Please note there will be no Russia Analytical Report on May 29 due to the Memorial Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump’s NATO Article 5 Problem,” Thomas Wright, Brookings Institution, 05.17.17: The author, the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump’s policy shift on NATO is not as significant as it may seem. While Trump has recently said that NATO is no longer obsolete, that statement only addressed two of the three reasons he originally gave for calling the alliance obsolete. Since taking office, Trump has claimed credit for other NATO countries shouldering a greater financial burden and for beginning to focus on counterterrorism. He has not, however, addressed the third reason: “NATO’s original mission of countering Russian power in Europe.” Trump has not said that this mission is no longer obsolete, nor has he even acknowledged it. The author stresses the need for Trump to explicitly support Article 5, like all U.S. presidents before him since NATO’s founding. Trump “needs to state his support for NATO’s original mission and America’s solemn commitments if the alliance is to be as effective in the future as it has been in the past.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“Inside Russia’s Social Media War on America,” Massimo Calabresi, Time, 05.18.17: The author, who covers politics for TIME, writes that Russia has moved beyond the email hacks of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In March 2017, U.S. counterintelligence learned that Russia had sent over 10,000 “expertly tailored” malware-carrying messages to Twitter users in the U.S. Defense Department. The messages, based on the users’ interests, carried links that, when clicked, allowed Russian hackers to take control of that user’s electronic device and Twitter account. The danger posed by Moscow-wielded Twitter accounts that speak with the authority of the U.S. armed forces lies in the ability to create chaos and confusion through sending out false information, “perhaps during a natural disaster or a terrorist attack.” It’s hard to see if Russian attempts to influence Americans’ behavior have been successful; however, one Russian soldier “successfully infiltrated a U.S. social media group by pretending to be a 42-year-old American housewife,” participating in online political debates “with specially tailored messages.” The U.S. learned of Russia’s plans through a Russian military intelligence officer who bragged to a colleague that they were going to create chaos in the U.S. election “to pay Clinton back” for the influence operation Russian President Vladimir Putin believed she ran against him when she was Secretary of State. The engineer who created the algorithms for the Russian social media campaigns worked in the U.S. for 10 years with social media researchers. Some “are skeptical of such a conspiracy,” having found algorithms that microtarget voters to be “ineffective political influencers.” As emotionally targeted messages move from being crafted by humans to being fully automated, the author posits that telling the truth may be a good place to start countering Russia’s “firehose of falsehoods.”

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“Democrats Are Falling for Fake News About Russia. Why Liberal Conspiracy Theories Are Flourishing in the Age of Trump,” Zack Beauchamp, Vox, 05.19.17: The author, a senior reporter for Vox, writes that the “fake news bubble for liberals,” which he calls “the Russiasphere,” is growing. It is the “mirror image” of the right-wing’s Breitbart and InfoWars, focusing almost exclusively “on real and imagined connections between Trump and Russia.” It exists mostly found on Twitter and is headed by former right-wing British parliamentarian Louise Mensch, “NSA spook” John Schindler and Washington, DC photographer Claude Taylor. The three figures have various claims to credibility and around 200,000 followers each. These followers widely spread unfounded rumors, reports and stories. Some websites are also part of the Russiasphere, including Palmer Report, which had more traffic to its website last month than GQ magazine’s website. The author notes that some of these “unfounded left-wing claims … are already seeping into the mainstream discourse,” just like their right-wing counterparts. The Russiasphere is not dominated by a unifying theory, but rather by “a general sense that Russian influence in the United States is pervasive and undercovered by the mainstream media.” On Twitter, Mensch, Schindler and Taylor “form a kind of self-reinforcing information circle, retweeting and validating one another’s work.” The author notes that experts on the formation of political beliefs are disturbed by what is happening in the Russiasphere and how mainstream publications and figures are beginning to validate its claims.

“Your Cheat Sheet Into All the Investigations Into Russia and Trump,” Amber Phillips, The Washington Post, 05.17.17: The author, a reporter for the paper, provides a breakdown of the various investigations currently taking place regarding U.S. President Donald Trump and his campaign’s possible connections to Russia.

• As of May 17, a special counsel on Russia headed by Robert Mueller has been created. The benefits of a special counsel include its independence and the power to prosecute if any wrongdoing is discovered. However, it can become “a political spectacle in its own right—or uncover unexpected things.”
• An FBI investigation was taking place until Trump fired its director, James Comey. Now, the fate of the FBI investigation is unclear. Benefits include: Lawyers, not Congress, conduct this investigation, and Attorney General Jeff Sessions has recused himself from any Russia related investigations. The drawbacks to the FBI investigation are that it is unclear who Trump will choose to replace Comey.
• Multiple congressional committees are also conducting investigations, include the House and Senate intelligence committees. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee have both asked the FBI for Comey’s memos. The benefit of congressional committees is that a variety of committees with unique perspectives can launch investigations; however, as “Congress is an inherently political body,” the investigations are not free of political leaning. Additionally, the American public is likely to be skeptical of any finding from Congress.
• A special, Russia-only congressional committee is not currently investigating the issue. However, following Comey’s firing, some members of Congress are demanding a Russia-only congressional committee. This kind of committee could be seen as less partisan and would be focused on only this one issue. However, this kind of investigation can take years and is “not immune to partisanship.”
• An independent commission on Russia, like the one set up after Sept. 11, 2001, is not happening. This type of investigation would be “independent and outside the confines of Congress,” but it does not have the power to prosecute.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Russian Views of the International Order,” Andrew Radin, Clinton Bruce Reach, RAND Corporation, May 2017: The authors, researchers at the RAND Corporation, write that Russia has five core interests. These include: “defense of the country and the regime, influence in the near abroad, a vision of Russia as a great power, noninterference in domestic affairs and political and economic cooperation as an equal to other great powers.” Russia has grown increasingly suspicious of the West following the failure of closer ties after the Cold War. Russia views Western support of color revolutions as a threat to Russian security, and believes the West has “refused to recognize Russia’s basic interests.” Russia is interested in preserving international order that it believes benefits Russian interests, such as the U.N., but actively seeks to undermine international order it finds threatening. The authors highlight the status of former Soviet Republics Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as the “most fundamental point of contestation between the United States and Russia.” Where the U.S. sees these countries as free and sovereign, Russia views them as “part of its exclusive sphere of influence.” This contrast “could lead to contestation or even conflict.” The authors recommend cooperation in areas of shared interest and note that the U.S. approach to Russia depends on two factors: whether or not former Soviet republics should be free to join Western institutions and whether or not Russia would scale back aggression in Europe if its interests are recognized. U.S. policy will likely consist of “both recognizing Russian interests and strengthening the existing international order in Europe.”

“Trump Has Given Putin the Best Gift He Could Ask for,” Michael McFaul, Washington Post, 05.17.17: The author, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump has given Russian President Vladimir Putin an invaluable gift: “the denigration of American democracy.” Putin has long since argued that there is nothing particularly admirable about the U.S. government and its democracy, an argument that has now become more difficult to refute. The author argues that by firing FBI Director James Comey, “the most senior government official responsible for investigating the Trump campaign’s possible ties to Russia,” Trump violated the spirit of the U.S. Constitution. Trump’s “fake media” accusations are also music to the ears of Russian state-controlled media. Trump also harmfully “asserted that ‘our country does plenty of killing’ when asked about Putin’s actions.” While the author believes that American democratic institutions will outlive Trump, the idea that American democracy is nothing special “will linger.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

“As China Rises, Russia Tries to Make the Best of a Tough Situation,” Jeanne L. Wilson, Russia Matters, 05.19.17: The author, a professor at Wheaton College, writes that Putin’s “measured praise” of China’s One Belt, One Road project is a reflection of “Russia’s need to make the best of a bad situation.” Hurt by economic sanctions and a tense relationship with the West, Russia has increasingly turned to China. However, Moscow is also aware that the success of China’s OBOR project will also further highlight the economic disparity between the two states, where Russia is clearly weaker. The project steps on the toes of Russia’s area of “privileged interest” in Central Asia, and hurts Russia’s own integration plan, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). However, Russia quickly saw that supporting OBOR could bring greater benefits than opposing it, but so far, Russian hopes for Chinese financing of infrastructure projects “have been tempered by the realization that Chinese investors are oriented less toward friendship than profit.” China’s increasing influence in Central Asia remains unchanged, even with Moscow’s attempts to alter “the narrative about Central Asia, posing a division of labor in which the Kremlin provides security guarantees, while China provides capital.” The relationship between China and Russia has clearly grown closer in recent years, seen in rhetoric, symbolic action and in Russia’s giving China more investment opportunities, as well as the close relationship between Putin and Xi. While Russia has accepted the OBOR, the U.S. has “largely refrained from direct engagement.” Trump’s initial anti-China stance has given China opportunity for “greater clout on the international stage.” Putin must “negotiate a role for Russia” in the changing geopolitical landscape, which is made more difficult by China’s presence as a contiguous neighbor with overlapping regional ambitions.

