Russia Analytical Report, April 10-17, 2017

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

  • No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“The Russian and Iranian Ties That the US Can’t Seem to Break,” Ishaan Tharoor, The Washington Post, 04.11.17: The author, a foreign affairs reporter, writes that the Trump administration’s plans to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran by improving U.S.-Russia relations was out of reach. The plan never came to fruition due to unfavorable “conditions on the ground” as well as a lack of “diplomatic savvy” in the Washington. Following the U.S. missile strike on a Syrian airbase, the joint command center coordinating Iranian and Russian forces in Syria said that the U.S. “had crossed its own ‘red line.’” While Russia and Iran are not “natural allies,” they need one another in Syria.  

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

  • No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“If Trump Really Wants to Improve Relations With Russia, He Should Persuade NATO to Stop Expanding,” Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Brookings Institution, 04.14.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that the U.S. is “an out-of-control hyper-power that must be opposed” in the eyes of Russian President Vladimir Putin. While this is a “warped” view, “it appears to be sincere.” The author advises U.S. President Donald Trump to attempt to deescalate tensions through an agreement between Russia, NATO and Europe’s neutral countries. NATO would pledge to stop expansion and Russia would “leave the neutral countries alone,” including withdrawal of Russian military, acquiescence to those countries joining the economic and diplomatic groups of their choice and a stop to arming separatists. Following this, the U.S. would lift its sanctions against Russia. However, “Putin continues to make diplomacy difficult.” Tensions are rising in Syria and the investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. election is causing more members of the Trump administration to adopt “anti-Russia rhetoric.” This makes conflict in Europe increasingly possible. To avoid this, there needs to be “an alternative” to NATO expansion.

“Only Thing Different About NATO Is President's Opinion of It,” Peter Baker, New York Times, 04.14.17: The author, chief White House correspondent for The New York Times, writes that during U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign, Trump notably characterized NATO as an obsolete organization, “a musty relic of old thinking.” Less than 100 days into his presidency, Trump has made an about face and taken credit “for transforming [NATO] into a modern, cost-sharing, terrorism-fighting pillar of American and European security.” The author notes that any changes that NATO has undergone in the last three months were in the works for some time before Trump took office. “After weeks of being lobbied, cajoled and educated by the leaders of Britain and Germany, not to mention ‘my generals,’ as he likes to call his national security team, Mr. Trump has found fresh virtue in a venerable organization.”

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“The US-Russia Nuclear Arms Race Is Over, and Russia Has Won,” Scott Ritter, Newsweek, 04.12.17: The author, a former Marine intelligence officer, writes that Russia’s test of “Object 4202” in October 2016 has “fundamentally changed the landscape of arms control.” “Object 4202” is a hypersonic warhead “capable of evading any anti-missile system the United States has today, or may develop and deploy for decades to come.” It will be carried on a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the RS-28. While an RS-28 armed with “Object 4202” hypersonic warheads would take 12 minutes or less to reach the United States from a silo in central Russia. Due to become operational in 2018, the RS-28 gives Russia “the ability to annihilate the United States in retaliation for any American first strike, while providing Russia a silo-killing first-strike capability of its own.” The author notes that Russia’s “hypersonic, missile silo-killing weapon” undermines the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s “thin justification for a new land-based ICBM.” All of Russia’s missile systems are capable of defeating American ones, both existing and in production. Russia is also set to finish its anti-missile shield, which “will seal off its air space … negating in totality America’s nuclear triad.” The author advises U.S. President Donald Trump to accept the disarmament agenda proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “and expand it to include a new ABM treaty and a new disarmament treaty.”

Counter-terrorism:

  • No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“No Plan? No Strategy? No Problem! Syria and Why Trump’s Russia Policy Is Off to a Rough Start,” Michael Kofman, War on the Rocks, 04.11.17: The author, an analyst at CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, writes that Washington’s leverage over Moscow remains lacking. While the U.S. was hoping its cruise missile attack on a Syrian airbase would give Washington a position of strength, it does not seem to be the case. “Russia, Syria and Iran hold almost all the cards in that conflict while the United States has had no discernible strategy since its inception.” The author notes that Russian leadership is also furious at the Assad regime for using chemical weapons, as it is a sign that its “control over local actors in Syria remains elusive” and Russian hopes for rapprochement with the U.S. have also been threatened. Russia will also likely retaliate for the U.S. strike elsewhere, perhaps in Ukraine, Libya or another domain, such as cyber. Attempts to uncover Russian complicity in Syria failed for the previous U.S. administration and are unlikely to be more productive now. “In a contest of wills, Trump needs a plan to establish coercive credibility rather than hoping to scare the Russians with expensive fireworks. The number one mistake previous administrations made with Moscow is that, rather than deal with the Russia that is, they all imagined a Russia that suited them more, and then tried to have relations with that imaginary country.” The Kremlin, however, holds out hope that better U.S.-Russia relations are possible. If maintained, this perception could provide “an opportunity to obtain concessions.”

Cyber security:

  • No significant commentary.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

  • No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

  • No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Tillerson in Moscow: A Welcome Return to Reality,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russia Matters, 04.13.17: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Moscow was a first step “for setting U.S.-Russia relations back on course.” Tillerson provided “some needed clarity” on how Russia’s policies, including its involvement in Syria and interference in the 2016 U.S. election, “create difficulties for those in the U.S. establishment promoting engagement with Russia.” Tillerson also clarified that the U.S. administration is “not on the verge of directly intervening in Syria for the purpose of regime change.” While some commentators have criticized the meeting’s lack of substantive agreements, the author notes that creating working groups and establishing clear lines of communication is a vital step. A face-to-face meeting between Putin and Trump will not be a productive event until both sides are “working off the same set of assumptions and understandings.” Tillerson did not “magically” resolve the problems between the two countries in one visit, but he “has committed to seeing through a substantive dialogue” that could root U.S.-Russia relations “in a firm foundation” for the first time in a long time.

