I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“A Strategy for (Modestly Increasing the Chance of) Saving the INF Treaty,” James M. Acton, Russia Matters, 05.11.17: The author, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes that the INF Treaty is not likely to be salvaged, an undesirable outcome for the U.S. The Treaty currently prohibits development, testing or possession of ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles that would pose a threat to European and East Asian U.S. allies. With the banned missiles, Russia could easily undermine the current U.S. strategy to defend NATO’s eastern members. The author argues that Washington needs a strategy to “change Moscow’s cost-benefit calculation” of consequences for violating the Treaty. For this, there are options, including investing in cruise missile defense or deploying offensive weapons to impose costs on Russia. Costs could also be imposed via diplomatic or economic means. However, Russia must also believe that compliance with the INF Treaty would alleviate the pain of these costs, otherwise Moscow would not have the necessary incentive “to return to compliance.” If the U.S. were to develop or deploy weapons prohibited by the INF Treaty, such efforts would be undermined. Washington should also “present Moscow with a solution that allows Russia to save face.” Moscow has accused Washington of treaty violation as well, and one of the three charges “cannot be easily dismissed.” As such, “Washington should offer Moscow a deal:” Russia will be allowed to inspect ground-based missile defense launchers in Europe and the United States will be allowed to inspect Russia’s banned missiles to ensure treaty compliance.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Trump Should Be Wary of Putin’s Syria Plan,” Stephen Sestanovich, New York Times, 05.12.17: The author, the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to revive American influence in the Middle East “is floundering.” Rather than calling the shots, Washington is “following in Moscow’s wake.” The current proposal for de-escalation in Syria, struck by Russia, Iran and Turkey, would ensure the very outcomes Washington wants to avoid: a stronger regional role for Iran and the consolidation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The U.S. strike on a Syrian airbase had little effect on the ground, and Trump’s impatience to prove the that it was effective has given Russian President Vladimir Putin leverage. In addition, Trump appears more concerned with “personal atmospherics” than with the concerns of U.S. allies. The author also argues that Trump needs to understand the cost of not articulating clear policies. From Ukraine, to arms control, to NATO, Washington needs to convince Putin that there is no better option than the one proposed by the U.S. “Sooner or later, Mr. Trump will see that better Russian-American relations depend more on effective diplomacy than on imagined personal rapport.” The author argues that Trump would “be better off without” Putin’s plan for Syria.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“These Two Former Intelligence Chiefs Differ Sharply on Russia and Trump,” Paul J. Saunders, The National Interest, 05.15.17: The author, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, writes that the accounts given by James Clapper and Robert Gates of Russian interference in the 2016 election and its aftermath are “dramatically different.” Clapper has declared the American institutions “under assault” by Moscow from without and by U.S. President Donald Trump from within via his attempts to undermine “checks and balances.” Clapper attempted to distance himself from previous statements saying he was unaware “of any evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russian officials” and of the FBI’s counterintelligence investigation until March 2017. The author argues that these remarks are important, as Clapper does not appear to have a strong grasp of the Constitution’s “checks and balances.” Additionally, his comments indicate that Clapper, who was Obama’s top intelligence leader, “is manifestly opposed to Trump,” raising questions regarding “the Obama administration’s whole approach to intelligence assessments and investigations surrounding Russia’s election interference.” The author also asks how Clapper could have been unaware of the FBI’s counterintelligence investigation. Gates, on the other hand, “put Russia’s election interference into historical context.” Gates noted that for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the U.S. appears to have been against his 2012 reelection and behind the color revolutions in the post-Soviet neighborhood. Putin’s responses, argued Gates, were “very KGB,” with the goal of undermining the legitimacy of Western elections. Gates was also skeptical regarding the possibility of former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn being blackmailed by Russia. In addition, Gates “implicitly supported Trump’s firing of Comey while criticizing its execution.” The author argues that America’s institutions would benefit from the “dispassionate approach” of Gates as opposed to “Clapper’s chest-thumping.”

“As Trump Embraces Controversy, the Stakes Get Higher; Firing of FBI Chief Comey Threatens to Weigh on the President's Broader Agenda,” Gerald F. Seib, Wall Street Journal, 05.15.17: The author, the Washington bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal, writes that the firing of FBI director James Comey does not appear to have had much of an impact outside Washington. According to a survey, party affiliation appears to be shaping opinions, with Democrats disapproving and Republicans supporting the move. U.S. President Donald Trump’s 39% approval rating is also unchanged following Comey’s firing. However, the survey shows a bipartisan desire for “some kind of independent commission or a special prosecutor” to resolve the question of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. While Comey’s firing could “come back to haunt” Trump, Trump’s operating style does not appear likely to change, as “controversy is a sign he is shaking things up, just as promised.”

“The Comey Debacle Only Magnifies the Russia Mystery,” David Ignatius, New York Times, 05.10.17: The author, a foreign-affairs columnist for the Washington Post, writes that by firing James Comey, U.S. President Donald Trump has only intensified the focus on the question of Russian influence. The White House’s reasons for firing Comey are no more plausible than the assertions about Michael Flynn’s firing earlier this year. The author argues that this latest move only “heightens the mystery” behind Trump’s slow reaction following “warnings about Flynn’s involvement with Russia.” A possible explanation is that Trump already knew about both Flynn’s talk with the Russian ambassador and Flynn’s misrepresentation of the call to Mike Pence. “Trump may have done nothing improper involving Russia, but why does he act so defensive?” The author also notes the building congressional pressure for an independent counsel, “which is the most sensible way to restore a measure of public confidence after this debacle.”

“Putin’s Hackers Are Coming After Everyone,” Joe Queenan, Wall Street Journal, 05.11.17: The author, a journalist and humorist, writes that Russian hackers are clearly behind everything. Whether it's a bad cheesecake recipe or incorrect instructions for inflating a bike tire, faulty information on the internet is all the work of Russian hackers. “Incorrect specs. Phony statistics. Airport delays. Three-hour waits for tech support that is then provided by state-sponsored morons based in Vladivostok.” All are thanks to Russian hackers, who have moved beyond simply discrediting Western democracy and are seeking to bring the West to its knees by wrecking chaos in the lives of ordinary citizens.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“New Allies for a New World,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 05.14.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, writes that the reign of Atlantic nations is drawing to a close and East Asian nations are returning to “the position of dominance they once enjoyed.” The author argues that China will achieve with diplomacy and economic power what the U.S. has failed to do through guns and bombs. While the emerging world “may offer less personal freedom,” it will have more peace. The U.S. will need allies in this world, and gun-shy Europeans make an unfavorable a strategic partner. As such, the U.S. is ultimately “likely to settle on Russia.” A world of three great powers is one where “numbers two and three instinctively unite against number one.” As such, a future partnership between the U.S. and Russian against “the specter of Chinese power” is possible. U.S. actions such as demonizing Russia run the risk of pushing Russia and China together, creating “scary new security problems” for the U.S. The idea that all countries are equally independent will fade, and the sovereignty of small countries will depend on whether or not their governments are able to resist foreign power. “American-style democracy” will also give way to “the undemocratic but relentlessly meritocratic system that gives China its future-oriented leadership.” The author argues that “history ordains” America’s decline. “We, however, set the pace.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Sorry, but Putin's Still Winning ; He Has No Reason to Stop Creating Turmoil Around the World,” Christian Caryl, The Washington Post, 05.12.17: The author, a journalist widely published in international politics and foreign affairs, writes that the “collective sigh of relief” following the election of Emmanuel Macron to France’s presidency is not necessarily the defeat for Putin that it is made out to be. Putin’s strategy is “first and foremost” creating the perception that Moscow is a force to be reckoned with. While a Le Pen victory would have been a bonus for Putin, “pro-Russian sentiment and populist rage remain potent in France.” In the rest of the world, populism is continuing to grow while “European leaders in Brussels continue to wallow in complacency.” In the U.S., Russian diplomats recently received a warm welcome in the midst of fresh political turmoil following FBI Director James Comey’s firing. While Western sanctions remain a dampener for Russia, Europe is looking increasingly likely to let sanctions “peter out” this year. The U.S. is also conspicuously absent from the peace deal being set up for Syria. The author argues that “American negligence and European dithering” is providing Putin with new avenues of creating trouble.

China:

“A Sino-Russian Military-Political Alliance Would Be Bad News for America,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 05.12.17: The author, director of Russia Matters and assistant director of the Belfer Center's U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, writes that Russian support for China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative is indicative of a greater desire for closer ties between the two countries. Strained ties between Russia and the West could mean that a stronger relationship between Moscow and Beijing could eventually lead to an official military-political alliance. This would not be in America’s interest. OBOR would compete with and could undermine Russian integration initiatives in the post-Soviet neighborhood. Even so, Moscow has possibly realized that it needs China and “cannot afford to antagonize Beijing over a project so dear to the hearts of the Chinese leadership.” Influential Russian policy-shapers have begun to openly entertain the idea of a Sino-Russian military-political alliance, and their Chinese counterparts have welcomed the idea. Along with the Ukraine crisis, several factors support these closer ties: trade, interest in preventing the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia, preserving their rights as veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council and shared grievances with the West. Russia also sees China as a rising power while the West declines. Factors that could hinder this alliance include “Russian reservations about demographic, economic and conventional military disparities,” but these concern will become less important as “a state of Cold War with the West” drags on. This alliance would be bad for the U.S., and Washington could try to mitigate things by playing “Moscow and Beijing off one another, but such a strategy might backfire.” Normalizing relations with Russia in the short term would be beneficial. A constructive relationship in the “American-Sino-Russian triangle … would help China and America to escape what Harvard professor Graham Allison has described as Thucydides’s trap: When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, the most likely outcome is war.”

