6 Things to Know

1. On July 3, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump discussed Ukraine in a one-hour phone call, with the Kremlin indicating that little progress was made in the U.S. president’s efforts to bring an end to the war, Bloomberg reported. “Donald Trump once again raised the question of an early cessation of hostilities,” while Putin said Russia “will not back down” from its war aims, according to Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov’s account of the conversation. Putin told Trump that Moscow will continue to “search for a political negotiated resolution of the conflict,” but underscored that “Russia will pursue its stated goals, namely the elimination of the well-known root causes that have led to the current state of affairs and the present sharp confrontation.” The two leaders also discussed the Middle East, including Syria and Iran, with Putin stressing the need to stick to diplomatic methods of resolving conflicts in the region, according to Ushakov. Putin and Trump also discussed potential bilateral space and energy projects, but there was no discussion of a meeting between the two leaders, Ushakov told reporters. The Putin-Trump conversation, as described by Ushakov—with the White House version yet to be released as of Thursday afternoon—reaffirms that prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict remain dim, as do the prospects for significant improvement in U.S.-Russian relations in general. Trump is unlikely to accommodate Putin’s proposals for not just stabilizing the bilateral relationship, but also expanding it, for as long as Russia rejects his calls for an unconditional and full ceasefire in Ukraine. In his turn, Putin remains reluctant to heed Trump’s calls for a full ceasefire until what Russian leaders describe as the “root causes” of the conflict (e.g., NATO’s non-expansion into Ukraine) are addressed.*
2. The Trump administration has reportedly ordered a halt to the delivery of certain munitions to Ukraine, including some 30 interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems, which can shoot down ballistic missiles. Deliveries of several thousand 155-millimeter artillery shells have also been suspended, along with deliveries of 100 Hellfire missiles, over 250 GMLRS rockets, several dozen Stinger surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles for F-16’s. The deliveries now on hold were all allocated under the Biden administration, and Donald Trump has not approved new military aid packages for Ukraine, according to The New York Times. Some of the Ukraine-bound shipments were reportedly already in Poland when they the hold took effect. “The Pentagon presents the interruption as a limited and temporary action, but Ukrainian officials suspect a more concerted effort by the Trump administration to squeeze political concessions out of Ukraine,” according to the Economist. Following the halt, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha called the U.S. embassy’s deputy chief of mission in Ukraine, John Ginkel, to urgently discuss military assistance, which Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Trump are also likely to talk about in a call on July 4, according to Financial Times and Bloomberg. If Russia continues to launch ballistic missiles into Ukraine at the same recent monthly level as in say, May 2025 (44, according to a CSIS estimate reported by RM), and if Ukraine tries to intercept them all, then the 30 Patriot interceptors would last less than a month.¹
3. Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones, according to ISW and Bloomberg. The Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles; five Kalibr cruise missiles; and three S-300 air defense missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 221 drones, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles, and that 225 drones and one Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missile were "lost in location" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Thus, Ukrainian forces shot down just one of the seven Iskander-M/KN-23, and it did not shoot down any of the four Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, according to ISW.
4. In the week preceding July 1, Russian forces gained 72 square miles of Ukrainian territory (nearly one Martha’s Vineyard island)—doubling the rate of advance from the previous week’s 36 square miles, according to the July 2, 2025 issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In the past month (June 3–July 1, 2025), Russia gained 234 square miles of Ukrainian territory (area about the equivalent of the U.S. territory of Guam). That monthly total represents a modest increase from the previous month’s (May 27–June 24, 2025) total of 216 square miles, according to the card.
5. Ukraine’s front lines increasingly rely on older men, many nicknamed “Did” (Grandpa), according to The Wall Street Journal. Ukraine’s shrinking youth population means the “most common age group” in Ukrainian units is 40 to 45, according to WSJ. Yet Kyiv resists lowering the draft age, which currently ranges from 25 and 60, despite U.S. pressure, this newspaper reports.
6. The share of Russians who believe use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the course of its “conflict’ with Ukraine could be justified declined from 39% in November 2024 to 24% in June 2025, according to Russia’s Levada Center. The same period saw the share of Russians who believe such use cannot be justified grow from 45% to 65%, which constitutes a 44% increase, according to this pollster. The same period also saw the share of Russians who believe the “situation in Ukraine can escalate into an armed conflict of Russia with NATO countries” remain unchanged at 56%. That the share of Levada’s respondents who believe the use of nuclear weapons by their country against Ukraine cannot be justified has exceeded 50% (again) indicates that not only do many Russians remain wary of a radical escalation, but that they also see no need for such an escalation, given the incremental gains that Russia’s conventional forces continue to make in Ukraine.  

6 Ideas to Explore

1. “As the war grinds on ..., it's worth questioning the conventional wisdom that neither side can win on the battlefield. Which is to say, Ukraine can lose,” Lee Hockstader writes in his July 4 column in The Washington Post. Hockstader argues that “the chances of that outcome have risen considerably in recent days” due, in part, to the Trump administration’s decision to suspend delivery of certain arms to Ukraine, including interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems. “One has to wonder how many more such blows [like halting U.S. arms supplies] Ukraine—badly outmanned, struggling with personnel shortages and lacking Russia’s strategic depth—can withstand,” he warns.
2. “Russia now controls more than two-thirds of Donetsk. But to seize the rest of the region, it must take urban centers still under Ukraine’s control and vital to its army logistics,” Constant Méheut, Olha Konovalova and David Guttenfelder write in The New York Times. Russian strikes around this region’s city of Kostiantynivka, which is a primary target for Russian forces, have already become so constant that “Ukrainian troops avoid leaving their underground shelters altogether,” the three authors report. Still, the battle for this city could “take months to play out,” they predict.
3. “If you want to defend the U.S., you have to make sure that three things are secure. You need a secure Arctic … You need a secure Atlantic … And you need a secure Europe, because Russia’s here, and Russia is reconstituting itself at an incredible pace—not to attack Norway, but to attack ultimately the U.S.,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte claimed in an interview with The New York Times. It is difficult to see how Russia would initiate an attack on the U.S., given that both possess enormous nuclear arsenals.
4. China does not want to see a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fears the United States would then shift its whole focus to China, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, according to South China Morning Post.
5. Ukraine’s political infighting has escalated, with Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov charged with corruption, a cabinet reshuffle imminent and a failed (for now) attempt to oust military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, according to the Economist. Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s powerful chief of staff, is seen as driving these moves, though Zelenskyy retains final authority, according to this U.K. media outlet. According to the Economist, an opaque co-dependency has emerged between Zelenskyy and Yermak as Ukraine navigates war and internal power struggles. Referring to these circumstances, one Ukrainian official told the Economist: “The Russians are slow-roasting us over a low flame while we are playing at idiotism with very serious consequences.”
6. Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 27 gigawatts (GW) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW to the combination of Russia’s occupation and strikes,  Romina Bandura and Alexander Romanishyn write in a report for CSIS. The two authors argue that a strategy of survival through energy decentralization should be adopted to mitigate these losses, warning that the “next two years are critical for Ukraine’s energy security.”

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

July 8 update: Russian territorial gains in Ukraine over the last week slowed to 18 square miles—Russia’s lowest weekly rate since the week of April 22–29, 2025, when it gained 14 square miles. The past week saw Russia set at least two records in the number of drones and missiles launched in single barrages (550 on July 4 and 741 on July 9) despite Trump expressing dismay with Putin for “killing too many people” and threatening the Russian leader (again) with more sanctions.

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control (figures as of July 8, 2025)