“Rex Tillerson's Visit to Moscow. A Glass Half Full,” Kimberly Marten, Foreign Affairs, 04.14.17.

“5 Conservative Principles for Dealing With Russia,” William Tobey, Foreign Policy, 04.12.17: The author, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, lays out several principles for managing the U.S.-Russia relationship. While the two countries’ political values are often “deeply incompatible,” they do on occasion align. “We should cooperate where we can, even as we compete where we must.” Vital national security interests of both the U.S. and Russia need to also be taken into account. This includes America’s need to defend its allies around the world and not pursuing Russia’s vital interests that are peripheral to the U.S. However, “this does not mean simply acceding to Moscow’s use of force.” Through “prudent analysis and careful diplomacy,” the U.S. and Russia and avoid the greatest risk of confrontation—“misjudging where each other’s vital interests lie.” The author also notes that Putin’s Russia will not last forever. “The country is capable of democracy.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Putin's Self-Serving Israel Agenda/ Why Russia Now Recognizes West Jerusalem as the Capital,” Anna Borshchevskaya, Foreign Affairs, 04.13.17

China:

“China and Russia: Friends With Strategic Benefits,” Alexander Gabuev, The Interpreter/Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.07.17: The author, a researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Sino-Russian relations, while not a new axis of authoritarian regimes, do harm the Western-led world order. Official figures state that China has invested $14.2 billion in Russia since 1991, but a more realistic figure taken by polling Chinese companies puts that number at $40 billion of investment. Trust between Beijing and Moscow is growing. After sanctions were imposed on Russia in 2014, it sold China Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 missile defense systems. Russia’s aid in building China’s military capabilities is “more important in practical terms and more detrimental to Western interests than any grand rhetoric coming out of officials’ mouths. While neither China nor Russia have “alternative proposals to current norms,” their similarly authoritarian systems and their places in the international order “make them natural partners” in stymying it.

Ukraine:

“Richard Haass Explains Why We Should Care About Ukraine,” Richard Haass, USA Today, 04.13.17: The author, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that there are many reasons why Americans should care about Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine violates the idea that borders between countries are barriers not to be changed via military force. Allowing Russia to believe that it can use force—military, cyber or other—to “make Russia great again” will continue this troubling trend. Ukraine was once also a vital part of the Soviet Union’s nuclear power. Ukraine gave up its nuclear program and was assured by the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994 that it would remain safe. “The assurance has shown to be empty.” The U.S. spends far less on defense now than it did during the Cold War, and as global events continually illustrate, “what comes from or happens out there will quickly come here.” “Ignoring what goes on in Ukraine or elsewhere in the world will not make us smarter, healthier or richer—but it will make us less safe.”

“What Ukraine’s Jews Fear,” Eduard Dolinsky, New York Times, 04.11.17: The author, director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, writes that anti-Semitism is not absent from Ukraine today. At Babi Yar, a mass grave of Holocaust victims, an exhibit honoring Ivan Rohach omits that he was the editor of a radical nationalist newspaper and a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N), “whose members were actively involved in the Holocaust in Ukraine.” Despite their anti-Semitic ideology and participation in the Holocaust, “the O.U.N. and its military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or U.P.A., are now being glorified as freedom fighters” for waging a guerrilla war against the Soviets in the 1950s. “As the historical revisionism has ramped up, so has the desecration of Ukraine’s Holocaust sites and memorials.” From vandalized memorials to “a torch-lit march through central Kiev in honor of the O.U.N. leader Stepan Bandera … with cries of ‘Jews out,’” anti-Semitism is on the rise in Ukraine. The author stresses the need for Western leaders to highlight that glorifying “organizations like O.U.N.-U.P.A. remains incompatible with Western values.”

“Ukraine Should Prioritize Domestic Governance While Building Trust at Home and Credibility Abroad,” Balazs Jarabik and Bogdan Belei, The Moscow Times, 04.13.17: The authors, a nonresident scholar and a junior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, write that Ukraine’s tempestuous domestic politics impact the flare-ups in the continued, “not actually frozen,” conflict with Russia. While Western powers want Kiev to adhere to Minsk II, the Ukrainian public supports resisting Russian aggression. “Adding to the mess, some key members of the Ukrainian elite have manipulated the war with Russia to advance their political and business interests.” Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s opponents also want to weaken his authority, which the recent economic blockade of Donbass and “attacks on Russian-controlled banks in Kiev” have allowed for. Blaming Russia for all of Ukraine’s ills has been an effective tactic for mustering Western support, but it could backfire on Poroshenko. “Ukraine’s best tool to defend itself against Russia is to deliver on the tough reforms, which Poroshenko embraced when he first took power almost three years ago.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

  • No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russian Corruption Is Among the World's Worst—And It's Here to Stay,” Boris Grozovsky, The Moscow Times, 04.14.17: The author, a columnist at Russia’s Vedomosti weekly, writes that corruption can be found at every level of the Russian government, with Russian officials favoring certain businesses and firms in a variety of ways. “This distorts the business environment,” making fair play impossible, as each segment of the market has its own “‘winners’ that always come out on top thanks to their official ties.” Reforms, therefore, are only possible so long as they do not harm “the interests of officials who are on the take.” The author notes that Russia’s “neopatrimonial system”—granting favor and benefits to those with ties to power—is one of the worst and most pervasive in the world. “The country’s officials involve their relatives, college chums, school classmates and friends in their corrupt dealings. With no seeming end to the flourishing micro-empires built under the auspices of state officials, the country’s economic prospects look bleak.”

Defense and aerospace:

  • No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary.