommend.”
  • “Fifth, our alliances may prove to be weaker than they were in Cold War I.”
    • “For all these reasons, we should not be overconfident about the outcome of Cold War II.”

“The Axis Off-Kilter: Why an Iran-Russia-China ‘Axis’ Is Shakier than Meets the Eye,” Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar and Jason Warner, War on the Rocks, 04.19.24.

• “The United States and its allies ... should refrain from fixating solely on this somewhat tenuous trilateral nexus. Instead, they should look at the broader trend toward multipolarity among countries committed to eschewing U.S. leadership. Regrettably, this trilateral engagement is but one symptom of a much larger problem.”
• “What would a more pronounced Iran-Russia-China axis look like? One potential indicator of deepening trilateral engagement would be the public acknowledgment and inclusion of Tehran’s ambitious proposals for more structured military cooperation in the official discourse of Moscow and Beijing. Iran’s quest for Shanghai Cooperation Organization membership is an instructive example: After over a decade of resistance, Beijing eventually came around to the idea following sustained advocacy from Moscow and Tehran. If Moscow were to take Iran’s side and advocate for formalized military engagement among all three nations, it would represent a significant step in this direction, as together, the two states may be able to soften China’s position. Should Beijing, likely the most resistant partner, indicate its interest in the idea, a formalized military alliance could be imminent. Until then, observers should realize that for now, the axis is indeed off-kilter.”

“Realist Internationalism and the Issue of Legitimacy.” Anatol Lieven, Telos, Spring 2024.

• “Liberal internationalist thinking in America is not “internationalist” in any real sense at all.”
  • “References to the United Nations by liberal internationalists have declined or become hostile. Too many liberal internationalists have abandoned belief in international law for the highly dubious concept of a 'rules-based order.'”
• “A fundamental element in any true internationalist project must be the full and not just formal recognition…of the legitimacy of other political systems. Legitimacy is the most important foundation of state strength and stability and its capacity for economic and social development.”
• “Authoritarian states may enjoy legitimacy in their own populations and deserve recognition of their legitimacy by the United States and the West. Liberal internationalists seek to deny this threat to the legitimacy of other systems by claiming that it applies not to states but only to particular regimes.”
  • “This, however, ignores two crucial factors. The first, once again, is the American geopolitical ambition to maintain its global primacy and weaken or destroy rivals.”
  • “The association with American power involves liberal internationalists in endless contradictions and hypocrisies when it comes to U.S. support for repressive allies.”
  • “On the other hand, not only rival regimes but the populations of rival states have good reason to believe that U.S. attempts to change their regimes are not intended to bring about democracy but to weaken or destroy the states themselves or reduce them to American vassals.”
• “In many cases, it is believed with good reason that the destruction of a given regime may lead to the disintegration of the state itself. In the Soviet Union, the collapse of Communist legitimacy led to the break-up of the union itself, and the legitimacy of the Putin regime rests partly on a longstanding popular belief that if it fell, it would take the Russian Federation with it.”
• “Today, all states are facing a radically new challenge in the form of climate change, and their future legitimacy will depend heavily…on their success in meeting this challenge.”
  • “We cannot possibly…say with any certainty that only democracies will succeed and survive.”
  • “To meet [this threat] …we need to move…to an approach that will be morally founded because committed to international peace and progress and common human efforts to overcome common human threats. This would correspond to the search for… [cosmopolitan ethic] rooted in morality…but recognizing both the realities and limitations imposed by the actual world.”

“Ukraine is the frontline of a much larger conflict,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 04.21.24. 

• “After many months of argument and hesitation, the House of Representatives has finally acted. The vote in Washington to provide $61bn in new military aid for Ukraine may be a turning point in the war with Russia. At the very least, it will keep Ukraine in the fight.”
• “The Russians will continue to hope that, if Donald Trump is elected president this November, this might be the last big package of American military aid. But even that might not be fatal to the Ukrainian cause. Europe’s military industries are belatedly cranking into action and will be in a better position to supply Ukraine in 2025.”
• “Collectively all of this money is intended to push back against four countries that General Chris Cavoli, the commander of US forces in Europe, describes as an “axis of adversaries”: Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.”
• “As these four autocracies pull closer together, so America’s democratic allies are also tightening their links.”
• “Of course, there remain important distinctions between these countries. Russia, Iran and North Korea are treated as pariah nations by the US and its allies. By contrast, China remains a major trading partner of all the countries of the “global west”. In Washington and Tokyo, however, the acting assumption is that, in the long run, Xi Jinping is just as determined as Vladimir Putin or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to overturn the current world order.”
• “The US and its allies believe therefore that they are playing defense by supporting countries that are in the line of fire of the axis of adversaries — above all, Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.”
• “America is playing a potentially deadly mind game with its adversaries, deploying military force selectively, in the hope of preventing the outbreak of a wider war. Ukraine is fighting for its own freedom and independence. But it is also the frontline in what is potentially a much larger conflict.”

“Washington Should Squeeze Europe Like It’s 1945,” Eoin Drea, FP, 04.17.24. 

• “Today, three overlapping events provide Washington with the opportunity to reshape Europe.”
  • “The first is the ongoing war in Ukraine. ....No matter who wins the U.S. presidential elections in November, the United States should use the threat of withdrawing from NATO—something that former U.S. President Donald Trump considered during his administration—to fundamentally reshape European attitudes to their own security and defense.....Washington should explicitly link the continuation of U.S. military supplies for Ukraine to increased spending by European NATO members, significant EU funding for the recently launched European Defense Industrial Strategy, and expedited Ukrainian membership in the EU.”
  • “The second window of opportunity for the United States to pressure Europe is energy policy. .... Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is one reason that Putin thought he had a free hand to invade Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022. Washington should press Europe—especially Germany—not to make that mistake again.”
  • “Finally, the Kremlin’s war and suspension of gas deliveries to Europe have conspired to unleash political and economic instability in Germany, the EU’s largest and most important economy. ... Therein lies the third opportunity and leverage point for the United States. Washington should step into the leadership void—not to lead Europe, but to help hammer out the next phase of the trans-Atlantic security relationship. Many EU member states—including most Nordic, Baltic, Central, and Eastern European states—would welcome direct pressure from Washington to condition trans-Atlantic security relations on clear European policy changes, most notably on a much more serious expansion of defense capabilities and meaningful energy independence from Russia.”
    • “That’s why Washington should squeeze Europe like it’s 1945—and why it would benefit both sides.”

“How to get more people into military uniforms,” The Economist, 04.18.24.

• “Mandatory military service is under discussion once more in Europe. The reasons? The possibility of Ukraine’s defeat looms large, as does the threat of a future president Donald Trump abandoning NATO. Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defense minister, says that Europe must be ready for war before the decade’s end. He describes dropping a one-year period of service for school-leavers in 2011 as 'a mistake.' Britain’s army chief, General Patrick Sanders, has called for a 'citizen army.'”
• “Citizens in most of the rest of the rich world do not yet feel an imminent threat.”
• “Because conscripting young people infringes harshly on their liberty, the policy would need public support. Even Ukraine, in existential peril, found lowering the call-up age from 27 to 25 this month politically tricky. Undoubtedly the difficulties faced by most of Europe’s armed forces in recruiting regular soldiers and building proficient reserves need redress. But they can mostly be resolved by means other than compulsion.”
  • “First, consider raising soldiers’ salaries.”
  • “Second, more civil-society support is needed to attract those with the specialist skills required in emergencies.”
• “To deter the most dangerous enemies, you must be ready for a war that you do not want to fight. Just ask the courageous Ukrainians.” 

“The shadow of war darkens on the global economy,” Martin Wolf, FT, 04.16.24. 

• “As Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, the IMF’s chief economist, explains in his introduction to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, the recent performance of the world economy has been notably better than feared, despite the shocks to output and inflation caused by the pandemic, Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the surge in commodity prices and sharp tightening in monetary policy.”
• “It is noteworthy that cumulative output growth in 2022 and 2023 exceeded the IMF’s October 2022 forecasts for the global economy and every significant grouping within it except, crucially, for low-income developing countries (LIDCs). The same was true for employment, except in the LIDCs, again, and China. The US economy has been particularly buoyant, though that of the eurozone very much less so.”
• “While the short-term performance of the world economy has been surprisingly good, the longer-term performance has been the opposite. Marked declines in growth of real GDP per head have occurred across the world since the early years of this century. The collapse in the growth of “total factor productivity” — the best measure of innovation — has been particularly significant. In the LIDCs, the growth of TFP even turned negative between 2020 and 2023.”
• “We may have managed shocks better than expected. But we are walking on eggshells and must tread carefully.”

“Russia Moves In on Northern Africa; The Kremlin fills the vacuum left by the French, and the U.S. may lose its antiterror base in Niger,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 04.19.24.

• “In the new era of great power competition, Africa is one place where the U.S. is losing. ... A hundred Russian military instructors arrived in the capital of Niamey last week, according to Radio Télévision du Niger. Last Saturday hundreds gathered in Niamey to protest the U.S. military presence, some of them reportedly waving Russian flags. France withdrew its troops from Niger last year, and last month the ruling junta that took over in a July coup cancelled the status of forces agreement with Washington.”
• “Niger has been a vital counterterrorism hub for the Sahel and Northern Africa, where al Qaeda and Islamic State are making gains. Niger has hosted the second-largest U.S. military presence on the continent after Djibouti. If the U.S. loses a base in the Sahel, it will "degrade our ability to do active watching and warning, including for homeland defense," Gen. Michael Langley, the head of U.S. Africa Command, recently warned.”
• “The U.S. has long neglected Africa, but the world's rogue regimes aren't making the same mistake. They're filling this vacuum, and trouble for U.S. interests will follow.”

“The US is crawling away from Ukraine,” Dmitry Trenin, RT, 04.18.24. Clues from Russian Views.(This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities and has engaged in propaganda.) 

• “From our point of view, genuine talks are ones that would solve the problem that led to the military operation. If we do not solve it, we will all face a new war in the future, and perhaps a more terrible one, with more serious consequences.”
• “The West, and they say this quite openly, is trying to prevent a victory for Moscow. And they are trying to do this in two ways. One is by pumping arms and money into Ukraine. And the other is diplomatic, by creating the appearance of some kind of negotiations. This is diplomatic propaganda.”
• “At the same time, the Americans are crawling away from the front line. They are still in charge but, as Obama used to say, they are now a 'backseat driver.'”
• “For us, partial victory will be equivalent to defeat. The West will be able to influence the situation in our country in every possible way if we fail to achieve the stated goals of military operation.”
• “We must make progress.  Real, serious successes on the battlefield, which I understand the Russian army is now carrying out.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “How Russia targeted France and radicalized Emmanuel Macron,” The Economist, 04.18.24.
• “The Baltic balancing act over the threat from Russia,” Richard Milne and Ben Hall, FT, 04.18.24.
• “If Ukraine falls, it'll be a catastrophic turning point in history - and an utter humiliation for the West ... Why the hell are we waiting to give this heroic nation the weapons it needs?” Boris Johnson, Daily Mail, 04.12.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia. Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations,” The Economist, 04.11.24. 

• “Four main factors will influence the course of the war.”
  • “The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary.”
  • “The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.”
  • “The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems.”
  • “The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long.”
    • “In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?”
• “The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr. Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. ... Political risk in Russia is very high. Mr. Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events. Adding to the risks confronting Mr. Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.”
• “The war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its 'brain-dead' state.”
• “The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. ... Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.”
• “Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the 'no limits' stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of 'non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties.' Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them.”
• “Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.”
• “In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.”

“The world in 2035: down the stairs leading up?” Zhao Huasheng and Andrey Kortunov, RIAC, 04.17.24. Clues from Russian and Chinese Views.

• “The collapse of the current world order is still in its initial stages.”
  • “So far, it has mainly affected a relatively narrow circle of bilateral and multilateral institutions and regimes in which Russia plays a particularly significant role - from the UN Security Council and the Russian-American strategic arms control regime to the Arctic Council and the OSCE, as well as global energy, raw materials and food markets.”
  • “However, what we see today may be just the tip of the iceberg since disintegration is increasingly affecting many other areas of world politics and economics, such as the WTO and WHO, mechanisms for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international anti-terrorism cooperation and various regional security and development institutions.”
• “We cannot analyze the ongoing global governance crisis without addressing fundamental changes within nation-states.”
  • “Nation-states (especially in the West) are increasingly governed by fragile and unstable political coalitions that are extremely vulnerable and sensitive to even minor fluctuations in public sentiment and preferences… leadership deficits are accumulating and reaching dangerous proportions.”
• “Likely, the world of 2035 will still show many features of the world of 2024 or even the world of 1945. The world of 2035 will be more fragmented than that of 2024, further complicating the task of equitably distributing global wealth and agreeing on a common strategy for developing humanity.”
  • “The existence of a single international order in 2035 will be somewhat symbolic, and the role of regional organizations and trans-regional mechanisms will become more substantive (focused on specific problems). The emphasis on building a world order will shift…to private situational projects with few interested participants.”
• “It is…critical that…responsible actors in global geopolitics and economics can manage the fragmentation that is occurring.
  • “First, there are general security threats (for example, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and high-tech crime).”
  • “Secondly, there are challenges associated with new sensitive technologies (AI, cyber and biotechnologies, Internet governance).”
  • “Third…climate change, biodiversity and environmental protection, resource management and the transition to sustainable development.”
• “We can assume that by this time, the conflict in Ukraine will, one way or another, end, and some kind of new agreement will be reached between Moscow and the “collective West.” Building new relations will be slow and gradual and will not lead to the restoration of the model of interaction that existed in the first two decades of this century.”
• “China and Russia, as representatives of the Global South or its partners, must work together to build a world order and a system of global governance.”
  • “Over the next decade, it is possible to form… regimes for combining the priorities of individual countries of the Global South…in which some security and development mechanisms will ensure others.”

“Mitter, Wishnick: Alignment, Not Alliance for Russia-China Relationship,” Conor Cunningham, RM, 04.18.24.

• "Is the Russia-China relationship truly an alliance? This pivotal question framed a recent seminar hosted by the Belfer Center and Russia Matters, entitled 'Russia-China: A Long-Term Alliance?' as part of the series 'Russia's Past, Present, and Future.' Moderated by Paula Dobriansky, a senior fellow with Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the seminar featured insights from Harvard’s S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations Rana Mitter and senior research scientist at the China and Indo-Pacific Studies Division at CNA, Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick.”
• “Both Wishnick and Mitter agreed that alignment defines the current Sino-Russian relationship, not alliance. Over the course of the ensuing discussion, the nuances of this alignment were explored in detail; Mitter and Wishnick delved into the essence of the Russia-China relationship, probing whether this partnership signifies a long-standing alliance, the potential role of China in a post-Putin Russia, the prospects for cooperation or discord and the broader implications of this relationship for the Indo-Pacific region.”

Missile defense:

“The Lessons of Israeli Missile Defense,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 04.15.24.

• “The performance of Israeli air defenses, combined with assistance from U.S. jets and interceptors, saved countless lives.”
  • “The U.S. needs to do more to deter and protect Americans from future assaults.”
  • “Democrats have resisted or under-financed missile defenses for decades on grounds that they’re too expensive and too easily defeated by new technology.”
• “Progressives oppose defenses because they think vulnerability somehow makes war less likely. On nuclear arms, the Union of Concerned Scientists and others prefer the doctrine of mutual-assured destruction to being able to shoot down enemy ICBMs.”
  • “Israel’s defenses proved how wrong this view is, displaying their practical and strategic value. The…success of air defenses is a tribute to Israeli strategy and decades of investment in defense technology.”
• “The U.S. helped to finance Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, which evolved into a co-production agreement that also covers gaps in U.S. missile defenses.”
  • “The West’s adversaries are adapting their methods and technology to defeat aerial defenses. One threat is overwhelming defenses with sheer numbers.”
  • “There is also the question of asymmetric cost. Drones are cheap to produce and easy to transport, but they can be expensive to shoot down.”
  • “The West will need to innovate to counter the problem of having to shoot down drones with interceptors that are a hundred times more expensive.”
• “Iran’s attack also puts into focus, or at least it should, the shortfall in U.S. interceptor production. The U.S. stockpile is thin. The U.S. military needs to field new technology rapidly while also shifting closer to a wartime footing to produce more current munitions.”

Nuclear arms:

“The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine,” Nicholas L. Miller, Proliferation Papers, No.67, IFRI, April 2024.

• “Four categories of factors have been identified that may trigger a nuclear proliferation escalation.”
  • “First, changes to the international security environment can lead to an increase in the proliferation pressure amid intensified security competition in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.”
  • “The second key issue is that, over the years, the US ability to enforce the non-proliferation regime has been declining.”
  • “A third factor that might increase the odds of proliferation involves the normative environment surrounding nuclear weapons and nonproliferation.”
  • “Finally, the war in Ukraine has the potential to increase proliferation risks, as it signals that nuclear powers can attack an adversary with conventional capabilities while backing its actions with nuclear threats to deter third-party intervention.”
• “Although there are many reasons to suspect that proliferation risks are growing, the proliferation environment is not as dire as it seems. Several of these factors are not new and have been effectively managed in the past without leading to widespread proliferation.”
  • “First, the concern about US reliability goes back to the beginning of the Cold War, and even if US allies did consider acquiring nuclear capabilities as a response, the American government generally effectively managed these concerns through a combination of coercion and reassurance.”
  • “In the same way, the failure of nuclear states to engage in a meaningful discussion on disarmament is not new, and qualitative and quantitative studies support the idea that US policies on arms control and disarmament were not a major factor in influencing whether key countries made commitments to the nonproliferation regime.”
  • “The US and international community have also been able to manage proliferation consequences from conventional wars backed by nuclear deterrence, as seen in the cases of Israel and Pakistan.”
  • “Other proliferation risk factors are more novel but are unlikely to be decisive in their impact. For example, the decline of the American nuclear industry is mitigated by the limited rebound in the US nuclear industry, the increase of overall stringency of global safeguards, and the ability of the US to use alternative sources of leverage that can compensate.”
• “The risk of proliferation in the coming decade is real but less acute and more manageable than many analysts have suggested. To limit proliferation pressures, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.”

“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s video address to participants in the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 04.22.24.Clues from Russian Views. 

• “Today, the United States and their NATO client states are still dreaming of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia and are ready to carry on with their policy of deterring our country “to the last Ukrainian.” At the same time, the West is balancing on the dangerous edge of a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers, which could have catastrophic consequences. We are especially concerned that the three Western nuclear powers are among the main sponsors of the criminal Kyiv regime and the main organizers of various provocations. This could create serious strategic risks and increase the level of nuclear threat.”
• “There is no basis whatsoever for an arms control and strategic stability dialogue with the United States in the face of a total hybrid war being waged against our country. This agenda cannot be artificially separated from the general international segment and be considered in isolation from other aspects of interstate relations, as Washington is seeking to present.  It will be possible to discuss these topics only after the US authorities renounce their openly hostile anti-Russian policy. Any hypothetical effort to reduce the conflict potential should be comprehensive in nature and based on removing what we regard as the central problem, to wit, NATO’s aggressive eastward expansion. We see no alternative to these fundamental approaches.”
• “Moves to undermine the existing arms control and non-proliferation system are affecting the stability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. ... That said, we remain a full-fledged party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.”
• “The attempts of the Western countries to tailor the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to their vested interests are a source of serious concern.”
• “Russia is firmly committed to its international legal obligations, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. ... Our priority is to elaborate an international legally binding instrument that would establish reliable guarantees to prevent the deployment of weapons in space and the use or threat of force as regards space facilities.”

Counterterrorism:

“An ISIS Terror Group Draws Half Its Recruits From Tiny Tajikistan,” Neil MacFarquhar and Eric Schmitt, NYT, 04.18.24. 

• “Tajik adherents of the Islamic State -- especially within its affiliate in Afghanistan known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (I.S.K.P.), or ISIS-K -- have taken increasingly high-profile roles in a string of recent terrorist attacks. Over the last year alone, Tajiks have been involved in assaults in Russia, Iran and Turkey, as well as foiled plots in Europe. ISIS-K is believed to have several thousand soldiers, with Tajiks constituting more than half, experts said.”
  • “'They have become key to I.S.K.P.'s externally focused campaign as it seeks to gain attention and more recruits,' said Edward Lemon, an international relations professor at Texas A&M University who specializes in Russia, Tajikistan and terrorism.”
• “Analysts say a kind of double whammy leaves Tajiks vulnerable to recruitment. An increasingly authoritarian former Soviet republic, Tajikistan ranks among the world's poorest countries, which fuels discontent and drives millions of migrant laborers to seek better lives abroad. In a country of 10 million people, a majority of working men, estimated at more than two million, seek employment abroad at any given time. And most migrants end up in Russia, where rampant discrimination, low wages, poor prospects and isolation make some susceptible to jihadist recruiters. Officially, about 1.3 million Tajik laborers are in Russia, although experts believe hundreds of thousands of others work there illegally.”
• “Recruitment of foot soldiers is focused online, where ISIS-K maintains an extensive media operation in Arabic, English, Russian and other languages. Russia is a frequent target. Many online testimonials from Tajiks imply that Muslim men who avoid fighting with ISIS are not really men.”
• “After the Tajik suspects in the concert hall attack appeared in a Russian courtroom bearing wounds from an apparent torture, one online poster said, ''Broadcasting videos of prisoners being tortured by you has increased the thirst of thousands of brothers for your blood.'' Another post showed what appeared to be a man in military fatigues staring at television screens that showed London, Paris, Rome and Madrid. ''After Moscow ... Who is the next?!'' the English text read.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“AI’s baptism by fire in Ukraine and Gaza offer wider lessons,” Callum Fraser, IISS, 04.17.24.

• “The current usage of AI brings both lessons and warnings for Western armed forces. Ukraine and Gaza validate the theory that AI synthesis and decision-making support can help generate more targets and a greater operational tempo. But it has also highlighted that AI is not a cure-all. Generating more targets drives up a requirement for humans in the loop to prosecute the greater volume, sapping resources.”
• “There are other key takeaways that hedge against the techno-optimism that characterizes the Western way of war. Despite the sophisticated use of AI, technological advantage rarely converts into an enduring battlefield advantage given the dialectal nature of warfare, with both sides adapting and counter-adapting in real-time. Ukraine has exemplified this with the employment of direct-attack munitions, efforts to defeat them, and their evolution to overcome those defenses, a testament to the Darwinian evolutionary dynamic in warfare. Additionally, despite the increasing employment of AI in both Gaza and Ukraine at the tactical and operational level, technology in isolation rarely leads to an enduring strategic advantage. Other factors, such as industrial capacity, alliances, organizational structure and leadership become increasingly significant at the strategic level of war.”
• “There are other issues to ponder. While the moral and legal implications of AI use have been debated for some time, and the extent to which humans should be ‘in the loop’ or ‘on the loop’, the current conflicts that include a reported 20 seconds-worth of human input in a strike brings this thought experiment into the cold light of reality.”
• “What is already clear is that while effective human–machine teaming will grow in importance, it is a mistake to believe that AI represents a strategic silver bullet to achieve victory.”

“The growing role of fighting robots on the ground in Ukraine,” The Economist, 04.19.24. 

• “So far, ground robots have featured little in the conflict. Is that about to change?”
• “Most UGVs [Military robots operated by remote control are known as Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs)] are expensive. The United Arab Emirates recently bought 60 such robots from Milrem Robotics, an Estonian firm, reportedly for more than €100m ($107m). The Russian military’s most advanced ground robot—Marker, a vehicle the size of an SUV that uses sophisticated artificial intelligence to operate autonomously—would be too costly to make in large numbers. In Ukraine both sides have used simpler models, mainly in support roles, such as transporting supplies, mine-laying and demining.”
• “But that is starting to change. In March Russia carried out an attack on a Ukrainian defensive position with what appeared to be three Couriers, small, tracked robots armed with automatic grenade-launchers. Recent videos show Ukrainian UGVs attacking bridges and positions in Russian-held territory, either by placing an explosive charge and withdrawing or in a kamikaze attack.”
• “Using commercial components makes production cheap: some of the Ukrainian machines cost as little as $900. That means they could be fielded in large numbers, much like the drones buzzing overhead. Ukraine hopes these UGVs will help it to counter the numerical superiority of Russian forces. And although Russia has a huge advantage in troop numbers, it too wants to limit its casualties. In a long war of attrition, substituting expendable fighting machines for irreplaceable humans could be a winning strategy.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Yulia Navalnaya: The 100 Most Influential People of 2024,” Kamala Harris, Time, 04.17.24.

• “This February, I spoke at the Munich Security Conference about the Biden-Harris Administration’s commitment to stand for democratic values and against authoritarianism. Moments later, in an unplanned appearance, Yulia Navalnaya took the stage. And she immediately captivated the hundreds of leaders there—myself included. Navalnaya addressed the news that had broken just hours before that her husband Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader, had died. With great courage, Navalnaya denounced the lies and cruelty of the Russian government. She wondered out loud if she should have remained in Munich after she heard the news. “What would Alexei have done in my place?” she asked. “He would be on this stage.” We met later that day and spoke about her children and how her family was contemplating the fate not just of her husband, but also of his cause. To the benefit of people around the world, Yulia Navalnaya has now assumed her own leadership role on the world stage. Navalnaya has vowed to continue her husband’s fight for justice and the rule of law, giving renewed hope to those working against corruption and for a free, democratic Russia. And in so doing, she demonstrates exceptional selflessness and strength. Since that day in Munich, Navalnaya has emerged not only as a symbol of democratic values, but as a courageous fighter for them. The United States stands with her—and all those fighting for freedom and democracy.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "Inside the fight for top Trump national security roles," Alexander Ward and Daniel Lippman, Politico, 04.22.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Personnel Stagnation to Splinter Putin Elite With Battle of Lost Generations,” Andrey Pertsev, CEIP, 04.19.24.