“Putin-Xi Embrace Masks Misgivings on Belt and Road Project,” Kathrin Hille and Charles Clover, Financial Times, 05.14.17: The authors, reporters for Financial Times, write that warm rhetoric about Chinese-Russian partnership does not extend to the reality of China’s One Belt, One Road project. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke in Beijing about the OBOR’s parallels to the Russian integration project, the Eurasian Economic Union. However, China appears to be “encroaching on a traditional Russian sphere of influence,” and Russia has also yet to receive any substantial benefit from the OBOR. The authors note that the Kremlin is also aware of Russian and Chinese overlapping ambitions for the post-Soviet space. According to one Russian government official, the Chinese need to consider Russian interests and “make some compromises if they want us to get anywhere.”

“How Putin Plans to Cash In on the One Belt One Road Initiative,” Vita Spivak, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 05.16.17: The author, the Russia in Asia-Pacific Program Coordinator for the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Beijing for the inaugural Belt Road Forum was seen as “yet another important step of Sino-Russian strategic friendship.” During the forum, the China-Russia Regional Cooperation Development Investment Fund was established; however, Russia still has work to do. China and Russia in 2015 signed an agreement allowing talks on a free trade zone between the Eurasian Economic Union and China, lasting from 10 to 20 years. However, Chinese investors are becoming increasingly choosy about which projects they finance, and Russia’s China-watchers are increasingly skeptical on the economic benefits of the OBOR project.

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Burden of Predictability: Russia’s 2018 Presidential Election,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.18.17: The author, a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that while Russians are looking towards the March 2018 presidential elections with mixed emotions, the outcome is a foregone conclusion. Vladimir Putin will serve another six-year term until 2024, and the Kremlin is “quietly working hard to ensure a smooth continuation of power.” Putin’s inner circle has recently changed from “cronies” to “technocrats and security service veterans” who neither speak to him as a peer nor “disagree with his judgements.” Putin has also had the country’s elites scale back their obvious displays of wealth in order to not “irritate the general public” in a time of economic hardship. While some hope for “reforms within a framework of authoritarian modernization,” the author notes that Russia’s particular brand of authoritarianism does not leave room for modernization. The Kremlin also needs to ensure a high voter turnout in March 2018 and a landslide victory for Putin. Opposition leader Alexey Navalny will thus be prevented from taking part in the election. Putin’s regime also seeks “popular legitimacy.” Putin is not only a man, but also a brand, one associated with Russia and the seizure of Crimea. Approving of Putin’s performance “is intuitively understood” to be approving “of Mother Russia herself.” The author notes that the current regime is resistant to change, but that systems that do not “progress almost inevitably begins to rot despite attempts to keep all change on ice.” However, that very “balancing act” carries the risks of “sudden and instantaneous collapse.”

“Russia's Age-Old Identity Question,” Michael Khodarkovsky, New York Times, 05.18.17: The author, a professor of history at Loyola University Chicago, writes that Russia is on the verge of a demographic crisis. With widely varying birthrates dependent on ethnicity and religion, Russia could become a majority-Muslim country. This has led to attempts to increase Russia’s Slavic population, an action that does not provide an answer to Russia’s identity question. “Where does the Russian empire end and the Russian nation begin? On a global scale, what is Russia's relationship to the West? These have always been the principal questions in Russia's perennial search for its national identity, and still there is no clear answer in sight.” The difficulty of creating a “civic nation” in Russia stems from its vast size and diversity. The Kremlin has sought to restore Russia’s imperial identity in recent years, but the projects have been ill-fated. Recent demonstrations, a continuing truckers strike and a more skeptical younger generation may all indicate, the author argues, that “Putinism, as a political system, may be headed for a crisis—one in which Russia could ultimately go the way of the Soviet Union.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.