“China Seeks to Ease Belt and Road Strategy Concerns,” Charles Clover and Sherry Fei Ju, Financial Times, 05.15.17: The authors, reporters for Financial Times based in Beijing, write that Chinese President Xi Jinping is seeking to sooth worries that China’s Belt and Road project will undermine the regional integration initiatives of other countries. Xi called for an end to “beggar thy neighbor practices” and announced the new China-Russia Regional Cooperation Development Investment Fund. The fund is likely an attempt to ease Moscow’s concern that the Belt and Road initiative will undermine the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russian President Vladimir Putin said he favors merging Belt and Road with other regional institutions, like the EEU. While Beijing opposes such a merge, Xi said that Beijing would work with the existing regional institutions.

Ukraine:

“Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, Jenny Oberholtzer, RAND Corporation, May 2017: This RAND Corporation report discusses Russia’s annexation of Crimea. While clumsy political maneuvering suggests that Moscow did not have a political outcome in mind before the move, Russia did deploy its army with speed and mobility. Moscow’s biggest success was capitalizing on Ukrainian missteps and weakness. As the operation used “only a small, distinctly capable slice of the Russian force,” it is difficult to make assessments regarding the whole of the Russian army from this move. While some of the political, military and geographical conditions that were present in Ukraine are present in other former Soviet republics, they are not all present. As such, do all of these factors need to be present for Russia to achieve a similar outcome? Moscow has not sought to replicate its “Crimean approach to Eastern Ukraine,” limiting its objectives to instability. The report calls the Russian effort in Eastern Ukraine an “ineffectually implemented—and perhaps ill conceived” attempt to “gain leverage over the central government and the country’s long-term strategic orientation.” While Russia’s operation in Crimea was effective, its efforts in Eastern Ukraine have been less so. Spreading instability in other states of the post-Soviet neighborhood would require “an adapted version” of Russia’s approach in Ukraine. The situation in Ukraine has also sparked neighboring states to make preparations that would make similar Russian operations more difficult.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russian Terrorism Now Comes in Green!” Oleg Kashin, New York Times, 05.10.17: The author, a Russian political journalist, writes that “zelyonka,” a common antiseptic, has been used as a political weapon since the spring of 2014. It has become a favorite for use against critics of the Kremlin. While these attackers are not government agents, they are nonetheless never arrested. In March, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was splashed with zelyonka, an event he turned into a joke. In April, a similar attack left Navalny in danger of losing the vision in one eye. A radio host recently wrote that the attacks are terrorism sheltered by the state. The author finds it “hard to disagree.” While the Kremlin has promised to put a stop to the attacks, the author doubts this will happen, noting Putin’s fear of revolution. Today, Russia’s “riskiest radicalism” comes from Kremlin supporters, not the opposition.

“Kadyrov's Campaign of Anti-Gay Violence. The Chechen Dictator's Latest Wave of Persecution,” Layla Taimienova, Foreign Affairs, 05.10.17: The author, a human rights activist in Chechnya writing under a pseudonym, discusses the recent persecution of gay men in the Chechen Republic. At least three men have died and over a hundred “have been abducted, tortured and detained.” The author writes that this is only “the latest iteration of perpetual violence” that has occurred under the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Chechen citizens do not have Russian constitutional protection, and the Kremlin provides Kadyrov with financial and political support in return for maintaining stability. The author writes that this stability comes at a high cost for its citizens, an issue the international community can now no longer ignore. The author urges Western governments to continue their censure and to put pressure on the Russian government to investigate these abuses.

Defense and aerospace:

“Moscow Conference on International Security 2017: Cooperation Lost in Translation,” Michael Kofman and Dmitry Gorenburg, The National Interest, 05.09.17: The authors, research scientists at CNA Corporation, write that Russia’s annual Moscow Conference on International Security (MCIS) was again an interesting event. Attendees included “Russia’s national-security aristocracy.” The Russian leadership signaled a desire to work with the U.S., but in a “take-it-or-leave-it” manner. This possible cooperation focused on battling ISIS, but came with “reproaches on violating countries’ sovereignty.” Sergei Shoigu presented a plan for solving the crisis in Syria and offered to share Russian “experience in fighting terrorists with air strikes.” Shoigu also criticized NATO’s role in Europe. Valery Gerasimov’s presentation featured “the most concrete language” accusing the West of an information-warfare campaign against Russia. In a panel on information security, Russian Gen. Igor Dylevksy “asserted that NATO had codified an approach to information warfare at the 2016 Warsaw Summit” and raised the problems and blurred lines presented by cyberspace. Another strong theme throughout the conference was missile defense. A new feature was “the incorporation of China into the Russian model of how U.S. missile defenses will be capable of intercepting all ballistic missiles launched at Western countries, regardless of country of origin.” The Chinese echoed Russia’s “arguments about how American missile-defense plans exceed the requirements to counter North Korea’s missile program, and are actually aimed at degrading Chinese and Russian strategic capabilities.” While the conference tried to provide some positive insights, solutions to established bilateral problems were not on offer.   

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.