• “The Russian elite is both fearful and hopeful about the major personnel changes expected to follow March’s presidential election. The new configuration of power could cement the successes of the ambitious and largely effective bureaucrats in their sixties. But it’s also possible that President Vladimir Putin could replace these aging professionals with younger bureaucrats in their forties.”
• “There are three distinct generations within the ruling Russian elite.”
  • “First, there is a group of people around seventy years of age: these are primarily members of Putin’s inner circle who control key resources, hold high-status positions, and head the security services.”
  • “The second generational cohort comprises ambitious and often professional bureaucrats in their sixties.”
  • “The third and final generation is made up of politicians and officials in their forties, including some “princes” with benefactors in the oldest group and ambitious bureaucrats who currently hold secondary or tertiary roles, but are already making names for themselves and want to get further ahead.”
    • “The conflict over the clashing interests of these generations is becoming increasingly acute. The principle reason is Putin’s ultraconservative personnel and resource allocation policies of recent years.”
• “In theory, intra-elite competition benefits any political system by forcing its members to be as efficient as possible. Younger players gradually replace older figures, while motivated and professional middle-aged bureaucrats endeavor to keep their positions. However, in order to be beneficial, competition must be lasting, natural, and follow clear rules, which is not the case in Putin’s nontransparent and nepotistic Russia, where competitive processes could spin out of control when one generation loses or starts to fear that it is losing.”
• “Putin is more likely to promote those in their forties in order to rejuvenate the bureaucracy. After all, those in their sixties have been in power for too long and can envisage life without him. The problem is that Russia doesn’t have enough young administrators ready to replace those in their sixties.”
• “There is no easy solution for the Kremlin. The battle of the generations, which could jeopardize the stability of the system and prompt a split in the elite, was made inevitable by Putin himself through his ultraconservative personnel policy of the past decade, and by his refusal to leave his position—putting his own interests above those of his regime.”

“Putin’s New Social Justice, Andrei Kolesnikov, CEIP, 04.17.24. 

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin is creating his own model of a just society and efficient economy. It marries political mobilization and emotional demobilization, alternates between talk of war and peace, and offers massive assistance to those working 'for victory.'”
• “To borrow terms coined by the German-American philosopher Herbert Marcuse, Putin is at once engaged in the construction of a warfare state and a welfare state. His promise to Russians is that for the next six years, the beneficiaries of his regime’s largesse will be those parts of society directly linked to the war in Ukraine. Those opposed to the war are to be cut out of the social contract, as are top taxpayers, who are set to pay even more under the new model.”
• “This new concept of fairness is extremely uneven. The move to replace Russia’s current flat tax with a progressive rate, as announced by Putin in a recent address, destroys the stability and predictability of Russia’s tax system. It does, however, make clear the president’s priorities—and not the economic kind.”
• “Politically, Putin is concerned with the loyalty of specific segments of the population: those reliant on the state, those fighting in the war, those involved in the manufacture of what are euphemistically referred to as 'finished metal goods,' and those prepared to take advantage of state incentives for having more children—to create more soldiers and state-dependent citizens.”
• “The problem is, buying the loyalty of millions is not cheap. All this largesse will be paid for by productive workers and top taxpayers—the remnants of the middle class—while those who “work” to “defeat” the West and crush civil society reap the rewards.”
• “That Putin has set about forming this new “fairness” speaks to how long the war is expected to go on for. ... It could even be described as something of a national idea.”
• “Most taxpayers ... have no choice but to allow the government to spend their taxes on the war and those parts of society involved in it. While such a model cannot last, Putin can rest assured that as he commences his fifth term as president, he will face minimal discontent.”

“Russia’s surging budget revenues,” Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 04.19.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Russian budget revenues were up by more than 50% in the first quarter of this year compared to 2023. In March, the state budget even recorded an overall surplus of 867 billion rubles ($9.3 billion).”
• “Why are revenues increasing? Both of the main components of Russia’s budget — energy and non-energy revenues — are up impressively so far this year. ... The increase in oil and gas revenues is linked to three main factors:
  • “High oil prices. Since January, benchmark Brent crude oil has traded above $80 per barrel, with the price clearing $90 in April.”
  • “New tax calculations. Russia’s oil taxes no longer depend on export volumes, which allows the government to rake in higher revenues even as it abides by OPEC+ agreements.”
  • “Windfall taxes. Oil companies paid more in quarterly additional income tax and one-off MET payments increased to compensate the government for unsuccessful subsidies paid out to oil companies. Those payments were valued at 190 billion rubles ($2 billion).”
• “Key business sentiment indicators, such as the central bank’s business climate indicator and optimism in industry, are running high. The manufacturing purchasers’ managers index (PMI), a key reading of business confidence, has reached its highest level in almost 18 years. ... The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised its forecast for Russia’s economic growth to 3.2% in 2024 — ahead of predictions from Russia’s own economy ministry (2.3%) and the central bank (1-2%).”
• “Russia’s government finances look to be in a comfortable position. If the current dynamics continue, then the finance ministry will be able to fund its planned spending and stay within its target deficit parameters.”
• “The big external risk is a possible tightening of oil sanctions, which could lead to a fall in export revenues. For now there seems little likelihood of this. But for Russia’s economy, an excess of money could be an even greater problem than a shortfall. As budget revenues rise, there will be an irresistible urge to spend more. One key unknown in the government’s spending plans is the situation at the front and Moscow’s future military plans, which could require higher outlays.”

“Where have the current account surpluses gone? Russia’s accumulation of foreign assets since the invasion of Ukraine,” Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Alexander Conner, Brookings, 04.19.24.

• “According to the Central Bank of Russia, the country’s net financial claims on other economies rose from close to $500 billion in 2021 to over $850 billion at the end of 2023.”
• “The main reason for the increase in Russia’s external creditor position during 2022-23 was its large current account surpluses. The surplus in 2022 exceeded $230 billion (10.6% of GDP), buoyed by high prices for its oil and gas exports and by the increased purchases of oil and gas by European countries to bolster stocks ahead of a planned sharp reduction in purchases of Russian gas (by two-thirds in one year).”
• “Russia has accumulated substantial external assets since its invasion of Ukraine, in the form of commercial credits as well as loans and bank deposits. However, it is difficult to establish where these assets are held as well as their nature. Claims vis-à-vis the main advanced economies have been scaled back—excluding the frozen foreign exchange reserves. The evidence suggests that Russia has accumulated increased claims on emerging economies, with an increased share of claims denominated in currencies other than those of the main advanced economies. These claims are likely to be less liquid than deposits in the main international banks (absent sanctions), but a more comprehensive assessment is difficult, since data on the relative size and location of such claims remains elusive.”

“At Home and Abroad, Intimidation is Now Official Russian Policy,” Thomas Kent, NI, 04.18.24. 

• “The Kremlin seems to be spending less time justifying itself and more openly intimidating its opponents at home and abroad. As French analyst Nicolas Tenzer has put it, 'The crime is the message.'”
• “Even for non-political Russians, violence seems to be increasingly normalized. Official media deluge citizens with hate speech about Ukrainians and the West. At the same time, citizens are given constant reasons to ignore the devastation their country is wreaking on Ukraine. Such bifurcated messages can serve to justify violent acts while at the same time dulling empathy for their victims.”
• “The hate content on Russian television and the violence permitted by security forces is a choice by the nation’s leadership. Putin, or his successor, will have to judge whether continued hate speech and repression are essential to prevent challenges to the regime or whether Russia would, in fact, be more stable with more freedom and less violence.”

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“Brave New Ukraine. How the World’s Most Besieged Democracy Is Adjusting to Permanent War,” Nataliya Gumenyuk, FA, 04.19.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Missiles rain down, tulips bloom, Ukraine soldiers on,” Anna Husarska, WP, 04.20.24.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.

Footnotes

1. In addition to Burns, Johnson’s own informal advisor and former CIA director Mike Pompeo “impressed upon him the urgent need to approve assistance for Ukraine,” according to CNN.
2. Machine-translated from Ukrainian.
3. U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairperson Sen. Mark Warner reported on April 21 that U.S. provisions of military aid to Ukraine, including long-range ATACMS missiles, will be in transit to Ukraine “by the end of the week” if the Senate passes the supplemental appropriations bill on April 23 and U.S. President Joe Biden signs it by April 24. (ISW, 04.21.24)
4. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.).
5. Representative Michael McCaul of Texas, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
6. In the interview, Lavrov also signaled Russia’s intent to seize the city of Kharkiv in a future significant Russian offensive operation, the first senior Kremlin official to outright identify the city as a possible Russian operational objective following recent Ukrainian warnings that Russian forces may attempt to seize the city starting in Summer 2024. Lavrov stated that Kharkiv “plays an important role” in Putin’s idea of establishing a demilitarized “sanitary zone” in Ukraine to protect Russian border settlements from Ukrainian strikes. (ISW, 04.19.24)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by the Office of Congressman Mike Johnson available in the public domain.